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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines backsourcing of corporate IS activities, and why IS 
outsourcing clients decide to backsource. Information Systems (IS) backsourcing is a 
business practice in which a company takes back in-house assets, activities, and skills 
that are part of its IS operations and were previously outsourced to one or more outside 
information service suppliers. Focusing on economic, strategic and relationship motives, 
a number of theoretical backsourcing factors is derived from transaction cost theory, 
agency theory, core competency perspective, IOR theory and marketing channels 
literature.  The economic lens considers asset specificity of outsourcing activities, and 
cost benefits and switching costs of backsourcing. The strategic lens examines the change 
in the role of IS, loss of control over IS direction, and internal and external structural 
changes in the organization. The relationship lens examines goal conflict between the 
client and the provider, service quality and client satisfaction with an outsourcing 
arrangement, the client’s trust in the provider and voice behavior of the client.  
To identify factors salient in IS backsourcing and to examine the process of 
backsourcing this dissertation employs exploratory case study methodology. Six 
outsourcing contracts within three client companies are analyzed. The evidence is 
collected using semi-structured interviews, archival records and company documents. 
Results of individual cases are reported and then triangulated to single out the primary 
backsourcing antecedents. Qualitative comparative analysis is employed to augment the 
findings.  
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The findings indicate that power of decision makers and other organizations, 
change in the role of IS, cost benefit of backsourcing, service quality of the outsourcing 
arrangement, loss of control over the outsourcing arrangement and changes in the 
management impact backsourcing decisions. While service quality and cost 
considerations are important deliverables in the outsourcing contract, these factors by 
itself do not justify the decision to backsource. Strategic considerations, a change in the 
role of IS and a loss of control, dominate the backsourcing decision even if costs or 
service quality suggest otherwise. The dissertation also highlights the role of authority of 
company executives in the backsourcing decision. The executives exert power through 
their structural position within an organization and have a major impact on decisions. 
Executives’ beliefs, prior experience and values impact their perception of backsourcing 
and play a role in backsourcing decisions. Additionally, the dissertation uncovers the 
importance of power of other organizations involved in the interorganizational 
relationships with the client company.  These organizations use political maneuvering to 
impose their goals on the client organization. Understanding the underlying reasons for 
backsourcing provides managers with better decision tools when reviewing the 
outsourcing contract as termination nears or as major environmental changes occur.  
  
 iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This dissertation was a long endeavor that would not have been possible without 
many people who supported me throughout the process. Most of all, I would like to thank 
my dissertation advisor and the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Carol S. 
Saunders. She spent numerous hours reviewing this manuscript and guided it from the 
point of inception as a course paper to its current state as a finished dissertation. Her 
constructive feedback helped me develop my ideas and make the writing more 
compelling.  
I am indebted to the dissertation committee members, Drs. Craig Van Slyke, 
Mihir Parikh, Stephen A. Sivo and Bruce Kavan, who offered their invaluable expertise 
and advice on multiple revisions of this dissertation. I would like to also thank MIS 
Department at UCF, and especially Drs. Paul Cheney and James F. Courtney, who 
introduced me to the MIS Ph.D. program and served as my mentors during five years 
here.  
My educational journey to the United States would not have been possible 
without the support and encouragement from Drs. Elmar Fetscher, Richard Crepeau, and 
Jean C. Kijek. With their assistance I was able to continue my education at UCF and 
realize my potential. I am forever grateful to them for this opportunity and their 
friendship. 
Certainly, the doctoral program would not have been the same without my Ph.D. 
cohorts Wafa Elgarah, Virginia Ilie, JT Shim, Qing Chang and Las Adams. Our 
 v
friendships and laughter kept my sanity during the program and our informal discussions 
of each other’s research contributed to the improvement of my dissertation.  
My dissertation research heavily relied on interview data and I am thankful to all 
anonymous informants who found time to speak with me about backsourcing. The 
revealing accounts of backsourcing would not have been possible without the 
contributions from every one of them.  
Finally, I would like to thank my mother Tatjana and father Grigory who 
supported me throughout the many years of my education. My family and friends around 
the world encouraged me as I progressed on my dissertation.  Last but not least, I am very 
grateful to my wonderful husband Frank. His dedication, discipline and patience during 
the last stages of this dissertation helped me bring this project to the end. I am thrilled 
about our newest addition to the family, who is inspiring me from the inside.  
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xvii 
LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................................... xviii 
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1 
Backsourcing Phenomenon............................................................................................. 1 
Examples of IS Backsourcing......................................................................................... 2 
Problem Statement .......................................................................................................... 8 
Research Questions......................................................................................................... 9 
Importance of Research ................................................................................................ 10 
Scope of Research......................................................................................................... 11 
Organization of Dissertation ......................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................... 13 
IS Backsourcing vs. IS Outsourcing ............................................................................. 13 
Backsourcing Antecedents: Theoretical Background................................................... 21 
Transaction Cost Theory........................................................................................... 22 
Agency Theory.......................................................................................................... 24 
Core Competence Perspective .................................................................................. 25 
Interorganizational Relationships Theory................................................................. 28 
Marketing Channels Relationship............................................................................. 30 
Theoretical Framework................................................................................................. 32 
CHAPTER THREE. THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS OF BACKSOURCING......... 37 
Research Framework .................................................................................................... 37 
 vii
Economic Considerations ............................................................................................. 40 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement .................................................. 40 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ................................................................................... 41 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ............................................................................. 43 
Strategic Considerations ............................................................................................... 44 
Redefinition of the Role of IS................................................................................... 44 
Internal and External Structural Changes ................................................................. 46 
Loss of Control over IS............................................................................................. 47 
Relationship Considerations ......................................................................................... 48 
Goal Conflict............................................................................................................. 49 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .................................................... 51 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship........................................................ 52 
Trust in the Provider ................................................................................................. 53 
Client’s Voice Behavior............................................................................................ 55 
Triangulation of Factors................................................................................................ 57 
CHAPTER FOUR. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...................................................... 59 
Case Study Approach.................................................................................................... 59 
Unit of Analysis ............................................................................................................ 61 
Selection of Cases ......................................................................................................... 62 
Company One - Alpha .............................................................................................. 64 
Company Two - Beta ................................................................................................ 65 
Company Three - Gamma......................................................................................... 66 
Data Sources ................................................................................................................. 66 
 viii
Interviews...................................................................................................................... 69 
Development of the Interview Protocol.................................................................... 71 
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 74 
Development of Case Descriptions........................................................................... 74 
Data Coding .............................................................................................................. 76 
Interrater Reliability.................................................................................................. 78 
Synthesis of Results Within Cases............................................................................ 80 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ............................................................................ 82 
Triangulation of the Results.......................................................................................... 83 
Ensuring Quality of Research ....................................................................................... 84 
CHAPTER FIVE. CASE SITE DESCRIPTIONS............................................................ 86 
Developing Case Descriptions...................................................................................... 86 
Company One - Alpha .................................................................................................. 86 
Sources of Evidence.................................................................................................. 87 
Company History ...................................................................................................... 88 
IS Activities .............................................................................................................. 91 
Outsourcing Agreements .......................................................................................... 97 
Contract One - Kappa ........................................................................................... 97 
Contract Two- Iota................................................................................................ 99 
Contract Three - Sigma....................................................................................... 101 
Contract Four – Tau............................................................................................ 103 
Backsourcing........................................................................................................... 105 
Contract One- Kappa .......................................................................................... 105 
 ix
Contract Two- Iota.............................................................................................. 106 
Contract Three - Sigma....................................................................................... 108 
Contract Four – Tau............................................................................................ 109 
Company Two - Beta .................................................................................................. 111 
Sources of Evidence................................................................................................ 111 
Company History .................................................................................................... 113 
IS Activities ............................................................................................................ 115 
Outsourcing Agreement .......................................................................................... 116 
Backsourcing........................................................................................................... 120 
Company Three – Gamma.......................................................................................... 123 
Sources of Evidence................................................................................................ 123 
Company History .................................................................................................... 124 
IS Activities ............................................................................................................ 126 
Outsourcing Agreement .......................................................................................... 128 
Backsourcing........................................................................................................... 131 
CHAPTER SIX. BACKSOURCING ANTECEDENTS: CASE RESULTS................. 133 
Company One – Alpha................................................................................................ 133 
Contract One - Kappa ............................................................................................. 133 
Economic Considerations ................................................................................... 134 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ......................................................................... 134 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement ........................................ 135 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ................................................................... 135 
Strategic Considerations ..................................................................................... 137 
 x
Internal Structural Changes............................................................................. 137 
Redefinition of the Role of IS......................................................................... 138 
Loss of Control over IS................................................................................... 140 
Relationship Considerations ............................................................................... 141 
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement ................................................ 141 
Trust in the Provider ....................................................................................... 143 
Goal Conflict................................................................................................... 144 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.............................................. 145 
Voice Behavior ............................................................................................... 145 
Emerging Themes ............................................................................................... 149 
Power .............................................................................................................. 149 
Integration of Perspectives.................................................................................. 149 
Contract Two – Iota ................................................................................................ 153 
Economic Considerations ................................................................................... 153 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement ........................................ 153 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ......................................................................... 154 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ................................................................... 156 
Strategic Considerations ..................................................................................... 159 
Redefinition of the Role of IS......................................................................... 159 
Internal Structural Changes............................................................................. 161 
Loss of Control over IS................................................................................... 163 
Relationship Considerations ............................................................................... 167 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .......................................... 167 
 xi
Trust in the Provider ....................................................................................... 170 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.............................................. 172 
Goal Conflict................................................................................................... 173 
Voice Behavior ............................................................................................... 174 
Emerging Themes ............................................................................................... 178 
Power .............................................................................................................. 178 
Integration of Perspectives.................................................................................. 180 
Contract Three – Sigma .......................................................................................... 184 
Economic Considerations ................................................................................... 184 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement ........................................ 184 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ......................................................................... 184 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ................................................................... 186 
Strategic Considerations ..................................................................................... 189 
Internal Structural Changes............................................................................. 189 
Redefinition of the Role of IS......................................................................... 189 
Loss of Control over IS................................................................................... 191 
Relationship Considerations ............................................................................... 193 
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement ................................................ 193 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.............................................. 196 
Trust in the Provider ....................................................................................... 197 
Goal Conflict................................................................................................... 198 
Voice Behavior ............................................................................................... 199 
Emerging Themes ............................................................................................... 202 
 xii
Power .............................................................................................................. 202 
Integration of Perspectives.................................................................................. 203 
Contract Four – Tau................................................................................................ 207 
Economic Considerations ................................................................................... 207 
Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement .............................................. 207 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ......................................................................... 208 
Strategic Considerations ..................................................................................... 210 
Redefinition of the Role of IS......................................................................... 210 
Loss of Control over IS................................................................................... 211 
Changes in Management................................................................................. 211 
Relationship Considerations ............................................................................... 212 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .......................................... 212 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.............................................. 213 
Voice Behavior ............................................................................................... 213 
Emerging Themes ............................................................................................... 215 
Power .............................................................................................................. 215 
Integration of Perspectives.................................................................................. 215 
Company Two – Beta ................................................................................................. 218 
Economic Considerations ....................................................................................... 219 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ............................................................................. 219 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ....................................................................... 220 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement ............................................ 221 
Strategic Considerations ......................................................................................... 222 
 xiii
Redefinition of the Role of IS............................................................................. 222 
Loss of Control over IS....................................................................................... 223 
Internal Structural Changes................................................................................. 225 
Relationship Considerations ................................................................................... 226 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .............................................. 226 
Goal Conflict....................................................................................................... 227 
Trust in the Provider ........................................................................................... 229 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.................................................. 229 
Voice Behavior ................................................................................................... 231 
Emerging Themes ................................................................................................... 233 
Power .................................................................................................................. 233 
Integration of Perspectives...................................................................................... 234 
Company Three – Gamma.......................................................................................... 240 
Economic Considerations ....................................................................................... 241 
The Cost Benefit of Backsourcing...................................................................... 241 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ....................................................................... 242 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement ............................................ 244 
Strategic Considerations ......................................................................................... 245 
Redefinition of the Role of IS............................................................................. 245 
Loss of Control over IS....................................................................................... 246 
Internal Structural Changes................................................................................. 249 
Relationship Considerations ................................................................................... 250 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .............................................. 250 
 xiv
Goal Conflict....................................................................................................... 253 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship.................................................. 254 
Voice Behavior ................................................................................................... 255 
Emerging Themes ................................................................................................... 258 
Power .................................................................................................................. 258 
Integration of Perspectives...................................................................................... 259 
CHAPTER SEVEN. ANALYSIS OF BACKSOURCING ANTECEDENTS .............. 264 
Triangulation of Backsourcing Antecedents Across Cases ........................................ 264 
Economic Considerations ....................................................................................... 266 
Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement .................................................. 267 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing ............................................................................. 268 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing ....................................................................... 270 
Strategic Considerations ......................................................................................... 271 
Internal Structural Changes................................................................................. 272 
Loss of Control over IS....................................................................................... 274 
Redefinition of the Role of IS............................................................................. 275 
Relationship Considerations ................................................................................... 277 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement .............................................. 278 
Trust in the Provider ........................................................................................... 279 
Goal Conflict....................................................................................................... 279 
Satisfaction with Outsourcing Relationship........................................................ 280 
Voice Behavior ................................................................................................... 281 
Emerging Themes ................................................................................................... 283 
 xv
Power .................................................................................................................. 283 
Power of Decision Makers.............................................................................. 284 
Power in Interorganizational Relationships .................................................... 285 
Role of Power in Backsourcing Decisions...................................................... 287 
Integration of Factors.............................................................................................. 288 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis .............................................................................. 289 
CHAPTER EIGHT. LESSONS LEARNED AND REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH 294 
Evaluation of Conducted Research............................................................................. 294 
Implications for Practice and Research....................................................................... 296 
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 304 
Future Research Directions......................................................................................... 307 
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL FORM...................................................................... 310 
APPENDIX B: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE ..................................... 313 
APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY PROTOCOL ................................................................ 318 
APPENDIX D: CODING SCHEMA FOR DATA ANALYSIS.................................... 325 
APPENDIX E: SAMPLE CASE MATRIX ................................................................... 328 
LIST OF REFERENCES................................................................................................ 349 
 xvi
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 2.1. Sourcing Process ............................................................................................ 14 
Figure 2.2. Backsourcing Framework............................................................................... 33 
Figure 4.1 Steps in Qualitative Comparative Analysis..................................................... 83 
Figure 5.1 Ownership structure of Alpha before 2001 ..................................................... 89 
Figure 5.2 Organizational structure of Alpha after 2001.................................................. 90 
Figure 5.3 Organizational Structure of Beta ................................................................... 114 
Figure 5.4 Organizational Structure of Gamma.............................................................. 125 
Figure 5.5 Revenues and Expenses at Gamma, 2004 ..................................................... 126 
 
 xvii
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1.1. Motives for Backsourcing.................................................................................. 3 
Table 2.1. Stages and Activities in Information Systems Sourcing.................................. 17 
Table 2.2. Outsourcing Vs. Backsourcing ........................................................................ 19 
Table 3.1. Factors Involved in Backsourcing Decision .................................................... 39 
Table 4.1. Case Study Sites Key Information................................................................... 66 
Table 4.2  Data Collection Sources................................................................................... 69 
Table 4.3 Mapping of Interview Protocol Questions to Theoretically Derived Antecedents
................................................................................................................................... 72
Table 4.4 Coding Schema Categories............................................................................... 76 
Table 4.5. Coding Agreement Matrix ............................................................................... 79 
Table 5.1 Company Alpha: Sources of Evidence for Case Description ........................... 88 
Table 5.2 Information Systems Arrangements at Alpha................................................... 92 
Table 5.3 Alpha’s Outsourcing Agreements..................................................................... 97 
Table 5.4 Company Beta: Sources of Evidence for Case Description ........................... 113 
Table 5.5 Beta Backsourcing Transition Schedule ......................................................... 121 
Table 5.6 Company Gamma: Sources of Evidence for Case Description ...................... 124 
Table 6.1 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant ............... 150 
Table 6.2 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ............. 152 
Table 6.3 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Informant Agreement............................................. 153 
Table 6.4 Alpha – Iota Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant.................... 180 
Table 6.5 Alpha – Iota Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ................. 182 
 xviii
Table 6.6 Alpha – Iota Contract: Informant Agreement................................................. 183 
Table 6.7 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant................ 203 
Table 6.8 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ............. 206 
Table 6.9 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Informant Agreement............................................. 207 
Table 6.10 Alpha – Tau Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ............... 217 
Table 6.11 Alpha – Tau Contract: Informant Agreement............................................... 218 
Table 6.12 Sampling of Communication from Beta to Omega ...................................... 232 
Table 6.13 Company Beta: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant ............................ 235 
Table 6.14 Beta – Omega Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ............ 237 
Table 6.15  Beta – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement ........................................... 240 
Table 6.16 Company Gamma: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant ....................... 259 
Table 6.17 Gamma – Omega Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant ....... 262 
Table 6.18 Gamma – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement....................................... 263 
Table 7.1 Reasons for Backsourcing Across Cases ........................................................ 265 
Table 7.2 Economic Considerations Across Cases......................................................... 267 
Table 7.3 Strategic Considerations Across Cases........................................................... 272 
Table 7.4 Relationship Considerations Across Cases..................................................... 277 
Table 7.5 Presence of Backsourcing Conditions Across Cases...................................... 291 
Table 8.1 Evaluation of Dissertation .............................................................................. 296 
 xix
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
Backsourcing Phenomenon 
Information systems backsourcing is a business practice in which a company 
takes back in-house assets, activities, and skills that are part of its information systems 
operations and were previously outsourced to one or more outside information services 
providers. Backsourcing does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposition (Buxbaum 
2002), and depending on the circumstances companies undergo partial or complete 
reversal of an outsourcing contract.  
Backsourcing, as the term implies, follows the initial outsourcing arrangement, 
and can be a result of an expired, renegotiated or terminated outsourcing contract. The 
global outsourcing market has been growing steadily from revenues of U.S.$9 billion in 
1990 (Lacity and Willcocks 2000), to U.S.$120 billion in the year 2002, and was 
estimated to reach U.S.$150 billion by 2004 (Lacity and Willcocks 2001).  Yankee Group 
predicts that this growth will continue at 10% to 12% annually through 2006 (Kaplan 
2003).  Companies of all sizes pursue outsourcing arrangements, and many multimillion 
dollar deals have been widely publicized. 
Outsourcing is viewed as wholly satisfactory by 55% of the companies involved 
in this arrangement, and as partially satisfactory by 39% (Lackow 2001).  Even though 
information systems (IS) outsourcing contracts exhibit rather high success rates, some 
problems still arise in this customer-supplier relationship.  Outsourcing frequently has 
been found to be poorly controlled, high in cost, and a drain on quality and service 
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performance (King and Malhotra 2000).   Outsourcing disadvantages include loss of 
expertise and control of IS direction (Benko 1992; Quinn and Hilmer 1994), increased 
costs (Doig, Ritter, Speckhals et al. 2001), lack of flexibility in addressing change in the 
business (Quinn 1999), and dissatisfied customers.  All of these problems diminish the 
business value of the outsourced processes and make the current arrangement 
unprofitable. Furthermore, outsourcing contracts often do not specify outsourced services 
in detail. This is usually more detrimental to the customer than the outsourcing provider 
because it places the customer at a disadvantage in terms of pricing services.   Because of 
this, conflicts may arise in the relationship between the client and the provider. 
Consequently, some IS outsourcing deals get renegotiated or even canceled before their 
expiration.  
Once the decision to terminate the contract has been made, or the contract is about 
to expire, the company faces a choice of either staying with the current provider, hiring 
another provider to manage the IS functions, or taking activities and assets back in-house. 
Lacity and Willcocks found that almost one-third of the canceled contracts were 
eventually brought back in-house, or backsourced (2001). 
Examples of IS Backsourcing 
While there is an abundance of theoretical frameworks, qualitative and 
quantitative studies on IS outsourcing, IS backsourcing issues are rarely discussed in the 
literature. There are, however, more and more real life examples of both total and 
selective backsourcing found in both practitioner and academic literature. Various 
companies seem to have chosen to backsource for different reasons. All of this existing 
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anecdotal evidence can be grouped into several general trends in the backsourcing 
scenarios (Table 1.1). Whereas the most commonly cited motive for outsourcing is costs 
savings, backsourcing also can be prompted by other factors that can be grouped into   
strategic, economic and relationship reasons.  
Table 1.1. Motives for Backsourcing 
Examples Key Motives Category 
MLC, Australia 
Oxford Health Plans 
· Need to gain control over IS 
 
Strategic 
Sears in U.K.  
East Midlands Electricity 
Bank One 
· Change in the importance of IS 
 
 
Suncorp Group, Australia 
Halifax Bank of Scotland 
J.P. Morgan 
· Structural changes in organization  
LSI Logic Corp, USA 
Farmers Group 
Bank One 
· Cost Savings Economic 
Xerox 
Washington Mutual            
· Questionable performance of the provider Relationship
Continental Airlines · Tension between parties over contract  
 
There is a number of possible strategic reasons to reverse the outsourcing contract 
which include the need to regain control over the IS functions, redefinition of the 
importance of the IS function for the organization and internal or external structural 
changes.  One of the most frequent reasons for the termination of outsourcing contracts 
and taking the function back in-house is the loss of control over the direction of IS. For 
example, Australian-based financial services giant MLC brought back in-house 
management of its application development and maintenance after renegotiating its 
outsourcing agreement with IBM Global Services (Australia). MLC felt they needed to 
have control over the IS enabled business solutions (Lacity et al. 2001). When Oxford 
Health Plus ended its relationship with CSC in 2002, it aimed to integrate IS functions, 
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which could help to deploy technology solutions in a more flexible and timely manner to 
meet its business goals (Bushell 2003). As the business needs of Oxford were changing, 
its IS needs were changing as well; backsourcing was the only way to regain control over 
the entire IS function and to use technology effectively.  
Another motive for backsourcing involves redefinition of the importance of IS 
and change in the IS requirements and the context. For instance, Sears’ U.K-based 
operations canceled a £344 million 10 year outsourcing contract with Andersen 
Consulting after just 17 months. It took back 500 employees and chose the selective 
outsourcing route. In the new arrangement, the internal staff focused on new application 
development, whereas the provider managed more mundane functions (Lacity et al. 2000; 
Lacity et al. 2001). In another case, East Midlands Electricity cancelled its 12-year 
contract with Perot Systems five years early. The management of the company had 
redefined the importance of IS to its business and decided to rebuild the in-house skills 
(Kern and Willcocks 2001).  
Some organizations may decide to bring IS back in-house in response to structural 
business changes such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers. The previously existing 
arrangements within the old companies may not meet the needs of the new organization. 
When Suncorp Group, Australia acquired GIO, the decision was made to transfer GIO’s 
IS functions in-house as the best way to maintain a competitive advantage and achieve 
the benefits of platform synergies (Bushell 2003). In a similar context, Halifax Bank of 
Scotland (HBOS) canceled its outsourcing contract with IBM and Xansa, when Bank of 
Scotland and Halifax Building Society merged. The requirements of the business changed 
and HBOS took the outsourced processes back in-house (Bushell 2003). Most recently 
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J.P. Morgan pulled the plug on their seven-year U.S. $5 billion deal with IBM less than 
two years into the contract after it merged with Bank One. J.P. Morgan decided that 
managing their own technology infrastructure was best for their long-term growth and 
success (Morgenson, 2004). 
Economic reasons and cost savings remain salient for backsourcing consideration 
as well. For some outsourcing arrangements, cost savings never materialize. For instance, 
Farmers Group insurance company terminated a 10-year U.S. $150 million outsourcing 
contract with Integrated Systems Solutions (division of IBM) eight years into the deal 
due to escalating costs. Even with U.S.$4 million in cancellation fees Farmers Groups 
was saving U.S.$6 million a year within the first year of backsourcing (Overby 2003a).  
In the case of long term outsourcing contracts, as the costs of technology decrease over 
time, the client company may be unwilling to pay fees specified in the service level 
agreement that are above the market rates. On the other hand, companies often realize 
that they can implement the same effective strategies internally. For example, US-based 
chipmaker LSI Logic Corp terminated its outsourcing contract with IBM Global Services, 
and was able to save 33% in costs as a result (Lacity et al. 2001).  
In addition to the above mentioned strategic and economic issues, the client may 
also backsource because of the unsatisfactory relationship with the provider. The  
problem of the questionable performance on the part of the provider arises in 25% of 
outsourcing relationships and may lead to backsourcing (Lackow 2001). Xerox contract 
with EDS can be an example of such difficulties. Xerox had undergone selective 
backsourcing in 1998 by adjusting its exposure to its main provider, EDS. While the deal 
with EDS was often considered strategically successful, at the operational level service 
 5
performance remained far below expectations in many areas such as telecommunications 
and laptop services. Because of the low service performance, Xerox decided to withdraw 
the services and support for laptops from EDS (Kern et al. 2001). In another case, 
Washington Mutual took back help desk, network management, architecture and strategy 
work while restructuring the contract with IBM Global Services (IGS). Calls to the help 
desk weren’t being answered in a timely manner, which was giving IT a bad reputation; 
IT service levels were low under the management of IGS. Backsourcing was done to 
improve service levels and offer additional value to the customers, not for cost reasons 
(Overby 2003b).  
In many cases, companies undergo backsourcing for a combination of reasons 
including economic, strategic and relationship. For example, Continental Airlines was in 
financial distress when it outsourced nearly all of its IS to EDS with the cost savings as 
the primary motivation. Over time, tensions have developed between some of Continental 
and EDS’ staff regarding expectations of what services should be provided according to 
the agreement. At the same time, Continental recognized the potential value that IS can 
bring to its business and was trying to improve its operations using the new technologies 
such as online ticketing. Unfortunately, EDS did not have the capabilities and skills to 
support the new needs of the airline.  As a result, four years after the signing of the 
contract Continental Airlines reconsidered EDS’ particular competencies, strategic 
implications of each IS and business function as well as relationship conflicts. 
Continental Airlines brought much of its IS back in-house, arriving at a 50-50 
outsourced-insourced equilibrium (Buxbaum 2002; Christensen and Pearlson 1996). This 
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decision was driven by strategic and relationship considerations which included tension 
over the contract with the provider and changes in the importance and role of IS.   
Bank One also decided to backsource for a combination of reasons, including 
strategic and economic. It cancelled its outsourcing arrangements with IBM and AT&T 
Solutions to cut operating costs, improve customer service and be able to quickly 
implement new products and services. There was no dissatisfaction with either 
outsourcing provider, but a change in the philosophy of how they wanted to do business 
and change in the positioning of IS in its business. As a result of backsourcing, the bank 
expected to cut U.S. $200,000 in annual operating costs. A company of this size can 
achieve the same cost efficiencies as outsourcing providers by purchasing hardware, 
software and  IS services directly from the manufacturers (Hoffman 2003).  
While a multitude of reasons can affect the decision to reverse the outsourcing 
arrangement, one of the factors either strategic, economic or relationship seems to 
dominate this decision.  Even though there are multiple reports of backsourcing activity, 
taking outsourced functions back in-house can be a time consuming and expensive 
proposition (Christensen et al. 1996).  Issues of intellectual property ownership, changes 
to the IT structure (Doig et al. 2001), recruitment of skillful and knowledgeable IS 
personnel and large switching costs (Kern and Willcocks 2002) can complicate the 
transition. Thus, it is crucial that the companies undergo a thorough evaluation of the 
existing outsourcing contract before pursuing backsourcing.   
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Problem Statement 
Backsourcing is a significant emerging trend, and a number of companies have 
returned outsourced functions back in-house. While there are some explanations of 
backsourcing phenomenon in both academic and popular press, most of it is conjectures 
and anecdotal evidence. There has been no theoretically grounded study of this 
phenomenon. However, Lacity and Willcocks recognized its importance when they called 
for the investigation of the factors that lead to backsourcing (2000). This research is the 
first attempt to examine theoretical underpinning of IS backsourcing.  
Backsourcing is preceded by the contract with an IS outsourcing provider. 
Relationship with the provider is a dynamic process that is affected by various factors 
throughout its development. Reported instances of backsourcing demonstrate that 
performance issues, conflicts between the parties and lack of expertise on the part of the 
provider may sour the relationship (Kern et al. 2001; Lacity et al. 2001). Unsuccessful 
outsourcing relationships can lead to premature cancellation of the contract or 
nonrenewal at expiration. At the same time, clients undergo business changes and 
continuously reevaluate the existing IS outsourcing arrangements. Regardless of the 
problems that may arise in the outsourcing relationship, some clients may backsource due 
to changes in business strategy or to streamline their operations.  
Why would organizations take back in-house assets, activities, and skills 
previously outsourced? Backsourcing seems to be motivated by a change in 
circumstances, redefinition of the character of outsourced service, or discovery of flaws 
in the initial assessment that led to outsourcing (Lacity & Willcocks, 2000). The 
examples given in the previous section demonstrate that backsourcing reasons seem to be 
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different from the foremost outsourcing reason of reducing costs. There is a combination 
of factors that seem to be salient in the backsourcing considerations, yet it is not clear 
which ones are more important and represent the key drivers of backsourcing.  
The organizational situation has to be analyzed thoroughly and all the possible 
factors should be taken into consideration before the change. Success of the changeover 
from outsourcing into backsourcing may depend not only on the availability of resources 
and strategic considerations, but also on a good relationship and support from the 
provider. Better understanding of backsourcing and its theoretical underpinnings will lead 
to better backsourcing strategies and business outcomes for organizations that return their 
previously outsourced IS functions back in-house.  
Research Questions 
This dissertation aims to investigate the reasons for backsourcing after the 
outsourcing arrangement, considerations involved in the formation of backsourcing 
intentions on the part of the IS outsourcing client, as well as the transition to 
backsourcing and issues associated with it.  In particular, it targets the following research 
question: 
⋅ Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to backsource? 
To answer the above research question, multiple theories are examined to uncover 
theoretical underpinnings of the possible economic, strategic and relationship motives of 
the backsourcing decision. These theories previously have been applied to explorations 
about sourcing considerations and include transaction cost theory (Ang and Straub 1998; 
Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Poppo and Zenger 1998; Wang 2002), agency theory (Ho, 
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Ang and Straub 2003; Logan 2000), core competency perspective (Quinn 1999), 
interorganizational relationships theory (Kern et al. 2001) and marketing channels theory. 
This theory has been widely used in marketing literature to analyze the exchange 
relationships (Alajoutsijarvi, Moller and Tahtinen 2000; Bolton 1998; Dwyer, Schurr and 
Oh 1987; Ping 1995). Using these theories, a number of factors that could play a role in 
backsourcing considerations is developed and the possible influence of various factors is 
explained.   
The exploratory case study approach is utilized to examine the nature of IS 
backsourcing and to investigate the drivers for this arrangement. Using the evidence from 
six case studies, the possible theoretically suggested and emergent reasons for 
backsourcing are analyzed. Triangulation across cases identifies the primary factors that 
lead outsourcouring clients to backsource. 
Importance of Research 
The theoretical contribution of this research is the framework of factors involved 
in backsourcing considerations which is constructed through exploratory case studies. 
While backsourcing may seem to be similar to outsourcing decision, backsourcing 
decision involves factors different from those used for the original outsourcing decision. 
They include not only cost factors but also a variety of strategic factors, as well as prior 
experience and performance in outsourcing relationships. Interplay of these factors seems 
to be present in many backsourcing scenarios discussed in the earlier section. The 
assumptions and predictions of the theoretically derived factors used in the backsourcing 
framework are evaluated using the case study evidence collected in the course of this 
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dissertation research. Emergent themes are examined across cases and are introduced to 
the framework. 
Understanding the underlying reasons for taking the IS function partially or 
completely back in-house can provide managers with better decision tools when 
reviewing the outsourcing contract as termination nears or as major environmental 
changes occur. Not all outsourced functions may be suitable for in-house operations. 
Looking at the reasons underlying the backsourcing decision helps identify a potential 
framework for future assessments, and distinguish factors most relevant for the 
backsourcing decision. The analysis of the circumstances and decisions that lead to 
backsourcing should be beneficial for both academics and practitioners.  
To address the needs of practitioners, this dissertation aims to provide managers 
of the client company with better tools for reevaluating an outsourcing contract, and 
specify factors that should be considered during partial or complete transfer of outsourced 
services and processes back in-house. It does so by analyzing the possible antecedents of 
IS backsourcing in strategic, economic, and relationship areas, observing the transition 
process to backsourcing and gaining insights into successful and unsuccessful practices.  
Scope of Research 
This dissertation examines the backsourcing phenomenon as a change in sourcing 
process after the initial outsourcing contract. It focuses on the factors that lead to the 
formation of the backsourcing decision. Staying with the current provider, partial 
backsourcing or outsourcing to another provider are also options for the client after the 
end of the initial outsourcing relationship. This dissertation evaluates cases that involve 
 11
backsourcing, partial backsourcing and continuation of outsourcing in order to single out 
the factors that would lead to backsourcing.  
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is comprised of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the IS 
backsourcing phenomenon together with examples from practice providing basis for 
research problem statement, research questions and the importance of research. Chapter 2 
compares IS backsourcing with IS outsourcing and then provides a review of literature on 
agency theory, transaction cost theory, core competency perspective, interorganizational 
relationships theory and marketing channels literature that are used to further examine the 
reasons for the backsourcing decision. Chapter 3 presents possible antecedents of 
backsourcing along with their theoretical underpinning and explanation of their influence 
on the backsourcing decision. Case study research methodology and the details of the 
case sites selection, data collection procedures and data analysis are presented in Chapter 
4.  Chapter 5 provides the descriptions of each of the case sites, IS outsourcing and 
backsourcing situation in each contract. Chapter 6 presents detailed results of the case 
studies and discusses the role of each of the proposed antecedents in backsourcing 
considerations.  The results of all case studies are synthesized in Chapter 7, and the 
primary factors that affect the backsourcing decision are identified. In the final chapter, 
Chapter 8, implications and limitations of findings are discussed, and future research 
directions are suggested.  
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CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW 
IS Backsourcing vs. IS Outsourcing 
Make or buy assessments and decisions are continuously made in business 
organizations, and in terms of information technology entail outsourcing vs. insourcing of 
IS functions and activities. Insourcing deploys and manages information systems 
internally within the organization. Outsourcing involves business arrangements to 
manage IS activities outside the original organization. Once the decision to outsource is 
made, the company contracts a provider to perform the necessary activities. When the 
contract expiration date approaches, or the partners decide to terminate the contract 
prematurely, the issue of sourcing arises again. At that time, the client is facing a choice 
of either staying with the current provider (continuing outsourcing relationship), hiring 
another provider to manage the IS functions (finding a new outsourcing arrangement), or 
taking the activities and assets back in-house (backsourcing). IS backsourcing is the 
partial or complete reversal of the outsourcing contract and returning previously 
outsourced IS back in-house. Both IS outsourcing and IS backsourcing address the 
organization’s buy or make decision.  However, the decision to outsource is made early 
in the sourcing cycle at the time of initial insource or outsource considerations. The IS 
backsourcing decision represents a change in sourcing and is made towards the end of the 
sourcing cycle. It is made after the evaluation of the initial outsourcing contract taking 
into consideration the experience with the outsourcing as well as company technology 
requirements and needs (Figure 2.1).    
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Figure 2.1. Sourcing Process 
The outsourcing contract is based on an interorganizational relationship between a 
client and a provider. Ring and Van De Ven view the development and evolution of 
interorganizational relations as a repetitive sequence of negotiation, commitment and 
execution stages, each of which is assessed in terms of efficiency and equity (1994). 
During the negotiation stage involved parties assess uncertainty associated with the 
contract, each other’s trustworthiness, rights and obligation in the transaction, and 
possible usefulness of the transaction. This is the stage when the original buy or make 
decision is made. In the commitment stage, parties reach an agreement and establish the 
terms of contract. The execution stage involves actual administration of the contract 
details. Usually in this stage, as the parties continue to become more familiar with each 
other’s performance, uncertainty is reduced, which makes interactions more predictable. 
During the commitment and execution stages the actual outsourcing relationship develops 
and the parties engage in the activities specified in the contract.  Every stage can be 
followed by an assessment where the progress is assessed in terms of efficiency and 
equity.  
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As the contract progresses, conflicts, misunderstandings and changing 
expectations are inevitable.  In the end of the IOR development process, in the final 
assessment period, all of these factors lead to reconsideration of the terms of the 
relationship. The relationship can be terminated once the parties have completed the deal 
or as a consequence of some condition such as breach of contract, mutual rescission or a 
new contract  (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). In terms of the termination of the relationship 
and intention to backsource, the assessment represents the most interest. At this point, 
parties face two options: they can continue with the relationship or terminate the contract. 
If they decide to remain partners, they can carry on their relationship under existing terms 
or modify the terms of the outsourcing agreement. If the contract is terminated, the client 
can seek another provider or take the previously outsourced functions back in-house.  
Lacity and Willcocks (2000) examined stakeholder relationships in IS outsourcing 
and identified six phases of outsourcing activities: scoping, evaluation, negotiation, 
transition, middle and mature phases. The scoping phase involves identifying potential IS 
activities for outsourcing. During the evaluation phase, the company searches for the best 
arrangement to manage its IS functions.  When the future provider is found, terms of 
contract are detailed during the negotiation phase.   Transition activities may last for up to 
two years and during that time the provider sets up the outsourced activities, and 
completely takes over managing those IS activities for the client.  In the middle phase, as 
the outsourcing relationship progresses, realignment of the agreement and involvement of 
the provider in value adding activities may be necessary. In the mature stage, the parties 
are faced with planning for the future of the current sourcing arrangement and assessing 
the available options.  
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Lacity and Willcocks’ six relationship stages can be mapped into the more general 
Ring and Van de Ven model of interorganizational relationships (Table 2.1).  These 
stages help highlight the sourcing cycle and the alternating emphasis on sourcing and 
resourcing. Ring and Van de Ven’s framework is a general framework for analyzing 
exchange relationships, while Lacity and Willcocks focus specifically on the outsourcing 
relationship. Backsourcing of information systems is always preceded by the outsourcing 
contract.   The decision to backsource is likely to be based on the evaluations and 
projections done in Ring and Van de Ven’s assessment process or Lacity and Willcocks’ 
mature phase.  Since backsourcing requires a previous outsourcing relationship, it is 
especially useful to also consider the success and implications of prior outsourcing 
experience on the decision to backsource.  
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Table 2.1. Stages and Activities in Information Systems Sourcing 
General Interorganizational Relationship  
Ring & Van 
de Ven 
(1994) 
Stages 
Negotiation Commitment Execution Assessment 
(iterative process 
during and after 
each stage 
Ring  & Van 
de Ven 
Activities 
Parties develop 
joint expectations 
about motivations, 
possible 
investments, and 
perceived 
uncertainties of a 
business deal that 
they are exploring 
to undertake jointly 
Parties reach 
an agreement 
on the 
obligations and 
rules for future 
action in the 
relationship. 
Commitments and 
rules of action are 
carried into effect; 
parties give orders 
to subordinates, 
buy materials, pay 
amounts agreed 
upon, and 
administer the 
agreement. 
Evaluation of the 
progress and 
relationship. 
Misunderstandings, 
conflicts, and 
changing 
expectations can 
provide cause for 
rethinking the terms 
of the relationship. 
Ring  & Van 
de Ven 
Objectives 
Assess uncertainty 
associated with the 
deal, the nature of 
each other’s role, 
the other’s 
trustworthiness, 
their rights and 
duties in the 
transaction, and 
possible efficiency 
and equity of the 
transaction. 
Terms and 
governance 
structure of the 
relationship are 
established and 
codified in 
formal 
contract. 
Parties execute 
commitments that 
make the 
interactions 
among parties 
more predictable. 
If the contract 
commitments are 
not executed in 
efficient and 
equitable manner, 
the parties will 
initiate corrective 
measures by either 
renegotiating or 
reducing their 
commitment. 
Outsourcing Interorganizational Relationships 
Equivalent 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
(2000) 
Stages 
Scoping 
Evaluation 
Negotiation 
Transition Middle Mature 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
Activities 
Client identifies 
core IS capabilities, 
and IS activities for 
potential 
outsourcing 
Measure baseline 
costs and services 
Contract is 
distributed, 
post contract 
management is 
established and 
parties validate 
costs and 
responsibilities 
Parties benchmark 
performance and 
realign contract to 
reflect changes in 
technology 
Determine if 
relationship will be 
terminated or 
extended 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
Objectives 
Identify IS activities 
for potential 
outsourcing; select 
the best and final 
offer 
Sign contract 
and establish 
operational 
performance 
Achieve value-
added above 
operational 
performance 
No lapses in 
operational 
performance during 
final transition  
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At the time of assessment some of the activities similar to the activities of Ring 
and Van de Ven’s negotiation or Lacity and Willcocks’ scoping and evaluations phases 
take place.  Analogous to the earlier initial sourcing evaluation, full investigation of IS 
sourcing options, benchmarking of costs, reconsideration of the role and importance of IS 
for the organization, assessment of uncertainty and each other’s trustworthiness take 
place. At the same time, all the prior experience with outsourcing is reviewed, the current 
outsourcing relationship is evaluated, its successes and failures are analyzed, and 
competencies of the provider and needs of the client are reassessed. During this stage 
some of the companies may decide to discontinue the current outsourcing arrangement 
and pursue backsourcing.  
While some of the considerations of backsourcing are similar to the initial 
outsourcing decision, outsourcing and backsourcing have different motivations and goals 
underlying them (Table 2.2).  The motivation behind IS outsourcing decisions is very 
often the opportunity to save significant amounts of time and money by modifying the 
management of IS functions (McKeen, Smith, Joglekar et al. 2002). Outsourcing is also 
used to fill gaps in the firm’s IS resources and capabilities, such as access to information, 
equipment, IS personnel and skills (Grover, Teng and Cheon 1998). Approaching 
outsourcing considerations strategically, companies base the choice of outsourced 
functions on their core competencies, and outsource only non-critical functions (Quinn et 
al. 1994).  
Goals of the provider and the client in the initial outsourcing situation are usually 
complementary. Clients are interested in receiving the quality services that meet their 
business and technology requirements at a reasonable price, and providers are ready to 
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offer those services at sensible costs to the client and at a profit for themselves. When the 
deal is signed, both sides are usually happy. However, as the contract gets under way, the 
client often feels like it is paying too much for the services (Scardino 2002a). Costs are 
usually squeezed out to a minimum in the first couple of years (Scardino 2003), and 
eventually the client starts looking for additional business value in its IS activities. At this 
time the goals of the client and provider may differ, especially if the client is requiring 
additional services from the provider that are asset and skill specific. The provider is 
interested in economies of scale and can only offer low costs on commodity services, but 
customization of services can turn out to be exorbitantly expensive and time-consuming.  
Table 2.2. Outsourcing Vs. Backsourcing 
Characteristic Outsourcing Backsourcing 
Definition Business arrangement where third-
party providers manage information 
system activities or develop 
information systems. 
Business practice in which a company takes 
back in-house assets, activities, and skills 
that are part of its information systems 
operations and were previously outsourced to 
one or more outside information service 
providers. Always occurs after outsourcing 
Motivation • Strategic 
o Focus on core 
competencies 
 
 
• Economic 
o Cost savings 
o Access to resources 
o Deals with volume 
uncertainty 
• Strategic  
o Change in circumstances/core 
competencies 
o Redefinition of importance of 
outsourced service 
o Structural changes/mergers 
• Economic 
o Costs savings 
• Relationship 
o Inability of provider to provide 
service 
o Misalignment of provider 
performance and outsourcing 
organization’s needs 
o Discovery of flaws in initial 
assessment about outsourcing 
Goals of the 
parties 
Provider’s goals complement or are 
congruent to outsourcing 
organization’s goals (reduce the costs 
of services) 
Provider’s goals (reduce costs) are 
incongruent with outsourcing organization’s 
goals (lower costs and additional business 
value)  
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Cost considerations are important, but often the client is seeking additional 
business value in the utilization of its technology. A frequent reason for taking the 
function back in-house is the need to regain control over the direction of IS. Redefinition 
of the importance of IS (Kern et al. 2001) in response to structural business changes such 
as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers (Bushell 2003), or questionable performance on 
the part of the provider (Lackow 2001), often play a role in backsourcing decisions. The 
outsourcing arrangement experience and the relationship between the outsourcing client 
and the provider also are important in understanding the backsourcing decision, since 
backsourcing is always preceded by the termination of the outsourcing relationship.  
In the case of backsourcing, there is often an interaction of economic, strategic 
and relationship considerations that motivate ending of the relationship and transferring 
previously outsourced services back in-house. During outsourcing assessment, the 
organization focuses on economic performance of the outsourcing contract, value 
generated by the utilization of IS, strategic role of IS, future IS needs, current service 
quality of the outsourced IS services, etc. When multiple factors are involved in the 
evaluation of the outsourcing arrangement and the backsourcing decision, some of those 
factors may have a stronger influence on the determination of IS governance in the 
organization. For example, poor service quality, delays in responses to service requests 
and unsatisfactory performance on the part of the outsourcing provider, or conflicts and 
tension between the client and the provider over the contract can compel the client to 
consider termination of the outsourcing agreement. Yet the client may decide to continue 
with outsourcing services for cost reasons or because the IS is not one of its core 
competencies. On the other hand, a client who is satisfied with the current level of IS 
 20
services received from the outsourcing provider may decide to backsource in order to 
regain control over their IS functions even at the expense of higher costs of managing IS 
internally. The following section examines possible theory-based precursors of 
backsourcing decision. 
Backsourcing Antecedents: Theoretical Background 
Various theoretically-based perspectives have been applied to the explorations of 
IS sourcing antecedents. Because the costs saving is the primary factor in the make-or-
buy decision, the most commonly used perspectives were economic theories that 
emphasized organizational concerns with the economic efficiency of the arrangement. 
The two most frequent contributors to the cost-based perspective on sourcing are 
transaction cost theory (Ang et al. 1998; Grover et al. 1996; Poppo et al. 1998; Wang 
2002) and agency theory (Ho et al. 2003; Logan 2000). In addition to economic theories, 
sourcing can be considered through a strategic lens. One of the frequent criterions for 
make-or-buy decision is the strategic role of the IS activities (King et al. 2000; McFarlan 
and Nolan 1995). Core competency perspective has been used to examine outsourcing 
decisions in terms of the contribution that a particular activity brings to the business 
(Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny 1996; Quinn 1999).  
Backsourcing takes place after the initial outsourcing contract. Thus, relationship 
factors also play a role in the assessment considerations. In addition to the above 
mentioned frameworks, interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels 
theory are utilized in this research to understand the motives involved in the relationship 
between the outsourcing client and the provider. Interorganizational relationships theory 
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has been recently applied to better understand the relationship advantage in IS 
outsourcing (Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002), while marketing channels literature 
considers the factors involved in the termination of the channels relationship (Ping 1993; 
Ping 1995; Ping 1999; Tahtinen and Halinen 2002).  
Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1981) provides guidelines for the make-or-
buy decision.  Its basic premise is that firms organize their exchange relationships to 
minimize the total costs incurred in the exchange of goods and services.  This theory 
maintains that the organization of economic activity depends on balancing production 
economies of scale against the cost of transacting (Grover et al. 1998).  
For optimized performance and minimized costs there must be a good fit between 
characteristics of the transaction exchange and the governance structure.    Based on this 
premise, transaction cost theory suggests that the higher the cost of transacting in the 
market, the greater will be the comparative advantage for organizing resources within the 
firm using a hierarchy governance structure (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), i.e. having an 
internal department in charge of those resources and functions.  
Transaction cost theory focuses on three dimensions when describing 
transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of the transaction (Williamson 
1981). Asset specificity describes “the degree to which durable, transaction specific 
investments are required” for a particular transaction (Williamson 1981). Uncertainty 
deals with the difficulty in assessing choices in the decision. Transaction cost theory 
relies on the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality 
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implies that all economic actors are intentionally and limitedly rational (Williamson 
1985). Bounded rationality assumes complexity of the contractual relationships and, thus, 
uncertainty. Opportunism is concerned with economic actors’ self-interest seeking 
tendency and trustworthiness (Williamson 1981). An opportunistic party would exercise 
distorted disclosure of information, especially designed to mislead, disguise or otherwise 
confuse (Williamson 1985). Opportunism is a source of uncertainty in economic 
transactions (Williamson 1985). 
Transaction cost theory has been widely applied to examine buy-or-make 
decisions, including IS outsourcing vs. insourcing (Ang et al. 1998; Grover et al. 1996; 
Poppo et al. 1998; Wang 2002). In outsourcing arrangement, production costs are 
expected to decrease, while transaction costs are expected to rise. According to 
transaction costs theory, outsourcing is not recommended for a company (or client) if its 
uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of contracting are high, number of suppliers 
is small and it has insufficient knowledge of the IS market (Lee, Huynh, Kwok et al. 
2001).  
Both internal and external sourcing initiatives are driven by a need to reduce costs 
(Scardino 2002b). Focus on cost savings underlies many outsourcing arrangements, and 
costs often play a significant role during reevaluation of the agreement and the turn to 
backsourcing. Companies focus on the current state of their business environment, ways 
to introduce efficiencies, improve operations and reduce costs.  However, there are large 
switching costs involved in changing IS sourcing decisions (Willcocks, Fitzgerald and 
Lacity 1996), and backsourcing can prove to be an expensive alternative. Thus, high 
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external production and transaction costs can be the reason for the reversal of the 
outsourcing arrangement, while switching costs can impede backsourcing.  
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is directed at the agency relationship in which one party delegates 
work to another who performs that work (Eisenhardt 1989). Its focus is on developing the 
most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship, assuming that 
organizations are self-interested (Logan 2000). According to this theory, goal conflicts 
that arise between the agent (provider) and the principal (client) are “resolved through the 
coalignment of incentives – the price mechanism of economics” (Eisenhardt 1989). 
This theory is most applicable to the situations that have inherent goal conflict 
between the parties and sufficient outcome uncertainty.  Uncertainty coupled with 
differences in willingness to accept risk should influence contracts between principle and 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Small ventures usually face higher outcome uncertainty in 
terms of their future business opportunities and cash flows. High outcome uncertainty 
results in high risk for any business transaction and, thus, managers tend to be more risk 
averse when it comes to additional investments or business decisions. Agency theory 
suggests that in this situation managers are likely to transfer the risk to the supplier. 
Organizations facing less outcome uncertainty and taking a risk neutral outlook tend to 
choose the “make” option. Contracts that govern the relationship are in place to limit the 
risk undertaken by the involved parties through specifying either a fixed payoff or an 
incentive payoff tied to specific measures of performance (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
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Difference in interests of client and provider can result in problems and additional 
expenses for the client or agency costs (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991).  
Agency theory is another economic theory that has been extensively used for the 
explorations of sourcing decisions (Ho et al. 2003; Logan 2000; Yao, Watson, Chen et al. 
2003). According to agency theory, outsourcing is not recommended when outcome 
measurability is low, outcome uncertainty is high, risk aversion is high, programmability 
is low, and length of relationship is long (Lee et al. 2001). Since both client and provider 
pursue their own interests, and there is goal incongruence, the client may have to exert 
extra effort to monitor the behavior of the provider, which results in additional costs for 
the client, i.e. agency costs. Escalating agency costs and changes in the business situation 
as a result of business uncertainty can lead to the reevaluation of the outsourcing contract 
and the return of the outsourced functions back in-house.  
Core Competence Perspective 
Core competencies include skills that currently underpin the firm’s success and 
represent the firm’s most valuable resources (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Core 
competence perspective maintains that a company can create uniquely high value for its 
customers through its core competencies (Quinn 1999). Core competencies empower 
individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities and provide potential 
access to a wide variety of markets. For a function to be considered a core competency, it 
should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end 
product and should be difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) . 
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Focusing on core competencies enables companies to concentrate their limited 
resources on relatively few competencies where they can develop superior capabilities. It 
also helps them to leverage their internal innovation capabilities to ensure that their 
performance stays ahead of competitors. Through core competencies, companies can 
eliminate inflexibilities in overhead to deal with changing competitor pressures and 
opportunities. Additionally, companies can expand their own knowledge and physical 
investment capabilities by exploiting the facilities of outside sources (Quinn 1999). 
According to the core competency perspective, companies should perform the activities 
that represent their core competencies in-house, while outsourcing all the non-critical 
commodity operations. 
Core competency argument has been frequently applied to outsourcing 
considerations (Lacity et al. 1996; Quinn 1999). Some IS functions happen to be critical 
contributors to business operations, while other activities only make incremental 
contributions to the bottom line. Therefore, each company must analyze its IS activities 
in its own business context, rather than accept generalities (Lacity et al. 1996). 
Outsourcing can be used as a process for focusing on an organization’s core 
competencies and to push for operational efficiency (Allen, Kern and Mattison 2002).  
When business value of a particular technology is low, then that activity is a good 
candidate for outsourcing. However, if cost savings are the most critical driver in the 
outsourcing decision, it is likely that the company will sacrifice crucial competencies and 
capabilities in the initial outsourcing decision (Earl 1996).  Firms that outsource the 
majority of their IS functions lose valuable IS expertise, and thus, companies should not 
outsource anything but commodity elements (Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny 1995).  
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Over time, changes in the company business processes, changes of the 
environment and reconsiderations of the role of IS in the organization may lead to shifts 
in the positioning of IS within the organization. Changes in the perception of the 
importance of the activity can lead to reevaluation of the outsourcing benefits and may 
result in backsourcing. Control over outsourced services can also become an issue in the 
client-provider relationship and lead the client to the decision to backsource. Strategic 
issues are even more important during the assessment of the outsourcing arrangements, as 
most likely cost savings have already been realized, and now other considerations 
become important.  
From the provider perspective, core competency focus also plays an important 
role. To offer its customers the best possible service and products at competitive prices, 
the outsourcing provider has to not only achieve economies of scale performing those 
activities, but it must also have superior skills and resources to ensure the maximum 
contribution to the business operations of its clients. Efficiently providing quality IS 
services and products should be the core competence of any IS outsourcing provider. 
Only providers that can respond to changing client needs are able to create an additional 
value for the client, therefore, when selecting an outsourcing provider clients should 
focus on the provider’s core competencies (Levina and Ross 2003).  
Goles suggested that the provider must possess the following competencies to be 
able to satisfy the client’s outsourcing needs: understanding of the customer's business, a 
minimum level of technical capabilities in order to provide outsourcing services, and 
some relationship management capabilities (2001). Levina and Ross found that an 
outsourcing provider can deliver value to its clients by developing a set of core 
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competencies by addressing client needs and market conditions, exhibiting 
complementarities that result in service delivery, and by having a large number of 
projects from multiple clients (2003).  The provider’s focus on core competencies and 
development of the necessary competencies for the outsourcing business ensures the 
success of the outsourcing relationships with the clients.  
Interorganizational Relationships Theory 
Interorganizational relationships (IOR) theory discusses why organizations enter 
into relationships and how the relationships develop over time. This theory examines 
structural, behavioral and interaction dimensions of the relationship (Kern et al. 2001) 
and provides understanding and analysis of the causes and conditions for the emergence, 
growth, and dissolution of IORs (Ring et al. 1994). Backsourcing is preceded by a 
relationship between the outsourcing client and provider, and a termination of such a 
relationship. IOR theory can be useful in understanding the development and termination 
of the outsourcing relationship.  
Relationship building is a dynamic process that develops through interaction of 
the involved parties.  The ways in which the parties negotiate, execute, and modify the 
terms of the interorganizational relationship strongly influence the beliefs about the 
efficiency of the relationship (Ring et al. 1994). Two types of uncertainty are inherent in 
cooperative IORs: uncertainty about the future of the business and uncertainty of the 
relationship (i.e. whether the parties are able to trust one another) (Ring et al. 1994). 
Usually a legal contract is used to safeguard against uncertainties and opportunism of the 
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other party. However, trust can be another form of control based on predictability of 
relationship and shared sense of fairness between parties (Davis 1996).  
Trust refers to one agent’s assessment of  a particular level of subjective 
probability that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both 
before the agent can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects the agent’s 
own action.  When an agent trusts someone, or believes that someone is trustworthy, they  
implicitly assume that the probability that the other agent will perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not detrimental to the trusting agent is high enough to consider 
engaging in some form of cooperation with the other agent (Gambetta 1988). 
Interorganizational trust entails the collectively held trust of organizational members 
toward the partnering company (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone 1998).  
Trust is important in maintaining long term cooperative relationships. Exchange 
relationships that feature personal trust will survive greater stress and display greater 
adaptability (Williamson 1985).  Where the relationship between two parties is subject to 
great uncertainty, trust should not be allowed to deteriorate (Davis 1996).  Investments 
that economic partners make to build trust often create economic value in the exchange 
relationship (Dyer and Chu 2003). 
The outsourcing relationship recently has received increased attention (Goles 
2001; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002; Lacity et al. 2000; Lee and Kim 1999).  The 
outsourcing relationship often has a mission critical status, as it provides support services 
for the organization’s processes and operations (Kern et al. 2002). Conflicts and 
misunderstandings between the client and provider can undermine an otherwise 
successful relationship and result in cancellation of the contract. If the client is not 
 29
satisfied with the existing relationship, alternatives for the management of the IS function 
are considered. Indeed, a KPMG Consulting study revealed that more than 70% of clients 
were not planning to renew their current contracts due to their dissatisfaction with the 
client-provider relationship (Goles 2001). The relationship between the outsourcing 
provider and the client is important in the evaluation of backsourcing. IOR theory 
provides a lens to examine the interaction in the relationship between the outsourcing 
client and provider, and the behavioral and structural factors that may lead to termination 
of such relationship and backsourcing. 
Marketing Channels Relationship 
Marketing channels research originated from microeconomics and behavioral 
research (Stern and Reve 1980), however, relationship management has since become its 
central research paradigm (Heide 1994). In particular, marketing channels literature 
examines exchange relationships and their development from the beginning of the 
interaction to the relationship dissolution.  The relationship development process includes 
phases of  awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment and dissolution (Dwyer et al. 
1987).  
The relationship dissolution phase in the marketing channels literature helps 
analyze the termination of client-provider relationships (Ping 1993; Ping 1995; Ping 
1999; Tahtinen et al. 2002) and can be useful in the evaluation of outsourcing 
relationships and backsourcing. Dissolution begins when one of the parties evaluates its 
dissatisfaction with the other party; it is followed by negotiation and public 
announcement of relationship termination, and then recovery from the breakup (Dwyer et 
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al. 1987). Research indicates that many of the reasons for relationship termination are 
related to the relationship itself, tendencies created within the relationship and potential 
weaknesses in interaction (Tahtinen et al. 2002).  
Interorganizational relationships can be terminated for various reasons.  
Satisfaction with the relationship, attractiveness of the alternatives, switching costs, 
service quality, trust and commitment are some of the factors that have been suggested to 
play a role in the ending of exchange relationships (Bolton 1998; Garbarino and Johnson 
1999; Halinen and Tahtinen 2002; Ping 1993). Client and provider are likely to have 
different reasons for ending the relationship and may have limited knowledge of the other 
party’s reasons (Tahtinen et al. 2002).  The majority of the reports on ending of the IS 
outsourcing relationships cite client organization as the initializer of the contract 
termination (Bushell 2003; Buxbaum 2002). On the part of the provider, it is important to 
be able to recognize the signals of potential contract cancellation and take action to 
preserve the relationship (Alajoutsijarvi et al. 2000).  
Before terminating the relationship, a client can voice its concerns to the provider 
in an attempt to have the issues resolved. Voice option can be an effective method that 
can either prevent termination of the relationship or complement the exit strategy 
(Hirschman 1970). In interorganizational relationships, voice can be used to bring the 
other party’s attention to the problems with the product or service, as well as negotiate a 
desired change in the contract or relationship.  When performance of the provider 
declines, voice on the part of the discontented client can be very useful in getting the 
provider to alter the state of affairs and improve the situation to the client’s content. It can 
also be used to constructively work out the relationship problems without offending the 
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partner (Ping 1999). However, extensive use of voice may also hinder the efforts of the 
provider and lead to negative returns (Hirschman 1970). While managing outsourcing 
relationships, it is important to establish a protocol for effective communication which 
specifies the points of contact and schedule of the meetings (Langfield-Smith 2000). 
Theoretical Framework 
The above theories addressing transaction costs, agency costs, core competencies, 
interorganizational relations and marketing channels are useful in examining the 
interorganizational relationship between the outsourcing client and provider and the 
factors that affect the backsourcing decision. As have been previously discussed, there 
are various economic, strategic and relationship reasons that have an impact on intent to 
backsource, and many different theories can be applied to the backsourcing phenomenon 
and investigation of its antecedents. However, to properly evaluate the client’s 
backsourcing decision, all of the various factors should be taken into consideration 
(Figure 2.2). While individually economic, strategic and relationship theories explain 
backsourcing, the combination of these theories helps to develop a more integrated and 
internally consistent theoretical lens. By articulating its analytical paradigm, each of the 
theories can be applied to the backsourcing phenomenon to produce a thorough 
theoretical explanation and help in reconciling the differences (Allison 1969).  
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 Figure 2.2. Backsourcing Framework 
Transaction costs economics and agency theory help identify various costs and 
related economic factors that play a role in the evaluation of backsourcing. Like any 
sourcing decision, backsourcing is based on comparison of the cost of performing 
services internally and the cost of performing the same services externally. Applying only 
economic theories to the backsourcing considerations would provide insights very similar 
to the outsourcing situation. However, even though economic theories have been widely 
applied to sourcing considerations, when used individually they  fail to consider other 
important environment, structure, and strategy factors that may affect organizational 
decisions (Lee, Huynh, Chi-wai et al. 2000).  
Core competency perspective brings in strategic considerations, and allows 
considering additional factors that have been reported to play a role in sourcing decisions. 
Indeed, over time the role of IS  can increase in importance, or the management  may 
realize that initial assessment of the IS contribution to the bottom line of the business was 
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flawed (Kern et al. 2001). Reviewing the outsourcing contract through a strategic lens 
could produce recommendations somewhat different from the purely cost focused 
perspectives.  
Both the economic perspective and the strategic perspective also ignore the 
importance of prior relationships that may have tremendous influence on future sourcing 
decisions (Lee et al. 2001). Thus, examining the relationship between the client and 
provider by applying interorganizational theory and marketing channels literature 
completes this multifaceted framework and provides important insight into the role of 
relationship success in backsourcing.  
The proposed framework triangulates multiple approaches through inspection of 
the existing evidence, articulation of the conceptual models employed in different 
theories, formulation of the possible explanations of the phenomenon based on the 
underlying logic of the various intellectual perspectives, and reflection on the questions 
being asked  (Allison 1969).  Various models that are applied to explain backsourcing 
intent are not exclusive alternatives. Each of the theories provides a partial explanation of 
the framework, what it emphasizes and what it leaves out (Allison 1969).  
Combining multiple theoretical perspectives provides opportunities for synergy, 
and improves the efficiency of research. It is especially appropriate in situations where 
the area of research is relatively unexplored (Kern & Willcocks, 2001). IS backsourcing 
is a new phenomenon in IS research, and there are no theoretical frameworks that have 
been applied to examine this issue. A review of backsourcing cases published in 
practitioners and academic literature revealed various underlying factors that can be 
grouped into economic, strategic and relationship motives.  All three perspectives are 
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fundamental to the sourcing relationships, and all three need to be integrated into a 
comprehensive framework, as each of the perspectives has a unique emphasis that 
contributes to the understanding of the sourcing relationship in its entirety (Kern et al. 
2001).  
By integrating these different views to explain the backsourcing decision, 
weaknesses of one view can be compensated by the strengths of another (Lee et al. 2001). 
Additional perspectives can help capture the greater complexity of the phenomenon 
(Eisenhardt 1989), and designing a comprehensive framework can provide guidance in 
studying the various aspects of backsourcing in a consistent manner.  
When combining multiple perspectives to explain a phenomenon, it is important 
that the employed perspectives are compatible or can be developed to be compatible 
(Willcocks and Lacity 1998). Transaction cost theory, agency theory and 
interorganizational relationships theory all assume that the companies are functioning 
under uncertainty, incorporating uncertainty into the analysis. The information systems 
field is advancing very rapidly and is full of business uncertainty. Assessment of the 
sourcing options may lead to different conclusions as the business situation advances.  
Another important consideration when applying multiple theories to a new 
research phenomenon is their applicability to the issue under consideration.  Transaction 
cost theory, agency theory, core competency perspective and interorganizational 
relationships theory have been previously applied in the IS outsourcing research. 
Marketing channels theory has been extensively used in marketing to examine exchange 
relationships and is introduced in this research to examine the ending of the outsourcing 
relationship. Costs, importance of the activities considered for sourcing and relationship 
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issues all play a significant role in the assessment of sourcing options. This dissertation 
focuses on the evaluation of the outsourcing arrangement and the decision to backsource.  
A review of backsourcing cases published in both practitioner and academic 
literature revealed that a majority of backsourcing activity was driven by various strategic 
factors.  The decision to backsource IS services is a complex process,  and the transition 
of IS functions back in-house is challenging.  There should be significant benefits to the 
company before backsourcing can be implemented. Strategic interests and goals 
dominate activities of any organization, and ineffective IS strategy is likely to require 
attention and change.  While the effect of economic and relationship factors can not be 
discounted, they can serve as additional reasons to bring the previously outsourced IS 
function(s) back in-house.  
The following chapter will discuss in detail the possible antecedents of IS 
backsourcing developed using transaction cost theory, agency theory, core competency 
perspective,  interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels theory. 
There is a certain interaction between the constructs in those theories: their approaches 
are intertwined. Integrating the concepts will allow to better address the backsourcing 
phenomenon by using the strengths of each theory and minimizing overlap (Kern et al. 
2001). 
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CHAPTER THREE. THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS OF 
BACKSOURCING 
Based on the analysis of various backsourcing cases in Chapter 1, several key 
factors have been identified that appear to affect the reversal of the outsourcing 
arrangement. Those factors include: cost savings, redefinition of IS role, structural 
changes in the organization, questionable performance of the provider, and tension 
between provider and client over the contract. All those factors map into three general 
categories: economic, strategic, and relationship. This chapter develops theoretical 
support for the influence of these and other various factors on a backsourcing decision. 
Taking into consideration economic, strategic and relationship motives involved 
in the backsourcing process, the conceptual factors underlying the intent to backsource 
integrate transaction cost theory, agency theory, core competency perspective, 
interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels literature.  The main 
focus is how these factors are involved in the evaluation of the current sourcing 
arrangement and information systems backsourcing. Various costs, the strategic role of 
IS, structural changes in the organization, and relationship factors are proposed to play a 
role in the evaluation of backsourcing.  
Research Framework 
 The make-or-buy decision that all firms face compares the costs of in-house 
production with market prices. According to economic theory, firms acquire goods and 
services in the marketplace when internal production of those goods presents comparative 
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cost disadvantages. On the other hand, when they have a comparative cost advantage they 
provide to markets goods and services. However, there are also costs involved in carrying 
out the market transactions. For a client, four major types of costs are salient in the 
evaluation of the backsourcing decision: production, transaction, agency, and switching 
costs.  
Another popular criterion for the IS sourcing decision is the role or strategic 
contribution of the IS function to the company’s end product or service. Certain activities 
are considered core for the company, and according to the core competency perspective 
those activities should be performed in-house, while less crucial activities that represent 
commodity type functions should be outsourced if possible. At the same time, IS 
products and services providers can maintain a niche by performing certain commodity 
services or producing IS products for a large number of clients.  Such specialized 
providers can focus on optimizing investments in their core business (IS services) 
(Levina et al. 2003), and thus offer clients lower cost solutions, while maintaining high 
quality service.   
While achieving cost savings by outsourcing IS to an outside provider, the client 
companies also may feel that they are losing control over the direction of IS in their 
organization (Lacity et al. 2001).  The outsourcing provider is in charge of keeping the 
technology up-to-date and applying it effectively to the needs of the client. When the 
requirements of the clients’ company or industry change, they are not too flexible in 
responding to those changes quickly as it is the provider who is in control of how IS is 
managed. In addition to changes in the role of  IS and loss of control over IS, some 
companies may decide to bring IS back in-house in response to structural organizational 
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changes such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers, or internal changes in 
management.  
Finally, a multitude of relationship issues arise during the years of the outsourcing 
contract. Tension may develop between parties over the contract, there could be instances 
of questionable performance on the part of the provider, or the provider may be unable to 
support the changing requirements of the client organization. Additionally, the provider 
may also experience dissatisfaction with the client, and feel that the efforts they are 
extending are not gratified by the terms of the contract and the payments that they 
receive. Both parties’ satisfaction with the outsourcing relationship plays an important 
role in the continuation of the relationship or its termination.  
The next sections discuss the role of various economic, strategic and relationship 
factors and their interplay in the backsourcing considerations. The list of factors 
considered in this analysis is presented in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1. Factors Involved in Backsourcing Decision 
Economic Strategic Relationship 
Asset Specificity 
Backsourcing Cost Benefit  
• Production costs 
• Transaction costs 
• Agency costs 
Switching Costs 
Change in the Role of IS 
Loss of Control over IS 
Internal Structural Changes 
External Structural Changes 
Outsourcing Service 
Quality 
Satisfaction with 
Outsourcing 
Trust in the Provider 
Voice Behavior 
Goal Conflict 
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Economic Considerations  
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Asset specificity is “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson 1989). 
Considering IS sourcing from the client’s perspective, asset specificity refers to the 
uniqueness of the service or product being outsourced. Customized products and services 
are considered to be highly asset specific and are not easily transferable to a provider 
(Grover et al. 1996). Only when asset specificity is low, the provider can offer a client a 
production cost advantage, because the provider is able to achieve smoother production 
schedules and greater economies of scale performing the same activities for multiple 
clients (Walker and Weber 1984). 
A major benefit of outsourcing is reduction in costs, which is not easily achieved 
by outsourcing highly asset-specific products and services, as customization usually 
requires more effort and expense by the provider.  Further, a company may find it more 
efficient (and less costly) to perform customized services in-house than to locate a 
provider that can accommodate its unique needs. The expense to coordinate asset specific 
activities is higher when the provider lacks the expertise or the skills necessary for 
completing the particular task. Since the activities require customization, the client is 
likely to spend more time detailing its requirements and needs. Any increase in asset 
specificity usually increases transaction costs (Walker et al. 1984; Williamson 1985), 
thus making outsourcing less beneficial.  
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When a client needs to find a suitable outsourcing provider to meet its specific 
needs, it may also mean increased costs for monitoring that particular deal.  The more 
idiosyncratic the providing firm’s investment is, the more likely the provider is to take 
advantage of the client by exercising distorted disclosure of information or not 
performing activities and services appropriately. If the client fears lack of effort on the 
part of the provider, the relationship between the two is likely to suffer and the client may 
incur additional costs for monitoring and restructuring the existing outsourcing contract.   
With highly asset-specific services and products, the production costs, transaction 
costs and also agency costs will be higher if compared to non asset-specific services and 
products. As a result the client’s perceived cost benefit will be lower when customization 
is required for their outsourced products and services. Consequently, highly asset-specific 
services are better to be managed in-house, and thus are likely to be backsourced if they 
were initially outsourced.  The client company can assess the uniqueness of the 
outsourced services and the capabilities of the IS outsourcing provider in performing 
those services, and decide to undertake the transition of those IS services in-house.  
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing  
Various costs are associated with the outsourcing arrangement. Their overall 
impact represents the cost advantage that is associated with the make-or-buy decision. 
Production costs include the cost of manufacturing a product or the cost of operations. 
Transaction costs refer to the effort, time, and costs incurred in coordination of external 
market activities. These costs result from processing transactions in the market 
(Gurbaxani et al. 1991).  Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
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bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests (Fama et al. 1983).  
These costs are incurred as a result of discrepancies between the goals of the client and 
the provider (Gurbaxani et al. 1991; Logan 2000). Cost benefit gained by outsourcing is 
the combination of internal and external costs associated with the outsourcing 
arrangement. It can be presented as the overall cost advantage achieved by getting the 
production costs benefits minus the costs associated with carrying out and enforcing the 
business deal (i.e. transaction and agency costs).  
Production cost advantage has been reported to lead to a greater degree of IS 
outsourcing (Ang & Straub, 1998). Outsourcing providers may be able to achieve cost 
savings for their clients for several reasons. Because of economies of scale, outsourcing 
providers may be more effective at negotiating bulk purchase, leasing arrangements and 
software licenses than independent clients could hope to be. They may be more 
aggressive in their use of low-cost labor pools, more realistic and creative in the 
structuring of leases, and better at enforcing tighter overhead cost control than their 
clients. They also may be more capable of managing excess hardware capacity, since the 
capacity can be used across a number of clients.  A cost advantage influences the decision 
to outsource, and it also plays a role in the decision to terminate the outsourcing contract 
and follow the backsourcing route.  Even though a company may desire to terminate the 
outsourcing contract for a variety of reasons, the higher alternative production costs 
compared to the costs currently offered by the outsourcing provider may be an 
impediment.   
Outsourcing entails unique transaction costs – searching, contracting, controlling, 
and re-contracting – that at times may exceed the transaction costs of having the activity 
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directly under management’s in-house control (Quinn et al. 1994). That can lead to loss 
of comparative advantage of the outsourcing arrangement and motivate the termination of 
the outsourcing contract. Transaction costs are important, but often underestimated, when 
the outsourcing contract is initiated. In addition, agency costs are often not adequately 
considered at the time of outsourcing.  Yet, mechanisms need to be built into the 
outsourcing company’s structure, operations, and information systems to ensure that the 
contract is being executed appropriately.  Each of these mechanisms carries associated 
costs. 
Substantial transaction and agency costs diminish the effect of the cost savings 
generated by decrease in production costs due to IS outsourcing, thus decreasing the 
overall cost benefit from outsourcing. Costly maintenance of the contract provisions has a 
negative impact on the success of the outsourcing and tends to play a role in the 
termination of the outsourcing. Unsuccessful outsourcing contracts are likely to be 
scrutinized and renegotiated or canceled upon reconsideration. Unsatisfactory experience 
and costly maintenance of the IS outsourcing contract can compel the client to consider 
other alternatives including backsourcing. 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
Another type of cost involved in the process of change in sourcing is switching 
costs. Switching costs refer to the effort, time, and investments incurred in undergoing 
change in sourcing.  Outsourcing can be forever. The time and expense necessary to 
actually migrate away from the outsourcer is substantial, changing the IS structure could 
be an incredible undertaking (Christensen et al. 1996). Even if lessons and strategies 
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learned from the outsourcing experience can be implemented in-house at lower costs, 
switching costs can be prohibitive.  Thus, even though performing IS functions within the 
organization can be more effective in terms of the overall cost benefit, moving the 
outsourced processes back in-house can require significant efforts and resources. There 
are large switching costs associated with IS sourcing decisions (Lacity et al. 1996), which 
can be an impediment to the return of previously outsourced functions back in-house 
after the termination of the outsourcing arrangement.  
Exorbitant costs associated with the IS outsourcing arrangement or lower 
expected costs of internal IS management are important considerations in the evaluation 
of outsourcing and the possibility of backsourcing. Cost considerations are the primary 
motive for an outsourcing make-or-buy decision and they play a significant role in 
justification of backsourcing.  However, the governance of IS is an important decision 
and there are other considerations involved in it.   
Strategic Considerations 
Strategic reasons can also play a role in the backsourcing evaluation. Similar to 
the insourcing vs. outsourcing decision, strategic contribution of IS function to the overall 
business of the organization has to be considered. Furthermore, structural changes in the 
organization, both internal and external, can prompt backsourcing.  
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
Role of the IS in the organization describes the mission of the IS function and its 
actual contribution to the company’s business operations (Premkumar and King 1992). 
Indeed, for some organizations IS activities are an area of strategic importance and 
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deliver unique value, and for others IS activities only play a supportive role. Processes 
and skills that are most critical for the business success represent the core competencies 
of the organization (Hamel et al. 1994). By focusing on core competencies, businesses 
are able to concentrate their resources on the activities that contribute the most to their 
operations.  Some of the activities that are necessary for the organization’s operations 
play a secondary role and can be considered a commodity.  These types of activities play 
a supportive role to the core business of the organization.  
Outsourcing can be used to achieve operational efficiency by focusing on the core 
competencies (Allen et al. 2002). Activities that support the main functions of the 
organization are generally good candidates for outsourcing.  However, strategically vital 
functions should be kept within the company as they are important to the company’s 
competitiveness and probably represent its core differentiating skills.   By outsourcing, 
organizations relieve themselves of performing an outsourced activity in-house, but also 
run the risk of losing the expertise in that area. Core competency perspective suggests 
that only commodity elements should be outsourced (Lacity et al. 1995).  
Changes in the positioning of IS can occur within the company over time. If the 
currently outsourced IS activity becomes critical to the client’s business and presents 
opportunities for a competitive advantage, management may need to reconsider its 
positioning within the company and bring it back in-house. Leaving it outsourced gives 
an opportunity to the competitors to learn about the unique utilization of IS and 
implement it within their organization. Consequently, the role of IS and its actual 
contribution to the company’s business operations is an important consideration at the 
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assessment stage in the outsourcing relationship and is a critical factor in the evaluation 
of the backsourcing decision.  
Internal and External Structural Changes 
External changes of corporate structure involve changes to the overall 
organization such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers. When such major changes 
occur in a company, the overall business strategy is likely to be reconsidered and aligned. 
IS managers are interested in keeping the IS structure aligned with the corporate structure 
(Davis 1996), and thus, changes to the IS department are likely to take place when the 
organization is restructured.  The previously existing arrangements within the old 
companies may not meet the needs of the new organization. In such cases the new entity 
formed as a result of the structural changes may reassess its strategy and decide to 
terminate the outsourcing contract and move the previously outsourced functions into the 
company’s internal IS unit (Bushell 2003). Once the requirements of the business change, 
which can often be the case when the size, product mix or strategy of the company 
changes, termination of the outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing may be the best 
solution for the organization.  
An organization can also undergo changes of the internal structure or power shifts 
within the organization, that can result in a new approach to the management of IS. New 
management in charge of IS or a new CEO can have a completely different perspective 
on the outsourcing of IS products and services. As a result, internal structural changes in 
the client company may lead to the reassessment of the outsourcing arrangement, its 
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termination, and subsequent return of the previously outsourced IS services and products 
back in-house. 
Loss of Control over IS 
One of the major problems that clients face with the outsourcing arrangement is 
the loss of control over IS direction (Bushell 2003; Lacity et al. 2001). Loss of control is 
characterized by the client’s reduction in ability to take action when things are going 
wrong (Huxham and Macdonald 1992). In the context of outsourcing contracts the client 
acts as a principal delegating certain IS activities to its agent, the outsourcing provider.  
Such delegation of IS activities results in loss of control for the principal (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997). To prevent significant loss of control, the client can chose to outsource only 
unimportant functions and activities (Aghion et al. 1997). Yet in many cases, IS activities 
are outsourced to gain access to the scarce IT human resources and latest technology, and 
not necessarily represent commodity services. By seeking outside expertise and 
competency, the client runs the risk of losing control over IS. 
As the business and environmental requirements change, organizational 
technology requirements are modified and need immediate attention. However, the 
provider may not always be able to meet the individual requests of the client in a flexible 
and timely manner, especially if they involve major changes.  As a result, the client can 
not adjust quickly to satisfy its technology needs, cope with the technology advancement, 
or take action when necessary. Such loss of control over the outsourced activities and IS 
direction may hinder the client organization’s competitiveness (Lacity et al. 2001). 
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Since outsourcing IS functions can hamper the client company’s ability to 
respond to competitive and environmental challenges in a timely manner, the contract  
has to include clauses about current and future technology requirements of the client 
organization (Behara and Gundersen 1995). If the contract does not account for 
technological changes, and once the client organization does not have control over the 
deployment of technology solutions, its business vitality is at stake. Consequently, the 
client organization may decide to terminate the outsourcing arrangement and undergo 
backsourcing to manage IS internally when there is a need for technology innovation and 
its cross-functional implementation (Behara et al. 1995).  
Strategic considerations, such as change in the role of IS, loss of control over the 
direction of IS, or structural changes within the organization, present the client 
organization with a choice to continue with outsourcing or return the outsourced services 
back in-house. All of these reasons represent significant changes in the organization and 
in the management of IS, thus, they require a change in the way IS is managed in the 
organization and are likely to result in backsourcing.  
Relationship Considerations 
Managing a relationship between the client and provider is one of the greatest 
difficulties. The companies are faced with a variety of challenges that include: achieving 
a consistent level of service, measuring responsiveness, improving service levels, 
resolving differences, tracking changes, and keeping down costs and prices (Violino and 
Caldwell 1998). A good client-provider relationship is critical for long-term success of an 
outsourcing arrangement (Grover et al. 1996; McFarlan et al. 1995; Willcocks et al. 
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1998), and it is one of the important reasons for continuation of the contractual activities. 
The length of the contract does not make the relationship long-term or short-term.  What 
is important is the way parties operate and it can make or break the relationship (Greaver 
II 1999). Termination of the relationship is one of the responses to problems within the 
exchange relationship (Hirschman 1970). When the outsourcing relationship is not 
satisfactory and results in termination, the client company may decide to bring the 
outsourced services back in-house. One third of all terminated contracts end up being 
backsourced (Lacity et al. 2001).   
Success of the outsourcing arrangement is dependent on the atmosphere that 
permeates the relationship between the provider and the client. Such atmosphere can be 
characterized by commitment and trust, cooperation and conflict, satisfaction and 
expectations, and power and dependency (Kern 1997). Research on customer retention 
suggests that service quality, satisfaction (Bolton 1998; Ping 1995), and trust (Garbarino 
et al. 1999) help maintain customer-supplier relationship and influence future intentions 
to remain with or leave the provider. Other factors also play a role in the termination of 
an outsourcing relationship. They can be as follows: goal conflict as perceived by the 
client, provider’s service quality as perceived by the client, client’s satisfaction with 
outsourcing, client’s trust in the provider and voice behavior of the client, all play a role 
in the evaluation of the decision to backsource.  
Goal Conflict  
Goal conflict, or the extent to which the goals of the outsourcing company and its 
provider differ, plays an important role in the development of the relationship between 
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the client and the provider (Anderson and Weitz 1989). The provider is contracted to 
execute the agreed-upon tasks at the performance levels specified in the contract.  The 
client enters the IS outsourcing relationship in order to receive IS products and services 
cost effectively. At the same time the client is expecting IS products and services to be 
value adding to their company. The provider is striving to deliver the required products 
and services, utilizing economies of scale by servicing multiple clients. Sometimes, the 
provider is not ready to adjust to the needs of an individual client, and is only interested 
in delivering commodity services. At such time the goals of the client and provider may 
disagree. When goals do not coincide and dissatisfaction of either one or both parties 
develops, the relationship may come to an end with the client withdrawing and taking 
outsourced activity back in-house. 
If the client and provider’s goals coincide then there is less conflict in the 
relationship and a better working atmosphere (Stern and El-Ansary 1982).  Misalignment 
of goals is likely to cause tension between the parties and as a result, affects the 
atmosphere in the relationship and the client’s satisfaction with the outsourcing contract. 
The provider’s actions in the interest of the client are motivated by the economic 
incentives that are part of the outsourcing contract. If the provider is exhibiting 
opportunistic behavior, the client is likely to be unhappy with the relationship and exhibit 
low satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement.  Whenever there is tension over the 
contract details, the overall client’s satisfaction is likely to decrease and lead to 
reconsideration of the outsourcing arrangement.  
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Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Service quality involves the conformance of the service delivered by the provider 
to the requirements of the client (Whitten 2003). Clients assess service quality by 
benchmarking the received level of service against the expected level of service. The 
smaller gap between the desired service and the perceived service results in the higher 
assessment of the service quality of the provider (Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman 
1993). Service quality involves five dimensions: tangibles, or the appearance of physical 
facilities, equipment, personnel , and communication materials; reliability, or the ability 
to perform a promised service dependably and accurately; responsiveness, or the 
willingness to help customers and to provide prompt service; assurance, or the 
knowledge and courtesy of employees and their ability to convey trust and confidence; 
and empathy, or the caring attitude which provides individualized attention to customers 
(Kettinger and Lee 1997).   
The quality of the service offered by the provider is important in the outsourcing 
contract. Service level agreements, as part of the outsourcing contract, specify the 
expected levels of the service. The quality and promptness of the provided outsourcing 
services is likely to have an impact on client’s overall satisfaction with outsourcing, as 
satisfaction reflects client’s feelings about the interaction with the provider (Susarla, 
Barua and Whinston 2003). When the client believes that it is receiving good quality 
service, it is likely to be more satisfied with the overall outsourcing relationship.  
An IS outsourcing client enters an outsourcing relationship to obtain IS products 
and services required for the successful functioning of their business. However, 
questionable service of the provider is a concern in 25% of the outsourcing relationships 
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(Lackow 2001). Continuous service performance below client’s expectations puts a 
negative strain on the relationship between the client and the provider. When the quality 
declines the client may consider exiting the relationship (Hirschman 1970). Low service 
performance leads not only to poor client satisfaction with the outsourcing relationship, 
but also can be a precursor to the termination of the outsourcing relationship and then 
backsourcing. 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship  
Client satisfaction with IS outsourcing reflects a positive affective state based on 
the outcomes obtained from the relationship with the IS services provider (Ganesan 1994) 
and plays an important role in the outsourcing relationship. Satisfaction with outsourcing 
is based on the satisfaction with various details of the outsourcing arrangement: 
timeliness and quality of the delivered services, provider behavior and performance on 
the contract, costs of services, and overall competitive advantage gained by contracting 
with the provider (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2000).  
The client’s satisfaction is built over the course of the relationship with the 
provider and is reflective of all the various events and service encounters that took place 
during the interaction. Overall satisfaction includes both the satisfaction with the working 
relationship with the provider, as well as the satisfaction with the provided service (Bitner 
and Hubbert 1994; Susarla et al. 2003). When the client is overall satisfied with the 
services, the outsourcing contract with the provider is perceived as more valuable (Ping 
1995). The satisfied client is likely to enjoy the benefits of the relationship and continue 
doing business with the provider.  
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Trust in the Provider 
Interorganizational trust refers to the willingness of one company to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another company  based on the expectation that the other 
company will perform a particular action important to the first company, irrespective of 
the first company’s ability to monitor or control that other company (Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman 1995). Interorganizational trusts promotes information sharing and openness 
between the partners (Zaheer et al. 1998), and as a result parties communicate better and 
their expectations of one another are more predictable, and there is less room for 
misunderstanding and conflict.  
Relational trust is specific to a particular exchange partner and is based on 
experience.  In terms of interorganizational relationships, relational trust does not imply 
trusting all the partners, but only trusting a specific counterpart (Zaheer et al. 1998). This 
research is concerned with the client’s trust in the provider of the IS outsourcing services 
and products, and thus, relational trust is of interest.  
Competitive ability, benevolence and integrity are the three characteristics of the 
trustee that traditionally appear to be important in the development of trust.  Competitive 
ability refers to a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that allow an 
organization to have influence within some specific domain. Benevolence describes the 
extent of goodness and positive orientation of the trustee towards the trustor aside from 
the profit motive. Integrity is comprised of the consistency of the trustee’s past actions,  
opinions about the trustee from other parties, sense of justice and the extent to which 
trustee’s actions are consistent with its words (Mayer et al. 1995). Trust in the partner is 
built based on the evaluations of ability, benevolence and integrity of that partner. 
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Interorganizational trust is built over time as the organizations engage in various 
activities. Satisfaction with the outsourcing deliverables and the overall relationship leads 
to the development of trust. Overtime, as the provider demonstrates greater reliability, 
consistent performance contributes to trust building (Hart and Saunders 1998). A satisfied 
client is likely to view the provider as trustworthy (Ganesan 1994; Garbarino et al. 1999), 
and thus, satisfaction with all factors of the outsourcing arrangement results in higher 
levels of trust on the part of the client.  
When outsourcing IS activities to the provider, the client assumes that the 
provider would make an effort to behave in accordance with the terms of the contract, 
adjust the contract as needed if market circumstances change, and would not take 
excessive advantage of the client even if such an opportunity presents itself (Dyer et al. 
2003). If a client company believes that the provider is trustworthy, they expect the 
provider to act on their behalf to the best of the provider’s ability. Overtime, as the 
provider demonstrates greater reliability, consistent performance contributes to trust 
building (Hart et al. 1998). Trust reduces the uncertainty associated with taking 
advantage of otherwise risky new opportunities (Hart et al. 1998), reinforces the prospect 
of continuity in a relationship (Hart and Saunders 1997), and has been reported to be the 
most important factor in selecting an outsourcing provider as reported by the IT managers 
(Violino et al. 1998). 
Trust encourages cooperation between the client and the provider in the 
outsourcing relationship (Gambetta 1988; Mayer et al. 1995) and helps develop 
synergistic relationships (Jones and George 1998).  Greater trust between the client and 
the provider is likely to build a stronger relationship and lead to its continuation. A client 
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organization that has high trust in the provider is likely to stay in the relationship 
(Anderson et al. 1989). Therefore, as the outsourcing contract progresses, termination of 
the relationship is unlikely where a client’s organization has high trust in the provider. 
But if the trust in the provider is low and the satisfaction with the outsourcing 
relationship is below expectations, the client may consider backsourcing to overcome 
these issues.  
Client’s Voice Behavior 
Dissolution of the relationship begins when one of the parties evaluates their 
dissatisfaction with the other party (Dwyer et al. 1987). When problems arise in the 
relationship, clients may respond differently to those issues. Some customers voice their 
concerns immediately to remedy the situation and avoid termination of the relationship, 
and some remain silent, hoping things will get better.  Voice behavior corresponds to any 
attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, either by 
appealing to the management directly in charge or to higher authority. An organization 
can resort to voice behavior instead of terminating the relationship in an attempt to 
change the practices, policies and output of the partner firm (Hirschman 1970).  
In an unsatisfactory relationship voice can be used to improve the conditions of 
the relationship (Ping 1999). In order to improve the relationship, voice behavior should 
be constructive and aim at alerting the partner to the problem and working on resolving 
the issue, but at the same time maintaining the relationship (Ping 1999).  The provider in 
this situation can decide to work with the client on improving the unsatisfactory 
characteristics of the products or services and resolve the relationship problems. In this 
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case, the client’s choice to voice their concerns helps promote the relationship and 
prevent termination.  
Clients use voice to attract attention and to warn the provider about the decline in 
performance or any other relationship issues. It is used as an alternative to an immediate 
termination of the relationship in hopes that the relationship can be salvaged. For the 
provider, it is an opportunity to respond to the client’s concerns, improve if necessary, 
and prevent the relationship from termination. For the client, voice is a chance to get 
better products or services, or even leverage their position.    The client is likely to resort 
to voice if there is a lack of alternatives to the current outsourcing arrangement and the 
termination of the relationship is undesirable (Hirschman 1970). In certain situations, 
voice behavior of the client can signal to the provider the intent to terminate the 
relationship. The client company may decide to backsource the IS services for reasons 
other than relationship factors, but use voice in an attempt to end the relationship with the 
provider.  
Voice effectiveness usually increases with its volume, but only up to a certain 
point (Hirschman 1970). Naturally, frequent expression of concerns and dissatisfaction, 
as well as requests and appeals for changes, lead to increased attention from the provider 
and improvements in products or services. For a while, increased voice serves to improve 
the relationship and helps to reduce the client’s intent to terminate the relationship. 
However, if discontented clients become too harassing, frequent complaints may 
discourage the provider and hinder the efforts to remedy the situation (Hirschman 1970). 
If the provider is not willing to make changes, termination of the relationship is inevitable 
and the client needs to seek other alternatives.  Effectiveness of voice reaches a limit at a 
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certain point, and any additional increase in voice only increases the client’s intent to 
terminate the outsourcing relationship with the provider.  
Even though the client’s satisfaction with the provider’s performance leads to a 
continuation of the relationship and long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994), voice 
behavior  can be detrimental to the relationship (Hirschman 1970). Voice can be used by 
clients not only to improve the situation but also to negotiate additional benefits or 
modify the contract. Clients engaging in voice behavior may be bargaining so much, that 
their protests at some point only further deteriorate the relationship, and the provider will 
not be interested in making any efforts to salvage or maintain such a relationship. Inflated 
use of voice is also costly for the client as it requires time and effort for negotiation and 
complaints, thus, making the outsourcing arrangement less efficient. In this situation, 
frequent criticisms and bargaining over the details of the contract would lead to 
destabilization of the relationship and its termination.   
Once the outsourcing relationship is to be terminated because of the problems in 
the client-provider relationship, the client company is likely to use its experience with 
this outsourcing relationship in assessing other alternatives. Backsourcing is the most 
likely solution in this case, especially if there are also cost benefits or strategic 
advantages associated with the decision.  
Triangulation of Factors 
Assessment of the outsourcing contract takes into consideration multiple business 
factors. The decision to backsource IS services is a complex one and the process of 
transitioning IS functions back in-house is not easy. Theoretical development above 
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argues for a multitude of factors that can have an effect on backsourcing, and some of 
them are bound to be more critical than the others. How do all of those factors interplay 
and which ones drive the backsourcing process?  
Change over from outsourcing to backsourcing is not an easy transition and it 
requires numerous resources (Christensen et al. 1996). As such, the outsourcing client 
company should have substantial reasons for this decision. Backsourcing is a strategic 
decision for the organization, a decision that is big, high-risk and breaks new ground 
(Hall 1999). As such, strategic decisions are made to accomplish determined objectives 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992). Proper evaluation of the existing outsourcing situation 
and the potential backsourcing benefits and impediments is necessary before committing 
to backsourcing. Several major factors combined should justify the backsourcing 
decision. No factor alone can by itself substantiate a significant strategic decision like 
this. This dissertation analyzes the factors that played a role in several backsourcing 
decisions, and through exploratory study, identifies the factors that are most critical for 
backsourcing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the procedures that were used to collect the data and 
analyze the factors involved in the backsourcing decision. First, it focuses on the case 
study research methodology that was used to investigate the backsourcing phenomenon, 
the evidence sources that were accessed and provides details of the organizations that 
participated in the study. Then it details the data collection procedures, and explains the 
interview guide development process and pretests. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the techniques used for data analysis, and a triangulation of the results and 
methods used to ensure the quality of the research methodology.  
Case Study Approach 
To investigate the factors salient in the decision to backsource and to examine the 
process of backsourcing, this research employed case study methodology. A case study 
research approach is popular in IS research, specifically, 15% of articles in major IS 
journals utilize case study methodology (Dube and Pare 2003). A structured program of 
multiple case studies is especially suitable for exploration of the relationship between 
information technology and corporate strategy (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987). 
Since this research focuses on the examination of the factors leading to backsourcing, and 
in particular, investigates economic, strategic and relationship reasons involved in the 
backsourcing decision from the client and the provider’s perspectives, a case study 
approach provides an opportunity to explore the relationship between the organizational 
factors and the decision to backsource IS activities. Qualitative procedures help to 
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understand the social reality at a greater richness and depth, and record such reality 
through a more complex, and subtle set of interpretive categories (Feagin, Orum and 
Sjoberg 1991). 
There are several reasons why a case study approach was deemed appropriate for 
this research. First of all, a case study is a preferred strategy when the researcher has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real life context (Yin 2003). The study of the backsourcing decision is embedded in the 
multitude of organizational decisions. The researcher has no control over the course of 
events, however, has an opportunity to observe the organizational processes and changes 
in the way information systems are managed. Backsourcing is a relatively new 
phenomenon and the case study approach allows examining it in its real life setting as the 
organizations undergo the evaluation of the current outsourcing arrangement and change 
over to in-house management of IS.  
Secondly, a case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin 2003). The main interests of this study 
are the organizational and managerial processes involved in the evaluation of the 
outsourcing contract and possible backsourcing, as well as the relationship between the 
provider and the client. The case study approach provides an opportunity to closely 
examine the interaction between the client and the provider in the outsourcing context 
and focus on the relationship between these two parties. It also permits the researcher to 
gather the first hand opinions and experiences of the outsourcing clients and providers 
and further analyze those in the overall real-life backsourcing context.  
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Finally, case studies can be used to explain the causal links in real-life 
interventions that are complex, or describe a real-life context in which an intervention has 
occurred (Yin 2003). Backsourcing considerations are complex, and backsourcing 
decisions are likely to be based on a large number of factors. Different criteria used in the 
evaluation of the outsourcing contract may not corroborate with one another, making the 
final decision even more difficult. Undergoing the reversal of the outsourcing contract is 
not an easy process (Christensen et al. 1996), and the case study approach is posed to 
provide interesting insights into the process and also allow for an investigation of the 
reasons for backsourcing and any impediments to that decision.  
Case studies are often critiqued for their lack of generalizability since they only 
focus on a few cases. However, it should be noted that case studies are not supposed  to 
generalize to populations (Yin 2003). Examining backsourcing considerations within a 
small number of client companies enables the researcher to generalize the findings to the 
theoretical underpinnings. The cases in this research approach do not represent a 
“sample”, and the researcher’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization) (Yin 2003).   
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study is the IS outsourcing contract between the 
outsourcing client and the provider. The contract refers to all of the contractual events 
and any interaction between the outsourcing client and the provider, regarding the 
outsourcing services, products or contract details, throughout the course of the 
outsourcing arrangement, from its very inception to the end. A client can be involved in 
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several unique agreements with different providers. As such, each outsourcing contract 
signifies a separate relationship that exists between the client and the provider. 
Selection of Cases  
An exploratory multiple case study approach was selected for the analysis of 
backsourcing.  Multiple cases  make the gathered evidence more compelling, analytic 
conclusions more powerful, and strengthen the validity and stability of the findings 
(Miles and Huberman 1984; Yin 2003). The selected cases need to be appropriate and 
demonstrate a fit to both the purpose of the research and the phenomenon of interest 
(Kuzel 1999). Because case studies rely on analytical, rather than statistical 
generalization, use of case studies helps to expand and generalize theories through 
replication (Yin 2003). The selection of the case study sites for this dissertation followed 
literal replication logic, which suggests selection of cases with different settings that are 
expected to achieve similar results.  
To isolate the factors that are critical for backsourcing, this research focused on 
companies that ended the outsourcing relationship to backsource the previously 
outsourced IS operations. This approach provided an opportunity to compare the different 
decision processes and settings for the backsourcing situations. Specifically, multiple 
cases were needed to answer the main question of this study: “Why do IS outsourcing 
clients decide to backsource?” and to compare the backsourcing decision and transition 
to backsourcing across different organizations that have experienced outsourcing.  
There are different purposeful sampling strategies available for case site selection. 
Theory based strategies seemed most appropriate for this dissertation. Theory determined 
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cases use either criterion, theoretical or confirming-disconfirming strategies (Shakir 
2002). Criterion based sampling strategy suggests selection of cases based on some 
predetermined criterion. Theoretical sampling strategy represents cases that manifest a 
particular theoretical construct and are used to examine it in detail, and confirming or 
disconfirming strategy seeks cases that elaborate on initial analysis and test variations 
(Patton 1990). Criterion based sampling strategy is used for this research to select 
companies that have experienced the reversal of the outsourcing arrangement, and 
subsequent backsourcing.   
Continuing with the criterion based sampling strategy, the researcher sought out 
companies that were differentiated on the role of IS and structural changes in the 
company.  The first criterion was selected because core competency perspective suggests 
that functions and activities that make significant contribution to an organization success 
should be kept in-house. The choice of companies for the study was, thus, driven by the 
role that IS plays in their organization. Companies where IS was expected to play a 
supporting role, as well as companies where IS was perceived to be a critical component 
of company’s business, were selected for the study.   
The second criterion that was used focused on the internal structural changes in 
the company. Power shifts within organizations can have an impact on the backsourcing 
decision. Consequently, the companies also were selected to be different in terms of the 
internal structural changes. Some of the companies had changes in the top management 
around the time of the reversal of the outsourcing contract and some of them continued 
on with the same management.  
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Yin (2003) suggests that a satisfactory number of cases for a literal replication 
study is two or three.  In particular for this study, three companies that have recently 
undergone backsourcing were selected (Table 4.1). One of the companies had four 
separate IS outsourcing contracts; three of those contracts were terminated and brought 
back in-house. Since the unit of analysis for this research is an IS outsourcing contract, 
the total number of individual contract cases is six. Patton (1990) points out that the most 
interest is in any common pattern that emerges from great variations. To address the issue 
of maximum variation of the case studies, selected companies were of different size, 
represent different industries, and have different profit orientations.  The final criterion 
that was used for the case study selection calls for the selection of companies that have 
made the backsourcing decision within the past three years. This time frame ensured that 
the interviewees have better recall of the details of the outsourcing experience and 
subsequent backsourcing. 
The following subsections present the description of three companies. These cases 
represent companies that decided to bring the previously outsourced functions back in-
house. Additionally, the cases differ in terms of the role of IS and internal structural 
changes. These cases are especially selected to make the findings more representative and 
to gain a better understanding of a broad range of backsourcing processes. 
Company One - Alpha 
An international company that employs 7,500 people and has undergone recent 
reversal of outsourcing was selected as the first case study site. This company provides 
support and services that enhance supply chain management for their clients. The 
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company has over 400 service centers in almost 40 countries with more than 100,000 
customers worldwide. The company strives to differentiate itself from its competitors 
through quality of service delivery, the application of technology, innovative products, 
and the ability to offer a lower cost solution to customers. The company had almost U.S. 
$2.5 billion in sales in the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2003.  
The company currently has 350 IS professionals on its staff. Originally, 
subsidiaries in different countries managed their IS operations individually.  United 
States, continental Europe, United Kingdom and Australia all had separate service 
agreements with various IS outsourcing providers that handled the organizational IS 
needs. However, recently the company worked its way out of all the outsourcing 
contracts globally and now runs its IS operations from its headquarters in the United 
States.  
Company Two - Beta 
The second company that was selected for the case study is a non-profit 
broadcasting station. The station serves the 13th largest market in the US and has been on 
air since 1958. The station’s revenues for 2004 were almost U.S. $10 million, and it 
currently has 48 employees. The station exists through direct financial support of the 
community with over half of the revenues generated through its member contributions. 
Approximately 39,000 members from 16 different counties support the station. The 
station employs two IS professionals to support its business operations.  
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Company Three - Gamma 
The third case study company was a non-profit organization in the broadcasting 
industry. With revenues of U.S. $6.2 million for the fiscal year 2003, its main source of 
revenue is donations from the members. The station employs 52 full-time staff, and 
currently has almost 30,000 members that support the station through donations.  One 
full-time individual supports the IS needs of the station.  
Table 4.1. Case Study Sites Key Information
Company 
Details a
Company One: 
Alpha 
Company Two: Beta Company Three: 
Gamma 
Industry Supply Chain Broadcasting Broadcasting 
Revenues  
(U.S.$ millions) 
2,500 10 9.6 
Employees 7,500 48 52 
IS Employees 350 2 1 
Action after 
Outsourcing 
Backsourcing 
Continuation of 
outsourcing 
Backsourcing Backsourcing 
Some re-outsourcing 
Outsourced 
Services 
Data Processing 
Network 
Infrastructure 
Data Processing Data Processing 
a. Company information is based on Hoover’s Online Business Directory 
 
Data Sources 
The case study can rely on several sources of evidence: primary documents, 
archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observation and participant 
observation. When doing a case study, it is beneficial to utilize multiple sources of 
evidence converging on the same set of facts (Yin 2003). This section focuses on the data 
sources that were used for the case studies, since a clear description of the data sources 
and the way they contribute to the findings of the research, ensure the reliability and 
validity of the results in the case research (Benbasat et al. 1987).  
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To examine the factors that may lead to backsourcing, several sources of evidence 
seemed appropriate; in particular: primary documents, archival records and interviews. 
The opportunity to collect data from many different sources is a major strength of case 
studies (Yin 2003). First of all, the use of multiple sources of evidence allows addressing 
a broader range of issues. Additionally, when the data is really triangulated, the facts or 
findings of the case study are supported by more than one source of evidence. This way, 
the potential problem of construct validity is addressed through data triangulation since 
multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 
2003).  
Interviews were the main source of evidence in all conducted case studies (Table 
4.2). Various documents and archival data were used to augment and corroborate the 
evidence collected through the interviews (Yin 2003). Archival records included publicly 
available financial statements, annual reports and organizational charts. Documents 
included communication between the client company and their IS outsourcing providers, 
such as complaint letters and contract agreements, internal documents detailing the 
organizational mission and documents pertaining to the backsourcing transition.  
Initial research on the case study companies and their respective industries was 
done using publicly available materials. Company websites were utilized to obtain 
mission statements, annual reports, financial statements, staff listings and learn about the 
company’s business.  Hoover’s Online Directory of Business was searched for company 
fact sheets and basic information. Additionally, other available online materials were 
perused to gain industry insights. Organizational charts and news announcements, 
pertaining to management changes, were used to examine changes in both external and 
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internal organizational structure and to capture the structural changes in the organization 
as one of the possible motives for backsourcing. 
The informants were requested to share any documents that they had at their 
disposal, related to either the outsourcing experience or the backsourcing transition. 
When available, the researcher perused the documents at the company’s office. No 
copying of the documents was allowed in any of the case companies. The documents 
were helpful in verifying the dates of the IS outsourcing contracts, names of the 
individuals involved in the outsourcing and backsourcing activities, and gathering overall 
corporate information. In some cases, the researcher was able to obtain the 
communication between the client and provider. It was informative in highlighting the 
disagreements and issues that arose during the outsourcing contracts. Service records and 
communication with the provider, related to the prior IS outsourcing arrangements, 
provided data to ascertain service quality of the IS outsourcing and also satisfaction with 
IS outsourcing. Complaint letters were used as a measure of voice behavior on the part of 
the client and were analyzed for presence of any indication of the loss of control over the 
IS.  
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Table 4.2  Data Collection Sources 
Data Sources  
Constructs of Interest Archival Records Interview Company 
Documents 
Cost Advantage  X  
Asset Specificity  X  
Switching Costs  X  
Change in the Role of IS  X  
Structural Changes X X  
Loss of control  X X 
Goal Conflict  X X 
Trust  X  
Service Quality  X X 
Satisfaction  X X 
Voice  X X 
Other information   X  
 
Interviews 
Interviews were the essential source of the case study evidence since this 
particular research and case studies focused on the organizational affairs and 
interorganizational relations (Yin 2003). Before data collection, an approval to collect 
data through interviews was received from the university’s Institutional Review Board 
(Appendix A). Interviews were conducted with the various executives of the company, as 
well as other senior and junior personnel involved with outsourcing and subsequent 
backsourcing, using a semi-structured interview guide (Appendix B). The interviews 
focused on the experience of the individuals with the IS outsourcing, and were intended 
to explore the issues associated with the termination of the outsourcing relationship and 
with backsourcing. Since individuals within the company may have different accounts 
reflecting their own experience, motives and involvements with the IS outsourcing 
provider (Ping and Dwyer 1992), multiple responses from various individuals involved in 
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the process were solicited. The initial interviews with the main informant were used to 
generate a list of people who were involved in the backsourcing decision and also in the 
transition process from outsourcing to backsourcing.  
Most interviews were conducted in person and lasted between 30 minutes to two 
hours. Before each interview, informants were asked to complete written consent forms 
which were kept by the researcher. A permission to record the interview was received 
from each interviewee, and all interviews were tape recorded to ensure the complete  
capture of the interviewee’s response and to assist the researcher in concentrating on the 
direction of the discussion (Rosenthal et al. 1991). While tape recording an interview 
makes some subjects more apprehensive, and may interrupt the interview (Taylor and 
Bogdan 1998), it allows the researcher to capture the subject’s responses for future 
thorough analysis.  
Every effort was made to keep meticulous record of all the data in the case 
research,  as it helps enhance the validity and reliability of the study (Benbasat et al. 
1987). After the meeting, each interview was transcribed by the researcher or a research 
assistant. During the transcription, every effort was made to reflect the interview as fully 
as possible by being verbatim (Seidman 1998). Once transcribed, the interview was 
reviewed by the researcher for any inconsistencies. In the case of questionable sentences, 
the researcher went back to the tape to verify the text. Afterwards, transcriptions of the 
interviews were forwarded to the interviewees for review. 
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Development of the Interview Protocol 
Important characteristics of a qualitative interview design are that it is flexible, 
iterative, and continuous (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Open ended questions were used in the 
semi-structured interview guide to allow respondents an opportunity to expand on their 
answers (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991). Questions dwelled on the issues identified in the 
theoretical development, and in particular, addressed the change in the role of IS in: the 
organization, structural changes, loss of control over IS, goal conflict, service quality, 
satisfaction, voice behavior and trust in the provider. Additionally, the interview explored 
other possible reasons for backsourcing as identified by the informants and their 
experiences with outsourcing and backsourcing. Table 4.3 lists the mapping of the 
questions in the interview guide to the constructs of interest.  
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Table 4.3 Mapping of Interview Protocol Questions to Theoretically Derived Antecedents 
Lens Construct Questions 
Asset 
Specificity 
1. If you think about your company’s IS processes, how do they 
differ, compared to other companies in the same industry?  
2. Can you think of any unique technical skills, extensive business 
knowledge or substantial investments in equipment on the part 
of the outsourcing provider that your company requires? 
Cost 
Advantage 
1. What kind of cost savings did your company achieve by 
returning the previously outsourced services back in-house? Ec
on
om
ic
 
Switching 
Costs 
1. How long did the transition from outsourcing to in-house take? 
2. What were the difficulties during the transition from 
outsourcing to backsourcing? 
3. Were there any extra costs involved in the transition? 
Change in 
the Role of 
IS 
1. Can you think of any changes in the way IS was utilized in your 
company during the outsourcing contract? 
a.  Change in the role of information systems in the success 
of your company? 
b.  Change in your company’s expertise in information 
technology and understanding how it can be used in your 
organization?  
c.  Change in the competitive advantage that information 
systems offer your company? 
Structural 
Changes 
1. Did your company recently merge with or acquire another 
company?  
2. Can you tell me of any significant changes in the management 
that your company has undergone during the outsourcing 
arrangement and during backsourcing? S
tr
at
eg
ic
 
Loss of 
Control 
1. When you had some special requests to the provider, were they 
able to meet them in timely and flexible manner?  
2. Can you think of any changes that you requested from the 
provider and tell me about how they responded to your requests 
for changes?  
3. Do you think your company had control over the IS processes that 
were handled by the Outsourcing Provider and why?   
4. During the outsourcing contract did you feel your company was 
able to respond to competitive and environmental challenges in 
a timely manner? 
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
Goal 
Conflict 
1. Can you tell me of any significant disagreements (if any) between 
your company and the Outsourcing Provider during the time of the 
contract? 
a.  About specific way work is done or services are provided? 
b.  About goals and priorities of outsourcing? 
c.  About specific terms of the relationship between your 
organization and Outsourcing Provider? 
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Lens Construct Questions 
Satisfaction 1. What did you think about the  
a.  IS service performed by Outsourcing Provider?  
b.  Customer support by Outsourcing Provider?  
c.  Relationship with Outsourcing Provider?  
Service 
Quality 
1. What did you think of the quality of service provided by the 
Outsourcing Provider? 
a.  Physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of staff 
b.  Willingness to help customers and provide prompt 
service 
c.  Ability to perform the promised service dependably and 
accurately 
d.  Knowledge and courtesy of employees 
e.  Caring, individualized attention 
Trust 1. What did you think about the 
a.  Honesty and accuracy of deadlines set by Outsourcing 
Provider?  
b.  Reliability of the computer systems of Outsourcing 
Provider? 
c.  Willingness of Outsourcing Provider to share 
information?  
d.  Outsourcing Provider’s adherence to agreements?  
Voice 1. What kind of concerns did your company have about the service 
that it was receiving?  
a. How did you communicate those concerns to 
Outsourcing Provider’s representatives? 
b. How did the provider react to those communications? 
2. What kind of changes if any did your company suggest to 
Outsourcing Provider if there was a problem? 
a. How did your company work with Outsourcing Provider 
to help improve the situation? 
 
In addition to the above questions, the informants were also asked about their 
overall experience with outsourcing, their company’s IS situation after the termination of 
the outsourcing relationship, and their experience with backsourcing. Each informant also 
named their reasons for backsourcing the discussed outsourcing contract. General 
information about the company, the informant’s role in the company and in outsourcing 
and backsourcing and their thoughts on backsourcing, were also collected.  
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During the development of the interview guide, care was taken to establish the 
best sequence of questions and ensure the best wording of the questions. Cognitive 
interviews with MIS professionals were conducted to assure the relevancy of the 
questions in the interview guide as well as the flow of the interview discussion and 
proper wording of all items (Dillman 2000).  Questions dealing with the sensitive issues 
in the outsourcing relationship, termination and backsourcing, were placed at the end of 
the questionnaire.   
Data Analysis 
Development of Case Descriptions 
Following the guidelines of the Case Study Protocol (Appendix C), case 
descriptions were composed for each of the cases. A description of the company was 
compiled based on the collected archival data and interviews. Then, the company’s IS 
operations were detailed using the data gathered through interviews and other archival 
sources. It was followed by the description of the provider, the IS outsourcing contract, 
and then details of the subsequent backsourcing process. Quotes from the interviews were 
used when necessary, to highlight and support the case descriptions. Excerpts from the 
interviews with multiple respondents helped triangulate and produce a more accurate 
account of the events.  
Since reliability depends on explicitly described observational procedures (Kirk et 
al. 1986), data collection followed the steps specified in the case study protocol. 
Additionally, a digital case study database was created to ensure the reliability of the case 
study (Yin 2003).  All collected data was organized by case. Case study notes for each 
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case were stored in individual computer folders, in a way that other persons can 
efficiently retrieve them at a later date. Interview transcripts, corporate documents found 
on-line and notes of the reviewed corporate documents inside the company were 
organized, categorized, and made available for later access. For case company Alpha, 
case documents were additionally organized by each of the four outsourcing contracts. 
The researcher used the statements made by various informants for illustrating each case.  
No analysis of the interview data was done until all interviews were completed for 
each case. This approach minimized imposing what was learned in earlier interviews, on 
the participants that were interviewed later (Seidman 1998). If something was not clear in 
the transcript, the tapes allowed going back to the source and checking for accuracy.  For 
analysis, all interviews that related to each case of backsourcing were combined on a 
single transcript. The first step in reducing the text of the interview was to read the 
interview and mark the passages that: 1) related to the overall information about the 
company and descriptions of the information system functions, and 2) that described the 
initial IS outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing. After that, the individual passages 
were grouped into one of the above mentioned categories. The paragraphs pertaining to 
overall information about the company and description of information systems were used 
to compose case descriptions. The second category was further analyzed to mark the 
statements describing details of the outsourcing contract (SLA, contract terms, dates of 
contract, history of the contract, reasons for outsourcing, costs etc.). Those passages were 
used to create the outsourcing contract description. Additionally, statements detailing the 
backsourcing transition (dates of backsourcing, steps undertaken to transition back in-
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house, negotiation of contract termination, set up of the in-house operations) were used to 
compose a brief description of the backsourcing for the case descriptions.  
Data Coding 
Miles and Huberman (1984) methodology for textual pattern coding was 
employed during the analysis of interviews. Following the guidelines of the Case Study 
Protocol (Appendix C) all text passages from all the interviews that related to the 
outsourcing contract and backsourcing experience for each case were combined on a 
single transcript. Then a coding schema was developed, based on earlier theoretically 
derived backsourcing antecedents. A preliminary code schema was based on an initial 
conceptual model or literature review (Crabtree et al. 1992). Each of the constructs was 
represented in the schema and a brief description of the construct was provided (See 
Appendix D for final coding schema). Additionally, three more categories were added to 
the schema: details of outsourcing contract, transition from outsourcing to backsourcing 
and benefits of backsourcing (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Coding Schema Categories 
Construct Categories Original Extra Categories Emerged Categories 
⋅ Asset Specificity 
⋅ Cost Benefit or Disadvantage 
⋅ Switching Costs 
⋅ Change in the Role of IS 
⋅ Control over IS 
⋅ Changes in the Management 
⋅ Service Quality 
⋅ Satisfaction with Outsourcing 
⋅ Trust in the Provider 
⋅ Goal Conflict  
⋅ Voice Behavior 
⋅ Details of Outsourcing 
contract 
⋅ Transitioning from 
Outsourcing 
⋅ Benefits of Backsourcing 
⋅ Multi Provider Situation 
⋅ Provider’s Perspective 
⋅ Power 
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To increase coding reliability, two individuals had to independently code the 
transcripts of one case. Coding had to be applied to naturally occurring chunks of text in 
the transcript. Naturally occurring chunks of text could be complete paragraphs, blocks of 
sentences or paragraphs, individual sentences, or even a part of a sentence, if it could be 
logically related to one of the categories. Initially the coders met to discuss the coding 
schema and ensure that the construct definitions were clear to both coders. A practice 
coding was done using several pages of the transcript and the differences in coding were 
discussed, reconciled and the coding schema was adjusted to reflect the modified 
construct descriptions.   
After that, both individuals independently used the revised coding schema to code 
the transcript text for one case study. If a passage did not fit into any category, it was 
assigned to an “Other” category. All of the text had to be assigned to one of the existing 
categories or to an “Other” category. Once coding of the whole transcript was complete, 
the coder reviewed all of the “Other” category quotes to decide if any additional 
categories surfaced. If a new category emerged, it was discussed with the second coder 
and added to the coding schema. 
When the coding was complete, the two coders met to reconcile the coded 
transcript. They went through the text and marked all the coded passages where they did 
not agree on the category. For those passages, after some discussion, they assigned the 
reconciled coding that was used in later analysis. The interrater agreement was calculated 
using the results from the coding reconciliation exercise. All other cases were coded by 
the main researcher using the revised coding schema and the discussions with the second 
coder.  
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Interrater Reliability 
To calculate the interrater agreement, Cohen’s Kappa, a coefficient of the 
agreement was used. It is a well accepted standard to evaluate the interrater agreement in 
discourse and dialogue processing community (Di Eugenio 2000). To compute Cohen’s 
Kappa, a coding agreement matrix was constructed (Table 4.5). Every cell represents a 
frequency of occurrences where Coder One coded Category A and Coder Two coded 
Category B. The diagonal of the matrix represents situations where the coders were in 
agreement, i.e. coded the same category for the same particular chunk of text.  
The following formula was used to compute Kappa: 
reementExpectedAg
reementExpectedAgreementObservedAgKappa −
−=
1
 
where the observed agreement was calculated as the diagonal sum divided by the 
total number of coded items and the expected agreement by chance was calculated as the 
multiple row marginal times the column marginal and divided by the total number of 
coded items. 
527.0
08098.01
08098.05652.0 =−
−=Kappa  
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Table 4.5. Coding Agreement Matrix  
AST COST SWI ROLE LOSS MAN TRU SAT SQ CON VB TRA SLA BEN POW Other Total
AST 5 1 6
COST 5 1 2 8
SWI 3 1 1 5
ROLE 2 2
LOSS 6 2 3 11
MAN 2 2
TRU 0
SAT 2 2 1 5
SQ 1 3 1 1 6
CON 3 1 5 7 1 1 18
VB 1 1 8 3 13
TRA 1 7 1 1 10
SLA 1 4 2 8 1 16
BEN 1 3 1 5
POW 1 2
Other 1 1 1 2 5
Total 5 6 3 4 10 2 1 5 17 8 11 11 16 10 2 4 115
C
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r
 
T
w
o
Coder One
3
 
Cohen’s Kappa turned out to be .527. To assess Kappa’s significance, the 
Rietveld and Van Hout scale was used. According to this scale, Kappa between .41 and 
.60 indicates moderate agreement, and Kappa between .61 and .80 indicates substantial 
agreement (Rietveld 1993). Therefore, calculated Kappa indicated moderate agreement 
between the coders and was considered acceptable, especially that the maximum value of 
Kappa permitted by the marginals was calculated to be .811.  
ementChanceAgre
ementChanceAgretalsCategoryToKappa −
−∑=
1
min
max  
where minimum of category totals is the smaller of totals for each category (either 
row or column) and chance agreement is the proportion of agreement expected by chance 
(Cohen 1960). 
811.max =Kappa  
The maximum value of Kappa permitted by the marginals demonstrates that there 
is a portion of the agreement (1 - .811) that can never be achieved because of differing 
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marginals.  Discrepancies between coders in their distribution of units into categories, by 
nature, constitute disagreement (Cohen 1960).  
Synthesis of Results Within Cases 
Once the interview coding was complete, a matrix for each case was constructed 
by combining the chunks of text assigned to each coding category and arranging it by 
each interviewee with coding categories in rows, and informants in columns (sample 
matrix is provided in Appendix E). The researcher reviewed the quotes to determine if 
there were any differences in the depiction of each category by the informants across 
each case.  
The quotes in each cell were then used to create a review matrix that summarized 
each interviewee’s perspective on every coding category.  All cases in Chapter 6 present 
a table with a summary of comments made by the informants listed and by the construct 
that those comments described. If comments of the informant were contradictory, all 
perspectives were described in the cell. The summary matrix was then used to calculate 
the agreement between the informants on the status of each category during the described 
backsourcing events.   
In addition to discussing the details of the contract, each of the informants had a 
chance to name their primary and secondary reasons for backsourcing during the 
interview. Those reasons were combined into a table for every case. Comparing those 
reasons across the informants allowed triangulating the main reasons for backsourcing in 
each case.  
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Matrixes with quotes were used for descriptions of case results. First, the details 
of the passages coded ‘Details of Outsourcing Contract’ for each case, were examined to 
determine the reasons for initial outsourcing, if possible. Those reasons were briefly 
described in the beginning of each case results section. Further on, the analysis of 
backsourcing antecedents were structured around three perspectives: economic, strategic 
and relationship. Starting out with economic perspective, the quotes in the matrix for 
economic categories, asset specificity, cost benefit/disadvantage and switching costs, 
were reviewed. The researcher selected quotes from every informant that related to the 
construct and represented their opinion of the situation. Depending on the availability of 
material, more than one quote or sometimes none, were selected from each informant. 
Then, relying on the quotes, the researcher described the situation with respect to every 
construct and used quotes to support the story. For strategic and relationship categories, 
the same procedure was performed and the results compiled.  
To integrate the perspectives of the informants, the primary and secondary 
reasons for backsourcing of the contract were assembled in a table for every case. The 
most dominant backsourcing motives were identified and discussed. The impact of 
various constructs on the backsourcing decision was evaluated based on the quotes from 
the informants. The most dominant motive was also compared and reconciled with the 
prior discussion of backsourcing antecedents in the case. Finally, the interrelations 
between the constructs in the case and their impact on backsourcing were considered. 
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
In an attempt to answer the research question and identify the primary reasons 
that affect the backsourcing decision, Qualitative Comparative Analysis was used to 
supplement the above described procedures. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
was developed by Charles Ragin and can be used for statistical analysis of causal 
relationships when the number of cases is too small for standard statistical tests, but the 
complexity of data is too great for traditional qualitative approaches (Ragin 1987).  For 
this dissertation this method provided a further insight into the causal relationships 
between the constructs in the backsourcing model.    
QCA “uses the logic of Boolean algebra to determine the most parsimonious sets 
of inter-related conditions that explain the outcomes observed among a given set of case 
examples” (Fichman 2004). In this method all possible combinations of the independent 
variables are analyzed to determine which combination presents a set of necessary and/or 
collectively sufficient factors to produce a specified outcome.  The methodology is based 
on the assumption that factors affect the outcome differently depending on the presence 
or absence of other compounding factors (Fichman 2004; Ragin 1987).   
QCA uses a software algorithm to make multiple comparisons of combinations of 
variables. It constructs a truth table and continuously applies a minimization algorithm to 
select a subset of prime reasons sufficient to imply all configurations (Drass 1992). By 
using QCA, factors necessary and sufficient to lead to backsourcing were determined. 
Figure 4.1 presents the steps in QCA.  
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 Figure 4.1 Steps in Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Triangulation of the Results 
Triangulation refers to both the use of multiple data sources, such as 
documentation and informant interviewing, multiple informants and various records, and 
of multiple methods for data analysis (Crabtree et al. 1992). The study of a complex 
phenomenon such as information systems in an organizational setting is particularly 
suited for case research methodology that uses a wide range of data collection methods, 
both qualitative and quantitative, thus, increasing richness and flexibility of the research 
(Dube et al. 2003).  In this dissertation, several sources of evidence were used to capture 
the data for individual constructs under investigation and multiple informants were 
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interviewed. Use of multiple approaches allowed to establish a more complete picture of 
the phenomenon under investigation (Kelle 1995). Combining multiple data sources for 
the analysis of the same phenomenon is referred to as triangulation (Jick 1979) and it 
aims at identifying similar findings coming from different data sources (Sawyer 2001).  
Interview data was supplemented by the analysis of existing documents as 
interview results may reflect subjective opinions of individuals and thus may be biased. 
Documents, on the other hand, represent stable, unobtrusive and exact sources of 
evidence by reflecting communication among parties attempting to achieve certain 
objectives (Yin 2003). Complaint letters, organizational communication, organizational 
charts and other documents were used to corroborate and augment the data from the 
interviews. Use of multiple sources of evidence allowed reconciling the differences and 
developing a better and more integrated picture of the backsourcing process.   
During the data analysis two methods were used to identify the primary 
backsourcing antecedents. First, the primary factors were determined by triangulating the 
primary reasons for backsourcing in each case as reported by the informants. As an 
alternative, qualitative comparative analysis was used to determine factors necessary and 
sufficient to result in the backsourcing outcome. Using these two methods allowed 
reconciling the differences between the two methods and identifying the factors most 
salient in backsourcing.  
Ensuring Quality of Research  
Several concerns that are relevant for all empirical research involve the issues of 
validity and reliability. In case studies tactics to ensure validity and reliability can be 
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applied throughout the subsequent conduct of the study and not just at the research design 
stage (Yin 2003). This requires the researcher to maintain strict standards of research 
design, data collection, data analysis and case study write-up.  
Yin (2003) suggested that to increase construct validity the researcher should use 
multiple sources of evidence during data collection, so that convergent lines of inquiry 
are encouraged; the researcher should maintain a clear chain of evidence during data 
collection and also have the key informants review the draft of the case study report. In 
this research, all three tactics were utilized in attempt to increase construct validity. In 
particular, both interview data and archival written communication between the client and 
the provider was used to ascertain the relationship dynamics in the outsourcing 
arrangement. In order to maintain a chain of evidence the case study database was kept 
that contains the actual evidence as well as the circumstances under which the evidence 
was gathered, consistent with the procedures outlined in the Case Study Protocol 
(Appendix C). Finally, the final case write ups were shared with the key informants in 
each of the cases to ensure that the accounts of the events are accurate.  
In terms of external validity the case study approach relies on analytical 
generalization. In analytical generalization, the researcher is striving to generalize a 
particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin 2003). The results of six case studies 
are used to examine the factors critical in the evaluation of backsourcing.  
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CHAPTER FIVE. CASE SITE DESCRIPTIONS 
This chapter presents case descriptions for all of this dissertation’s case study 
sites. Following a case study protocol, it identifies evidence collected for each case and 
provides details of three case study sites. Each case description starts with an overview of 
the company and its industry, and then describes the IS activities and the role of IS. It is 
followed by the details of the outsourcing contract(s) and concludes with the details of 
the backsourcing decision and transition back in-house.  
Developing Case Descriptions 
Following Case Study Protocol case descriptions relied on multiple sources of 
evidence (interviews, documentation, and archival records). Using multiple sources of 
evidence for the same set of facts or findings allowed to develop converging lines of 
inquiry (Yin 2003). Triangulation was also achieved by using interview quotes from 
multiple informants to depict the same set of events. Multiple sources of evidence helped 
to better reconstruct reality and develop complete case descriptions. 
Company One - Alpha 
Alpha is a large logistics company that is involved in planning, implementing, and 
controlling the movement and storage of materials, in-process inventory, finished goods, 
and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption. Alpha is 
part of a consortium of three other companies, Delta, and runs operations in 38 countries 
with 7,500 employees. It has over 400 service centers globally that handle more than 
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100,000 customers worldwide. The company had almost U.S. $2.5 billion in sales in the 
fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2004 with annual sales growth of 4%.  
Sources of Evidence 
The initial interview at Alpha was conducted with the CIO of the company. This 
meeting was used to learn more about the company, IS operations, outsourcing 
experiences, and subsequent backsourcing. Through this interview, three separate cases 
of backsourcing were identified. The researcher and another person at the meeting took 
notes, which were transcribed immediately after the interview. The notes from both 
individuals were reconciled in the final interview transcript. This ensured accuracy of the 
recorded information. 
Shortly after the initial interview the CIO was replaced with another CIO (the 
interviewed CIO is further referred to as the former CIO). The new CIO was not involved 
in the prior outsourcing and backsourcing activities of the company, but provided 
introductions to other individuals within the company who were in charge of IS 
operations and were part of the backsourcing transition. As a result, an interview with a 
Vice-President of Global Infrastructure and a Director of IT Operations was set up. This 
interview was tape recorded and focused on the details of IS operations, and the 
researcher was given a tour of the IS facilities in the company. Three separate 
outsourcing arrangements that ended up backsourced were confirmed during that 
interview.  
Following two introductory interviews, all other interviews were conducted using 
a structured interview guide (Appendix B) and were tape recorded with the interviewees’ 
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permission. Interviews concentrated specifically on outsourcing experiences and 
subsequent backsourcing. The Director of IT Operations was interviewed again, as well 
as the Global Telecom Program Manager. These two individuals introduced the 
researcher to other informants working for Alpha at international locations. Separate 
phone interviews were conducted with three individuals, in three global locations, who 
were involved in three different outsourcing contracts. Two respondents were involved in 
two outsourcing contracts each, and thus provided information about both of those 
contracts. Additionally, the now former CIO was contacted again and was interviewed 
using the structured interview guide. The individual interviews lasted between 45 minutes 
to two hours. To supplement the data gathered during the interviews, news reports and 
publicly available company information was used to compose this case description (Table 
5.1).  
Table 5.1 Company Alpha: Sources of Evidence for Case Description 
Non-structured Interview Semi-structured Interview Documentation 
• Former CIO 
• Vice President Global 
Infrastructure 
• Director of IT 
Operations 
• Director of IT Operations 
• Global Telecom Program 
Manager 
• Former CIO 
• Senior System Administrator 
• IS Director for Europe 
• European Relationship 
Manager 
• Hoover’s Online 
• News publications 
• Annual Report 
• Company History 
 
Company History 
Alpha started its logistics business locally in Australia after the World War II and 
over time expanded to service customers worldwide. In the 1950’s it was bought by a 
consortium of companies, Delta, and has been operating under the Delta umbrella since. 
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By the 1990’s, the company ran operations in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Americas and Africa. 
Corporate structure and ownership of Alpha was quite complex. Delta owned the Asia-
Pacific operations, yet another company, Epsilon, was the sole owner of African 
operations.  Epsilon and Delta partnered in a joint-venture that owned and operated 
European and North American businesses of Alpha (Figure 5.1). 
 
 Epsilon Consortium  
Delta 
JV 
50/50 
ownership 
Alpha – 
North America
Alpha - 
Europe 
Alpha-Africa Alpha – 
Asia-Pacific 
 
Figure 5.1 Ownership structure of Alpha before 2001 
From the period of inception until 2001, each global business unit was responsible 
for its own local operations, and businesses were not coordinated globally. It was 
increasingly difficult to integrate different regional businesses, and in 2001 Delta bought 
Epsilon. Alpha is now wholly owned by Delta and contributes 60% of Delta’s sales 
volume and revenues. The former CIO was with Alpha at the time of the acquisition and 
described the change in ownership:  
“It was a legal mess, it wasn’t clear who to invoice. Local parts were 
unwilling to share knowledge, expenses and profits. Before the buyout, we 
had to deal with two different masters. Things are easier now.” 
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After the acquisition in 2001 the organizational structure of Alpha changed. 
Global headquarters were established and a new CEO was hired to head the company.  
Regional president positions were abolished and one group of executives became in 
charge of the company (Figure 5.2). Alpha worked on centralizing its worldwide 
business, and repositioning itself as the world’s leading provider of logistics services. 
Two regional divisions Alpha-Europe, which also includes Asia-Pacific and Africa, and 
Alpha-Americas both reported to the global headquarters. The director of IT Operations 
referred to the new business model as the process of globalizing and standardizing:  
“So it is more or less an agreement that we have with all of these legal 
entities of Alpha. Now, we are in the process of globalizing and 
standardizing the environment to where we have a chair that sits on top of 
all the entities from a global standpoint and kind of sends down direction 
of centralization to everyone.” 
 
  
 Figure 5.2 Organizational structure of Alpha after 2001 
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Alpha has migrated from an uncoordinated local presence in multiple markets to a 
strong global presence and orchestrated strategy. The newly centralized Alpha strives to 
differentiate itself from its competitors through quality of service delivery, enabled by 
innovative application of technology, and the ability to offer a lower cost solution to 
customers. Following the changes in the organizational structure and responding to the 
business requirements, the IS activities of Alpha have also evolved over time.  
IS Activities 
Originally subsidiaries in different countries managed their IS operations 
independently.  This was the result of the overall organizational structure where the 
individual geographic regions, and sometimes even countries, were operating 
autonomously with little direction from above. In this format, the local businesses were 
responsible for providing their own IS support. United States, continental Europe, United 
Kingdom and Australia all had separate service agreements with various IS outsourcing 
providers that handled the organizational IS needs. The former CIO, who was in charge 
of IS from 1998 through 2003, described the status of IS operations in the 1990’s: 
“In the 1990’s clearly even through part of 1999, there wasn’t an overall 
plan of what we want to be in two years, three years, five years from 
information technology, architecture and structure standpoint, and 
business standpoint. Each of these countries before I came aboard, they 
didn’t report to one central location. They were sort of doing their own 
agreements, their own things their own way, whether it would be the 
provider contract with Tau, or Kappa or Iota, all those contracts were all 
done with just very local point of view, and very limited thinking. And I 
think the biggest motivation for most of them was can we save money this 
fiscal year as opposed over a period of time. I think that was the biggest 
flaw that they all had. And the other thing was even if they were all real 
viable and good agreements, not everybody knew what was going on. 
Because the business, each business unit itself were not all working 
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together and how can we help each other. You end up even if you are all 
working the same plan, but you are not talking.” 
 
Each European branch ran its own IS operations to handle programming, 
application maintenance, and IS support, hiring outside consultants when necessary. For 
printing and data processing, European locations had two different service bureau 
contracts, but infrastructure was handled by the same provider, Sigma, all over Europe 
(Table 5.2). Africa was self-sufficient with internal staff, occasionally bringing an outside 
consultant to help with a major project or conversion. In Asia-Pacific there was an 
internal programming and development staff, yet infrastructure and data processing was 
outsourced to Tau, the same outsourcing provider that handles IS infrastructure and data 
processing for the parent consortium Delta. Summarizing the variety of IS contracts and 
arrangements around the world the former CIO stated:  
“Each one of those countries had varying forms of contracts with vendors 
to do either just come in and do facilities type management or for them all 
to do all of the data processing and activities on their behalf remotely.” 
 
Table 5.2 Information Systems Arrangements at Alpha 
Location IS Activities Arrangement 
Application development Internal 
Data processing – UK 
E-mail servers 
Financial systems 
Outsourced to Iota 
Data processing – 
Continental Europe 
Outsourced to Kappa 
Europe 
Telecommunications Outsourced to Sigma 
Africa All IS activities Internal 
North America All IS activities Internal 
Application development Internal Asia-Pacific 
Data processing 
Telecommunications 
Outsourced to Tau 
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Alpha in North America had a data center and performed all application 
development and in-house support. They developed a core logistics application that 
supported planning and tracking of the customer’s products, and associated information, 
from the point of origin to the point of delivery.  Alpha USA has always been self 
sufficient and according to the Global Telecom Program Manager, managed IS 
architecture and applications internally: 
“We already had it in Alpha USA, it was in-house. Our data center was 
here. So we had core logistics application which was running on the main 
frame, we had Siebel, we had our e-mail system which was backed into 
Lotus Notes, now of course it’s Outlook. We had Novell File and Print 
Sharing, we had our customer facing application that allows customer to 
connect via the Internet and to order and look at their shipments, our 
website, all these kinds of things were insourced.”  
 
The former CIO joined the company in 1998. He was originally in charge of the 
Alpha North American IS group, however, when the global headquarters for Alpha were 
established in North America, he took over Alpha’s IS worldwide. His vision was a 
single central operation for Alpha and he spearheaded the new IS strategy for the 
company:  
“I was the one that caused the centralization in 1998. I started it and in 
1999 is when I physically said here is what we were going to do and had a 
road map of what we were going to do over a five year period.” 
 
The new centralized approach included building a new data center facility in 
North America. Since the core logistics application was running from this facility, Alpha 
had to make sure the facility could withstand weather damage to the systems and be up 
and running within 48 hours, in the case of a disaster. The new building had to have its 
own power generators and be damage proof. Centrally housed IS operations allowed 
Alpha to integrate all regional IS activities and design a better IS architecture. The new 
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global model involved standardized global infrastructure managed centrally from one 
location. The Global Telecom Program Manager explained this decision:  
“Alpha was by then divided in several areas: US and Europe that didn’t 
talk to each other and had their own systems. And we decided to build a 
global network and we decided to be not any more into managed model, 
where the service provider manages your equipment.” 
 
Since the new facility was supposed to handle worldwide IS support, the volume 
and higher utilization rate allowed Alpha to justify the cost. It was also easier to control 
and easier to manage by following common procedures throughout the organization. 
Bottom line, the centralized facility allowed Alpha to achieve economies of scale similar 
to any large outsourcing provider. The Director of IT Operations bragged about Alpha’s 
IS success: 
“Based on several surveys that we have done, one being Gartner, we 
actually run about 40% under the norm, of what normal data center 
operations and IT operations would cost because of that factor.”  
 
Alpha currently has 350 IS professionals on its staff, with about 200 of those 
employed at the company’s headquarters. They handle everything from proprietary 
application development that supports the logistics business, to enterprise wide financials 
and warehousing.  They provide the help desk support and global network administration 
for Alpha. The Vice President of Global Infrastructure explained the reasons behind 
Alpha’s effectiveness: 
“We have a lot of people here who have experience in other companies 
and our take on it is rather than being a firm that says we don’t have the 
expertise, we think that with a small group of key performers we can 
provide whatever services the outsourcer had. And we can react in faster 
or timely manner with in-house resources.” 
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Alpha’s business is heavily dependent on the support from IS. Implementing and 
tracking the delivery of customers’ products, and then invoicing customers for performed 
services is done by Alpha’s proprietary logistics application.  The perception of the role 
of the IS by Alpha’s management has evolved over time. The former CIO, who initiated 
and oversaw the centralization of IS, perceived IS as the main component of a successful 
logistics operations. He left the company in 2003 when he was replaced by a new CIO. 
The current top management of Alpha views IS simply as one of the overhead costs to 
run the main business of the company, i.e. logistics. Such perception seems to depend 
heavily on the individual and their perspective on the role of IS. The Vice President of 
Global Infrastructure mentioned that currently IS is perceived as cost to the business by 
the top management of the company: 
“[Former CIO] used to say ‘We are really an IT company, that happens to 
rent containers.’ Ok? Current CEO is a 180 degrees in another direction. 
He does not even think about IT. He does not think about anything except 
the business. Even if someone says let’s have power in the plug in the wall 
and telephones on the desk, he just expects it to work. We are an enabler 
for the business, but he does not really consider us as enabler as much as 
simply a component of a business that has to work as it is intended to 
work. So therefore when we make magic, it’s not really magic to him. It’s 
just what is expected.” 
 
IS managers believe IS plays a crucial role at Alpha. It is not only enabling 
Alpha’s business, but also is an integral part of Alpha’s operations. Describing the role IS 
plays at Alpha, the Vice President of Global Infrastructure accurately pointed out: 
“And that’s because Alpha is such an IT driven organization. You don’t 
move 200 million pallets around the globe with a spreadsheet. Not an 
ability let’s say someone can call up today and say I want the order 
tomorrow and it gets there. It’s just the way business has to go.” 
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Currently Europe and the Americas completely migrated to the new systems that 
are managed out of the centralized location in North America. Africa is scheduled to 
transfer from legacy applications to the new system in 2005. The only region that still 
outsources network management and data center applications is Asia-Pacific. It is also 
slow in converting to the global financial and ERP system.   
Alpha is part of the consortium of companies, Delta, which includes three other 
companies. Being the parent company, Delta aggregates the demand for IS equipment to 
negotiate better deals with the suppliers and attempts to standardize some other 
operations. The former CIO indicated that there is collaboration between the members of 
the consortium:  
“The child companies do collaborate somewhat. For example, contracts 
with Dell and Microsoft are managed all together, they also are using 
consistent e-mail systems, share project management methodologies, share 
security strategies, IP address management.” 
 
Alpha recently backsourced most of its outsourcing contracts globally. So far the 
new IS strategy for the company has proved to be successful and cost effective. It is 
based on single central operation and allows Alpha to integrate most of the company IS 
operations. The details of four separate outsourcing agreements are presented in the 
following sections and summarized in Table 5.3. Three contracts were subsequently 
backsourced, while the agreement with Tau in Asia-Pacific was modified and is still in 
effect.  
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Table 5.3 Alpha’s Outsourcing Agreements 
Provider Kappa Iota Sigma Tau 
Service Data center Data center Network Network and 
data center 
Dates 1980s - 2002 1999 - 2003 1998 - 2001 1996 - present 
Cost (annual) U.S. $500,000  U.S. $1,500,000 U.S. $600,000 U.S. $1,000,000 
Contract 
Pricing Basis 
Fixed minimum 
plus 
incremental fee 
based on 
volume. 
Fixed minimum 
incremental fee 
based on 
volume. 
Based on nodes 
and equipment. 
Contract with 
Delta. Alpha 
responsible for 
60% of contract 
costs. 
Termination 
Clause 
No end date 
contract, 1-year 
termination 
notice. 
5-year contract, 
early 
termination 
fees. 
3-year contract, 
early 
termination 
fees. 
10-year contract, 
early termination 
fees. 
 
Outsourcing Agreements 
Contract One - Kappa 
The Alpha contract with Kappa handled data processing and storage for Alpha. 
This agreement originated back in the late 1980’s and supported Alpha’s European 
operations. At that time Alpha-Europe was jointly owned by the consortium of 
companies, Delta, and another company, Epsilon. Epsilon had its own IS services bureau, 
Epsilon-IS, that provided IS support for Epsilon’s businesses as well as some other 
businesses in the area. Alpha was part of that arrangement and used the Epsilon-IS 
services.  Eventually Epsilon decided to divest the IS unit and Epsilon-IS was purchased 
by Kappa. Alpha’s applications were transitioned under Kappa’s management and the 
contract with Epsilon-IS became a contract with Kappa. The Director of IT Operations 
described the evolution of the Kappa contract: 
“The Kappa contract evolved. Like I said it started out as a sister company 
of Alpha within the same ownership structure which initiated the 
beginning of it. There was really no cost factors involved, because it 
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would have been cost between associated industries within the same 
company. It evolved to a point when Epsilon decided that they were going 
to sell that portion of their company off to Kappa. From that point on it 
began an outsourced relationship external to the company.”  
 
Kappa’s data processing center supported operations of Alpha - Continental 
Europe. Alpha - UK had a separate outsourcing contract with another data center in the 
UK that handled the UK data processing. Alpha paid Kappa about U.S. $500,000 
annually to manage the data storage and processing in the European location. The main 
application handled all of the planning and tracking for the Alpha’s logistics operations 
and generated customer invoices. The former CIO of Alpha provided the details about the 
contract: 
“The contract was to do basically 100% of all of the transaction 
management, computer processing, data storage, everything but printing 
the output. It was all IBM large mainframe systems, a lot of DASD for all 
of Alpha Europe, except Alpha UK.” 
 
“So they did 100%, we didn’t have any employees there or anything. They 
just ran based on instructions the software that we wrote. But they didn’t 
do any programming or even the application maintenance, they just ran the 
stuff. And it was 7x24, they were there all the time.” 
 
Kappa didn’t own the mainframe equipment that it used for processing Alpha’s 
data. Instead Kappa subleased it from IBM. The logistics transaction processing software 
that ran on the equipment was developed by Alpha, and Kappa was only responsible for 
providing the data center facilities and running the applications. The European 
Relationship Manager, who was the main point of contact and worked closely with 
Kappa, explained the role of Kappa: 
“They were responsible for having mainframe computers available for us. 
There were main application programs that they were running. They were 
making sure that the jobs were started, job scheduling, and back up. They 
did not care about, they did not take over the function of data base 
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administrators. That was done within Alpha. It was more the operational 
work, the machines running the jobs, doing the back-ups.” 
 
Kappa charged Alpha a base cost regardless of the service levels that had to 
always be paid at a minimum and then an incremental fee based on the volume of the 
data that was processed and stored at the data center. Alpha’s contract with Kappa could 
run indefinitely and it required Alpha to give Kappa at least one year’s  notice, by 
contract, in order to end the relationship. There were some penalties stipulated in the 
contract in case Alpha wanted to terminate the relationship sooner. 
Contract Two- Iota 
In early 1999, a UK unit of Alpha signed a five year outsourcing contract with a 
provider in the UK, to handle data processing, equipment and infrastructure. Alpha was 
paying Iota about U.S. $ 1.5 million annually for the provided IS services. At the time, 
this contract accounted for about 6% of the global IS budget at Alpha.  The former CIO 
of Alpha described the contract: 
“It was around January-February 1999, Alpha UK which is really sort of 
Alpha Europe, Alpha UK signed a five year agreement, five years with 
Iota in England. That agreement was similar to the Kappa one, a 100% of 
the data center type processing and services.” 
 
In the 1990’s, data processing for Alpha UK was handled by Alpha in their own 
facilities in the UK, while the rest of Europe outsourced it to Kappa. At that time each of 
the regional offices ran logistics operations independently and relied on either internal or 
external IS units to support them. Alpha - UK had a small data room on their premises 
that housed the servers with the main logistics application, e-mail and financial systems. 
However, it was struggling to maintain the IS personnel and eventually decided to find an 
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outside provider to handle IS operations. Alpha’s former CIO explained the decision 
made by the Alpha - UK office:  
“And the only reason that the VP at the time moved everything from our 
location to Iota is that they were afraid that they couldn’t retain staff and 
the reliability would go down.” 
 
Kappa, who was already managing the applications for the rest of Alpha – 
Europe, was not interested in taking upon the servers in the UK.  Alpha – UK searched 
for another provider that can handle the job locally in the UK. While there were many 
providers, not many were interested in taking over Alpha’s operations. Iota, a small 
provider running data services for about 50 clients, was selected for the contract. The IS 
services were outsourced to Iota in England from January 1999 and the contract was 
signed for five years. The Senior System Administrator was closely involved in the 
transition to Iota: 
“It was really a small system regarding the number of servers. Because we 
had a few servers when we tried what we have done just to get to extend 
the service and to help out to find the best company for us to take our 
system. When we started to consider the system in the beginning the hard 
part for here was that no company wanted to take our system because we 
have a few servers. And the costs were there but there is no benefit. Then 
in just trying to find a medium outsourcing company or maybe a small 
one, we found Iota. Iota is a medium range company that can manage 
outsourcing. And it was also based in U.K.” 
 
“A lot of people, technical people, left from Alpha because we thought 
now we don’t want the people to stay in Alpha because we pay Iota.”  
 
Under the agreement Alpha owned all the equipment and all the software. Iota 
provided a room for the servers and operated the equipment for Alpha. They were also in 
charge of disaster recovery and customer support. Any required changes to the 
configuration of the servers and the applications upgrades requested by Alpha, were 
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handled by the outsourcer.  The former CIO of Alpha shared the details about the 
contract: 
“All of the equipment, the servers, the DASD, communications 
equipment, everything belonged to Alpha, and they basically took 
everything from the Alpha data center near London and physically 
transported it and installed it in a multipurpose data center that was run by 
this company called Iota. It was help desk, 7x24, data center including 
disaster recovery, and all of the operations for all of the servers, a lot of 
UNIX equipment and things like that.” 
 
Iota housed the main logistic application that supported the Alpha – UK business. 
In addition to that, Iota also hosted financial and e-mail systems for both Alpha – UK and 
Alpha – Continental Europe. Iota’s data processing contract was three times the amount 
of the agreement with Kappa. The former CIO shared more details:  
“Alpha UK is 60% of the volume of all of Alpha Europe combined. So 
they did have more stuff. Plus some of the utility applications, like some 
of the financial applications and e-mail and things like that, they were all 
hosted in the UK, not in Kappa in Germany for the rest of Europe.”  
 
The main reason for Alpha to enter the relationship with Iota was access to IS 
expertise, which was unavailable at Alpha. Alpha hoped that Iota staff could manage the 
data center more efficiently. Alpha also expected to realize some cost savings.  
Contract Three - Sigma 
A subsidiary of one of the large telecommunications carriers in Europe, called 
Sigma, was managing Alpha’s data networks and telecommunications in Europe. Sigma 
provided all the data communication links and access to the European backbone, as well 
as the router hardware and software. The provider also handled the network management 
for all the nodes for Alpha-Europe, including the routers and switches, and connected all 
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of the Alpha offices in Continental Europe and the UK. Alpha’s former CIO recalled the 
details of the contract:  
“That was a contract for all of the network management, our routers, hubs 
and switches physically, and also 24x7 diagnostics and escalation. And 
they were the ones that if the network went down, in theory they would 
know first.” 
 
The contract was negotiated in August of 1998 and was signed for a three year 
term. At the time of the negotiation the IS Director for European Operations was French, 
and as a result, a French company, Sigma, was selected for network management. 
Midway through the contract another IS Director for Europe was appointed, who was 
based in the United Kingdom. He took the ownership of the contract and worked with the 
Alpha-France office to maintain the relationship with Sigma.   
Pricing of the contract was based on the number of nodes that Sigma was 
supporting. Alpha had to pay an average of U.S. $50,000 a month for all the routers, 
hubs, and switches that Sigma managed. When Alpha added or discontinued various 
circuits, the monthly fees were adjusted accordingly. The fees had to be paid for the 
physical equipment rented from Sigma, even if there was no volume on the network.  The 
service level agreement stipulated the average capacity of the network traffic that Sigma 
was supposed to provide.  
The design of Alpha’s telecommunications network in Europe was completely 
done by Sigma. When Alpha wanted to make a change in IP addressing or add an 
additional node, they had to contact Sigma for those services. The SLA specified the 
period of time that Sigma had to respond to requests from the client. Every time Alpha 
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had a problem with the network and its performance, they had to rely on the services of 
Sigma to detect and fix the issue.  
Contract Four – Tau 
Asia-Pacific operations of Alpha enjoy a close relationship with the parent 
consortium, Delta, which is headquartered in the Asia-Pacific region. Delta outsources 
most of its IS services and has a very small IS staff. Network administration, 
telecommunications and data center hosting for Delta are handled by an outsourcing 
provider, Tau. As part of the outsourcing agreement with Tau, the  IS needs of Alpha– 
Asia-Pacific are also supported by Tau. Alpha’s contract with Tau is a complete 
outsourcing service agreement.  Tau owns all the hardware and the software and houses 
the data center and the network routers at its facilities. Tau provides 24 hour 
maintenance, 7 days a week, and on site support for all data and voice networks of Alpha.  
The Global Telecom Program Manager at Alpha explained the situation:  
“Delta, our mother company, has outsourced all of its IT services. Delta 
had small non existent IT stuff. Delta is in Australia. And they have said 
we take the telephony and data communications services needs of all of 
the Delta businesses in Asia-Pacific region and we bid them out as one 
contract, including data center services. So Tau provides data 
communications, land line telephony, cellular telephony and data center 
hosting and services to all of the Delta companies including Alpha in all of 
the Asia-Pacific region including Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Thailand and a couple of other countries.” 
 
The parent company, Delta, was the initiator of the outsourcing contract with Tau. 
Delta always tried to aggregate the demand for IS hardware and software and negotiate 
better IS deals for its four subsidiaries. The computer equipment for the consortium, 
Delta, was able to get a volume discount from Dell. In Asia-Pacific it meant combining 
the data and telecommunication needs of the consortium companies and outsourcing IS to 
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Tau. The combined contract lowered the IS costs for Delta and all its subsidiaries in the 
region. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha referred to the leadership role of Delta in 
Tau’s contract:  
“Delta was the initiator of that and basically to drive the costs down they 
were motivated to interconnect everybody under the same contract, so it 
wasn't necessarily each outside business wanted to do it, Delta kind of 
drawn that.” 
 
Initially, there was not much accounting going on inside Delta to separate the 
expenses and revenues of the four companies that comprised the consortium. However, as 
the businesses grew, Delta implemented separate accounting for each of the companies. 
For contract with Tau, Alpha was charged a portion of the cost based on the size of their 
business. Alpha is the largest of the Delta businesses, globally contributing 60% of the 
revenues, and also is the largest in Asia-Pacific. As a result, Alpha ended up responsible 
for the largest share of the outsourcing contract’s costs. The former CIO of Alpha 
provided the details: 
“Also, all of the networks with a company called Tau, which is an 
equivalent of [large telecommunications company] in Australia and New 
Zealand. Tau had a single contract with Delta and Delta has an allocation 
to Alpha for a portion of that cost. But because Alpha is the single biggest 
Delta company in Australia, they got the lion share of the expense.” 
 
While Alpha is a separate entity of Delta and runs its operations independently in 
various locations globally, in Asia-Pacific, Delta has a strong influence on Alpha –Asia-
Pacific. The network of Alpha and Delta are bundled together and outsourced under a 
Delta contract. Alpha maintains its own data center, and additionally pays Delta for a 
back-up facility that mirrors the image of the logistics application.  
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Backsourcing 
Contract One- Kappa 
When it was decided to bring the outsourced data processing from Kappa back in-
house, Alpha worked closely with Kappa’s personnel to manage a smooth and successful 
transition. The first step of the transition was the set up of the data center operations at 
Alpha’s corporate headquarters. A raised floor data center was built and a new software 
environment was acquired and modified to Alpha’s needs. Since Alpha was changing 
from legacy systems to a new SAP environment, thorough testing was performed before 
the final transfer. The Director of IT Operations oversaw construction of the new data 
center and backsourcing:  
“From start to finish if you want to think from the concept when we first 
thought about doing it to the point when we actually executed it was a lot 
of development effort to be done to build the SAP environment, to get it 
introduced to where they can support it. And then executing through all 
the tests and everything in comparisons, I want to say it was probably an 
18 to 24 months process that actually went beyond its original deliverable 
date by four months.”   
 
A required one year termination notice was given to Kappa. Alpha’s CIO at the 
time negotiated with Kappa and it was agreed that the relationship between Alpha and 
Kappa would end upon the expiration of the outsourcing contract in May of 2002.  A 
backsourcing transition plan was drafted which allowed Alpha to renew the contract in 
one month increments after May 2002 if necessary. Alpha ended up extending the 
contract for four more months until October of 2002. During those continuation months, 
Alpha was required to give a 30 day notice to Kappa if it wanted to stop the services.  
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The conditions of the exit were very favorable to Alpha, because it didn’t know exactly 
when it could completely convert to a new location. 
Most equipment in this deal was subleased, not owned by Kappa or Alpha, and 
was returned to the original owner upon the termination of the relationship. Once the new 
system was tested, the transition of the data center went smoothly. The users from Europe 
were able to access the data from a new location in the United States. Help desk support 
for the European employees was also transferred to the new data center. Several new help 
desk employees who spoke German, French, Spanish and Italian were hired to support 
the multiple languages and provide help desk support to Europe. The former CIO, who 
oversaw the backsourcing, felt they were ready for the transition, but they had to adjust 
their support to the different time-zones and languages.  
“I would say there was about a six month learning curve, but the biggest 
issue was the help desk because it took a while for the help desk to figure 
out how to answer a phone in German. Probably, the only challenge that 
we had to manage with, it wasn’t a problem, but we had to be really-really 
good at it, was the time zones. Because Alpha-Europe is six hours ahead 
of the corporate headquarters.” 
 
Overall, all informants agreed that the backsourcing process was long but well 
planned, and Kappa was extremely cooperative throughout the endeavor.  
Contract Two- Iota 
Iota provided data center support to Alpha – UK operations under a five year 
contract. Several years into the agreement, Alpha considered early termination, yet there 
were severe penalties associated with it.  Iota was not willing to let Alpha go early, and it 
was decided to ride the contract out. Meanwhile, a data center was reconstructed at the 
corporate headquarters to house both the U.S. and European data processing. By the time 
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Alpha was able to transfer the Alpha – UK data operations back in-house, Alpha already 
had a new data center at the corporate headquarters that had plenty of capacity to handle 
Alpha – UK data processing.  In April of 2003, Alpha finally shut everything down at 
Iota.  
To prepare for the backsourcing transition, Alpha had to identify all the 
applications supported out of the outsourced data center and test if they could move those 
applications to a U.S. location and still give the users in Europe the same performance 
and user level experience. Some modifications were made to the data room at the Alpha-
UK location to support the legacy applications that were not going to be moved overseas. 
The Global Telecom Program Manager participated in the transition from Iota to in-house 
operations:  
“I would say it took around 4 to 6 months. Six months. Our data room in 
the U.K., because it was now going to host some European applications, 
was a little bit improved with a file repressing system that took about two 
months. And then actually moving all the servers to the U.S. and to the 
U.K. took about a month, but a lot of it was parallel.” 
 
Alpha – UK staff had concerns about the move of the data center overseas. The 
backsourcing team had to demonstrate to them that the same level of connectivity, 
service, and support would be available from a new location.  Since the data center 
equipment belonged to Alpha, the transition team had to physically relocate all of the 
equipment to a new location overseas. As a result, the data processing services were 
interrupted for a weekend. The Director of IT Operations, who orchestrated the 
backsourcing transition, identified these challenges:  
“Getting the business buy-in to take the outage hit that they needed to take 
to relocate the environment was one. Number two was gaining the 
confidence of the people within the IT staff who were supporting the 
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systems and directly reporting that through the U.K. echelon. So I had to 
gain their confidence. I had to basically pull a plan together that had to 
satisfy the business requirements on that side and reduce the outage if 
possible. I had to show some level of assurance, that I was going to be 
able to achieve it, plus have a plan if something wrong did happen 
unexpectedly, I could recover from it.” 
 
Iota was not cooperative during the transition, and Alpha had to ensure that all of 
the equipment was moved out, tested and operational, before the contract with Iota 
expired. Alpha ended up finishing the transition process a few months before the actual 
end of the contract. Some older legacy applications presented problems during the 
transition. When everything was moved physically back in-house, there were some 
challenges in getting everything back to work, communicating with each other and 
getting all the functionality back. 
Contract Three - Sigma 
Alpha had a three year agreement with Sigma to manage Alpha’s network in 
Europe. In the third year of the outsourcing arrangement Alpha decided to take the 
network management under internal control. Alpha hired four experienced network 
engineers, at their corporate headquarters, who worked on redesigning Alpha’s global 
network. Then Alpha proceeded to slowly transfer the hubs and switches in Europe, 
under their control, and hired a large global telecommunications provider for the 
telecommunication services. After the contract was terminated Sigma continued to 
invoice Alpha for some discontinued circuits. The issue almost ended up in court with 
Sigma threatening to file a lawsuit against Alpha for non-payment. Eventually the case 
was settled out of court once it became apparent that the disputed circuits did not exist. 
Alpha’s IS Director in Europe was in charge of the contract: 
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“It was actually an umbrella contract where by you had access to what 
they call the European backbone which was owned by Europe nations all 
together, and then you went into domestic in country network which 
connected into that backbone. We terminated the European backbone. 
First we were going to replace that with [another provider]. And the 
second stage is when we terminated all of the domestic networks as well.” 
 
The transition from outsourcing back in-house took about eight months. Alpha 
stayed with Sigma until the end of the contract and continued buying their service for 
several more months on a few nodes that were not transferred in time. One challenge was 
following the time table, to ensure that all hardware was installed and tested before the 
network lines transitioned from one provider to another.  The comments from Alpha’s IS 
Director in Europe demonstrate the amount of work during the transition:  
“Implementation, that was the transitioning aspect. Meaning that we had 
to have hardware on site, our hardware, and we also had to have the links 
ready with the new supplier. We then had to manage the testing, we had 
virtually done the whole job ourselves, we had very little outside help. 
And as such we were flying people, going to the locations, installing 
hardware, testing it. And then we had project managers as well, managing 
the transitioning. We had people working on the contracts.” 
 
Alpha transitioned from an outside managed network model to an unmanaged 
service and now performs their network management in-house. Yet Alpha still has people 
in these countries, locally, who are able to replace components as needed. It was 
impossible to completely centralize the network as they own networking equipment and 
need to have network support in the remote locations.  
Contract Four – Tau 
Backsourcing of Asia-Pacific represented a special difficulty as the staff of Alpha 
worked closely with the parent company, Delta, and was reluctant to report to Alpha 
headquarters. Most information systems in Asia-Pacific were outsourced to Tau through a 
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contract drawn with Delta. Alpha’s new CIO wanted to bring back the data processing 
and network management into one location.  It was decided to renegotiate part of the 
contract to give Alpha more control over their network, yet keep it outsourced to Tau as 
part of the Delta contract. The Vice President for Global Infrastructure was in charge of 
the negotiations with Tau: 
“This new contract is going to give us the ability to manage our own 
router, which is something that wasn't done before, and it is going to give 
us some layers of service that we can’t ignore, so that basically we might 
be buying the pipe through Delta but we are going to be able to bring more 
and more into what we consider our own.”  
 
The new arrangement allows Alpha to assign its own IP addresses on the network 
and manage the network traffic. They have access to the routers and have complete 
visibility of the network. Delta built a multi-V-LAN around a city where it is 
headquartered. All Delta businesses have access and use this multi-V-LAN as well. As a 
result, the telecommunications network in Asia-Pacific is still provided and supported 
through a contract with Tau. Yet Alpha can view and modify the network from its 
corporate headquarters in North America. The Director of IT Operations has full control 
over the network around the globe with the exception of Asia-Pacific:  
“With the exception of Tau and Tau only, this is only providing 
interconnectivity between the companies within Australia.” 
 
Overall, the Asia-Pacific region was the last one to join the globalization efforts 
of Alpha. While all other local businesses migrated to a common platform, Asia-Pacific 
still runs legacy applications and has not converted to the enterprise wide systems 
implemented at Alpha globally. The Global Telecom Program Manager expects the 
transition to be complete in 2006:  
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“Right now Australia is not yet completely on board on the Alpha global 
system. Our network is connected there, they use our Siebel system from 
[corporate headquarters], but Australia is not yet on our SAP system, they 
still have a legacy system but it is locally hosted. They are slated to go on 
SAP in 2006 I believe, or the end of 2005.” 
 
Alpha backsourced all of their outsourcing contracts except for the contract with 
Tau. The company was able to negotiate with the provider and modify the terms of the 
contract to allow more flexibility. At this time Alpha’s management does not expect any 
changes in the situation and continues to buy the telecommunication lines from Tau.  
Company Two - Beta 
Beta is a non-profit broadcasting station. Its mission is to serve the public good 
and to connect communities through broadcasting, the Internet, and community outreach. 
The station serves the 13th largest market in the US and has been on air since 1958. It is 
recognized as one of the most watched non-profit television stations in the United States. 
The station currently employs 48 people who are involved in production and broadcasting 
of TV programs, marketing and fundraising, to support the operations of the station, and 
general management.  
Sources of Evidence 
Contact with Beta was initiated through Beta’s database administrator. The initial 
conversation focused on confirming the fact of IS backsourcing, explaining the purpose 
of the research, and setting up a time for the semi-structured interview. During the first 
on-site visit, the database administrator helped compile a list of individuals who were 
involved in the outsourcing arrangement with the provider. Using this list, the 
arrangements were made to meet with all the informants individually. Each appointment 
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lasted between one and two hours. During the meetings, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted and all conversations were tape recorded.  
The person doing data entry and batch processing presented an interesting 
situation. He was originally employed by Beta, and then left to join the outsourcing 
provider when the data processing was outsourced. After several years with the provider 
he was fired and returned to Beta. He then interacted with the outsourcing provider as a 
client. He was interviewed twice and provided accounts of his experience both as an 
outsourcing provider employee working with Beta, and as a Beta employee working with 
the outsourcing provider.  
To supplement the data obtained during the interviews, on-line news reports, the 
company website, and publicly available company information was perused. Requests to 
share documentation about the outsourcing contract and communication with the 
outsourcing provider were made to all of the interviewees. The Chief Financial Officer 
had saved all of his communication with the provider and provided the memos and e-
mails for review, which provided supporting evidence of the relationship’s problems. The 
database administrator shared the documents, detailing the transition process from the 
outsourcing provider back in-house. Table 5.4 summarized the sources of evidence for 
this case.   
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Table 5.4 Company Beta: Sources of Evidence for Case Description 
Semi-structured Interview Documentation 
• Database Administrator 
• Customer Service Representative 
• Data Entry & Batch Processing  
• VP for Development  
• CFO  
• VP Annual Giving and Outreach 
• Network Administrator 
• Hoover’s Online 
• Annual Report 
• Company History 
• E-mail, fax and mail 
communication between the 
company and the outsourcing 
provider 
• Transition Timeline 
 
Company History 
Beta’s revenues for 2004 were almost U.S. $10 million. The station exists through 
direct financial support of the community, with over half of the revenues generated 
through its member contributions. Anybody in the immediate broadcasting area can 
watch the station’s programming. Those viewers who send monetary contributions to the 
station are designated as members. Members renew annually to maintain their 
membership status and receive member benefits. Currently, approximately 39,000 
members from 16 different counties support the station. Beta’s Database Administrator 
explained the difference between members and viewers, and the benefits of membership: 
“Members also get a monthly program guide that kind of outlines some of 
the new shows, local programming events that we do, because we do 
outreach as the non-profit. So, at any given point we have about 35, 000 – 
40,000. We are pretty big. We cover 16 counties. Viewers are people who 
just watch, as opposed to members. , people who actively give to the 
station, supporters.”  
 
Additionally, the station seeks corporate sponsorships for its programs and 
receives contributions from a variety of corporate and individual donors. Federal, state 
and local government grants are also available to the station on a competitive basis and 
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account for about 15% of Beta’s revenues.  The Vice President for Development at Beta 
is in charge of fundraising activities:  
“In order to fund the programming, we raise money through individuals 
and corporate sponsors to pay for programs.  We do that through direct 
mail and through on-air support and events and other things and some 
government grants.”  
 
Broadcasting is the main business of the station and the largest expense item. 
However, fundraising is critical to the vitality of the station as it provides the necessary 
resources to run the broadcasting operations. Production of the programming at Beta is 
supported by a camera crew, editors and video engineers. Fundraising operations rely on 
membership department personnel. For communications and storage, retrieval and 
management of data, both production and fundraising are supported by information 
systems. The organizational structure of Beta is presented in Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3 Organizational Structure of Beta  
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IS Activities  
Given Beta’s small size, the station’s IS operations are small as well. Production 
and broadcasting of TV programs is handled by the broadcasting crew. Video engineers 
are in charge of TV programming facilities, equipment and technology.  The station has 
its own recording and editing equipment that is used by the broadcasting and production 
personnel. All video programming is stored internally on file servers. The station is 
currently transitioning all of its video programs to digital format. Maintaining a digital 
copy of all TV programming requires a large number of servers for data storage. The 
Database Administrator described the IS set up at Beta:  
“We have 40 to 50 boxes out here on the network. Servers somewhere in 
the neighborhood of 10, FTP, file, probably storage is most of what our 
network is for, because of all of the video stuff, you know it is data storage 
intensive, because of the video, mpegs and all that stuff. They are moving 
towards that especially with the video conversion. It could also be an e-
mail server, database.”  
 
All office staff at the station have desktop computers on their desks and they are 
supported by the internal IS staff. Currently, the station employs two IS professionals to 
support its business operations. Beta’s Network Administrator handles the phone 
systems, all the computers, all e-mail activity and even does some graphics work. There 
are almost 50 computer users at the station and the Network Administrator provides 
software, hardware and network support to those users when needed.  
The membership department maintains a database that tracks all information and 
interactions with the station’s members. Beta uses the database records to devise new 
pledge campaigns, monitor current donations and communicate with the members. When 
members contact the station, a membership representative can access their account on the 
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computer and provide services as necessary. Additionally, the accounting department 
utilizes the database to reconcile the monthly bank balance and accounts receivables, as 
well as monitor and forecast revenues. The Chief Financial Officer emphasized the key 
role of the membership department in funding the station’s operations:  
“Membership, and the whole income stream from membership, has always 
been an integral part of the organization. So in a sense, it’s such a big 
number.” 
 
This database that is used to manage the TV station’s donors, has over 400 tables 
that contain more than 300,000 donor records. The station maintains records for both 
current and previous donors in the database. In 1998, the data processing and 
management of this database was outsourced to an outside provider.  
Outsourcing Agreement 
A former Vice President for Development at Beta came up with an idea to 
combine the membership function of several TV stations in order to utilize the economies 
of scale. Because of her executive role at the station, she secured support of the CEO at 
Beta, and several other TV stations, as well as a non-profit corporation, Omicron, which 
oversees the licensing of non-profit broadcasting stations locally, and guides the stations’ 
programming. She left the station, wrote a business plan, and got grant and seed money to 
start an outsourcing company called Omega. The Vice President for Annual Giving and 
Outreach recalled this development during the interview:  
“At about seven years into my time here, my former development manager 
formed a task force with other development professionals [from similar 
TV stations] to see if they could streamline the fundraising and the 
management of a centralized database.  So they asked for funding for this 
project, just a feasibility study, based on each station and what their needs 
were if it would work to centralize the database, and that’s how Omega, 
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this company was developed.” 
 
In 1998 Beta signed a three year outsourcing agreement with Omega, to manage 
the station’s membership database and handle mail communication with the current and 
potential members. About ten other non-profit TV stations also signed up for the services 
and transferred their databases under the auspices of Omega. The transition at Beta was 
spearheaded by the CEO of the station. Membership personnel used the membership 
database and were accountable for fundraising activities, but did not participate in the 
decision. The Vice President for Development, who oversees contributions over U.S. 
$1000, was not involved in the decision making: 
“I think part of the problem was that we, as development people, were 
never involved in the decision making.  Our president decided that we 
would want to do this and then we had to make it work.”   
 
The Chief Financial Officer was not fond of the CEO’s decision to outsource 
either:   
“But our president and CEO was on the board of this organization that was 
in charge of centralizing this function.  So then we were one of the prime 
candidates to be one of the participants.  So our CEO said, yeah we’ll do 
that. But he dragged us screaming and kicking into the relationship.”   
 
When the CEO of Beta made the decision to outsource the membership database 
to Omega, only one possible outsourcing provider was considered. Omega’s founder was 
closely familiar with fundraising for a non-profit organization and outsourcing the 
membership database was expected to generate significant cost savings for Beta. First, 
the new company promised to operate more efficiently by combining the membership 
databases of multiple stations, and dedicating staff strictly to database management 
functions. Second, the membership department staff at Beta could then focus solely on 
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devising successful pledge campaigns and doing fundraising. Beta’s Vice President for 
Annual Giving and Outreach detailed the outsourcing benefits expected at the time the 
agreement was signed:  
“Because they felt it was the most efficient model for the stations, they 
would be able to reduce staffing and have a more efficient model and then 
the original intention was for cost efficiencies because if all the stations 
were pooling their resources and mailing at the same time, the 
commodities of scale and printing and processes of mailing didn’t quite 
work out that way, but that was one of the original intentions.  And then if 
the staff was reallocated because now you’re taking away the database 
side of it. The remaining staff, their efforts could be allocated having to do 
strictly fundraising, not having to do manually data entry and all of the 
work that went in with the hands on in-house way.” 
 
Together with the Vice President, another employee left Beta and started working 
for Omega. This person was in charge of making entries into the database, working with 
the pledge campaigns and lockbox company that processed membership contributions. 
He was offered a job at Omega and was one of its first employees. His duties remained 
the same, except at Omega he was responsible for handling database updates, pledge 
entries, and contribution uploads for up to 9 different TV stations. He worked for Omega 
for three and a half years before returning back to Beta: 
“The vice president, one of the vice presidents of Beta, left Beta to start 
this company. And I followed her over there… But as our company grew 
and they got more data-techs in there, they were able to assign these 
people to handle these stations, these people would handle these stations.” 
 
Membership department personnel relied on the database the most and used it 
daily in their fundraising and membership activities. After the membership database was 
transferred, they had to go through training and follow the new procedures for accessing 
membership data, submitting modifications, or creating reports. During the outsourcing 
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they interacted daily with Omega staff to pull up information from the database or request 
changes.  
As a result of transition to outsourcing, Beta had to convert its membership 
database to a new software format that was supported by Omega. Beta purchased eight 
licenses to run the software and accessed the database which was housed on the 
outsourcer’s servers via Citrix. The membership representatives had read-only access to 
the database, and whenever changes were necessary, a daily log of requests was compiled 
and sent to Omega for processing. Omega’s staff also handled the mailings to the 
station’s members and was in charge of entering contributions of each member into the 
database. Beta’s personnel could view the membership data and had access to several 
built-in reports. 
The billing in the outsourcing contract was per member, so Beta was charged 
depending on the number of the records in the database. For their marketing campaigns 
the station targeted different groups of former, current and potential members and worked 
with Omega to create the lists for mail drops. Whenever Beta’s staff needed a specific 
query or report created, they had to contact Omega and specify the characteristics for 
which they were looking. The service level agreement specified that Omega had to 
provide the resulting reports within 10 days. Beta was not charged for additional reports, 
but only per each membership record in the database. The Vice President for Annual 
Giving and Outreach requested the reports most frequently:  
“They did a set number of reports each month but then if we needed 
something else then we just had to go to them directly and work with them 
to get that report, but we weren’t billed extra for that.”  
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During the outsourcing contract, Omega provided data storage facilities and 
database administration for Beta. They also hired a lockbox company for receiving 
pledge payments and worked with them on recording the contributions in the database. 
Omega handled printing of mailings to the members during the pledge drive and also 
handled the renewal notices.  
Backsourcing 
When Beta decided to backsource the membership database, it was faced with 
rebuilding the in-house expertise in database management. The Vice President for 
Development spearheaded the project and developed a transition plan. The contract with 
Omega was annually renewable, so she notified the provider of Beta’s intention: not to 
renew the contract upon its expiration. At about the same time, one of the employees of 
Omega, who previously worked for Beta, was fired from Omega and returned to Beta in a 
temporary position. He had the expertise in processing the database entries on the 
provider side and was put in charge of processing entries internally. About 5 months 
before the expiration of the outsourcing contract, Beta also hired a database administrator 
to maintain the database internally.  
The database administrator worked closely with Omega and the database software 
developer to learn the procedures involved in managing the membership database.  Beta 
purchased a database server and acquired licenses for the database and the membership 
software from the developers. Then the database was set up in-house and testing began. 
The transition schedule was demanding with specific dates set up as cut-offs for the 
lockbox company, mailing provider, and then for the final transfer of the database (Table 
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5.5). The Database Administrator played a key role in transferring the database back in-
house:  
“There was a plan, a schedule for the actual transition, you know, on such 
and such a date, we stop doing this, and on such and such a date all mail 
goes to your box instead of to our box, and on such and such date we give 
you the final dump of the database etc.  I worked with the outsourcing 
company to some degree, in-house IT and the company who actually 
develops the application. It is the same application that we transferred in-
house that the outsourcer was using. Probably the first month I was here, I 
would say until mid January I went over to the outsourcing company and 
actually observed the use of application, got a little bit of training, I had to 
know how the application worked. And then, immediately following that I 
started getting with the developer to set up test instances in-house, so we 
can get a trial dump from the outsourcing company.” 
 
Table 5.5 Beta Backsourcing Transition Schedule 
Step Deadline 
Database setup and testing: 2/11 (2 weeks allotted) 
Software setup and deployment: 2/25 (2 weeks allotted) 
2nd data export from Omega: 3/08 
Testing with mail vendor: tbd 
Merkle data file layouts: 3/11(approx. 1 week) 
Parallel test with Merkle: 3/18 (approx. 1 week) 
Omega delivers April renewal: 3/18 
Testing with CC processor: tbd 
Parallel test with EFT 3/23 (1 week allotted) 
Omega fiscal month adjusts cut-off 3/29 
Omega Telemarketing cut-off 3/29 
Omega Lockbox cut-off 3/29 
Omega scheduled reports cut-off 3/29 
Omega online pledge cut-off 3/29 
Omega gift/pledge batch cut-off: 4/05 
Final data export from Omega: 4/12 
Omega read-only access: 4/12 - 5/10 
 
Beta negotiated with this lockbox company to process the payments on its behalf, 
upon the termination of the outsourcing contract with Omega. For printing, Beta signed a 
contract with another provider that would be in charge of printing the letters and mailing 
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them out to the members. The Network Administrator provided support setting up the 
hardware and software during the transition: 
“We kept the lockbox vendor that handled all the checks coming in.  We 
kept them.  So we were able to work out a deal with them directly.  We 
found our own mailing vendor that we ship all our data to and they do all 
our mass mailings.  And as far as any of the queries that need to be written 
we do that in-house now, and our database administrator handles that.” 
 
Beta was successful at transitioning, according to schedule, and transferring the 
data from Omega’s server to Beta’s new server. After Omega’s support was cut off, it 
took Beta two weeks to finalize the data transfer and test the database. During that time 
the database was not available to the membership personnel, and they had to develop 
procedures to support the members without the database. The Customer Service 
Representative, who handled most calls from the members, recollected the difficulties:  
“I know it took about a week to download everything. And when we were 
down, and I would just take messages, and then when the system came up 
I had to return calls and take care of the situation, because you can’t help 
the person who is calling you with the problem. And they are already 
aggravated because they want the answers now and I had to tell them the 
system is down and they are working on it.”  
 
The person in charge of data entry and batch processing expressed similar 
concerns on his end:  
“Then there was the actual month or two where we couldn’t do any 
processing and that was a difficult time because everything got caught up.  
We couldn’t look up people’s accounts in the computer, you know, we 
couldn’t do anything.  We were just dead in the water.  So that was a 
difficult time.  Once we got over that, very easy, everything flows much 
better.  There was a lot of cleanup involved, cleanup of the database, 
finding all those duplicates.  I went through all these catalogues here, I 
went through every gift batch that they had processed in the last year and I 
checked to see if that money was in the computer, and I found several that 
were not processed, either Beta did not send the file to Omega or Omega 
did not do it.”   
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Once the transfer was complete, Beta’s database manager spent several months 
cleaning the database. It turned out that Omega allowed many duplicate records in the 
database, and some members were entered in the database two, three or even more times. 
The duplicate validation controls were adjusted in the database and the system was able 
to recognize duplicates.  
Company Three – Gamma 
Gamma is a non-profit radio and television broadcasting organization. Gamma 
first signed on air in 1964 and originally broadcasted instructional programs for 
kindergarteners and school-aged children during the school year. The station’s focus 
eventually expanded from the classroom to the community and radio broadcasting was 
added in 1980. In 2005 Gamma served the 20th largest market in the United States and the 
third largest market in its state. 
Sources of Evidence 
Initial information about Gamma was collected through publicly available sources 
which included Hoover’s Online Database and the company’s website. To gain entry into 
Gamma, the researcher first contacted Gamma’s Vice President for Membership. During 
the first phone conversation, the Vice President for Membership explained Gamma’s 
operations and briefly described the IS outsourcing experience. She also confirmed that 
the outsourcing contract was terminated. An in person interview was arranged and later 
conducted. At the first interview, a list of potential informants at the station was 
generated, all of whom were contacted with an explanation of the purposes of research 
and a request for an interview. Subsequently, arrangements were made to meet with all 
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the informants individually. Each appointment lasted between thirty minutes and two 
hours. During the meetings, semi-structured interviews were conducted and all 
conversations were tape recorded. One potential informant refused to meet in person. 
Instead the questionnaire was e-mailed to him, and he responded to the questions about 
backsourcing via e-mail. Table 5.6 presents the sources of evidence collected at Gamma.  
Table 5.6 Company Gamma: Sources of Evidence for Case Description 
E-mail Questionnaire Semi-structured Interview Documentation 
• Senior Vice President 
for Administration and 
Technology 
• Executive Vice President & 
General Manager 
• Vice President for 
Membership 
• IS Manager  
• Member Services Supervisor 
• Hoover’s Online 
• News publications 
• Annual Report 
• Company History 
 
Company History 
The mission of Gamma is to demonstrate their interest and support in the 
community by providing radio and television programming, free and accessible, to all. 
Here is how the Executive Vice President and General Manager of the station described 
Gamma’s business: 
“Our primary business is to broadcast and to provide programs that 
educate, entertain, and inform.” 
 
The station audience is constantly growing, recording on average, a 4% annual 
increase in the number of households viewing its TV programs weekly. The radio station 
has 125,000 listeners every week and is experiencing double digit growth annually. To 
deliver the programming and support of its development activities, Gamma currently 
employs 52 full-time personnel. Figure 5.4 presents an organizational structure of 
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Gamma. The Vice President for Membership provided some details on the number of 
viewers during her interview: 
“We have for TV 1.9 million, I think it is 1.9 million viewers, potential 
viewers I should say.  I think we have 498,000 actual households who 
watch us in a given time.”  
 
Figure 5.4 Organizational Structure of Gamma 
With revenues of U.S. $6.2 million for the fiscal year 2004, Gamma’s main 
source of revenue was donations from its members. Gamma currently has almost 30,000 
members that support the station through donations. Gamma undertakes an extensive 
capital campaign to recruit new members several times each year.  Additionally it seeks 
corporate sponsors for its TV and radio programming. The other sources of funding 
include federal, state and local government grants. The Vice President for Membership is 
in charge of fundraising at the station:  
“Our organization is non-profit, a 501C-3 organization, and we receive 
some money from the federal government through the non-profit 
broadcasting corporation, Omicron, some money from our state 
government, and the rest comes from public viewers and listeners who 
support us through contributions as a charity.” 
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The Executive Vice President and General Manager also emphasized the 
importance of the members’ contributions to the functioning of Gamma: 
“We are supported by the community through membership support, 
program sponsorship support, some government grants. We are non- 
commercial. We are educational.  So the majority of our programs are 
educational based.” 
 
Half of the revenue stream is spent on broadcasting, with the rest being split 
between administration and development (i.e. fundraising). Figure 5.5 displays the 
breakdown of revenues and expenses at Gamma. Recruiting members and corporate 
sponsors are critical to the business of Gamma, as it brings in the finances for the 
functioning of the organization. Currently the Vice President for Membership and her 
staff are in charge of fundraising activities.  
 
Figure 5.5 Revenues and Expenses at Gamma, 2004 
IS Activities  
Information systems at Gamma supports TV and radio production, 
communications, storage, retrieval and management of data, and also fundraising 
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activities. Currently Gamma employs four engineers that handle video storage and 
processing for TV programming. There is also an IS Manager who supports the IS needs 
of the administration and membership personnel at the station. 
The role of IS has changed over the years at Gamma. Most financial resources at 
Gamma are generated through fundraising. The station relies on IS to maintain the 
membership database and pursue fundraising activities. On the broadcasting end of the 
business, Gamma’s need for storage and advanced IS is growing due to the conversion of 
television to digital. The Executive Vice President and General Manager stressed the 
changing role of IS at Gamma during the interview:  
“The Entire concept of IT needs is changing drastically for us now.  Three 
years ago, IT would have been running the business, you know, 
computers, for desktops, for e-mail exchange, websites, for running 
spreadsheets, word processing, a little bit of networking for exchange of 
files, etc.  But in today’s world of advanced technology, we use IT now 
for the membership database because now we have the ability to know you 
better as a member of the station and to manage your account so 
effectively we can get as much money as we can from you and to do that 
you do that through databases and software and that’s all interconnected as 
a system here at the station. But even more spectacular is that as we are 
entering the digital world to broadcasting, we have already converted TV 
to digital.  We used to operate the station on tape machines, but now it’s 
all based on computers.  So I think now we have something like 77 
computers back at the TV station to operate the TV station.  So technology 
is very-very important for us today, more than it was before as far as IT, 
information technology, because we are all sharing data.” 
 
To support its growing IS needs, the station relies on a combination of internal 
and external resources. Gamma houses its own e-mail, data and accounting servers. All of 
the administrative, development, and broadcasting personnel have desktop computers. In 
addition to that, the video production crew has extra computing equipment in their 
offices. Fifty two full-time employees rely on in-house support for network 
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administration, help desk support, hardware and software set up.  The IS Manager is in 
charge of the day-to-day IS support for the TV and radio stations. During the interview he 
described his responsibilities: 
“Well it’s pretty much everything that has to do with the business network 
here, whether it’s ordering the PC’s, setting the PC’s up, network 
administration, repairs, support, pretty much everything, we are a small 
shop and a one man department. We have standard word processing, 
spreadsheet type applications, we also have accountant applications.  We 
have internet access, e-mail, they also have membership packages.  That’s 
most of the business side.  Then on the broadcast side, which I’m not over, 
the engineering men they go into video editing, audio editing, that type of 
stuff.” 
 
The database server is currently housed off site, but the IS manager is in charge of 
daily back-ups and ensuring connectivity to the server. As described previously, the 
database, which tracks Gamma’s membership, plays a key role in fundraising for the 
station.   
Outsourcing Agreement 
Gamma was one of the stations that joined in the multi-station project to have 
their membership and fundraising outsourced to a start-up company: Omega. CEOs of 
several stations agreed to serve on Omega’s Board and to outsource their membership 
activities to this new company. Omega’s leadership proposed to offer participating 
stations more effective pledge campaigns by dedicating its staff to fundraising activities. 
In 1997 Gamma signed a contract with Omega and transferred the recruitment of new 
members and membership support to Omega. The Vice President for Membership at 
Gamma reflected on the events and reasons for outsourcing:  
“One was going to be an economy of scales from a fundraising perspective 
because we would all send out the same direct mail.  We would have a 
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group of individuals who would do it. Really each station fundraises 
similarly, so the thought was why should each station across the country 
have individual staff when there could be one staff that would have an 
economy of scale.  So that was the first reason to have an economy of 
scale for direct marketing.  And the second was to all share a server or 
servers and be able to afford at that time, which was very expensive 
software, called XYZ.” 
 
The process of recruiting members is similar across the stations. Twice a year (or 
more often) the station leads a pledge drive on TV. This pledge drive usually lasts for 
several days with special advertising and programming on air. Local residents who watch 
the station are asked to contribute and support the non-profit station. As members they 
would receive a program guide and also additional benefits such as special DVDs, or 
invitations to events. Additionally, separate mailings go to existing or discontinued 
members with subscription details. Omega’s job was to consolidate the separate pledge 
drives of different stations under one umbrella. The Executive Vice President and 
General Manager substantiated the expected benefits of outsourcing:  
“We all got together as general managers, you know we all do the same 
thing.  We have a fund drive on TV, we ask you to become a member, we 
get your name, we put it in a database, and then we ask you to renew after 
about 8 or 9 months since your membership we'll ask you give us more 
money, and throughout the year we'll ask you for more money. And we 
said, you know we all do it about the same way, yet we all have our own 
databases, we all have our own staff to do that, and we're all printing 
letters and envelopes. What if we were to consolidate all of that into one 
organization so that we could benefit from best practices, by being able to 
hire the best people. Instead of you hiring somebody I'm hiring, we all hire 
the best person, and by scale of economy we can do it better and do it for 
less.  So that was the initial concept that birthed Omega.  And Omega was 
created so they would house all the databases separately but in one 
database, manage the database and deal with all direct mail and 
telemarketing campaigns, so they were responsible for renewals, 
additional gifts, all that telemarketing and direct mail marketing.” 
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The outsourcing contract was annually renewable. Omega handled all the details 
of fundraising for Gamma.   The membership database was hosted on Omega’s server 
and the application, XYZ that helped manage the data, was served to the station from 
Omega via Citrix. All pledge campaigns had to be handled through the outsourcing 
provider.  The database had over 100,000 records for donors as far back as Gamma had 
computers. When the membership department devised a marketing campaign, they 
contacted the Omega staff with a request and specified the criteria for the mail drop. 
According to the Service Level Agreement, requests had to be submitted 10 days ahead 
of the due date. Omega created and printed the letters and then collected the membership 
contributions, which were posted to Gamma’s bank account. Gamma’s Vice President for 
Membership was in charge of working with Omega during the contract: 
“They would upload information into a database in server.  They did all 
the DBA, truly anything that was going on within the software, from 
charging, actually charging credit cards, to processing payments, to doing 
any kind of upgrades to the software to the server, they were responsible 
for all of that. They would do all the direct mail, so they would write the 
copy, they would chose who it was sent to, they would send it out.”   
 
The membership department had access to the database for viewing and some 
preset queries and reports, but no update capability. Whenever changes were necessary, 
Gamma’s staff had to contact Omega for updates. Gamma also had to contact Omega for 
any special queries or reports that were not built-in into the application. Gamma’s 
membership strategy included frequent contacts with the members and multiple reminder 
notices to renew.  Omega tried to optimize the renewal, recruitment and funds collection 
processes for all client stations and created standardized procedures for handling all these 
activities.  
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Backsourcing 
After three years of outsourcing, Gamma decided to end the relationship with the 
outsourcing provider, Omega. The Vice President for Membership was in charge of 
bringing the database back in-house. The planning for the backsourcing transition started 
about a year before the actual end of the relationship. Gamma first explored its options 
and evaluated the possibility of hosting the database in-house. Since the contract was 
annually renewable, Gamma notified Omega of the intent not to renew, about six months 
prior to the end of the contract.  
There were many components to the backsourcing plan. While Omega was 
managing the membership database, the membership department at Gamma became 
almost non existent and had to be recreated. New business practices and procedures for 
membership were created during the planning stage. Then Gamma had to take care of the 
direct marketing components that were handled by Omega. It was decided to hire another 
provider to process the mailings for Gamma. The station had to acquire new hardware 
and software licenses to be able to handle the database internally.  
Four months before the end of the contract, Gamma moved the direct marketing 
component to a new provider while maintaining the database with Omega.  One internal 
employee was hired as a database manager and was tasked with handling the database.  
The software developer, Lambda, agreed to assist Gamma with monthly clean-ups of the 
database and provide remote support if necessary. Multiple tests were performed before 
the final transfer of the membership data. The database set up and testing was done in 
close cooperation with the database software developer.  
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When Gamma decided to end the relationship, Omega was not very happy to lose 
one of its major clients. During the backsourcing transition Gamma received minimal 
assistance from the provider. The relationship grew more and more contentious during 
those months. Omega was very restrictive with the database access over the course of the 
contract, and tried to continue controlling the data throughout the conversion. The Vice 
President for Membership ran into major problems with Omega during backsourcing: 
“They actually threatened to sue me at one point.  When we were exiting 
out from Omega, which literally meant we had a server here, we bought a 
server, we were taking that back gradually. Because we only had access to 
one fourth of the application, we were having to try and learn. Because as 
soon as they handed it over they had wiped their hands clean, they weren't 
going to lend anything to us. So I can remember specifically going in and 
asking one person on their staff, ‘We need to try and create premium 
codes.  Is that okay?’  It's not going to hurt anything, we knew it's just 
basic, but we needed to learn how to do it.  And they said yes, so we went 
in and created premium codes.  But if you look at the fine, fine print of our 
contract, it stated that we were not supposed to do any kind of entering, 
give me a break.  I mean entering premium codes does nothing to the 
database.  And so their COO called me, threatened a law suit, threatened 
to immediately, the next day cease serving our database and that's one that 
scary in my mind.” 
 
After the outsourcing contract, Gamma successfully transitioned the membership 
database in-house. Less than a year after the end of the relationship with Omega, Gamma 
contracted the database software developer Lambda to host the database. The new 
contract allowed Gamma to have complete control of its data and the creative component 
of fundraising. Only hosting and maintenance of the database is currently handled by 
Lambda.  
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CHAPTER SIX. BACKSOURCING ANTECEDENTS: CASE 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of all the case studies and identifies backsourcing 
antecedents salient in each case.  Following a case study protocol, it describes the steps in 
data analysis and provides a detailed account of each of the cases, by reviewing every 
backsourcing construct and its possible effects on backsourcing. Every case concludes 
with discussion of the factors that were critical in the decision to backsource and the 
interplay of those factors.  
Company One – Alpha 
Contract One - Kappa 
Alpha’s data processing contract in Continental Europe originated in the 1980’s. 
At that time, Alpha was jointly owned by its present owner Delta and another company, 
Epsilon. Epsilon had its own IS department that also handled data processing for Alpha’s 
business. There were no cost considerations involved in the original decision as it was 
simply an arrangement between two subsidiaries of Epsilon. Eventually Epsilon decided 
to divest its IS unit and it was sold to Kappa. Alpha stayed on to continue the relationship 
with the new outsourcing provider, Kappa. 
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Economic Considerations 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
Alpha’s data processing contract with Kappa did not have a set expiration date 
and could have continued indefinitely. By contract, Alpha was required to give at least 12 
months notice to Kappa if it wanted to end the relationship. When Alpha was heading 
into backsourcing, the main goal for the company was to avoid costly termination fees. 
At the same time, it tried to ensure that Kappa did not lose any money and could slowly 
reduce its services as Alpha was transitioning out of the relationship. The former CIO of 
Alpha at the time, negotiated with Kappa to end the contract on favorable terms for both 
parties: 
“I negotiated with Kappa an agreement that was favorable to us both, to 
where they wouldn’t lose any money but we didn’t have to pay any 
penalties, that’s the bottom line. And we basically paid them a little bit 
less money per month than if we discontinued the contract in say another 
3-4-5 years. So it was financially good for us.” 
 
Alpha was paying around U.S. $30,000 a month for Kappa’s services, to support 
data processing for Alpha-Continental Europe. The costs were reasonable during the 
contract and Alpha had always worked closely with Kappa to ensure fair pricing. Alpha 
estimated that it would cost them less to host the data and run the same data processing 
operations in-house and decided to proceed with backsourcing. The Director of IT 
Operations did not think costs were the main deteriorating factor that ended the 
relationship:  
“There was no deteriorating factors to pull it out, cost wasn’t even 
necessarily bad. The pricing structure was reasonable. It was more than it 
would have cost us to insource but it wasn’t so outrageous that we wanted 
to get rid of it.” 
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In the year leading to backsourcing, Alpha invested heavily into a new data center 
at the corporate headquarters in North America. Instead of paying for separate data 
processing in various geographic sites, Alpha decided to run its main logistics application 
from one location. Consolidating data processing and services at the corporate location, 
Alpha was able to achieve economies of scale by increasing the utilization rate of its 
equipment. The transition was economically justified by the former CIO:  
“Because it wasn’t cost effective for us to just have two little servers 
sitting on a corner at this huge data center at Kappa in Cologne. And we 
were centralizing because it was saving us money. I was able to invest 
several million dollars into this central site, where I would have been 
replicating the infrastructure, you know, the generators, all of the stuff you 
do to put a huge data center with a help desk. They are much more 
efficient if you have high volume as opposed to just a little bit of volume 
by time zone.” 
 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Except for a few items, the majority of the equipment in the contract with Kappa 
was not owned by either Alpha or Kappa; instead, it was subleased from another party. 
As a result, the asset specificity of the outsourcing contract with Kappa was low. The 
provider simply housed the data of Alpha and multiple other companies at its facilities. 
Alpha was not receiving any special services and was merely sharing the data servers and 
support desk with several other clients. Low asset specificity justified the reasonable 
pricing of the contract.  
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
Alpha’s data processing in Continental Europe had been outsourced to Kappa, and 
before that to Epsilon-IS for many years. Most applications, including the main logistic 
application, were old legacy applications that were developed more than 10 years earlier. 
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A few pieces of equipment that belonged to Alpha and used to be housed at Kappa’s 
location were old and fully depreciated. Consequently, there were no additional 
amortization write-offs or losses during the transition.  The former CIO recalled it as one 
of the advantages of the situation:  
“Now, the other thing was because we had everything in that location for a 
long enough period of time, the assets that were ours were fully 
depreciated. But lots of times companies would capitalize equipment for 
three years or may be even five years. And if you do all this moving 
around quicker than three years or quicker than five years you quite often 
have to have a write-off to cover the wasted facilities, expense or 
infrastructure. We didn’t have to have that with this Kappa situation.”  
 
During the transition, Alpha worked closely with Kappa to ensure favorable 
backsourcing conditions for both parties. Because some equipment was subleased from 
another provider, Kappa had to renegotiate with them to reduce the number of leased 
items. As a result, there were some extra costs associated with arrangements with this 
other provider. Kappa passed the incurred expenses down to Alpha during the transition. 
However, according to the Director of IT Operations at Alpha, those costs were 
insignificant:  
“Well, the extra costs was the fact that Kappa had done the same thing we 
did. They were leasing the equipment and the operating system from 
[another provider], so they had an expectation when they were going to 
turn it off as well. And they had to renegotiate their support from [another 
provider], so they can continue to offer us that support so they had to pay a 
little higher degree of cost which they passed on us. And we actually had 
to pay. It wasn’t significant though. I mean less than 10,000 dollars. At the 
end of the contract there was no relocation to be done because it wasn’t 
our equipment, so there wasn’t relocation cost, hiring personnel, move or 
anything like that.” 
 
While there was a large investment into the new data center, it was not done 
specifically for the European operations. The data center was originally set up to house 
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the North American data processing and then was expanded to handle global systems as 
well. The help desk employees were assigned to several shifts to be able to support 
different times zones. The former CIO ensured that the help desk was able to answer the 
phones in several European languages in addition to English:  
“I didn’t have to in any case increase staff. Some places as you can 
imagine if some one else is doing all the work and if you move it back in-
house, you may have to have a hierarchy. But I was able to, again because 
we were consolidating, I didn’t need to hire people in [corporate 
headquarters] because Kappa wasn’t working. I did have to make sure that 
I had people on for second, third, fourth shift here in [corporate 
headquarters] who spoke languages, but before I didn’t have to worry 
about it.” 
 
Alpha pursued some economic benefits in the termination of the relationship with 
Kappa and backsourcing. Traditional argument of cost savings was used to justify the 
decision. While Alpha was satisfied with the pricing of the outsourcing contract with 
Kappa, consolidation at the corporate headquarters allowed Alpha to enjoy economies of 
scale and reduce the costs of internal production. Switching costs were almost non-
existent during the transition, as no equipment was relocated from Kappa. The only 
incurred expenses were the costs of recruiting multilingual staff for the help desk at the 
corporate headquarters, and minor charges from the provider for the return of subleased 
equipment. 
Strategic Considerations 
Internal Structural Changes 
Termination of the outsourcing contract with Kappa was a part of a company 
wide globalization project orchestrated by a new CEO. Alpha provides logistic services 
across the world and uses logistics software for tracking and billing purposes. Once the 
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new corporate headquarters were established in North America in 2001, Alpha embarked 
on a new project to homogenize its logistics business across the world. The Director of IT 
Operations was hired to be part of the globalization team:  
“Our current CEO was appointed, and he has been driving this message 
that says One Alpha. One Alpha, his goal is to get rid of the variations. His 
goal is to get rid of the differences that exist, and to make everybody 
provide the same services, common global consistent.” 
 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
Information systems that could support the new global business were part of this 
new strategy. The former CIO was tasked with modifying IS operations to fit the new 
paradigm.  The decision was to globally centralize and standardize information systems 
as well. Local IS arrangements had to be transformed into a consistent corporate 
infrastructure and systems.  The European Relationship Manager, who was in charge of 
the Kappa contract in Europe, referred to the new IS as a worldwide function:  
“Because I said we had, it was a company decision to centralize IT, it was 
no longer a European function, but a worldwide function and we had a 
data center in [corporate headquarters]. We did no longer had this split 
between Europe and America.” 
 
In the old Alpha, geographic regions ran their operations independently and 
managed information systems in their own way. Kappa’s arrangement was supporting the 
Alpha-Continental Europe offices and ran old mainframe logistic applications. New 
global architecture called for a new global logistic application, corporation wide 
financials and customer relationship management software. According to the Director of 
IT Operations there was no need for Kappa in the new structure:  
“The reason the contract with Kappa was terminated was because they had 
basically the regional system for Germany. It was housed on IBM 
mainframe environment, they ran an application that was about 25 years 
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old. When we integrated the German business into our global architecture 
being SAP and CMS etc. at that point on we no longer needed their 
services because we weren’t on legacy systems any more. And that’s why 
we terminated the contract.” 
 
The decision to backsource was propelled by the corporate headquarters and 
aimed at centralizing IS activities. IS assumed a new central role in the business of 
Alpha. Because Alpha wanted to standardize its logistics operations globally, it had to 
rely on IS to create infrastructure for support. As part of the global business changes, 
Alpha was replacing its legacy applications with new enterprise wide systems. The 
former CIO presided over the centralization efforts and masterminded the conversion to 
global systems:  
“Because we were taking all of our legacy systems and converting them to 
single global systems, centralized in [corporate headquarters], at the 
location where you visited, what we did was as countries were being 
converted we then took work away from whoever their processing center 
was.” 
 
The decision to backsource the data processing operations from Kappa signified 
strategic changes in the positioning of IS at Alpha. The company decided to concentrate 
its resources on state-of-the-art logistics and utilize technology to track the movement of 
its resources across the globe. To improve operational efficiency, Alpha was transitioning 
to a new corporate ERP system. The former CIO referred to the changes as the business 
reengineering process:  
“Because we were centralizing. We were strategically centralizing all of 
our applications into one global location. It just happened to be in 
[corporate headquarters].  But it was because we were centralizing our 
applications. And the timing of it was because we were converting to SAP. 
It was really they had a brand new application. So that was a big business 
reengineering process change for the company.” 
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Loss of Control over IS 
Alpha had personnel on location in Europe to monitor the activities of the 
outsourcing provider. Kappa was consistent in providing regular reports and full 
disclosure of the outsourcing details. Additionally, Alpha had a database administrator 
who regularly checked on the quality of the data processing by the provider. The 
European Relationship Manager felt she was in control of the situation during the time of 
the outsourcing contract:  
“Control and so far that I got reports, regular reports to follow up service 
level agreements. And if we had our DBA who checked in addition, so it 
was a kind of control of what was done. And we could check batch 
schedule and so on, so it was kind of control of the work that was done. 
We checked whether all back-ups were done as requested and so on.” 
 
The main business of Alpha is logistics and it is critical for the company to have 
control over billing its customers for logistics services and the tracking and scheduling of 
their equipment. When the data processing was housed at Kappa, Alpha had access to the 
systems and had control over the logistics processes.  Alpha did not have actual control 
over the operating system and the environment, but it could fully monitor the performed 
activities and modify them when necessary.  The Director of IT Operations at Alpha was 
not worried about loss of control over the outsourced services:  
“We had control of the process aspects, from actually performing day to 
day processing in through Alpha. We didn’t have control over the internal 
operating system. It was kind of unique in fact that the server and 
operating systems licenses that ran on that environment Kappa had 
contracted through [another provider] directly and we just paid a subset of 
the amount every month for using it. So, we didn’t own the environment, 
therefore, there probably was some liability of some shape with the fact if 
we got onto changing things versus them maintaining it. In application 
yes, we had some control over it, from the other side of the house no.” 
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The corporate strategy of Alpha suffered significant changes with the arrival of a 
new CEO, who aspired to build a globally consistent and prominent logistics business. 
The new strategy necessitated changes in IS as well. All of the old legacy applications 
were replaced with corporation wide systems and uniform IS infrastructure across the 
world. The perception of IS shifted at Alpha from being a disorganized support function, 
to a thoroughly orchestrated core activity that enables logistics business. Change in the 
role of IS was associated with the overall changes in the organization driven by the 
changes in internal corporate structure.  
Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement 
Alpha outsourced its data processing to Kappa for many years. Before Kappa, the 
contract was managed by Epsilon-IS, a subsidiary of Epsilon, which at the time partly 
owned Alpha. When Epsilon-IS was sold to Kappa, all the staff was transferred to the 
new owner and continued to service Alpha. Over many years Alpha developed a good 
rapport with Kappa and its personnel. The provider always delivered quality service and 
promptly responded to Alpha’s requests. The former CIO expressed his satisfaction with 
the relationship during the interview:  
“From a business stand point and from a technical stand point, good 
rapport, we were managing based on written documented service levels. 
And they always did whatever we asked them to do, may be that is the 
best way to put it.” 
 
Kappa’s contract performance was always exceptionally good throughout the 
relationship. All of the outsourcing activities were structured, and there were specific 
procedures to follow for every situation.  The employees acted according to the 
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stipulations in the service level agreement and were well aware of their individual roles in 
the project. The former CIO of Alpha was impressed that the relationship was always 
business-like:  
“They are so business-like and structured, and there is nothing gray, 
everything is black and white. Everybody knew what everybody was 
doing. It was a very structured business-like relationship. Because we 
didn’t have to go up the ladder across and down in order to get two people 
to do something.” 
 
Kappa’s service levels were consistently high and Alpha was happy with the 
relationship. In rare cases of emergency, Kappa was always ready to assist Alpha with 
their data processing needs. Kappa’s personnel were very understanding and tried to 
ensure that Alpha’s database was back up and running as quickly as possible. All the 
procedures at Kappa were standardized and the personnel were well trained to always 
follow those guidelines. The Director of IT Operations praised Kappa as very 
professional:  
“And all indications that I had was that Kappa was very professional and 
the service they were providing was very good. I mean they had strict 
guidelines that had to be followed if changes were to be made. The 
German community followed this. They weren’t opposed to respond to 
things quickly as an unusual occurrence and we respected that. The quality 
of service was very good. So, the relationship and the service that Kappa 
provided was very good.” 
 
As with any service contract from time to time, some issues surfaced that required 
the provider’s attention.  However, most of those issues were minute and were addressed 
properly by Kappa. A few times Alpha experienced situations where Kappa’s staff was 
not taking personal responsibility for the problem. Yet it always happened on the 
individual level and was quickly resolved. On the company level Kappa followed 
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documented service levels and the former CIO described the problems coming to mind as 
minimal:  
“The only things that came up that I would say were negative if there were 
any, is every ones in a while again at the technical level, you know a 
systems programmer, a technician, would say “He did this”, the other guy 
would say “No, he did that”,  or “Hey, they can’t fix that”, or “We can’t 
fix that”. But that was really-really minimal, it was not a big issue at all.”  
 
Trust in the Provider 
During the entire time of the contract there was no need to micro manage Kappa. 
The outsourcing staff was always courteous and willing to help. Time after time Kappa 
delivered on time performance and kept its promises. There was not a sign of 
opportunism in Kappa’s actions and the provider always acted in the best interest of its 
client. The former CIO was confident that Kappa would adhere to contract’s deadlines 
and never take advantage of the situation:  
“We didn’t have to follow up and manage them. They did what they said 
they would do. So if we said we want some new equipment installed in 
three weeks, they would make sure that equipment got installed in three 
weeks, kind of thing.  In fact, it was just an example were Kappa was 
doing their best to make sure we didn’t get charged for things we didn’t 
need to get charged for.” 
 
During the contract, Kappa consistently gave Alpha the highest standards of 
service quality and problem resolution. Alpha felt very comfortable outsourcing its data 
processing to Kappa and trusted Kappa to handle those activities as its own. The provider 
was perceived as an honest agent and was trusted to always do the best they could on 
behalf of Alpha. When asked if he trusted the provider, the former CIO responded:  
“Very much so. And both in terms of trust in a sense of integrity and also 
trust in the sense would they do what they said they were going to do. I 
knew that they would do an honest and an efficient job.” 
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Goal Conflict 
The outsourcing relationship between Alpha and Kappa was almost conflict free. 
Part of the reason was that Kappa strictly adhered to the service level agreement. The 
provider never tried to take advantage of Alpha or be opportunistic during the contract. 
Alpha trusted Kappa to always perform to the best of its abilities. On one occasion Kappa 
had to negotiate with its subcontractor to protect the interests of Alpha. Even though it 
displeased the subcontractor, Kappa stood its ground and put Alpha’s satisfaction and 
welfare first. The former CIO could not recall any major problems with Kappa, instead he 
detailed a situation where Kappa worked hard to resolve a problem with another provider 
that leased the equipment to them: 
“There were none. There were none at all. The only problems we had, and 
it had nothing to do with either Kappa or Alpha, but because they had to 
use [another provider], for example, as a subcontractor. For example, 
[another provider] provided software to them so they can do their job. And 
there were issues at times between them and [another provider], because 
we had some older versions of operating systems, MDS operating systems. 
And [another provider] said, hey we are going to discontinue support of 
those systems, the next layer, or the new version of the system would be 
expensive and Kappa would have had to charge us more money. We said 
we don’t want to pay more money. So Kappa had to go back to [another 
provider] and said we are not going to upgrade even though you are 
refusing to support us. So, but again, it did not affect the relationship.”  
 
Similarly, the European Relationship Manager could not recall any conflicts with 
Kappa. She worked closely with them on day-to-day activities and was happy with the 
way problems were addressed:  
“Not really. It was if at all day to day issues. Where we think the job 
should have started and they think they started it and we said you did not 
something. Only day to day issues, if at all. No real issues.” 
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
Overall, all informants expressed their satisfaction with the relationship they had 
with Kappa. The provider delivered consistent, high quality service over many years. 
Whenever there were issues to solve, Kappa acted promptly and professionally to address 
them. Conflict was almost non-existent in the relationship and there was a lot of 
communication. The former CIO even referred to the Alpha and Kappa outsourcing 
relationship as a perfect relationship:  
“Very positive, very good. And if we were to do it all over again, I 
wouldn’t have changed that particular relationship, or that contract or 
anything. It was very good. It made for a perfect relationship. That’s again 
why I am saying that we felt real comfortable that it was almost as if they 
worked for us.  They worked pretty well.” 
 
The relationship between Alpha and Kappa was truly cooperative. The Director of 
IT Operations praised the relationship as well:  
“So the relationship between vendor and customer went very well. There 
was a lot of cooperation there, anything outside of the norm that came up 
that wasn’t expected was handled appropriately. So the relationship was 
very good.”  
 
Voice Behavior 
Communication with Kappa was very structured. Every employee knew how to 
address the problems and there was a hierarchy for escalating any issues that surfaced. 
An initial attempt was always made to resolve the problem at the level where it 
originated. Therefore, if it was a network problem, the network administrator first got 
involved. If that person was not able to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of Alpha then 
the problem was escalated to a higher level. All of the communication was logged and 
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any problem could be tracked from the moment of its origination to the point of 
resolution. The former CIO of Alpha was the last person to get involved:  
“There were hierarchies of who talked to who, and who did what, and the 
follow up and escalation stuff.  It got escalated and she would talk to their 
manager, but if it was, the reason it was 5 or 6, the network guys would 
talk to the network guys, computer operations would talk to computer 
operations, applications would talk to applications. That’s why there were 
several people but it really had to do with their technical discipline, not 
because it was out of control. In fact, and even the way we had it set up, 
anytime that there was a problem or an issue or anything it had to be 
logged, had to be escalated and had to be communicated.” 
 
To monitor the relationship, a senior manager from Alpha was designated as a 
local point of contact with Kappa. She reported directly to the former CIO of Alpha and 
was responsible for the day-to-day activities and communication with Kappa. She was 
able to speak with the provider’s personnel in their native language and address the 
problems locally. She also monitored the progress of the contract and held regular 
meetings with Kappa to foster the relationship. The former CIO visited the location 
several times a year as well:  
“Now, one of the things I was required to do, they were in Germany, these 
are all Germans, and I don’t speak good German. Now they spoke fairly 
good English, but I had a manager, a senior level IT manager in Cologne, 
Germany, who could drive there in 20 minutes. And so she, would go and 
meet and talk to them in their language at least once a month. So that also 
kept a lot of good rapport.” 
 
Kappa’s style of communication was very open. Even though there was a great 
deal of structure to the contract and all the procedures, Kappa’s staff remained open to 
suggestions. Alpha developed a friendly relationship that helped to communicate Alpha’s 
needs and concerns.  As the main local point of contact, the European Relationship 
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Manager addressed issues directly with the management of Kappa, who in turn was 
always willing to help:  
 “The people had an open style to communicate and things were discussed 
in a friendly environment. Very directly and openly. I called to manager of 
data center and told him about the concerns or problems and he tried to 
help. They really tried to help.” 
 
Most of the time during the contract the problems were resolved very quickly. 
From time to time the European Relationship Manager organized meetings with the 
provider to discuss the issues and arrive at solutions. If there was a complex problem, the 
provider worked closely with Alpha to resolve it. Even in case of emergency, Alpha 
could rely on Kappa to deliver satisfactory service and prevent business problems. The 
European Relationship Manager worked closely with the provider’s employees to resolve 
any issues:  
“Most of the time the agreed service level was fulfilled. If not we had 
regular meetings to discuss what caused it and to solve problems. But it is 
a problem to announce in advance if you have a problem on a Friday 
evening. And there was an emergency number or a number you could call 
but it did not always work as we expected.” 
 
Over the years, the European Relationship Manager developed a personal 
relationship with the staff at Kappa. In the original contract with Epsilon-IS she could 
contact the members of the data center 7 days a week, 24 hours a day if there was an 
emergency. When the contract was transferred to Kappa, she could no longer contact 
Kappa’s personnel directly at their residences. Instead there was a general emergency 
number available for all the clients. Yet the European Relationship Manager still 
maintained a warm relationship with Kappa’s staff, which ensured even better service 
and responsiveness in time of need: 
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“As we worked with this company for a long time I knew all the people 
that worked for Alpha. So the operators, I knew them personally, and I 
knew another, the team leader that cared about the operators. So I could 
contract every person. I even knew their private numbers for weekends. So 
it was… and that was the point that changed when Kappa took over. So 
we were not allowed anymore to call an operator or people to get this 
direct help if necessary.” 
 
When Alpha decided to exit the relationship, good rapport with the provider 
helped to negotiate favorable terms for the transition. While Alpha’s own interests were 
most important, Alpha also sought to ensure that Kappa did not suffer financially because 
of the termination. The transfer of services went smoothly, and data was transferred to 
new systems in North America without a loss. The transition was transparent to the users 
and they were able to access the data without any disruptions.  The former CIO 
negotiated with Kappa during the backsourcing and found them to be very cooperative:  
“But because we had a very good working relationship. Kappa was 
extremely cooperative, we didn’t have any transitional problems 
whatsoever, we didn’t lose any data, there weren’t any outages, or 
anything.” 
 
Relationship wise, the contract with Kappa presented a perfect scenario. Kappa’s 
personnel were always professional, responsible and willing to help. Kappa’s business 
policies and procedures were well documented and relentlessly followed. By the account 
of all involved, the provider consistently delivered excellent service and resolved 
problems promptly and to the best of their ability. Alpha trusted the provider and there 
was almost no conflict during the relationship. The communication remained friendly and 
open, and Kappa addressed Alpha’s questions to the client’s full satisfaction. The 
relationship was fully satisfactory and there was no indication of discontent on behalf of 
either party that could lead to the termination.  
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Emerging Themes 
Power 
The arrival of a new CEO was one reason for the business globalization and 
centralization of IS activities at Alpha. The former CIO worked under the CEO’s 
direction to consolidate IS operations and backsource the contract with Kappa. The CEO 
and the former CIO used their position of formal authority to drive the changes across the 
organization and make decisions. Alpha pursued backsourcing of the Alpha-Kappa 
relationship despite Kappa’s satisfactory performance on the contract and good rapport 
with the provider. The executives exercised their structural power and justified 
backsourcing by redefinition of corporate goals. Interestingly enough, the transition of IS 
services from Kappa to Alpha was supported by Alpha’s local IS employees in Germany. 
Employees displaced as a result of Alpha-Kappa contract termination were relocated to 
other positions within Alpha. 
Integration of Perspectives 
All informants unanimously named centralization as the main reason for 
backsourcing of the data processing services previously outsourced to Kappa. Table 6.1 
presents the primary and secondary (if available) reasons for backsourcing as identified 
by the interviewees at Alpha. Centralization of IS activities was encouraged by Alpha’s 
CEO as part of the company-wide strategy of globalization. This new paradigm entailed 
standardization of logistics services worldwide, and IS played a critical role in enabling 
such standardization. Alpha’s former CIO masterminded the consolidated IS strategy that 
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included: global IS infrastructure and corporation-wide financials, main logistics 
application and customer relationship management.  
Table 6.1 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant 
Informant Primary Reason  Secondary Reason 
Former CIO Centralization Cost 
Global Telecom Manager Centralization  
European Relationship 
Manager 
Centralization  
Director of IT Operations Integration, centralization  
 
The former CIO justified termination of Kappa’s contract by expected cost 
savings. By establishing a corporate data center, Alpha was able to consolidate most of its 
worldwide data processing into one location. Economies of scale generated cost savings 
and Alpha is proud to be operating its data center at a lower cost than the industry’s 
average. During the outsourcing contract with Kappa, the cost factor was not profound by 
itself to result in termination of the relationship. However, as a result of backsourcing, 
Alpha did generate some cost savings by combining data processing of multiple 
geographic regions into one location.  
Table 6.2 reconciles the perceptions of different informants on the characteristics 
of the relationship between Alpha and Kappa, as well as economic and strategic factors 
that were considered as possible antecedents of backsourcing. It shows that the 
informants provided consistent accounts of the outsourcing contract and agreed on the 
evaluation of the main factors, on average, 98% of the time (Table 6.3).  
Overall, the backsourcing transition out of the Alpha – Kappa contract was first 
and foremost driven by the strategic changes at Alpha and the redefinition of the role of 
IS within the company. Information systems at Alpha were undergoing major changes 
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with legacy applications being replaced by new global systems and a global corporate 
network. The strategic changes came as a result of changes in the corporate structure and 
the appointment of a new CEO. He was responsible for the new strategy and global 
consolidation. Economic factors played a supporting role in the decision to backsource 
Kappa’s contract by economically justifying the transfer to the corporate data center. The 
relationship factors signaled a healthy and strong relationship between Kappa and Alpha 
and did not indicate premature ending.  Rather, the former CIO described the outsourcing 
contract as ‘perfect’. Decision making authority of the new CEO and former CIO 
impacted the Alpha-Kappa backsourcing decision. If it had not been for centralization, 
Alpha would have continued to outsource to Kappa.  
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Table 6.2 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant 
        Informant 
 
Construct 
Former CIO Global 
Telecom 
Manager 
European 
Relationship 
Manager 
Director of IT 
Operations  
Cost Advantage Saved money, 
volume justified 
lower internal 
costs. 
  Cost of 
outsourcing not 
bad. Internal 
cheaper. 
Switching Cost Did not lose any 
money. No 
increase in staff 
  No relocation 
cost, overall very 
small cost. 
Asset 
Specificity 
All equipment 
owned by Kappa 
   
Change in the 
Role of IS 
Centralization 
New applications 
Reengineering 
Centralization, 
SAP 
implementation
Centralization 
SAP 
implementation 
Centralization 
SAP 
implementation 
Loss of Control Had control  Had control, got 
reports 
Had control in 
process and 
applications, not 
in technical 
aspect.  
Structural 
Changes 
   New CEO 
Service Quality Very responsive, 
good value,  very 
structured 
 Good service 
level. A bit 
bureaucratic but 
fulfilled the 
task. 
Very 
professional, very 
good service, 
strict guidelines. 
Trust Did not have to 
manage. Trusted 
very much. 
Behaved as if 
worked for client 
 Trusted. Very 
open 
relationship. 
 
Goal Conflict None  None  
Satisfaction Relationship very 
positive, very 
good 
 Provider did 
best to fulfill 
client’s wishes. 
Relationship went 
very well 
Voice Behavior Good rapport 
Structured 
communication 
 Open 
communication, 
personal 
relationship, 
always 
responsive 
 
Power     
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Table 6.3 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number of 
Coded Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 13 2 100% (2/2) 
Switching Cost 6 2 100% (2/2) 
Asset Specificity 1 1 One opinion 
Change in the Role of IS 15 4 100% (4/4) 
Loss of Control 5 3 83% (2.5/3) 
Structural Changes 1 1 One opinion 
Service Quality 14 3 100% (3/3) 
Trust 6 2 100% (2/2) 
Goal Conflict 3 2 100% (2/2) 
Satisfaction 14 3 100% (3/3) 
Voice Behavior 11 2 100% (2/2) 
Power 0 0 No coding 
 
Contract Two – Iota 
Alpha’s 5-year outsourcing agreement with Iota was signed in 1999. Alpha – 
U.K. originated this contract in an attempt to manage the uncertainty associated with the 
recruitment of IS personnel. At the time, Alpha was struggling to maintain expertise in-
house and decided to gain access to the IS knowledge base by outsourcing IS activities to 
Iota. The CIO of Alpha-Europe at the time negotiated the contract. Once the outsourcing 
agreement was signed, Alpha terminated all of its existent IS personnel and completely 
relied on Iota to handle IS applications.  
Economic Considerations 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Iota housed Alpha’s data, e-mail and application servers at its data center facilities 
and provided on-site support when necessary. The provider’s duties included regular 
back-ups of the data, upgrades to the software when required, and other basic server 
maintenance. From the technical point of view, asset specificity of this outsourcing 
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contract was low. The Global Telecom Program Manager did not think there was 
anything complicated in Alpha’s requirements:  
“The only thing they did for us was host a server and do basic things. Like 
if we ask them can you reboot the server, they press the power button, they 
check that the backups were running. And it is nothing sophisticated to the 
point where they needed special knowledge for us.” 
 
On the other hand, Iota had to learn Alpha’s business policies and procedures. 
Frequently, providers are not very willing to adjust their outsourcing processes to fit the 
requirements of a particular client. However, Alpha insisted that Iota follow the 
procedures established at Alpha for the handling of the application, e-mail and data 
servers. From the business processes point of view, Alpha required some very specific 
attention to its data. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator, who was based in France, had 
to travel to the U.K. on several occasions to train Iota’s staff and ensure that specified 
practices were in place: 
“Because it was hard to Iota to understand the business of Alpha and 
hardware, interfaces and our requirements. It was not easy for them. I just 
may be spent six months just traveling to U.K. and trying to make things 
easy for Iota. And the different meetings most of them were technical area 
and transfer of knowledge from Alpha to Iota because we had special 
procedures and we needed the condition for Iota to follow the procedures.  
We didn’t want to modify anything and we got really all the knowledge 
and then we can make suggestions.” 
 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
The pricing of the outsourcing contract was based on the amount of data housed 
on the servers and the service requirements of Alpha. The contract had a fixed monthly 
minimum to pay for the rented space. The minimum fees had to be paid regardless of the 
utilization of the servers or the volume of service requests by Alpha. Alpha’s former CIO 
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felt the agreement was not negotiated well from the start, and as a result, put Alpha at a 
disadvantage financially:  
“That was one where there was a minimum whether we needed it or not, 
so it was a bad contract the way it was negotiated from the financial 
standpoint, secondarily it was actually costing more money to outsource 
during those few years, than it would have we left all of the processing 
internal in Weighbridge in our own building.” 
 
Iota’s contract turned out to be more expensive than initially expected. In fact, it 
was costing Alpha more than what Alpha used to spend to keep the servers in-house 
before outsourcing.  At the same time, Iota was not addressing Alpha’s concerns 
satisfactorily, and Alpha’s personnel had to travel to Iota’s facilities to resolve the 
problems on location. The IS Director for Europe was unhappy with the contract because 
he was paying for the services of Iota, yet incurred additional expenses to designate 
Alpha’s staff to fix the problems at the Iota’s data center: 
“It got to a stage where we were sending people off to site to resolve the 
situation which we were paying Iota for anyway. So we were paying them 
to do a job that they weren’t doing, and then we were sending our own 
people. So we were paying twice for this kind of thing.”  
 
Facing steep prices for support of its data and application servers, Alpha’s 
management decided to re-evaluate the outsourcing agreement with Iota. The contract 
proved to be economically unsound, and Alpha decided to explore its options for 
termination of this arrangement. Alpha’s former CIO summarized the two major financial 
problems with Iota’s contract:  
“I would say the biggest challenges we had with Iota were we had a 
contract, a base contract that was more expensive than had we never done 
a deal at all.” 
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When Alpha considered backsourcing the services handled by Iota, it performed a 
comprehensive financial analysis of all possible options. First of all, it received a quote 
from Iota for continuation of the existing outsourcing contract. It then estimated the costs 
of transferring the data servers and hosting them in-house at the data center in its 
corporate headquarters. According to the IS Director for Europe, backsourcing of Iota’s 
contract was financially substantiated: 
“But we wanted to make sure we were making that on the basis of the 
savings. So what we did, we asked Iota, the contract was coming to an end 
by the way, there was another six months to go, so we asked Iota how 
much it would be to extend the contract given the certain service levels 
over the next two or three years. So we then compared that cost against 
our own cost of moving the system in-house, so insourcing those systems. 
And then from there we then decided to proceed and bring the systems in- 
house.”  
 
During the re-evaluation of the Iota outsourcing arrangement, Alpha also 
considered terminating the outsourcing agreement and finding another provider. Staying 
with Iota was quickly ruled out as economically impractical. However, Alpha then 
compared the potential costs of hiring another provider and the expected internal 
expenses. The estimated in-house costs at the data processing center were lower than any 
other option. The IS Director for Europe was convinced that Iota was no longer an 
alternative: 
“If it was too expensive we probably done something different. And 
something different meaning, we would probably go from Iota to someone 
else. I don’t think we stay with Iota.” 
 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
When Alpha decided to end the relationship with Iota, the contract was in the 
middle of its five year term. Alpha’s management met with Iota’s contract manager to 
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negotiate a possible ending. Alpha quickly found that there were steep termination fees 
associated with a premature exit and Iota was not willing to let the client avoid those 
costs. Alpha’s Director of IT Operations recalled the details: 
“It was a couple of years early. And there was some terminology in the 
actual contract that they had signed. Basically we were liable for quite a 
bit of money had we just pulled out of it. There was no termination clauses 
that say if you want to leave you can. It had to have a reasonable amount 
of loss involved in it for us to be able to pull out without paying anything.” 
 
Once Alpha realized that the early termination fees were unavoidable, it tried to 
minimize the costs by continuing with the contract as long as it could.  Meanwhile, Alpha 
pursued the groundwork for the transition of the data center to a new location at the 
corporate headquarters. Alpha’s former CIO spent almost a year working out acceptable 
terms for both parties, to end the relationship:  
“And that was financially unfavorable for us because we were not in a 
good negotiating position because we were trying to get out of an 
agreement that was very legitimate. So, it ended up becoming at least from 
cash stand point a war. But it was … we didn’t have to get the attorneys 
involved, but the negotiations took about eight-nine months.” 
 
As a result of backsourcing, Alpha transferred all of its data servers to its 
corporate data center. The facility had enough space to house the additional data volume 
and also had enough human resources to support the transferred services. So, Alpha’s 
internal data center did not endure additional expense associated with hosting the 
European data. According to Alpha’s IS Director for Europe, Alpha was able to achieve 
costs savings by discontinuing services from Iota:  
“We were able to absorb the systems with the existing head count, with 
the existing computer room space. So really we didn’t have to pay any fee 
to Iota. So, yes there is a direct savings which would be the fee to Iota. 
And all we did was an internal cost of us running it, but it wasn’t 
additional internal cost, it was an existing internal cost.” 
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Alpha shipped all of the hardware that was located at Iota to a new location in the 
United States. Most applications that were housed at Iota were Alpha’s legacy 
applications. During the transition, some of them were replaced by new applications at 
the new data center. Other applications had to be physically transferred to the new 
facility. Alpha decided to minimize the risk of losing the applications by transporting the 
data servers intact and then simply plugging them in at a new location. The IS Director 
for Europe described various switching costs associated with backsourcing:  
“Yes, there were costs of shipping, we shipped the hardware back to US. 
The reason for that was safer for us to do that from an operations point of 
view. If you wanted to buy a new system or operational software we prefer 
to move the box as it was. It was very old systems and it was dangerous 
for us to rebuild it. So basically we shipped boxes back to US, there was 
cost of that. And there was cost also of having people flying to the US, we 
needed to have people who were going to take care of the system from 
US. We had a few people in the US from here during the project for a 
month and a bit. And we also asked Iota to help us prepare the transfer of 
the skill sets and the operational procedures.” 
 
Once all the preparations and transfers were complete, Alpha was able to end the 
relationship with the provider. In addition to the shipping expenses, Alpha incurred the 
early termination fee.  It was agreed that Alpha would pay Iota six months worth of 
contract fees for breaching the agreement. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha was in 
charge of the transition and acknowledged that Alpha experienced short term financial 
losses at the time of backsourcing, due to termination fees and moving expenses: 
“If you are looking at your day to day run rate, I had to agree to pay Iota I 
think it was six months of their expected revenue stream to terminate the 
contract. That had to be paid in one lump sum thirty days after we moved 
out. So you had a spike right after I moved out of six month worth of 
payment going out at one time. You also had some expense of moving 
physically moving the equipment that you normally would not have had. 
And some expense on the other end of set up because you had to have a 
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small amount of professional contractors available in case you had a 
problem while you were reengaging the systems to be on stand by.” 
 
Alpha’s staff worked diligently to finish the transfer process on time and within 
budget. Apart from the expense of the termination fees, all other activities stayed within 
the estimated budget of U.S. $80,000. The expected long term cost savings justified an 
early exit from the relationship and all the switching costs. The Director of IT Operations 
estimated that Alpha recovered the cost of backsourcing within a year: 
“So that was probably I think I had an 80,000 dollar budget to do it and I 
came in under budget. Somewhere around 80,000 dollars. Getting things 
up to a point that we felt comfortable putting the servers back into the 
environment. But overall and long term we were able to recoup the money 
all the money that we expensed in the first 12 months.” 
 
Alpha’s outsourcing contract with Iota was financially detrimental for Alpha from 
the very beginning. Despite hefty termination fees, and some expenses necessary to 
physically relocate the servers to the new location, Alpha decided to pursue 
backsourcing. As a result of the transition, Alpha was able to incorporate the European 
data servers into its global data center without any extra expenses for equipment or 
personnel. Alpha achieved significant costs savings by ending the relationship with Iota 
and transferring the data processing to its corporate data center.  
Strategic Considerations 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
When Iota’s contract was in the third year of the relationship, Alpha experienced 
some significant changes in its business strategy. The company embarked on a worldwide 
globalization project, bringing all of its disparate business locations under one corporate 
umbrella. Alpha standardized its business procedures across the world to become a global 
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player in the logistics business. Alpha’s former CIO at the time of the Iota contract, 
referred to the transformations as a strategic change in Alpha’s business:  
“Yet you made a strategic change in your business say in a year two or 
three of the agreement. And that’s what happened. We changed our 
business plan.” 
 
It was decided to implement SAP as a corporate wide information system and 
have it hosted at the data center, at the corporate headquarters. The proprietary logistic 
application and customer relationship management software, Siebel, was also installed at 
the new data center. As a result of the new IS strategy, Alpha no longer needed the 
outsourced data center in the U.K. The Global Telecom Program Manager referred to the 
change in strategy and centralization as the reasons for ending the relationship with Iota: 
“When Alpha changed the strategy to become a global company, 
centralized IS systems that got a ball rolling. Also because the function of 
that data center in U.K. became smaller. Because now we already had 
SAP hosted out of the US. We only had Siebel and some of the Novell 
servers and Lotus notes hosted out of the UK. That’s why we ended that.” 
 
Most applications that ran on the servers at Iota, were legacy applications. Since 
Alpha was transitioning to new corporate applications, the old applications were being 
phased out of service. Consequently, Alpha’s contract with Iota became obsolete and 
Alpha sought termination of the relationship. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha 
blamed the changes in technology for the backsourcing of Iota’s contract: 
“The other one was that the decision was made to make the environment 
global, completely change the platform long term. Which prompted other 
technologies being introduced in the environment and also prompted a 
new support staff to be built. Because you are changing from legacy to 
what is soon to be the new platforms, right.” 
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Alpha’s former CIO admitted that the decision to backsource Iota’s contract was 
entirely driven by the consolidation:  
“That one, in almost its entirety, was consolidation.” 
 
Internal Structural Changes 
Prior to centralization, Alpha had separate IS departments in each geographic 
region. When Alpha launched its globalization project, it established corporate 
headquarters in North America. The executives at the headquarters pioneered the changes 
and worked on centralizing the business, and especially the management, in one location.  
The Senior System Administrator, who was based in France, recalled how the corporate 
executives from the U.S. masterminded the backsourcing decision: 
“When we started this project we said we stop here because at the 
beginning we had European information systems, American information 
systems, Australian information systems, you know we have a region by 
information system. And the discussion there was to say we take SAP but 
for global vision not just for Europe we need also to include other regions 
across the world. From that discussion when we said this, then people 
from [corporate headquarters] come here and decision was to say we need 
to do a global Alpha for the IS. When we started here the American people 
said we will have a data center in [corporate headquarters] and we will 
move everything to [corporate headquarters], and we don’t want Iota.” 
  
When Alpha signed the agreement with Iota, Alpha-Europe had its own CEO, 
CIO and other executives who were responsible for the European operations. Less than 
two years into the contract, Alpha’s parent consortium, Delta, appointed the CEO of 
Alpha-Americas as a global CEO of Alpha. Together with the new CEO, Alpha hired a 
new executive team. As a result, most former staff at Alpha-Europe left the company. 
The Director of IT Operations was part of the new team that joined Alpha: 
“Like I said at the time of the agreement being executed, E.F. was the CIO 
of Europe. Under that structure you had CEO, CIO and a full executive 
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staff in Europe and also in the US. Probably a year and a half into that 
contract Delta decided to replace the CEO here in the US and make him 
the CEO of both. So that was the significant difference.  So we had a new 
CIO hired, which was now for both environments who they never dealt 
with. And they replaced most of the IT staff at the same time.” 
 
Alpha’s former CIO was pursuing IS centralization under the overall direction of 
the CEO, who was aiming to standardize Alpha’s business across the world. The former 
CIO did not believe in outsourcing and wanted to consolidate all of the IS activities under 
his supervision. The Director of IT Operations recalled that the backsourcing decision for 
Iota’s contract was made by Alpha’s former CIO even before any financial numbers were 
available: 
“A.B. who was the CIO of Alpha. At the time him and the CEO of Alpha 
who was C.D. didn’t believe in outsourcing. So it could have been the best 
contract in the world and they were going to be motivated to bring it back. 
Because his motivation was to bring everything back. He openly said that 
before he had any facts and figures on how the environment actually was. 
So the underlying thought process began the day he walked through the 
door.” 
 
The former CIO went on to establish a data center at the corporate headquarters 
and followed the new global IS strategy. A big component of the consolidation was the 
termination of various outsourcing agreements and backsourcing of those services into 
the corporate data center. The Global Telecom Program Manager believed the former 
CIO was one of the biggest reasons for backsourcing:  
“Yes. A.B., the CIO. He wanted to centralize everything. So it was a big 
driver to build a big data center in [corporate headquarters], and get rid of 
most of the other things. Yes, that definitely was a factor.” 
 
To help him with the centralization, the former CIO hired new IS staff. Since his 
intent was the consolidation of Alpha’s global IS systems, he brought on board 
individuals who had considerable experience working for various outsourcing providers.  
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Those people formed the core team that undertook the design of the data center and the 
subsequent transition of the services outsourced to Iota, back in-house.  The Senior 
System Administrator was the only person left on the IS staff in Europe after the 
reorganization:  
“The next point is really related to the people because the people that 
come to [corporate headquarters] and I think most of them come from 
[large outsourcing providers] or something like this. They had already the 
experience for outsourcer. They say we have this experience we can create 
our data center and we can manage it as an outsourcing company.  The 
change was coming after may be two years of the contract when most of 
people in Alpha left Alpha. You know when the people that worked there 
all left Alpha except me. You see, even the top management.” 
 
Changes in the management and establishment of the corporate headquarters, 
initiated strategic overhaul at Alpha. The business changes necessitated the redefinition 
of the role of IS at Alpha, centralization of IS activities and subsequent backsourcing. 
However, backsourcing of Iota’s contract was also driven by another important factor. 
The IS Director for Europe suggested that Alpha’s need to regain control over its IS was 
also critical in the backsourcing considerations:  
“It came about for two main reasons. The first one is that we wanted to, 
we had a policy, we meaning Alpha, we had a policy and decided to 
centralize our systems into one data center in [corporate headquarters]. We 
didn’t really want to, we didn’t just have a contract with Iota, we had 
Kappa as well, we had other people around. From a strategy point of view, 
we wanted to have control over our own environment. We decided to 
move the major systems, not legacy but major systems that are going to 
stick around for the next two or three years to move to [corporate 
headquarters].” 
 
Loss of Control over IS 
Iota was responsible for the maintenance of the application, data and e-mail 
servers for Alpha. Sometimes such maintenance entailed configuration changes or 
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upgrades, other times it meant changes to the hardware. The Global Telecom Program 
Manager recollected that some changes took longer than others, and as such, left Alpha 
with less control over the situation:  
“We could react if it was just a configuration change, we could react 
quick. But if we had to move something in hardware, then we were less 
able to.” 
 
Comparing the two data processing outsourcing contracts, Alpha’s former CIO 
felt that Iota’s contract did not allow him much control. There was a constant need for the 
monitoring of Iota’s activities and frequent reminders on behalf of Alpha. Iota was slower 
to react to Alpha’s requests and as a result, it slowed down Alpha’s responsiveness to 
business changes:  
“No nearly the control that we had at Kappa. I believe what you can say, 
we would have to often follow up and remind them. You know like this 
Saturday, if were going to do something really big, there had to be a lot of 
phone calls. Where in the Kappa example we would call them once and 
they would take care. That kind of thing.” 
 
All change requests had to be submitted to Iota. While Alpha was still in the 
driver’s seat, in terms of decisions about the data center and maintenance, Iota was the 
one acting upon the decisions made by Alpha. Frequently, requests for services 
necessitated an agreement from Iota and Alpha was dependent on Iota to perform those 
services on time. The Senior System Administrator lamented that Alpha always had to 
confirm Iota’s availability before making any IS decisions involving the data center: 
“We have the technical knowledge here and also to be sure that for the 
business we are delivering exactly what they are waiting for. We say in the 
beginning we must double check what Iota is doing. You know just it is 
always the major decision it is always taken by us. And Iota also you 
know there is also for the management there is change control should be 
agreed and all the people involved in this and we can not change any thing 
without the agreement, you know all of these possibilities were in place. 
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And we can not modify anything without this agreement.” 
 
Iota was responsible for updates to Alpha’s software housed at its facilities. 
Unfortunately, Iota was not consistent in performing those updates. The trouble with Iota 
was that frequently the provider did not exercise control over the data servers. The IS 
Director for Europe felt that Alpha could not have control over the data center because 
Iota did not have control over those activities in the first place: 
“So they weren’t in control themselves. So there is no way we would have 
had control when our own supplier wasn’t in control anyway. So, no we 
weren’t, we weren’t in control.” 
 
Iota did not modify Alpha’s environment unless it was requested to do so by 
Alpha. The Director of IT Operations believed Alpha had control over what changes were 
to be done to the data center environment, even though the changes had to be done by 
Iota’s personnel: 
“Yes, ok? The reason I say that is because we draw most of the changes 
that were happening. Be it right or wrong they usually didn’t do anything 
to the environment unless we told them to. So we had control. We may or 
may not have told them to do everything in a right sequence. Or we may 
or may not told them they could actually perform the maintenance they 
needed to perform.” 
 
However, the Director of IT Operations felt Alpha was not able to respond to 
business changes as quickly as required by the business. Iota was located several hours 
away from the Alpha-U.K. headquarters, and when the situation necessitated quick 
response, the distance caused delays for Alpha. The Director of IT Operations felt Alpha 
suffered from a loss of control over the IS, because of the remoteness of Iota: 
“Because their people, the data center and Iota was in Birmingham, ok, the 
Alpha office was in Weighbridge, it’s just outside of London. So there was 
80 to 100 miles distance between the two and on occasion when you had 
to do something physically, the person had to travel there. It is a 6-7 hour 
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drive, or a 2 hour flight and it wasn’t necessarily convenient, decreased 
responsiveness.” 
 
According to the IS Director for Europe, Alpha experienced difficulties making 
changes to the software hosted by Iota. Because all requests had to be submitted to Iota 
for processing, it caused delays for Alpha. The logistic business required continuous 
attention and Alpha had to rely on Iota to ensure that the applications and e-mail ran 
without glitches. The IS Director for Europe was concerned about the impact the delays 
had on the business of Alpha.  
“We weren’t really able to change things when it was required by the 
business. If we wanted to change the software, upgrade any piece of 
software, maintenance upgrade, or our application, if we wanted to 
upgrade our own application, critical updates of the systems we just 
weren’t able to do it. That was the impact to the business. The business 
can’t, our business was a truly 24x7, we needed 24x7 SLA, and we were 
not able to get it for our business. So as result we had loss availability 
some of our on site in Europe, we also had loss of availability of 
applications, people couldn’t get to the application. And in terms of 
upgrades people weren’t receiving upgrades. It was quite messy.” 
 
From a strategy point of view, there were several changes happening at Alpha that 
led to the backsourcing of the contract with Iota. First of all, Alpha experienced internal 
structural changes that had an impact on the positioning of IS globally. The new 
management team was determined to centralize the IS activities in one location at 
Alpha’s corporate headquarters. As part of the consolidation, Alpha was implementing 
new information systems, and thus, reducing the need for Iota’s support of the European 
data center. At the same time Alpha was also experiencing a loss of control over its IS 
because Iota was not able to react promptly to Alpha’s needs on a daily basis.  
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Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
The relationship between Alpha and Iota started out well. Iota presented itself in 
a favorable fashion during negotiations and helped transfer Alpha’s equipment into the 
outsourcing facilities. For the first several months Alpha was happy with the quality of 
the service. Gradually, however, the resources dedicated to Alpha’s contract 
diminished, and Iota no longer provided the original levels of service. The IS Director 
for Europe believed the service quality deteriorated over time:  
“It actually got gradually worse. In the beginning during the migration 
they put resources in and they were delivering, but gradually throughout 
the contract every malfunction got a bit worse. And the simple things they 
weren’t really I wouldn’t say that complex that you needed to do. And 
they just didn’t have the resources. They had a high turn over of staff 
which didn’t help.” 
 
Part of the problem with the poor service quality was inadequate staffing of the 
contract. Initially, Alpha’s contract was serviced by very capable staff, but as time went 
on, Iota relocated its most knowledgeable personnel to new projects. In effect, Alpha was 
left with an inexperienced service crew that did not provide an adequate level of support. 
The Director of IT Operations suggested that changes in the staffing of the contract led to 
the decrease in service quality of the outsourcing arrangement:  
“What we found after the environment was left at Iota initially they 
probably did provide your SLA <service level agreement> that they 
agreed, but as things went on as in most contracts that I have been 
associated with, they pulled their top people out of there because they 
want to use their top people to draw new business, right. And they started 
putting lower qualified people in the environment that’s where the 
support, quality of the support dropped.” 
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Another reason for incompetent personnel was high turnover rates at Iota. By the 
middle of the contract the provider lost many of its staff members and had difficulty 
staffing the project adequately. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator was frustrated that 
he had to constantly train Iota’s newcomers to ensure the outsourced service conformed 
to Alpha’s requirements: 
“At the middle of the contract it became hard because a lot of people from 
Iota leaving Iota, you know there is a turnover and in Information Systems 
it is always the case whatever the company. And what happened for us 
always to do the same thing, to spend much time to explain them the 
procedures, the requirements and so on and so on. And really we were 
upset by this because each time you need to explain the same thing to 
different people.”  
 
The incompetence of Iota’s personnel was exemplified by the difficulties in 
communicating problems to them, and having those problems addressed promptly. 
Frequently, Alpha’s representatives had to speak to several people at Iota before the issue 
was understood and resolved. Noticeably, the staff did not have the expertise to deliver 
quality service. The Vice President of Global Infrastructure complained that the charges 
were excessive for the level of service Alpha was receiving:  
“As in Iota the problem that we ran into was that their expertise was not 
great in UK but now you had one operator or two operators sitting there 
and now you are trying to talk through a problem and nobody knows what 
you are talking about. But that’s the service you are paying for. Even 
though you are paying prime dollar but that’s what you are getting.” 
 
On one occasion, someone at Iota had accidentally pulled some cables and 
unplugged Alpha’s server. Consequently, Alpha lost access to its applications and 
suffered financial losses. On other occasions, Iota suffered power outages and again 
brought Alpha’s systems down. Even though Iota had a first rate infrastructure, Alpha’s 
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former CIO contended that the system availability in Alpha’s contract suffered frequent 
problems and often was below the levels stipulated in the SLA:  
“The best way I can say that is system availability, and there were periods 
when the system would be down, or would be available only 80% when it 
supposed to be like 95. So there would be a month or two in a year in 
which it was well below of where we all wanted it to be. So in that sense I 
can’t say that they were reliable. But they had a first class operation. It 
was big and they were doing work for a lot of different companies, and all 
that. So they had the infrastructure to accommodate it.” 
 
Whenever there was a service issue, Iota always referred to the SLA and only 
addressed the problems that were specified in the contract.  Alpha was billed additionally 
for all other requests. Iota was unhappy because Alpha had many small applications 
running on its servers and Iota had to provide support for all of them. It sometimes 
necessitated contacting the software manufactures, and Iota always tried to charge extra 
for those services. The Global Telecom Program Manager did not think Iota’s staff was 
willing to help when Alpha had concerns: 
“They would go to little things and there was less willingness to help, they 
would always go back to the stamp of approval, to the contract.” 
 
Interestingly enough, not everyone at Alpha was completely disappointed with 
Iota’s service quality. On several occasions, Iota proved itself as a competent data center 
operator. The Senior System Administrator believed Iota tried to follow the structure and 
praised the provider on the fact that the data was never lost. Even though there were 
system and server failures, Iota provided a good back up service and was always able to 
recover the lost data:  
“Next point is Iota strongly followed our procedure, especially for the 
back up. You know we outsourced our information to Iota and we never-
never lose data. If system crashed we were able to recover from the back 
up which means the back up taken by Iota was good. And the procedures 
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to take the back up offsite also was good. And the procedure to restore the 
back up was good. Really good.” 
 
Poor service quality on the part of Iota caused some financial losses at Alpha. 
On one occasion, the services were down for a full week, and Alpha-Europe was forced 
to recruit a third party to support its business activities during the system outage. Alpha 
also relied on the same third party when it had to repair certain things that Iota was not 
willing to do because it was not in the contract. In the experience of the IS Director for 
Europe, Iota was unable to support Alpha at the required level:  
“But also we lost money because we had to pay third party extra to 
support us because the systems weren’t either available or they didn’t do 
what they were supposed to do. In some cases they lost complete site so 
we had no availability, in other cases is they lost complete service for a 
period of days and in one case it was actually a week. So you know it was 
a whole range of problems all to do with their inability to support us.”  
 
Alpha maintained a record of all service issues and system failures caused by Iota. 
Whenever Iota provoked financial losses for Alpha, because of poor service, Alpha tried 
to impose financial penalties on Iota. The former CIO estimated that by the time the 
contract was terminated, Iota owed Alpha around U.S. $75,000 for failure to provide the 
quality and responsiveness stipulated in the service level agreement:  
“Iota faltered on their service levels that they were supposed to give us, 
you know, how much of the system will be available, the response times, 
things like that, that you typically have in all of our contracts. But anyway, 
what happened was Iota was, I want to say around 50 to 75 thousand 
dollars US in penalties with Alpha from contractual arrangements.” 
 
Trust in the Provider 
Because Iota delivered mediocre service quality on the contract, Alpha found 
itself needing to monitor the provider’s activities.  It created extra work for Alpha’s 
personnel, to always double check that the required updates were performed, data was 
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backed up, and the system was running at its full capacity. The Senior System 
Administrator wanted to be confident that the systems were running according to Alpha’s 
requirements and used to frequently check Iota’s performance:  
“It is always double checking what Iota is doing to guarantee that the 
service for Alpha is always good, and I to make sure that everything is ok. 
But I think the natural is that if you outsource your system I suspect you 
need you can’t be confident at 100% for the outsourced company. Always 
to double check by yourself to be sure that what you are looking is there.” 
 
Poor service quality undermined the trustworthiness of Iota in terms of Alpha’s 
expectations of the provider, to deliver a satisfactory service. The mistakes were so 
frequent that Alpha could no longer trust Iota to maintain the applications and data 
reliably. The former CIO expected honesty from the provider, yet realized that the service 
may suffer because of the incompetence of Iota’s personnel:  
“So we didn’t distrust each other in terms of just they were honest. But 
they weren’t competent enough when things really went wrong their 
operation staff, not the management, their operation staff didn’t manage 
problems very well on several occasions.”  
 
The relationship between Alpha and Iota deteriorated over the duration of the 
contract. Consequently, the trust between the partners either never developed or 
weakened over time as well. By the time the Director of IT Operations joined Alpha and 
got involved in the relationship with Iota, he could not trust Iota to perform in Alpha’s 
best interest:  
“No, it was obvious we couldn’t trust them to run things. And I have to 
assume that things have deteriorated over the years to the point that they 
just really didn’t give a care anymore.” 
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
The relationship between Iota and Alpha at the inception of the contract was very 
congenial. Both parties were satisfied with the details of the outsourcing arrangement. 
Alpha was happy to gain IS expertise that was missing within the organization and was 
pleased with the timeliness and quality of the delivered services. Iota was happy to see a 
significant income from servicing Alpha. Both companies were enthused about the 
contract and were working hard to streamline the day-to-day operations of the agreement. 
However, that contentment subsided as the partners encountered conflict along the way. 
Alpha was no longer happy with the levels of service and Iota was not willing to deliver 
extra services to Alpha. By the time the Director of IT Operations got involved with the 
project, the relationship became hostile:  
“I would think at the initial time of the contract it was probably very good. 
I mean as most contracts usually when they start you are on your maiden 
year and each is trying to figure out how to work with each other and you 
have some give and take on both sides. Things are probably very ecstatic. 
As things progressed I think it got to be very hostile, ok, up to the point of 
me entering.” 
 
The Director of IT Operations was not with Alpha when the Iota contract was 
negotiated. But, from his conversation with other employees, he learned that Iota had a 
certain expectation of increased service volume and as such, increased revenues as the 
contract progressed.  However, Alpha was no longer interested in expanding its 
agreements with Iota, and instead, was trying to exit the relationship. The Director of IT 
Operations presumed that this unfulfilled promise may have caused some of Iota’s 
discontentment:  
“Which can also kind of drive your relationship to the dirt because 
negotiating monetary values and things you can and it is perfectly business 
 172
correct to give an implication of some expansion, some implied additional 
functions that you may need.” 
 
Goal Conflict 
As was mentioned earlier, Alpha insisted that Iota follow the procedures 
established at Alpha for data back up, server maintenance, application updates and other 
activities. This meant that Iota had to provide a customized service to Alpha, and 
frequently, Iota was not interested in modifying its business practices to satisfy just one 
client.  Iota wanted to keep customization to a minimum, to realize economies of scale. 
These two different perspectives caused tension between Alpha and Iota. Alpha often 
needed Iota to perform systems updates and maintenance over weekends, when it was 
less costly for the business to have interruptions in service. However, frequently Iota 
followed its own schedule of maintenance for all of its data center equipment, which at 
times conflicted with Alpha’s needs. The Senior System Administrator described one 
such occasion when Iota was performing generator testing and caused power outages for 
Alpha’s equipment:  
“When Iota did some tests in the tower, but not get informed just by e-
mail but not from the top management. You know sometimes you receive 
a lot of e-mails but if you don’t read them you don’t know what is the 
contents of the e-mails and what is the implication of the e-mails if Iota 
applied this. Sometimes the e-mails were sent by not the top management 
of Iota but by just low level people and we have ignored them. And the 
consequences were that Iota started to test the generator when they break 
down power it has cost us one day for the business was down. And we had 
major disagreements with them.”  
 
Major disagreements in the relationship centered around the service level 
agreement. Alpha believed that Iota was not delivering the levels of service specified in 
the SLA. On the other hand, Iota always referred to the SLA before performing any 
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service requests to ensure that that particular type of request was part of the agreement. 
The IS Director for Europe was disappointed with Iota’s inability to perform as 
contracted:  
“The major ones were about their inability to deliver against SLA, in 
terms of very basic tasks like doing back up, and changing operating 
system updates and so on. The major disagreements were all around their 
inability to deliver what they agreed by contract to deliver.”  
 
While there was an inherent goal conflict in the arrangement between Alpha and 
Iota, the relationship proceeded amicably for several years. But as soon as Alpha 
announced it was exploring the possibility to terminate the contract, things started to get 
confrontational. Iota did not want to lose the income arising from servicing Alpha, and 
insisted on collecting the payments, until the end of the contract, regardless of Alpha’s 
participation in the contract.  Alpha, on the other hand, was not satisfied with the service 
levels and arrangement’s costs and wanted out as soon as possible. The Director of IT 
Operations felt the parties were trying to blame each other for the unsuccessful 
relationship:  
“But there was no harshness or no animosity in those people. It didn’t 
really start out getting confrontational or disruptive until we actually told 
them that we were interested in pulling out of their facility and then 
blames started trying to be assigned.”  
 
Voice Behavior 
As part of the contract, Iota provided 24/7 monitoring of Alpha’s servers. 
Whenever there was a problem with Alpha’s equipment, Iota informed the client of the 
situation. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator was the first to be contacted and he then 
escalated the issues to Alpha’s management if it were necessary. Depending on the 
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severity of the problem and its impact on Alpha’s business, different layers of 
management at both companies were involved in the resolution of the situation:  
“The first point is I think for 24 hours monitoring. We get alerted at any 
time because it is part of the agreement for major issues like server crash. 
We have a person for escalation you know. The first contact it was me, 
and then if the problem was not resolved maybe in 15 or 30 minutes and 
we describe this to my manager here at Alpha and also to Iota manager. 
We continue with escalation until we get to the top manager and the 
decision must be taken.” 
 
In addition to the daily problem reporting, Alpha and Iota held weekly and 
monthly account management meetings to address contract issues. During those 
meetings, day-to-day operational matters were discussed and resolved if necessary. All 
unresolved conflicts were escalated to senior management of both Iota and Alpha, and 
Alpha’s IS Director for Europe was the top decision maker on Alpha’s side:  
“One was regular account management meetings and at those meetings, it 
was a weekly meeting and then went to monthly meeting, the main 
monthly meeting, so we had an opportunity to put our case through and 
escalate through those meetings as far as account management process. 
But also we had escalated through that operating for their service people, 
their end service people we escalated problems as they occurred. So we 
had two mechanisms, so as a problem occurred we could escalate its 
severity, and if it is still not resolved then escalate to internal 
management.” 
 
On Iota’s side, the highest authority was the company’s Senior Director. 
Alpha’s IS Director for Europe worked closely with Iota’s Senior Director to address 
the complaints.  As the service quality deteriorated, the IS Director for Europe found 
himself meeting with Iota more frequently. He also had to personally travel to Iota’s 
facilities to assess the situation and develop a plan for improvement: 
“My relationship with them in terms of working problems and the account 
management and meeting their Senior director. Basically what happened 
especially toward the end, not toward the end even in the middle of the 
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contract it happened, we escalated to their senior management several 
times, we met them several times, we went to their location in 
Birmingham. We discussed the issues, we came up with a plan to put it 
right, but still nothing happened.”  
 
Once a month Iota sent Alpha a formal report that listed all service requests, 
system problems and resolutions during the prior month. The report contained detailed 
information on the time of the incident, individuals involved, efforts to resolve the 
situation and the time the service request was fulfilled. Through such reports, the former 
CIO was able to assess the service quality of the outsourcing arrangement:  
“And then once a month, I believe it was once a month they would give us 
a report of all the problems for the prior thirty days and their status, it was 
called in at 8, here is the problem, it was fixed by this date, so the details 
on all of these issues we would get from them in writing every month.” 
 
When Alpha first considered backsourcing, it informally approached Iota to 
discuss possible options. The contract did not have a termination clause, and Alpha was 
required to continue with the contract, or at least continue paying Iota. At that point, 
Alpha sent formal letters to Iota notifying them of its intent to terminate the relationship. 
Iota responded by specifying the requested termination fees. Multiple letters traveled 
back and forth between the senior management, in an attempt to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution. The Director of IT Operations had a chance to review those letters 
and described the communication as quite unflattering:  
“Prior to me getting involved there was some verbal discussion, I guess 
that you would consider informal. And there was also some formal 
discussion at a CEO, CIO letter of exchange level. But I do know that 
there was some formal exchange in the letters because I’ve seen the letters 
that went back and forth. And in most cases it was very business like, very 
to the point, not too complimentary on either side. Because it was always 
at the point when they were trying to associate blame with other side.” 
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In its attempt to exit the relationship Alpha relied heavily on documented 
service levels. All the prior reports from Iota, showing frequent problems with the 
service, were used to demonstrate inadequate service quality and reasons for 
termination. Iota was previously aware of various issues and now faced a client who 
wanted to end the relationship because of Iota’s unsatisfactory performance. The IS 
Director for Europe believed regular account management significantly helped Alpha 
support its claims against Iota:  
“Because we had account management, one of the things that was actually 
to be in place was regular account management both from a service point 
of view but also from a commercial point of view. And because we had 
that on a regular basis, things like this I prepared the ground well in 
advance by saying to them we are not happy with the service, we asked 
them to improve and if you don’t we are going to walk. And I was pretty 
honest with them well in advance of this happening. So it wasn’t shock to 
them. They knew this was coming. They did have problems with other 
clients, they lost other clients for the same reasons anyway. So that wasn’t 
surprise to them.” 
 
To amicably end the relationship, Iota wanted to receive a lump-sum termination 
fee, accounting for minimum monthly payments for the rest of the contract term. In 
return, Alpha used documentation of system failures to demonstrate damage to the 
company and requested a credit from Iota. Because Alpha possessed thorough records of 
service levels, it was able to negotiate a reduced termination fee. Alpha’s former CIO 
agreed to continue to pay Iota as long as Alpha required its services, but only for the 
actual services without a base minimum fee:  
“The way we negotiated with them, we went back and said “OK. We want 
out two years early. And we don’t want to have to pay our minimums 
because the volume actually went down instead of up on the monthly 
limited billing.” And what we said was we’d forgive the 75,000 dollars 
that would be an immediate debt that we sort of wanted to get credit on if 
you will let us have an early termination without penalty and allow us to 
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only pay for the volume and the DASD and whatever we use but no more. 
They agreed to that.”  
 
Multiple relationship factors played a role in the decision to backsource Iota’s 
contract. Service quality declined throughout the time of the contract, because of the 
unwillingness to address the concerns and the incompetence of Iota’s personnel, which 
may have been due to high staff turnover rates at Iota.  Alpha and Iota were never able to 
resolve the innate goal conflict with Alpha focusing on its needs and Iota concentrating 
on the benefits to its business processes. Poor service quality necessitated frequent 
monitoring of the service by Alpha, and undermined building trust between two parties. 
As a result, overall satisfaction with the relationship was not high throughout the contract 
and then took a deep plunge when Alpha embarked on a backsourcing project. 
Comprehensive service records and frequent communication, helped Alpha to end the 
relationship on financially acceptable terms.  
Emerging Themes 
Power 
The decision to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract was a result of structural 
changes that happened within Alpha and led to the redefinition of Alpha’s business 
strategy and role of IS.  These structural changes shifted the power distribution within 
Alpha. The new arrangement eliminated the position of the CIO for Alpha-Europe and 
replaced it with a CIO for Alpha overall. The authority and decision making rights were 
centralized at the corporate headquarters in the United States. The new corporate 
executives made the decision to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract as part of the 
consolidation of IS activities.  
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The new executives justified the termination of the Alpha-Iota contract for 
inadequate service quality and high costs. The European IS personnel, on the other hand, 
perceived the contract as fairly successful. The Senior System Administrator, who was 
based in France, believed the backsourcing decision was first and foremost driven by the 
corporate decision makers, and had nothing to do with the quality of the arrangement:  
“The Europeans in the beginning when we outsourced to Iota we were 
happy to be honest. Then Americans said we don’t like to outsource.” 
 
The European personnel were not happy with the decision to backsource the 
Alpha-Iota contract. There was a fear of losing control over IS activities. The new 
organizational structure imposed new roles and forced the European staff to work with 
the Americans, who were suddenly in charge. The U.S. executives exercised their 
decision making authority and rationalized the backsourcing decision. Confrontation 
between the headquarters and the local personnel was the biggest challenge during the 
backsourcing transition, according to the Director of IT Operations: 
“In Europe the biggest challenge there was that the business was very 
comfortable with having it in their back yard…And the people that were 
doing it from U.K. side were very confrontational.” 
 
The CIO of Alpha-Europe left as a result of the centralization, and some IS 
positions were altered to fit the new structure. The staff of Alpha-Europe, who used to be 
responsible for the Alpha-Iota contract, lost their authority. One of the informants was 
even demoted from the Unix and Oracle Manager in Europe, to the Senior System 
Administrator as a result of backsourcing. He complained about his new position and new 
politics at Alpha:   
“I was downgraded to a Senior Systems Administrator with a new politics 
of Alpha.” 
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Integration of Perspectives 
Many different factors were involved in Alpha’s decision to backsource its 
contract with Iota. There was some disagreement among the informants as to the reasons 
for the backsourcing of Iota’s contract (Table 6.4). Two informants claimed that changes 
in the role of IS, and centralization of IS functions in particular, were the driving force 
behind the backsourcing decision. Two other informants believed that poor service 
quality necessitated backsourcing. Centralization, however, was also mentioned by one 
informant as the secondary reason for backsourcing, while low service quality was not. 
High costs of the existing outsourcing arrangement were the most popular secondary 
reason for backsourcing with one informant assigning costs to the primary role.  
Table 6.4 Alpha – Iota Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant 
Informant Primary Reason  Secondary Reason 
Former CIO Consolidation High Cost 
Vice President Global 
Infrastructure  
Poor service quality High Cost 
IS Director for Europe Poor service quality High Cost 
Director of IT Operations Regain control Centralization 
Global Telecom Program 
Manager 
High Cost Regain control 
Senior System Administrator Centralization Management 
changes/Power 
 
Poor service quality during the contract contributed to the need to regain control 
over the information systems. Iota was struggling to address Alpha’s concerns promptly, 
and on several occasions, had systems failures which caused financial and business 
problems for Alpha. Alpha felt they had low control over the actual activities carried out 
by Iota. Internal management changes lead to the redefinition of Alpha’s business 
strategy, and as a result, the repositioning of IS as a global function and consolidation of 
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IS activities in one location. High costs exacerbated the overall dissatisfaction with the 
relationship and justified the backsourcing decision.  
By informants’ accounts, the contract with Iota was very expensive (Table 6.5). 
Nevertheless, the financial aspect of the relationship only played a secondary role in the 
backsourcing decision. It was a combination of all other factors that undermined the 
relationship and changes in the strategy that led to backsourcing. But as for any business, 
cost considerations were important to Alpha and backsourcing helped reduce the 
company’s expenses. The IS Director for Europe insisted that the financial aspect was not 
the main reason for backsourcing: 
“I don’t think it was even the financial aspect of it, I mean the financial 
aspects came into the thing.”  
 
Similarly, the Global Telecom Program Manager suggested that reductions in 
contract fees would not have changed Alpha’s decision to backsource. Interestingly 
enough, it was the same person who named cost savings as the primary reason for 
backsourcing. His comments also demonstrate that centralization was the main reason for 
backsourcing Iota’s contract, as he refers to the transition as ‘centralization’:  
“Even if they would have dropped the price in half, I am pretty sure we 
would have centralized anyway, backsourced anyway.” 
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Table 6.5 Alpha – Iota Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant 
     Informant 
 
 
Construct 
Former CIO Vice President 
Global 
Infrastructure 
IS Director 
for Europe 
Director of IT 
Operations  
Global 
Telecom 
Program 
Manager 
Senior System 
Administrator 
Cost Advantage 
 
Cost savings 
Expensive 
contract 
 Cost savings:Cost savings: 
Expensive 
contract 
Cost savings: 
Expensive 
contract 
Cost savings: 
Expensive 
contract 
Switching Cost Termination 
fees, transfer 
costs 
 Settlement, 
transfer costs
Short term 
costs, long 
term savings  
Transfer costs, 
data center 
costs 
Termination 
fees, transfer 
costs 
Asset 
Specificity 
    Not asset 
specific: 
Provider only 
hosted data 
Asset specific: 
Provider had to 
learn Alpha’s 
procedures 
Change in the 
Role of IS 
Strategic 
business 
change: 
consolidation 
Change in needs Centralizatio
n 
Centralization Centralization Globalization 
Centralization 
Loss of Control Low control: 
low response 
time, frequent 
reminders 
Some control 
with monitoring 
software 
No control: 
provider was 
not in control
either  
 
Some control: 
Alpha made 
decisions, but 
slow provider 
Some control: 
application 
level good, low 
on level of 
equipment  
Some control: 
provider 
followed orders, 
but slow 
response 
Structural 
Changes 
   New CEO, 
CIO who 
didn’t believe 
in outsourcing 
CIO was a big 
factor 
New 
management 
experienced 
being providers  
Service Quality Low service 
levels, poor 
response 
times, outages 
Low expertise, 
poor response 
times 
System 
outages, got 
gradually 
worse 
Initially good, 
but declined 
over time 
Not too 
flexible, 
unwilling to 
help 
Followed 
procedures, 
never lost data, 
prompt, but high 
turnover  
Trust Had trust: but 
staff  not 
competent 
 Had no trust Had no trust Had trust Frequent double 
checking 
Goal Conflict   Could not 
deliver SLA
Confrontation 
many conflicts
Not many: 
only pricing 
issues 
Extra charges, 
unwillingness to 
do extra 
Satisfaction Good 
business 
relationship, 
bad contract 
 Good in the 
beginning, 
later 
problems  
Good in the 
beginning, but 
got hostile 
Frustration Good 
relationship in 
the beginning 
Voice Behavior Documented 
problem 
reports 
 Account 
management 
meetings 
Written 
communication
Escalation, 
maintenance 
policies 
 
Power    Europe was 
confrontational
 Americans did 
not want to 
outsource 
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Even though there was no perfect agreement in the comments of the informants, 
there was only one category (asset specificity) that the two informants did not agree on at 
all (Table 6.6). Average agreement in the descriptions of all constructs was 82%. Overall, 
the accounts of all six individuals had many common threads and helped depict a 
complete picture of the relationship between Iota and Alpha and bring together the true 
reasons for backsourcing of Iota’s contract.  
Table 6.6 Alpha – Iota Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number 
of Coded 
Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 25 5 100% (5/5) 
Switching Cost 14 5 100% (5/5) 
Asset Specificity 2 2 0% (0/2) 
Change in the Role of IS 19 6 100% (6/6) 
Loss of Control 24 6 67% (4/6) 
Structural Changes 8 3 100% (3/3) 
Service Quality 31 6 83% (5/6) 
Trust 8 5 60% (3/5) 
Goal Conflict 10 4 75% (3/4) 
Satisfaction 18 5 100% (5/5) 
Voice Behavior 19 4 100% (4/4) 
Power 7 2 100% (2/2) 
 
In summary, the decision to backsource the contract with Iota was first and 
foremost driven by the centralization that was taking place at Alpha. Such centralization 
was a result of internal management changes at Alpha and a shift of decision making 
authority to corporate management who did not believe in outsourcing. Poor service 
quality and high costs of the contract contributed to the dissatisfaction with the 
relationship. Through backsourcing Alpha was able to regain control over its IS 
applications and provide better support to its personnel. 
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Contract Three – Sigma 
Alpha-Europe outsourced its telecommunication network administration to Sigma 
in August of 1998. The contract was negotiated by the IS Director in Europe and 
involved telecommunication lines, equipment, and management of the network for Alpha 
offices in Continental Europe and UK. Alpha-Europe did not have prior experience in 
negotiating telecommunication contracts with an outsourcing provider, and chose Sigma 
because it was based in the same country as Alpha’s IS Director in Europe. Sigma was 
also affiliated with a large European telecommunications carrier, which afforded it some 
credibility.  
Economic Considerations 
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Sigma owned all the routers, switches and other telecommunication equipment 
that supported Alpha’s European network. Sigma provided access, for Alpha, to the 
European backbone and leased its own telecommunication lines out to Alpha locally. The 
asset specificity of the outsourcing arrangement was low, as all lines and equipment were 
the property of Sigma. Alpha required access to the network in multiple countries, and 
Sigma had the ability to provide that within Europe. 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
The pricing of the outsourcing contract with Sigma was based on the number of 
nodes that Alpha had on its network. Those nodes included all the computers, servers, 
hubs, switches and routers connected to the network. The network traffic volume was not 
part of the contract pricing, and even if there was no volume, Alpha had to pay the fees. 
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Such pricing put Alpha at a disadvantage because as the company grew it could not 
increase the network capacity. The former CIO felt the contract with Sigma was not well 
negotiated to begin with: 
“And also the contract was very expensive. In other words, other 
companies could have done it less expensively. And I think we could have 
bid on the job a little bit more.” 
 
Alpha – Europe did not have experience in negotiating network contracts and 
selected Sigma as a provider because it was a subsidiary of a large European 
telecommunications company. The agreement was poorly structured and Alpha – Europe 
had no knowledge of the network status or its capacity. Sigma had full control over the 
network and the traffic volume. The Senior System Administrator believed Sigma was 
exhibiting some opportunism and was overcharging Alpha:  
“But I am convinced because from Sigma I think they understood that 
Alpha had no knowledge in the network in Alpha and may be they take 
this opportunity and they have charged us maximum for this.” 
 
Overall, the contract proved to be very expensive because it was based on the 
number of nodes on the network. Alpha-Europe continued to expand throughout the time 
of the contract and had to pay increasing amounts to Sigma.  The Global Telecom 
Manager expected the costs of the contract to decrease as the contract went on, because 
typically telecommunication costs go down, yet Alpha-Europe saw its network costs 
continuously increase throughout the contract:  
“And apart from that it was also quite costly. But on the other hand, in 
general telecommunication costs go down a little bit during the 
relationship.” 
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Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
Taking into consideration the exorbitant costs, Alpha decided to exit the 
relationship and pursue backsourcing. Once the backsourcing decision was made, Alpha 
hired four network engineers to design the company’s new global network. The new 
engineers also took over the network management that was previously provided by Sigma 
in Europe. The Global Telecom Manager felt the transition expense was justified by the 
excessive costs that Alpha was incurring during the contract with Sigma:  
“Because the company we did business with charged us a lot of money for 
the management of our routers, and that is the fact that I had to hire four 
experienced engineers, that cost us still much lower than management feel 
they charged for managing all of our routers. So, Alpha hired experienced 
network engineers, not only to build a network but also afterwards to 
manage it. And then Alpha has hired its own network support stuff to 
maintain network equipment and install network equipment, configure it, 
monitor it” 
 
During the backsourcing, Alpha incurred significant expenses for the set up of the 
new global network. Its network engineers had to travel to various locations across 
Europe to physically set up the equipment and test the network. While there was no 
additional salary expense because the engineers were on Alpha’s payroll, the company 
incurred many travel costs. The IS Director in Europe was overseeing the set up of the 
new network: 
“We had people flying all over the place if you can imagine, we had 
expense for hotels, people cost was minimal because it is our people. We 
had costs of canceling the network, we had to cancel some links so we had 
termination costs, we had costs where we had during the migration we had 
two networks running parallel, so we had double cost for that. So yes we 
had a whole range of both internal and external costs.” 
 
Even though there were a lot of work and switching costs involved in the 
backsourcing, Alpha proceeded with its plans to terminate the relationship. While it built 
 186
its own network, Alpha continued to purchase network services from Sigma. It 
discontinued the outsourced nodes slowly, as the new Alpha-owned nodes were added to 
the network. The Global Telecom Manager’s staff spent several months installing the 
equipment and testing the network:  
“Obviously Alpha had to buy network equipment, where before it was part 
of the service. So it was a major investment. We had travel cost, we had 
people traveling across Europe installing all the equipment, car rentals, 
flights, hotels, everything. And always when you do this because it takes 
multiple months to implement all the sites, for a while you basically run 
two networks in parallel. So you have double network costs, because you 
can not terminate the old link before you are sure that the new link is 
working.” 
 
During the transition period, one potential expense was the early termination fee. 
Initially Alpha considered ending the contract prematurely but was stopped by the high 
penalties for breaching the contract. Since building a new network took a significant 
amount of time, Alpha continued the relationship with Sigma while slowly discontinuing 
the unnecessary circuits. It was cost effective since the contract was priced per node, so 
Alpha avoided the early termination fees, yet cut its interim expenses by reducing the 
number of nodes. However, Sigma continued to charge Alpha for some discontinued 
nodes and when the contract was terminated, Sigma tried to collect around 80,000 euros 
through court. Obviously, Alpha was not willing to pay for the nodes that did not exist, 
and brought charges against Sigma for mismanaging its network. The companies got 
involved in a lengthy legal battle, but in the end the parties settled out of court. According 
to Alpha’s former CIO, Alpha did not have to pay any extra fees: 
“So in that case no money changed hands, but to give you an idea of the 
volume, I believe at one time they felt that we owed them something like 
80,000 euros, something like that. But we proved to them finally that we 
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don't owe you 80,000, in fact if nothing else you would owe us, because of 
the harm that you have caused the company.” 
 
Transition to a new global network significantly improved network capacity for 
Alpha. In fact, the new set up allowed four times the capacity previously offered by 
Sigma. At the same time the costs of the internal network management coupled with the 
fees for purchased bandwidth from another provider, were dramatically lower than the 
price charged by Sigma. Clearly, the contract with Sigma was overpriced by as much as 
50%. The IS Director in Europe emphasized the importance of the cost factor in the 
decision to backsource Sigma’s contract: 
“As a result of this change we quadrupled, we more than quadrupled our 
capacity in terms of our network and we actually are now paying slightly 
less than what we paid before. So you can imagine if the costs were 
enormous, there was no other way we could save we had to upgrade and 
get the four time the capacity that we required. And if we stayed with 
Sigma it was going to cost us a lot more than we pay, more meaning as 
much as 150-200% of what we have today. So the costs were actually 
important.” 
 
The decision to backsource Sigma’s contract was based heavily on considerations 
of economic efficiency. The contract was poorly negotiated and very expensive. The fees 
continued to escalate throughout the time of the contract and Alpha made the decision to 
end the relationship. There were significant switching costs associated with the 
backsourcing transition. Despite these hefty costs, Alpha was convinced that the new 
internally managed network would allow Alpha to reduce its network costs and enjoy 
better capacity and service. In fact, after the transfer was complete, Alpha successfully 
integrated Europe into its global network and reduced the costs of network 
communication by more than 50 percent. 
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Strategic Considerations 
Internal Structural Changes 
Termination of the network outsourcing contract with Sigma was part of the 
company wide reorganization at Alpha. The new CEO redefined and restructured the 
company’s logistics business and pursued a globalization strategy. The new approach 
also included consolidated information systems. It was decided to design a global 
corporate telecommunications network and manage it from one location.  Alpha’s former 
CIO was working on centralizing the network: 
“Similar to the other ones, because I was consolidating all my network, 
management and operations under one infrastructure kind of control in 
[corporate headquarters], I was able to pull it in, and manage it from nodes 
in England and [corporate headquarters].”  
 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
As part of the globalization process, Alpha also replaced all of its legacy 
applications with new enterprise wide systems. At the corporate headquarters, a new data 
center was built to house the new financial applications, as well as the main logistics 
application that tracked Alpha’s services and customers. Alpha decided to serve these 
applications globally from its corporate headquarters. To accomplish that, Alpha 
designed its own network and purchased telecommunication lines across the Atlantic 
Ocean from a large telecommunication services provider. The IS Director in Europe 
described the changes that were taking place: 
“We were going through a large program in Europe of rolling out SAP and 
we were rolling out CRM Siebel. And as a result we needed a lot more 
capacity in place and those products required a lot more than what we had 
at that time. We also had a data center in [corporate headquarters] where 
those products were actually based. So we had transatlantic links that 
needed to be upgraded. So we had a technology change as well as it was 
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an upgrade to our systems across Europe. It was our change program. But 
we needed to make a change anyhow.” 
 
Centralization of the network administration signified a new approach to the 
management of telecommunications at Alpha. Working with the outsourcing provider, 
Sigma, Alpha paid for the telecommunication lines, for the network equipment and for 
management of its network. The new strategy involved purchased telecommunication 
lines, but Alpha-owned network equipment, and internal personnel to design, test and 
administer the network. The Global Telecom Manager supervised the engineering team 
working on the global network project:  
“Alpha then decided to go globally, especially when they decided to 
implement SAP. They would have to have a communications network 
spanning at least Europe and the US and Canada. So it was decided to 
build a global network. So the change in there, both the change the whole 
Alpha world and change in the business world to become a global 
company with respect to network specific. Change from a model where a 
service provider managed both the network links and the equipment to go 
to a model where the service provider just supplies you with links but you 
provide the equipment, you install it and manage it etc.” 
 
Redefinition of the business strategy at Alpha resulted in consolidation of the 
corporate information systems and changes in the management of its network. The new 
model relied on internal engineering staff and consequently necessitated backsourcing of 
the outsourcing contract with Sigma.  However, Alpha’s former CIO did not see the 
centralization in Alpha’s IS as the main driver in backsourcing of Sigma’s contract. He 
felt there were other compounding factors that played a role in this decision: 
“I wouldn't say centralization was the main driver. It was just one of 
them.”  
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Loss of Control over IS 
Sigma was in charge of the network equipment and managed the assignment of 
the network addresses for Alpha. When Alpha wanted to add a new node to the network 
it had to submit a request to Sigma and wait till it was completed. Alpha was not able to 
make modifications to the network on its own or reroute the traffic when necessary. The 
Global Telecom Manager believed that one of the benefits of backsourcing was increased 
control over the network:  
“And at that point it was also decided to get more control and management 
of the equipment ourselves. And I see that as a vital point to manage it in-
house, because there are so many requests for changes that we can react 
very quickly. It's impossible in my opinion to outsource that. You can 
never achieve the level of service that we have here.” 
 
Network capacity and network utilization rates are important factors in network 
management. Unfortunately, under the Sigma contract, Alpha did not have access to the 
network equipment and could not evaluate the network capacity and utilization. Those 
tools were only available to Sigma employees. Frequently, Alpha experienced slow 
network traffic, yet it had no way to assess the reasons for the delays or fix the problems. 
The Global Telecom Manager complained about limited flexibility in network 
management as one of the problems of Sigma contract:  
“We didn't have any flexibility, so we could not for example see the 
utilization of the network. There was not a lot of tools provided to see 
actually how we were using the network. So it was pretty much blank, if 
the network was slow, we didn't know why. Because we didn't know if it's 
slow because the provider has an issue, or is it slow because we over 
utilize our links. We didn't know. So it was limited network management 
tools and little flexibility by Alpha.” 
 
Limited control and lack of flexibility on the network plagued the contract with 
Sigma. Alpha struggled to make modifications to the network to address the changing 
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requirements of its business. Because the company was growing, it was increasingly 
difficult to make timely adjustments to its sprawling network.  Changing from a managed 
service to an internally administered network was one of the solutions to the problems 
with the Sigma contract. The IS Director in Europe believed Alpha could never have 
control in a managed environment: 
“Did we have control? No, I don't think we did.  I think the challenge with 
the network, they were providing an outsourced service, they were 
providing a managed network, not just the lines. They were also running 
the routers and switches, they were running the hardware and software. 
The challenge there is that you are never going to have control because 
you are relying on their technicians to effect changes to a schedule that 
meets their requirements which may not be yours.” 
 
Quick access to the network and prompt modifications when necessary were 
important to Alpha. It was relying on the network for the support of its logistics business 
and customer billing. Losses in connectivity had a negative impact on Alpha’s business, 
yet Alpha had no control over the repairs to the network. It could not even determine if 
the problems occurred on Alpha’s side or Sigma’s side without further involvement from 
the provider. The IS Director in Europe was frustrated with the limited control that he 
had: 
“If the network goes down it impacts my services, but I don't have control 
over their technicians and their resources even though they contracted to 
provide me a level of service. But the control from the management point 
of view, so you are managing a service and the routers and switches, is 
less than if you are doing it yourself.” 
 
Loss of control over the telecommunication network was negatively affecting 
Alpha’s business by restricting Alpha’s ability to quickly react to changes in its 
environment. Frequently, loss of control over the outsourced activities impedes 
company’s competitiveness (Lacity et al. 2001), especially when the outsourced activities 
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are critical to the business. According to IS Director in Europe, loss of control was an 
important driver that influenced the backsourcing decision in the contract with Sigma: 
“And another driver was that we wanted really, again we wanted a certain 
level of control over the network, so we wanted to be able if a piece of 
hardware goes down, we wanted to be able to monitor and we wanted to 
be able to respond and fix as quickly as we could.”  
 
Several strategic considerations played a role in the decision to backsource the 
network management from Sigma. First of all, corporate changes necessitated shifts in 
the positioning of IS in the company, and company wide globalization resulted in the 
consolidation of information systems, including telecommunication networks. At the 
same time, Alpha could not quickly respond to environmental changes and competitive 
pressures in Europe because its IS network was outsourced. The provider, Sigma, 
restricted access to the tools that provided detailed information on network utilization and 
allowed its modification if necessary. The network was an important component in 
tracking logistic operations and responding to customers requests. Loss of control over 
the network management forced Alpha to realize the need for internal management of its 
network.  
Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement 
One of the main problems that troubled Sigma’s network management contract 
was the inadequate service quality delivered by the provider. Most of Alpha’s complaints 
stemmed from failures in network availability. When the network was down, it was 
challenging to find a person within Sigma who was responsible for fixing the problem. 
There was a lot of finger pointing at Sigma, yet little action to remedy the situation. 
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Frequently Sigma was not even aware of the problems on the network until Alpha 
brought it to their attention. Alpha’s former CIO criticized Sigma for lack of 
responsibility and multiple mishaps in service: 
“And the issue there was surely really bad service. The network would go 
down, they wouldn't repair it, they didn't even know about it sometimes, it 
just was a mess. I would say there were multiple occasions where they 
didn't change the routing in time, or they weren't managing the switching 
time, and so again on those network kind of things, the local DPT was 
complaining about saying it's not our fault, then someone like say it's not 
our fault, and then would be these guys who are supposed to manage the 
whole thing say it's not their fault, but blaming the other guy. So, that 
happened too many times.” 
 
On several occasions the network downtime cost Alpha lost business revenues 
and dissatisfied customers. When the network was slow or unavailable, Alpha’s staff 
tried to address the issues with the provider and have the network back up and running 
promptly. Sometimes the resolution was not available within the agreed time frame, and 
Alpha sought reduction in outsourcing charges to account for Sigma’s poor performance. 
However, Alpha’s Global Telecom Manager felt the reimbursements were not solving the 
network problems and certainly did not help to repair the damage done to the business as 
a result of the outages:  
“Links connection goes down and it would not be repaired within the 
agreed time frame. Although you can always escalate and get a little bit of 
money back, but in my case it does not help me to get some money back if 
I've got a major site down. The money that I get back does not weight 
against damage that it is costing the business and also with users that are 
going to complain and are unhappy. So from that perspective there were 
some issues, I know that.” 
 
Apart from frequent network failures, another problem that disrupted the service 
was unknown capacity of the network. Alpha expected to have certain traffic volume on 
the network, yet it could not control the actual capacity or even measure it. When Alpha 
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experienced delays in network traffic, it felt that the telecommunication lines had lower 
capacity than specified in the contract. Unfortunately, there were no performance reports 
available from Sigma to prove one way or another. Alpha’s IS Director in Europe was 
frustrated with Sigma’s poor performance: 
“The networks went, they went down quite often, capacity was, the 
capacity we were paying for wasn't provided, and also there wasn't really 
performance reporting provided to us even though it was part of the 
contract. There was a mixture of things. It all goes down to the lack of 
performance and lack of reporting and availability of the network.” 
 
Part of the problem with Sigma’s performance derived from the provider’s poor 
managerial practices. While the staff may have been qualified for the job, there were no 
clear procedures for troubleshooting the network, or policies, to assign responsibility for 
fixing the problem to an individual or a team. The fact that the network was down quite 
often certainly did not help either. Alpha’s former CIO admitted that there were some 
knowledgeable employees at Sigma, yet the overall service was inadequate: 
“Now they had some people in their organization that were very 
competent good people. But the way they provided service was poor.” 
 
The original contract was negotiated by the IS Director in Europe who was based 
in the French offices of Alpha. Sigma was also located in France which made it easy for 
the IS Director to communicate with the provider’s staff in their native language. Later in 
the contract, another IS Director for Alpha-Europe was appointed who was based in the 
UK and did not speak any French. Sigma was not prepared to work on an international 
agreement and struggled when discussing the details of the contract and the problems in 
English. The IS Director in Europe who was in charge of the contract felt that language 
barrier posed a major difficulty in the relationship: 
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“And they found it difficult, Sigma to support an international agreement 
from an account management point of view and with someone who didn't 
speak French. And that was one of the difficulties there.”  
 
When problems surfaced, the communication between Sigma’s employees and 
Alpha’s staff proved to be complicated. Most of the provider’s personnel did not speak 
English well, and most Alpha employees did not speak French. A lack of good rapport 
resulted in frequent misunderstandings and a strained relationship overall. Sigma 
perceived Alpha as always unhappy and trying to end the relationship, while Alpha was 
never content with Sigma’s performance. Alpha’s former CIO never personally met any 
of the Sigma’s employees, and had to manage the contract through the IS Director in 
Europe: 
“I think it was just there was never any rapport between my management 
team in Europe and them. It was like all in water.  It was just a bad 
relationship. They, I think, I personally never met any of them, but I think 
what the situation was that they felt we were always trying to get out of an 
agreement, and we always felt they were trying to keep us in agreement 
that was really-really poor, and that we were stuck. Nobody was happy.” 
 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
Sigma’s contract suffered from lack of performance and many conflicts, which 
resulted in overall dissatisfaction and Alpha’s inability to control its own network and 
business. Alpha’s former CIO contrasted Sigma’s contract with the relationship that 
Alpha had with another provider, Kappa, where Alpha built an excellent rapport with the 
provider and trusted the provider to always perform in Alpha’s best interest. Sigma’s 
contract was a complete opposite, and Alpha’s former CIO could not recommend 
partnering with Sigma again: 
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“I'd say we'd never use them again, and I would say that was the situation 
that was the opposite of Kappa where we did not feel we were able to 
control. I think we felt we were pretty much at their mercy.” 
 
Poor performance coupled with many conflicts put a strain on the relationship 
between Alpha and Sigma. Alpha’s changing business requirements necessitated more 
bandwidth and a stable network that could reliably support its customers. Sigma often 
failed to conduct business and deliver the contracted services, according to the service 
level agreement. Dissatisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement on the part of Alpha 
resulted in reconsideration of the contract and a decision to exit the relationship and 
pursue backsourcing. The IS Director in Europe was not pleased with Sigma’s overall 
performance on the contract: 
“Because the driver there, it was probably the driver there was one to do 
with the lack of performance on their part and the lack of ability of 
responding to our changing business, we needed more bandwidth, we 
needed more capacity and we needed better performance. And they were 
not able to do that, and wasn't providing the right SLA.” 
 
Trust in the Provider 
Because of repeatedly poor performance by Sigma, Alpha had to dedicate one of 
its employees to continuously monitor the contractual performance of the provider. 
Sigma claimed they were maintaining the network and performing the services according 
to the SLA, yet there were frequent mistakes and network failures. The IS Director in 
Europe did not have any trust in the provider, and as a result,, he had to assign one of the 
staff members to supervise Sigma’s actions in order to ensure that Sigma was not taking 
advantage of Alpha: 
“The emphasis is on us, us Alpha to prove to them they weren't supplying 
the adequate bandwidth for what we contracted. And luckily for us we did 
happen to, so we were able to do that, and according to them they kept 
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putting it right but it kept going wrong, it is almost a full time job. I asked 
someone who was here full time to just keep monitoring what they were 
providing which is not necessarily what you want. We didn't trust them at 
all. They weren't really providing the capacity that we were paying for.” 
 
Goal Conflict 
While there were many conflicts throughout the term of the contract, the major 
disagreement arrived when Alpha decided to end the relationship. As part of the 
transition plan, Alpha was establishing its own network, thus duplicating an already 
existing network of Sigma. When a new component was tested and ready for service, 
Alpha transferred that part of the network, under its own management, and discontinued 
the matching circuits on Sigma’s network. Nonetheless, Sigma continued to bill Alpha 
for terminated circuits as the contract pricing was based on the number of nodes in 
service. Financial disagreements culminated in a legal battle, which was later settled out 
of court without much loss for Alpha. Alpha’s former CIO spent a lot of time negotiating 
with Sigma over the billing issues associated with the discontinued circuits: 
“But the other thing where there were some pretty big disagreements is we 
would discontinue a circuit, they charged us so much per circuit. We 
would discontinue a circuit, they would still keep billing us. And then 
three-four-five months later we would say we were not going to pay the 
bill because you overcharged us, they would say we don't have a record 
that you discontinuing it. There were constantly arguments over 
overcharge, undercharge of invoices, bills.” 
 
The IS Director in Europe referred to the same conflict during his interview:  
“We also notified them that several circuits that we no longer required we 
wanted to have them canceled. And there also was some issue in terms of 
invoices, some of the environments, some of the circuits across Europe 
that were decommissioned, we were still being charged for it. So these 
disagreements were very much financial disagreements. We started with 
what was promised and they existed through out the contract, and then on 
top of that started having commercial, financial issues. We were invoices 
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for things we didn't have, and we were invoiced for things that were 
terminated.” 
 
Voice Behavior 
To resolve the conflicts, Alpha’s personnel contacted Sigma by phone or e-mail. 
The latter was the most popular way to communicate with Sigma as it always provided a 
trail of communication to fall back to if needed.  As the problems escalated with Sigma, 
Alpha resorted to more written communication to document Sigma’s failure to comply 
with the contract. Most written communications were at the senior level as Sigma 
consistently failed to address Alpha’s concerns on the lower levels. Alpha’s former CIO 
served as the highest level for problem escalation: 
“E-mail, almost constantly. Towards the end it go to where it was in 
writing and, you know, legal, we are going to take it to court kind of stuff. 
But it was typically any time there was a specific disagreement it would be 
e-mail or something in writing as opposed to just a phone call. There were 
phone calls certainly but e-mails were sent to their management and to our 
management so that there was a record of what was going on and what 
was happening.” 
 
In Europe the highest authority for problem escalation was the IS Director in 
Europe. He was in charge of the Sigma contract, and all IS personnel in Europe reported 
to him. The IS Director in Europe traveled to France several times to meet with the staff 
of Sigma and address the issues around the contract. However, he felt Sigma was not 
responsive to Alpha’s concerns and was not very cooperative in a relationship. He 
speculated that one of the reasons for Sigma’s lack of attention to Alpha may have been 
the small size of the contract: 
“I think to be honest I don't think that from a relationship point of view 
and the account management point of view enough was done by Sigma. 
Even though I even went into France a couple of time, I flew into France 
because we had an office there. And I made an effort of meeting them 
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every time I was there, but it wasn't a two way relationship. I don't think 
also we were that big account for them. There wasn't really a sizable 
amount of revenue in the grand scheme of things, it wasn't really that great 
for them. So the amount of effort put on the account was pretty limited.” 
 
There was a standard procedure for communicating network problems to the 
provider. Every issue had to be logged in by one of the Alpha’s employees and then the 
provider was contacted with the request for service. On the provider’s side, the staff was 
also supposed to record the problem and then try to address it promptly. If the problem 
was not addressed to the satisfaction of Alpha, the IS Director in Europe contacted the 
management of Sigma, seeking resolution. On several occasions the IS Director in 
Europe had to personally meet with Sigma’s personnel to deal with the troubled network: 
“So any problems that we had, we had to log them, escalate them and they 
also had a regular accounting, a regular event account management. So we 
had those two methods of escalation though problem management and 
through their accounting procedures. I also escalated through the senior 
management and I also went and saw them several times in France about 
this.” 
 
Overall, there was little communication between Alpha and Sigma other than to 
report a problem. Internally, Sigma seemed to suffer from poor communication as well. 
Sigma was slow to respond to problems because there was lack of structured 
communication internally, and as a result, a lack of responsiveness when clients needed 
help.  Alpha’s former CIO complained about Sigma’s communication patterns: 
“And I would say that was basically where there was very little 
communication other than may be a phone call every once in a while.  
And there wasn't a lot of communication upwards or downwards within 
that company where they would be responsiveness if there was a contract 
or some big issue. And certainly not very responsive to us when we had an 
issue or concern to be dealt with.” 
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When it was decided to end the relationship with Sigma, Alpha sent a formal 
letter to the provider informing them of the decision to terminate the contract. The IS 
Director in Europe personally met with the management of Sigma to work out a transition 
plan. Part of the new arrangement involved renting the lines from another 
telecommunication provider that could offer the services globally. Sigma was notified of 
the upcoming stages in the transition and the proposed time table for the transfer was 
made available to them. The IS Director in Europe oversaw the transition: 
“The first stage they were notified that we are moving the network away. 
And we notified them both verbally, we've met with their managers and 
told them and discussed it, and we also notified them by e-mail and mail 
as we had to. And it was very much a notification that we were going to 
transfer services to someone else and we worked with them for a period of 
weeks putting that together.” 
 
The second component of the transition entailed the transfer of the previously 
leased equipment and network management under Alpha’s internal supervision. By then, 
Alpha already designed a new network and purchased bandwidth from the new provider. 
In stages, the new equipment was installed in Europe by Alpha’s team of engineers. After 
scrupulous testing, the new network components were added to the global network and 
the old components were terminated.  The IS Director in Europe recalled that Sigma was 
not very cooperative during the transition and even continued to bill Alpha: 
“Stage two was once we gave them notice, we still have a period of 
transitioning and in that period of transitioning they started overcharging 
us for circuits and refusing to apply credit against invoices, you know 
things we were misinvoiced.” 
 
When Alpha refused to pay for the terminated circuits, Sigma threatened to bring 
a lawsuit against Alpha for non-payment. Alpha was able to demonstrate that Sigma was 
notified about the termination of each of the circuits in question and the charges were not 
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substantiated. Sigma also claimed that Alpha breached the contract by exiting before its 
expiration. In reality, Alpha simply continued to  reduce the number of nodes in service, 
and slowly phased out of the relationship. Yet Alpha stayed with Sigma through the end 
of the contract, thus avoiding early termination fees. Alpha’s former CIO had to rely on 
Alpha’s internal legal counsel to resolve the confrontation: 
“[Alpha] sent them a letter of termination, and that was one where we 
showed it to our attorneys, internal attorneys, there wasn't a law suit but 
basically they were claiming that we owed them money because we left, 
we walked from the contract before it was done.”  
 
The Alpha and Sigma relationship was troubled by many conflicts. Alpha was not 
satisfied with the network capacity and frequently felt that Sigma was not addressing its 
concerns in a timely manner. From the technical perspective, the network suffered from 
frequent downtimes and as a result, Alpha’s business was hurting financially because of 
the delays. The communication was difficult between Alpha and Sigma because of the 
language barrier and overall lack of rapport between the two companies. Alpha even had 
to designate a full time employee to monitor the contractual behavior of Sigma to ensure 
that Alpha received the stipulated services. When Alpha tried to voice its concerns about 
the service, Sigma perceived it as another attempt on the part of Alpha to escape from the 
contract. Sigma was never responsive to Alpha’s requests and was not cooperative during 
the transition.  
Emerging Themes 
Power 
The decision to backsource the Alpha-Sigma contract was made by the executives 
at the corporate headquarters of Alpha. The original contract was negotiated and signed 
 202
by Alpha-Europe executives, but due to changes in corporate structure, it was transferred 
under the headquarters’ authority.  Backsourcing of the Alpha-Sigma contract happened 
as part of the consolidation of the IS activities and the centralization of power at the 
global headquarters. The Senior System Administrator suggested politics was involved in 
the decision to backsource the Alpha-Sigma contract:  
“It is a company and it is hard to say this and to prove this. There is 
always politics for the people.” 
 
Integration of Perspectives 
The backsourcing of Sigma’s contract was motivated by several different 
considerations. First, the contract was very expensive and the costs continued to increase 
throughout the time of the contract because it was priced per node on the network. All 
interviewees named high cost as one of the reasons for the backsourcing (Table 6.7). 
Despite high switching costs required to build a new network in Europe and lease 
telecommunication lines from another provider, the termination of Sigma’s contract was 
justified by almost 50% in cost savings.  
 Table 6.7 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant 
Informant Primary Reason  Secondary Reason 
Former CIO High cost Poor service quality 
Global Telecom Manager High cost Regain control 
IS Director in Europe High cost Poor service quality 
Senior System Administrator Management 
changes/Power 
High Cost 
 
Second, the important concern for Alpha was inadequate service quality 
demonstrated by frequent network failures, low network capacity, and an 
unresponsiveness of the provider’s personnel. Frequent conflicts, because of 
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disappointing service, undermined the trust between the companies and led to Alpha’s 
overall dissatisfaction with the contract. Poor performance also contributed to several 
business losses for Alpha and as such, left the client helpless in the situation. Loss of 
control over its network was a concern for Alpha and was identified by one of the 
respondents as the second most important reason for the termination of the Sigma 
relationship.  
While both high costs and inadequate service quality seemed to be salient for the 
backsourcing decision, a majority of the respondents agreed that cost was the dominant 
factor in this situation. Specifically, the IS Director in Europe expressed his conviction in 
the importance of the economic factor: 
“And also they were expensive, cost was another driver. I would say cost 
was actually a bigger driver here than even performance because their 
costs were enormous for the services they were providing, they were 
definitely too much money.” 
 
The informants admitted that Alpha was undergoing globalization of its business 
and centralizing its information systems (Table 6.8). However, centralization was not 
perceived as dominant motivation in the backsourcing of the Alpha – Sigma contract. 
One interviewee stressed the role and politics of Alpha’s corporate management in the 
decision to transition out of Sigma’s contract. Consolidation of Alpha and the 
establishment of global corporate headquarters resulted in shifts in power and authority 
inside Alpha. Formerly, each Alpha office ran its own operations and was independent of 
other offices worldwide. The new approach centralized the corporate power in one 
location and forced all other locations to conform to the new strategy.  
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In summary, backsourcing of Sigma’s contract was motivated by a combination 
of economic, relationship, and strategic factors. There was consistency across the 
accounts of the informants (Table 6.9). Exorbitant costs and poor performance served as 
the main reasons for the ending of the relationship. A lack of trust and many conflicts in 
the relationship, combined with inadequate service quality, left Alpha without control 
over the network and possible business failures. Strategically, Alpha underwent changes 
in corporate structure and management of the company and was pursuing centralization 
of all of its activities globally. Consolidation of the network was inline with the new 
corporate strategy. Sigma’s contract was causing Alpha huge financial losses, suffered 
from poor performance and was impossible to control.  
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Table 6.8 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant 
        Informant 
 
Construct 
Former CIO Global Telecom 
Manager 
IS Director in 
Europe 
Senior System 
Administrator  
Cost Advantage Costly contract  Costly contract 
Backsourcing 
costs less 
Costly contract 
Backsourcing 
less by 150% 
Costly contract 
Provider 
opportunism 
Switching Cost No termination 
fees 
Cost for new 
equipment, staff, 
network 
Cost for new 
equipment, staff, 
network 
Cost for 
purchased 
bandwidth 
Asset 
Specificity 
  Some: Business 
in many 
countries 
 
Change in the 
Role of IS 
Centralization Global network New software 
platforms 
 
Loss of Control  No control, no 
flexibility 
No control No knowledge 
of the network 
Structural 
Changes 
   Backsourcing 
initiated by 
corporate 
headquarters 
Service Quality Poor: network 
failures, delays, 
no one 
responsible 
Poor: network 
failures, delays 
Poor: network 
failures, less 
capacity, lack of 
reporting, 
language barrier 
Poor: network 
failures, lack of 
reporting 
Trust No trust: never 
use them again 
Had to trust but 
had concerns 
No trust: full 
time monitoring 
 
Goal Conflict Some conflicts: 
service level 
low, billing 
issues 
Some conflicts: 
termination 
clauses 
Some conflicts: 
billing issues 
 
Satisfaction Low:  
No rapport, bad 
relationship 
 Low: bad 
relationship 
Low: bad 
relationship 
Voice Behavior Written 
communication, 
lack of response 
Communicate 
with provider to 
address issues 
Communication 
problem, lack of 
response, 
escalation 
 
Power    Americans 
decided, politics
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Table 6.9 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number of 
Coded Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 13 4 100% (4/4) 
Switching Cost 13 4 100% (4/4) 
Asset Specificity 1 1 1 opinion 
Change in the Role of IS 8 3 100% (3/3) 
Loss of Control 9 3 100% (3/3) 
Structural Changes 2 1 1 opinion 
Service Quality 19 4 100% (4/4) 
Trust 4 3 67% (2/3) 
Goal Conflict 6 3 100% (3/3) 
Satisfaction 5 3 100% (3/3) 
Voice Behavior 9 3 100% (3/3) 
Power 1 1 1 opinion  
 
Contract Four – Tau 
Alpha – Asia-Pacific’s telecommunications and data center operations were 
managed by an outsourcing provider: Tau. The contract was actually drawn between Tau 
and Alpha’s parent company Delta. Delta aggregated the demand for IS services from its 
four subsidiaries and negotiated volume discounts with Tau. Alpha was charged a portion 
of the outsourcing contract costs based on its share in the revenues of the consortium, 
Delta. Recently, Alpha renegotiated part of the contract and transferred some services 
under internal control. However, most IS activities in Asia-Pacific remained with Tau.  
Economic Considerations  
Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement 
As part of the outsourcing contract, Tau provided a telecommunication link 
between the Alpha – Asia-Pacific offices and the corporate headquarters in the U.S. After 
Alpha successfully terminated the telecommunications contract with Sigma in Europe, it 
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brought back the network administration activities in-house, and purchased bandwidth 
from a large global telecommunications carrier. Tau only had local presence in the Asia-
Pacific region and Alpha was not happy with Tau’s connectivity to North America. The 
new telecommunication carrier, which Alpha signed up for the network, could provide a 
direct link to Australia.  The former CIO mentioned that he preferred a dedicated direct 
connection:  
“Because Tau did not provide a direct link to the U.S., Tau provided a link 
to Sydney, I believe to Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur to Frankfurt, 
Frankfurt to London, and that's how they got back to U.S., it was the way 
network went.” 
 
Because most of Alpha’s IS activities were carried out in the IS center at the 
corporate headquarters, Alpha needed a direct connection with its Asia-Pacific 
operations. Unfortunately, the current provider, Tau, could not deliver such a customized 
link. Because of its asset specific requests, Alpha negotiated with Tau to terminate the 
existing connection and purchased the line between North America and Australia through 
a global telecommunications provider.   
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
Delta outsourced IS services to reduce IS costs by aggregating the IS demands of 
all its subsidiaries in Asia-Pacific. However, Alpha by itself was large enough to achieve 
similar economies of scale internally by combining all its global IS needs in one location. 
Therefore, Alpha no longer needed the contract with Tau and wanted to run its IS 
activities inside. The former CIO believed that in-house IS operations were the most 
economical for Alpha:  
“The second issue is Alpha just happens to be big enough, and most of its 
areas of IT kind of services and things they do where there is enough 
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volume, enough inertia, enough mass to where it is justified to do it in-
house. Because of the peak period they are able around the world to lower 
the volume, it gives them different time zones, when Alpha-Europe 
processing is going on it is at a different time than when USA is going on, 
when Alpha is calling us the help desk for service, other people are asleep 
and so on and so forth.”  
 
It was not cost efficient for any individual regional unit of Alpha to run an 
internal IS operation. Consolidation allowed Alpha to aggregate the needs of all of its 
offices worldwide and manage all IS services from the corporate headquarters. According 
to Alpha’s former CIO, consolidation justified an internal IS center:  
“So I think Alpha just happens to be, now if you just took Alpha-USA by 
itself and you didn't do all of this consolidation, I would say Alpha-USA 
by itself would be a very good candidate for outsourcing. Alpha-Canada 
for sure could be outsourced if it was all by itself. Mexico - definitely. 
Outsource everything, because it's 20 employees and you can almost run it 
on a real small server, outsource the whole thing.” 
 
Alpha considered backsourcing telecommunication services outsourced to Tau in 
Asia-Pacific. However, the contract with Tau was signed by the parent consortium, Delta, 
and not Alpha itself. Delta received a discount from Tau thanks to a large volume of 
outsourced services. Consequently, Alpha was not able to terminate the contract by itself 
and had to take Delta into consideration. Because Alpha is owned by Delta, the parent’s 
financial matters were a big concern for Alpha. The former CIO could not end the 
relationship with Tau as it would have put Delta at a disadvantage:  
“If Alpha were to pull, and say hey we are going to bring all of that stuff 
back in-house, Delta would be stuck with this overhead of equipment, 
material, contracts with vendors and whatever, and empty floor space in 
the data center, an extra air conditioning, whatever that they don't need, 
and it would hurt because it's one company, and Delta is, and Delta owns 
Alpha. So it wouldn't make sense to do anything that would hurt the 
parent.” 
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While backsourcing was economically justified for Alpha, it was not beneficial 
for the parent company. The former CIO pursued termination of all other relationships, 
yet had to maintain the relationship with Tau:  
“Even though from a management day to day it is always nice to have 
everything in one room and everybody works together and they are not in 
Melbourne and Sydney and all scattered all around. Even though there is a 
benefit to do that, it is not cost justified to say well let's throw away 10% 
of our overhead because it's cleaner if we split up. So I would say that's 
probably the major reason.” 
 
From an economic perspective, both high costs and some asset specificity 
supported Alpha’s decision to backsource Tau’s contract. However, Alpha had to take 
into consideration the interests of its parent consortium, Delta, and continue with the 
arrangement. Part of the contract was renegotiated to address Alpha’s needs for a direct 
telecommunications link between North America and Asia-Pacific.  
Strategic Considerations 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
The original set up of the IS activities at Alpha had each individual office running 
its own IS operations. When global headquarters were established, Alpha embarked on a 
new mission to standardize its businesses worldwide. The former CIO deemed the old 
arrangements incongruous with Alpha’s new strategy and decided to standardize the IS 
systems as well:  
“I think that there was a situation where the agreements were out of sync 
with where the business was headed. And so, and there is probably a lot of 
businesses that get into that situation, and so that's one issue.” 
 
The contract with Tau was one of several regional outsourcing contracts that 
supported the IS operations of Alpha. A new centralized IS warranted backsourcing of 
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the outsourcing contracts and the establishment of a consolidated IS center at the 
corporate headquarters. Tau’s contract also had to be reevaluated in the new light.  
Loss of Control over IS 
Because Tau’s contract started out as a local IS arrangement, over the years the 
Alpha – Asia-Pacific personnel had established a decent rapport with the provider’s 
personnel. However, when the senior executives at the global headquarters tried to take 
over the management of the IS operations, some tension developed between Alpha’s 
local Asia-Pacific staff and the IS personnel at the headquarters. Asia-Pacific employees 
continued to perform their duties and work with Tau without reporting to the 
headquarters. At the same time, Alpha’s executives wanted to centralize the power in 
their hands and felt they did not have control over the IS activities in Asia-Pacific. The 
former CIO had to restructure the relationship with Tau to regain control over the 
network and the data center activities in Asia-Pacific:  
“The guys in Australia they had that relationship with Tau, the guys in 
Orlando who now own all the circuits and need to pay the bills, they don't. 
So the local people in Australia feel that they are being, they are losing 
their authority. Losing responsibility, losing control, where the guys in 
Orlando feel that they are out of control, they are not following the rules, 
they are not coming to us when they want to install a new circuit or a new 
router or a new switch or whatever.” 
 
Changes in Management 
Changes in management at the headquarters and the appointment of a CEO and a 
former CIO, shifted the distribution of power at Alpha. The regional offices no longer 
made their own decisions or controlled their business. The strategy was dictated by the 
senior executives who wanted to have full control over Alpha’s business. The former CIO 
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was working on centralizing IS activities at the corporate data center and was trying to 
backsource all existing outsourcing contacts:  
“So one issue is just internal Alpha management where one business unit 
wants to have this local touch and feel and control and the other unit says 
No, we are the global business and everything has to come through us and 
we are in charge.” 
 
Several strategic components called for backsourcing of Tau’s contract. Alpha 
was consolidating all of its IS services globally, under the direction of its new 
management, and Tau was one of the outsourcing contracts that had to be backsourced. 
Alpha also wanted to have more control over the network in Asia-Pacific, and be able to 
administer it remotely from its corporate headquarters. 
Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
One reason for considering backsourcing options in the relationship with Tau was 
the inadequate service quality. The staff at the Asia-Pacific office of Alpha was not 
happy with delays in service and poor responsiveness of Tau. They often sensed that Tau 
had a monopoly in the Asia-Pacific market and Alpha had no choice but continue 
purchasing Tau’s services. Alpha’s former CIO recalled that one of Alpha’s managers 
complained about his frustrating experiences with Tau:  
“[Manager in Australia] would tell me often that he would call Tau and 
Tau would not be responsive. That he would say hey we are going to do 
this on a weekend, they wouldn't do it. And there were many-many 
occasions where it was just bureaucratic. Tau is just huge and they have 
like monopoly in Australia. So, Tau as a vendor, as an outsource vendor is 
sort of like we can do no wrong, we are better than everybody, and since 
you don't have any other competition no other place to go, I don't think 
they really pay a lot of attention.” 
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Alpha was aggravated by Tau’s frequent delays in service. It had to rely on Tau 
for any modification to its network, updates to the routers and the assignment of IP 
addresses. Unfortunately, all requests had to be submitted to Tau and then cued to be 
addressed and resolved. The Global Telecom Program Manager sometimes had to wait 
for almost a month to be able to implement a change on the network:  
“So in the past we had many problems when we requested a change 
sometimes it took a month to implement. And it became a very frustrating 
experience. That has improved a bit.” 
 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
Satisfaction with the relationship with Tau developed, based on Alpha’s 
experiences during the contract. The former CIO described the relationship between Tau 
and Alpha as “strained”, the Global Telecom Program Manager was “not too happy” with 
the relationship and the Vice President for Global Infrastructure stated that he was “very 
unhappy” with the relationship.  
Voice Behavior 
Whenever concerns about the contract came up, Alpha tried to communicate with 
Tau to resolve those issues. One problems was the assignment of IP addresses to the 
network nodes at Alpha. Since most of Alpha’s network was managed internally, but part 
of it was managed by Tau, Alpha and Tau ended up assigning conflicting IP addresses. 
Tau worked with Alpha to resolve discrepancies and was cooperative in instituting a new 
policy for the assignment of IP addresses for Alpha – Asia-Pacific. The Vice President of 
Global Infrastructure described the situation: 
“Some of the challenges you have there, if you understand like 
networking, you have what we call public IP addresses and internal IP 
addresses. And so our challenge is when you have an outsourcer with a 
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piece of the world, they tend to use IP addresses which conflict internally 
with others.” 
 
Alpha was not able to backsource the contract with Tau. However, it negotiated 
with the provider to gain more control over its network. One of Alpha’s major concerns 
was its inability to evaluate the utilization of the network. As a result of renegotiation, 
Alpha received read-only access to the routers in Asia-Pacific and could now monitor 
network usage. The Global Telecom Program Manager was pleased with the improved 
level of control:  
“But for example one of the things that Tau allows us now we have at 
least what they call read access to the routers, which means we can 
actually measure the utilization in the network. So they have given us at 
least the access to look into the network, we can't change anything, but we 
now have some visibility.” 
 
To increase the level of control over the network in Asia-Pacific, Alpha relocated 
one of its network engineers to Australia. It allowed Alpha to closely monitor the 
activities of Tau and thus, improve the service. Alpha was able to establish a new contact, 
who could communicate directly with Tau, yet reported to the upper management in 
Alpha’s global headquarters. The Global Telecom Program Manager was satisfied with 
enhanced response levels: 
“And one of my engineers who used to work in the UK moved to 
Australia. Now that I have someone local who can speak to them face to 
face, I get a much better response.” 
 
On the relationship front, Alpha was dissatisfied with the service it was receiving 
from Tau. Since Alpha was not able to terminate the relationship, it negotiated with Tau 
in an attempt to improve the objectionable state of affairs. Tau was responsive to the 
requests and shared some network utilization tools with Alpha.  
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Emerging Themes 
Power 
Alpha was not able to backsource the Alpha-Tau contract and had to settle for its 
partial renegotiation. The termination of the contract was in line with Alpha’s new 
globalization and centralization strategy, but it had to succumb to the pressures from its 
parent consortium, Delta. While Alpha wanted to centralize control over IS activities in 
one location, Delta was consolidating IS services in Asia-Pacific to reduce costs through 
economies of scale. Delta fully owned Alpha and thus, it was the more powerful of the 
two organizations. It was able to use its power to persuade Alpha to continue with the 
outsourcing contract with Tau, despite economic and strategic benefits of backsourcing.  
In addition to the power struggle between the two companies, there was some 
internal discontent within Alpha. Its Asia-Pacific offices were used to operating 
independently. Centralization suddenly shifted the power from local managers, to the 
corporate executives, who wanted everyone in Asia-Pacific to report directly to them. 
According to the former CIO, the Asia-Pacific personnel feared losing control and 
resisted changes in the governance:  
“You have a little bit of geographic clash internally in Alpha and then the 
third issue is that Delta is the one that negotiated the contract. And you 
don't want to hurt the parent company's financials.” 
 
Integration of Perspectives 
The contract with Tau was not backsourced and is still in effect to this day. Some 
components, however, were renegotiated. Nevertheless, Alpha had several reasons to 
backsource this particular arrangement. Table 6.10 presents an overview of the various 
 215
factors identified by the informants, who provided consistent accounts of the details of 
the Alpha-Tau relationship (Table 6.11). First of all, Alpha experienced changes in the 
corporate executives who introduced a new global strategy of standardization and 
centralized control. As part of the new plan, IS activities were consolidated at the 
corporate headquarters. Alpha also struggled with unsatisfactory service quality and the 
overall relationship with Tau was tense. Alpha was unhappy with the low responsiveness 
of Tau and as a result felt it could not control IS activities in Asia-Pacific.  
Alpha had to maintain the relationship with Tau under pressure from its parent 
consortium, Delta. Delta derives economic benefits from aggregating the demand for IS 
services from all of its subsidiaries in the Asia-Pacific region. While Alpha estimated that 
it would be cost effective to backsource Tau’s contract, it had to continue with the 
relationship to spare Delta any financial losses. The bottom line, Delta was Alpha’s 
owner and Alpha had to act in the best interest of its parent.  
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Table 6.10 Alpha – Tau Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant 
      Informant 
 
Construct 
Former CIO Global Telecom 
Program 
Manager 
Director of IT 
Operations 
Vice President 
Global 
Infrastructure 
Cost Advantage Alpha is large 
enough to enjoy 
economies of 
scale. But Delta 
would suffer 
financially from 
backsourcing 
   
Switching Cost     
Asset 
Specificity 
Tau can not 
provide a direct 
link between 
US and 
Australia 
   
Change in the 
Role of IS 
Contract is out 
of sync with 
where business 
is headed 
   
Loss of Control Can not control 
the network 
Poor ability to 
adapt to change 
  
Structural 
Changes 
Contract was 
negotiated by 
Delta 
 Contract was 
negotiated by 
Delta 
 
Service Quality Delays in 
service, poor 
responsiveness 
Delays in 
service, poor 
responsiveness 
  
Trust     
Goal Conflict     
Satisfaction Strained Not too happy  Very unhappy 
Voice Behavior  Negotiated to 
have visibility 
of the network 
 Negotiated new 
policy for 
internal IP 
addresses 
Power Internal clash in 
Alpha, Delta’s 
interests first 
  Need 
representation 
in Asia-Pacific 
to negotiate 
with Delta 
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Table 6.11 Alpha – Tau Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number of 
Coded Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 2 1 1 opinion 
Switching Cost 0 0 No quotes 
Asset Specificity 1 1 1 opinion 
Change in the Role of IS 1 1 1 opinion 
Loss of Control 2 2 100% (2/2) 
Structural Changes 2 2 100% (2/2) 
Service Quality 3 2 100% (2/2) 
Trust 0 0 No quotes 
Goal Conflict 0 0 No quotes 
Satisfaction 3 3 100% (3/3) 
Voice Behavior 1 2 100% (2/2) 
Power 3 2 100% (2/2) 
 
Company Two – Beta 
Outsourcing provider, Omega, managed Beta’s membership database during a 
three year period.  The decision to outsource at Beta, and other non-profit stations, was 
driven by coercive pressures exercised by the non-profit broadcasting corporation, 
Omicron. The outsourcing provider, Omega, started under the auspices of Omicron and 
was supported and initially funded by a grant from the corporation. While each station is 
run independently, they all function under the umbrella of Omicron and carry its logo. 
The stations also depend on Omicron for some of their funding that comes in the form of 
grants.  
Omega planned to consolidate membership processing for several stations and 
thus, achieve economies of scale.  At the same time, Beta hoped to focus its efforts on 
development and membership growth instead of maintaining database and printing 
mailings, which would result in cost savings for the station. All in all, the initial 
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outsourcing decision at Beta can be explained by coercive pressures from the non-profit 
broadcasting industry as well as expected economic benefits.  
Economic Considerations 
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
Beta’s outsourcing provider, Omega, was a new company established specifically 
for the purpose of handling the membership operations of broadcasting stations. Being a 
start-up, Omega relied heavily on its clients for the operating capital. To have the capital 
flowing, Omega charged its clients for services two or three months in advance. This 
created an extra outlay of funds for Beta that received most of its funding from its 
members. The Chief Financial Officer of Beta expressed his dissatisfaction with the way 
the payments were set up:  
“They would estimate what their costs were going to be for a certain 
period of time, and then they would send you a bill, they would way 
overestimate because they needed to have this working capital, and then 
they would send you a bill and you would prepay all these fees.  And then 
after a period of time they would attempt to settle up with you.” 
  
 Payment for managing the membership database was calculated on a per 
member basis. As the membership of Beta increased over the years, so did the 
fees that Omega charged. Beta felt it was paying too much for the services it was 
receiving, especially that there was a large monetary outlay ahead of time. 
Additionally, there were significant difficulties in settling those prepayments with 
Omega afterwards. The employee in charge of the data processing at Beta 
complained about the escalating outsourcing charges during the interview: 
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“Omega charged so much for every member that Beta had.  And as the 
years went on Beta would increase its membership, and therefore the cost 
would increase.  So they charged for that, every member.” 
 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
Beta believed it could cut down its costs by bringing the membership function 
back in-house. Beta had to hire a database administrator to handle the membership 
database in-house. It also had to purchase a server to host the database and computer 
equipment for the membership department.  Membership software licenses were 
transferred from the provider to Beta. Beta had to renegotiate its contracts with the 
lockbox company and find another provider to handle the printing of the renewal notices 
and other membership mailings.  The Network Administrator was in charge of much of 
the technical set up at the station:  
“You would have to purchase whatever hardware you would need which 
we ended up buying a server and a whole new set of computers for them 
upstairs.  Software, I don’t believe there were any costs because we own 
the licenses.” 
  
By backsourcing, Beta saved the money that was paid to Omega as part of the 
contract, which had to be made several months in advance. The additional expense to set 
up the operations in-house was less than the amount of money Beta was paying Omega, 
to manage its membership services. The Chief Financial Officer believed Beta did not 
experience any extra costs as a result of backsourcing:  
“No extra costs, because we were paying for all these sorts of things 
anyway as part of the total cost and now we are just sort of carving them 
all out individual things, you know, the licensing fees and the training.” 
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Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Omega was providing the same membership services to several broadcasting 
stations. All stations were non-profit organizations that relied heavily on the members 
contributions for their operations. The membership database and pledge campaigns were 
the core of their business.  Each station had its own fundraising staff that was responsible 
for charitable campaigns. The Chief Financial Officer at Beta described all non-profit 
broadcasting stations as very similar:  
“I would say it is probably incredibly similar to other non-profit stations.  
Everybody pretty much does business the same way and the IT systems 
are probably quite similar.  In fact, the system that we have, XYZ, was 
developed for public broadcasting.”  
 
Omega, at the peak of its business, was handling the membership for 14 different 
broadcasting stations. Omega combined the data from all stations into one database and 
managed it as one large piece. While stations carried out their recruitment of members 
differently, they all had the same goal, i.e. membership contributions. Omega attempted 
to standardize the membership operations at all client stations by creating a set of 
procedures that all stations had to follow. Some stations were reluctant to change, but 
they had to adhere to the new guidelines to be able to operate through Omega. Sometimes 
the reports that Omega provided were not exactly what was needed, but Beta’s personnel 
had to make them work, recalled the Network Administrator: 
“I know that they did some custom queries for us. I am not really sure 
about that but I think that they ended up basically modifying something 
that they might have done for someone else. So, a lot of times it wasn’t 
quite what we needed, but it worked.” 
 
From the economic perspective, the expected cost savings for Beta did not 
materialize in the Omega contract. While higher costs sometimes can be explained by 
 221
extremely asset specific services, it was not the case with Beta. All the stations carried 
our similar fundraising operations and Omega forced the stations to follow the 
standardized procedures for membership.  Beta decided to pursue backsourcing because 
internal production costs combined with the backsourcing switching costs were lower 
than external outsourcing costs charged by Omega.  
Strategic Considerations 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
Beta is in the business of television broadcasting, and membership may seem to 
be a peripheral activity, yet membership is critical to Beta’s financial vitality. 
Membership is responsible for over U.S. $5 million annually, which accounts for over 
half of the station’s revenues. The membership database that was managed by Omega 
contains all of the membership data at Beta. It is used to create mailing lists for 
contribution campaigns and recruit new members. The quality of the membership pledge 
drive is directly responsible for the amount of contributions collected from Beta’s 
members. The Chief Financial Officer emphasized the role of the membership in Beta’s 
business:  
“Membership and the whole income stream from membership has always 
been an integral part of the organization, so in sense it’s such a big number 
and there are other dynamics aside from the information system that come 
into play. And it has always become more and more important over the 
years.  And part of that is the information systems, and so having the 
problems that we have had with Omega didn’t allow us to leverage that 
line of business, that income the way we wanted to.” 
 
The outsourcing decision was driven by the non-profit broadcasting corporation 
and was justified by the expected cost savings. The membership employees who had to 
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daily interact with Omega, and rely on the provider for help with the membership 
recruitment, did not have any input into the outsourcing decision.  Beta did not realize the 
role that membership data played in the station’s business, until it transferred the database 
out to Omega. Unquestionably, the membership database was the foundation of Beta’s 
recruitment efforts and a major source of the station’s funds. The Network Administrator 
suggested that during the outsourcing contract, Beta learned the importance of the 
database and membership to its business: 
“I think they realized the kind of power you can get out of your data.  
There was a lot that they wanted that they weren’t getting.” 
 
Loss of Control over IS 
The outsourcing provider Omega had complete control over Beta’s membership 
database. According to the service level agreement, Beta had to make a request for any 
kind of reports in writing and there was a ten day turn around on those requests. That left 
Beta at a disadvantage as it could not respond quickly to any situation involving 
membership. The person in charge of data processing felt helpless when the membership 
database was outsourced to Omega: 
“Whenever I was here and we converted to Omega, I felt helpless because 
I didn’t have the control, I just couldn’t go in and do something.  I had to 
send it to them to do it and that was frustrating.”  
  
While Beta could view the individual records in the database from its work 
stations, the access to reporting and querying capabilities was only available to Omega. 
Beta’s membership personnel were not able to pull up any aggregate information or make 
any changes to the database. Every modification had to be submitted to Omega for entry. 
While it was its membership data, Beta did not really own it. Omega was in charge and 
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allowed Beta only limited access to the database. The Network Administrator expressed 
his frustration over the situation during the outsourcing contract: 
“They had control over what kind of data we were getting.  And the thing 
is we could not see the queries that they were writing so we didn’t know 
what their results were based on necessarily.  So they would give us the 
results and we had to trust that they were what we asked for.” 
 
Membership contributions were solicited in several different ways at Beta. The 
renewal notices were sent out four months before the renewal date. If the members did 
not renew right away, renewal notices were sent once a month until the membership 
expired and then for three more months. Additionally, TV pledge campaigns aired in the 
viewing area and appealed to viewers to contribute and become members of the station. 
Another solicitation mechanism involved sending recruitment materials to the viewers in 
a certain geographic area with certain demographic characteristics.  Such mail drops were 
devised, based on the lists of viewers extracted from the database. Every time Beta 
wanted such a list during the outsourcing contract, they had to submit a request to Omega 
and wait until it was fulfilled, which slowed down the membership recruitment process. 
The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach did not have control over the 
membership database during the outsourcing contract:  
“And that we had a lack of control over the database. As part of the reason 
we are heading into a capital campaign, we need to have information at 
our fingertips. And the length of time of having to wait to get information 
was not conducive to us beginning the capital campaign.  We needed to 
have somebody on site who could get that information quickly and not 
have to wait 10 days and we knew that we’d have a lot more specialized 
information that we needed over the next coming months.”
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Internal Structural Changes 
Beta did not undergo any external structural changes. The station has been on air 
for over 45 years and has not merged or acquired any other entities. However, when the 
decision was made, there were some internal changes at Beta. The failure of the Omega 
outsourcing contract served as a demise of his CEO tenure at the station, who played a 
key role in the original decision. Once it was clear that the outsourcing of the 
membership was not successful, the station and even the station’s board wanted to end 
the relationship with Omega. Yet, the CEO never admitted to the mistake and continued 
to support the outsourcing project. Eventually, he had to resign, and after his departure, 
the station was able to pursue backsourcing. Beta’s Network Administrator reflected on 
the CEO’s departure: 
“Our CEO resigned and he was the one that was kind of on the forefront 
of that and after he had left that’s when they said let’s pull this back and 
bring it back in-house.  The number one and number two person, they 
both, the board kind of moved them out, so we got a new CEO.” 
 
During the outsourcing contract with Omega, Beta reevaluated the role that the 
membership database played in its business. It realized that while IS and the database 
were not its principal business, the database enabled fundraising, which was crucial for 
the station. At the same time, the station experienced a loss of control over its 
membership data. The way the agreement was structured limited Beta’s fundraising 
flexibility and took away from its core competency of recruiting subscribers. To regain 
control, Beta had to bring back in-house the outsourced membership database activities. 
The change in the management did not directly affect the decision to backsource, yet the 
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departure of the CEO allowed Beta to pursue the backsourcing plans without any internal 
confrontation.  
Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Omega operated on a ten day turnaround policy. All requests for service had to be 
submitted in writing and then were handled in a cue. Frequently, the employees at Beta 
experienced a long wait, and felt helpless in the situation. The lengthy turnaround 
undermined the service quality of the outsourcing contract. The CFO was one of the 
people at Beta who experienced a lot of delays in having the issues addressed:  
“Well, they, like I said, they would probably have a priority list of things 
to do, and they would say ok we’ll put that on the list.  And it would be on 
the bottom of the list somewhere and it wouldn’t be handled, and they 
would say we could get to that and that’s one of things that we’re going to 
work on in three months.  So we never felt like we were getting any 
attention to our problems.” 
 
The type of requests ranged from a simple update to an account to more complex 
queries, such as a list of all potential subscribers with certain features (for example, those 
who contributed five years in a row). Frequently, Beta wanted to see several lists quickly, 
so it could devise a successful fundraising campaign. As the number of stations under 
Omega’s management grew, the number of requests increased and the quality of the 
services started to slip. Sometimes, Omega also failed to send out a renewal mailing on 
time, which caused problems for Beta as it was expecting contributions based on the 
mailings. The Vice President for Development recalled that Beta ended up in dire 
financial distress because of Omega’s delays:  
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“Or a mailing would be delayed by two or three weeks and we were pretty 
close to the wire financially.  And there were never any “Well, we’ll make 
adjustments” to my knowledge they weren’t eager to make adjustments 
and take responsibility for their mistakes.” 
  
From Omega’s perspective, its employees felt they were performing their duties 
to the best of their abilities. When multiple stations were having pledge drives, it put an 
extra strain on Omega employees. Unfortunately, on those occasions, Omega did not 
have enough man power to support all stations at the same time, which caused delays and 
obvious aggravation on the part of the stations. The Omega staff tried to stick to their 
deadlines, however, one former employee of Omega admitted during the interview that 
sometimes the deadlines were missed:  
“Most of the time the deadlines were met.  It was really hard sometimes 
because we wouldn’t have enough people working.  I know during pledge 
time the stations required certain things to be done before pledge started 
and sometimes the deadline would come and things were done.  But if the 
backlog got too much, the pledge would start and they would not have 
certain items.  And they would get very upset about that.” 
 
Goal Conflict 
One major conflict between Beta and Omega arose towards the contract’s end. 
During the transition period, Beta was finally able to get its hands on the database and 
review the records.  To Beta’s dismay, it found multiple records that were duplicated in 
the database. The problem stemmed from the fact that Omega set up the duplicate 
controls loosely in the database. The record was not recognized as a duplicate even if 
only one of many database fields was different. The employees entering the data into the 
database did not follow uniform standards, and some of them abbreviated addresses, 
while others did not.  Consequently, some members ended up with several accounts in the 
database which should have been discarded as duplicate if the name and most fields 
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matched an existing record. The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach brought 
this problem to Omega’s attention during the transition period:  
“Particularly the way they managed the database they used very loose 
rules if you will or variables for mailing so we had a lot duplicate accounts 
created and that was a big issue for us and it continued throughout the time 
of the contract… So you end up having three pieces of mail going to the 
same address and one would be for example “Road” and the next one 
would be “Rd” and the next one would be “Rd period” but it wouldn’t 
match so there would be three to the same person. So there’s three pieces 
of mail, which means we’re spending to print three pieces of mail.”   
 
After duplicate records were discovered, Beta requested a refund from Omega. 
After lengthy negotiation and under the threat of a legal battle, Omega refunded a small 
amount to Beta. After the backsourcing was complete, it took Beta four months to 
completely clean the database of all duplicate records. One of Beta’s employees 
expressed his suspicion of Omega mishandling the database on purpose, to increase its 
revenues:  
“I have no proof of this, but I think it’s true.  I have absolutely no proof of 
this, but because Omega charged by the member, the number of records, 
they loosened the controls in the computer that checked for duplicates, and 
therefore whenever a file was uploaded, the computer did not check as 
thoroughly as it should have to see if this person was already in the 
database and therefore it would create a new record.  And if it creates a 
new record, they can charge more money, because here is a new member 
even though it is the same person.  That happened a lot.” 
 
Another issue that came up during the outsourcing contract with Omega was the 
mishandling of accounts receivables. Many members contributed to the station on a 
monthly installment plan. Omega recorded such contributions in an annual lump sum 
payment in the database instead of recording monthly installments and the total expected 
contribution. As a result Beta was not able to accurately account for the funds that were 
actually received and the funds that were still pending (account receivables). The CFO of 
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Beta spent numerous hours trying to reconcile the membership contributions recorded in 
the database and the actual money received in the bank:  
“They understood fundraising very well and they understood how to 
manage a large database of members, so the problem was they didn’t 
understand accounts receivable.  They didn’t understand that if somebody 
pledges $100 to you and then you’re going to send them a renewal notice 
once a month and they pay you $10 a month and you’re going to send 
them a renewal notice once a month for 10 months.  They could not 
understand that we wanted to know how much do they owe us today.”  
 
Trust in the Provider 
As the contract progressed more and more conflicts occurred in the relationship. 
Some issues were resolved with a phone call, some required more extensive follow-up, 
and sometimes even the CEO’s involvement. Beta tried to resolve all the issues amicably 
with Omega, but the problems only got worse. Beta’s staff could never trust Omega, and 
frequently had to communicate with the provider several times a day. The Vice President 
for Development spent a lot of time monitoring the provider: 
“You could never rely on them taking care of it.  You always had to go 
back and check to see if it was taken care of.  My lack of confidence in 
them created double work because I had to contact them to change 
something, to make a correction.  Then I had to go back to make sure that 
it was done and then if it wasn’t done I had to call them again.” 
 
Beta’s CFO expressed similar sentiment:  
“So there was always conflict just in the relationship.  We were always 
weary of what they were doing and trying to make sure they were doing 
the right thing.”  
 
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
Any relationship develops over time, and often the quality of the relationship 
affects the decision to either continue the relationship or to end it. Beta’s relationship 
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with Omega started cordially, but over time it became contentious as described by Beta’s 
employees. The dissatisfaction came as the result of multiple factors including inadequate 
service and escalating costs. The CFO of Beta expressed overall dissatisfaction with the 
contract:  
“Beta was never really fully satisfied with the situation.  And we did 
everything that we needed to do but they weren’t really capable of 
satisfying us as a customer, for the money that we were spending with 
them.” 
 
Membership personnel never welcomed the outsourcing contract because it was 
forced onto them from above. Furthermore, the staff experienced various problems with 
the service and felt they could not control their own membership activities. Yet the 
membership personnel were ultimately responsible for failed pledge drives, and missed 
financial goals. While most individual interactions were amiable, there was a growing 
sense of resentment among Beta’s employees. When asked about his opinion on the 
relationship between Beta and Omega, the Network Administrator described it in the 
following way: 
“Cordial. But I think there were some people that kind of resented it 
because it was so expensive. And it wasn’t really their decision.” 
 
The problems with Omega exacerbated over time. Beta’s personnel grew more 
and more frustrated with the service they were receiving. In many instances, Beta had to 
modify its business procedures to adhere to the new standards imposed by Omega. Still 
Beta was convinced that it knows fundraising and know its membership, and wanted to 
have more access to its data. The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach had to 
deal with a lot of frustration:  
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“It became worse.  I think that there were definitely territorial issues on 
both sides and frustration.  I think that it was a good model for other 
stations but not for our station.” 
 
Voice Behavior 
To communicate their concerns, Beta’s employees worked with various 
individuals at Omega. Initially, when the contract started, the membership personnel 
communicated their concerns to their supervisor (VP for Annual Giving and Special 
Events), who in turn contacted Omega. As the contract progressed, however, more and 
more people were communicating with various constituents at Omega directly. If there 
were errors in the data entry or requests to modify a particular account, a data processing 
person was contacted. For reports and queries, requests were sent to the database guru at 
Omega. Commercial issues were addressed with the account manager, who was one of 
the executives at Omega. Additionally, the CFO communicated with the comptroller at 
Omega about financial discrepancies. The Vice President for Annual Giving and 
Outreach was a designated contract manager at Beta: 
“Each station was assigned a point of contact.  We had our accountant 
manager, if you will, but then if there was a problem the account manager 
wouldn’t know on a detailed level so we would have to go to the actual 
person who was doing the data entry and the work.  And then there was a 
third person who was involved. He did the actual writing of the reports 
and getting the queries together.  So he was a technical person. You had to 
talk to him to get the information that you needed.  So the account 
manager was strictly the marketing person, if you will, to go over the mail 
plan and you have a technical person that if you just had a day to day 
question about why didn’t this check get this person’s account you had to 
go to the third person.  It was sort of a three-tiered situation.” 
 
On several occasions, Beta tried to rectify the problems with the unsatisfactory 
service at Omega. The delayed mail drop caused Beta significant financial losses. Beta 
approached Omega for adjustments on their account, but Omega was not willing to take 
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the financial responsibility for the mishandled mail drop. On another occasion a mailing 
went out with a wrong station’s name, and again no recourse was offered. The CEO of 
Beta was part of Omega’s board and he tried to work with other stations’ representatives 
on the board to resolve the issues.  Beta’s CFO recalled that there was a lot of conflict 
around the contract and shared his communication with Omega (Table 6.12):  
“They caused our mailing to not go out on time.  And we certainly rely on 
the mail marketing. And so the mail drop didn’t occur when it was 
supposed and consequently our whole cash flow was impacted negatively 
because of that. And I know our CEO was fighting about that.  He would 
have to go to the board of directors and lodge complaints and that sort of 
thing.” 
 
Table 6.12 Sampling of Communication from Beta to Omega 
Date Subject Format 
01/20/2000 December Membership Deposit Shortage. Fax 
02/16/2000 January Membership Deposit Shortage. Fax 
03/02/2000 Payment/Deposit Shortage. Mail 
03/08/2000 Cash Revenue Reconciliation. Phone 
03/10/2000 Revised January Pledge Receivables Summary Spreadsheet 
dated 03/08/2000. 
Fax 
03/16/2000 Auditors and Meeting with Omega. Phone 
03/21/2000 February Membership Deposit Shortage. Fax 
08/17/2000 Where is Beta’s July Pledge Receivables Spreadsheet? May 
and June only received after phone calls. 
Fax 
09/19/2000 Pledge Comparison and Reconciliation. Fax 
 
When Beta decided to end the relationship and transfer the services back in-
house, it notified Omega of the upcoming changes. The outsourcing contract was 
annually renewable, and Beta sent a letter to Omega informing of its intent not to renew. 
Beta was one of the largest stations that outsourced the membership database to Omega 
and was responsible for a large portion of Omega’s income. Omega was furious that Beta 
was discontinuing service. Beta’s VP for Annual Giving and Special Events spearheaded 
the transition, and she had to deal with a lot of hostility from Omega during the transition 
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period. Omega’s management warned that Beta would not be able to handle the database 
on its own and would lose all the data. The Network Administrator recalled that Omega 
was visibly disappointed with the situation: 
“I would say they were pretty frantic, they kind of freaked out.  Because I 
know we felt like we were one of the big fish and we were paying the 
majority of the money because it was based on numbers of members.  And 
there were a lot of other stations that were paying considerably less and 
we felt like we were footing their bill.  So I think when we told them that, 
they kind of freaked out because we were a big source of revenue for 
them.”  
 
The relationship between Beta and Omega deteriorated over time. Omega’s 
service quality continued to decline over the years, and Beta’s employees did not have 
any trust in the provider. Conflicts and major mistakes on the part of the provider only 
worsened the situation. Beta suspected Omega was opportunistic in handling the 
duplicates in the database. On multiple occasions Beta attempted to resolve the issues, 
modify the situation, and promote the relationship. However, Omega did not have enough 
personnel to address the concerns, and frequently ignored the requests. The CEO of Beta 
had to personally make multiple complaints to the management of Omega.  Beta clearly 
signaled to Omega its dissatisfaction and eventually decided to exit the relationship when 
its voice behavior became ineffective.  
Emerging Themes 
Power 
The original decision to outsource the membership database and activities to 
Omega, was imposed on Beta by Omicron. Not surprisingly, when Beta decided to 
backsource this contract, Omicron continued to support its pet project Omega. Omicron 
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was able to exercise pressure over Beta as it serves as an umbrella organization for non- 
profit broadcasting stations. Beta was dependent on Omicron for some of its financial and 
programming resources. The CFO recalled that Omicron even threatened Beta with 
retaliation during backsourcing:  
“There were people within Omicron, I’m not sure which, but there were 
people that were supporters of this concept of this having this service 
bureau do this for a bunch of stations, and when we were going to leave, 
they would talk to [The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach] 
and try to talk her out of it and tell her how we’re going to fail and how 
it’s not going to work.  They might’ve even threatened her with some kind 
of retaliation. You’re going to lose some of your support from Omicron or 
something like that.  They weren’t very happy as I recall, and she was 
intimidated by that.”   
 
Internally, Beta’s President and CEO was an avid supporter of the Beta-Omega 
contract. Despite troubled performance and growing disappointment, he continued to 
promote the project and was not willing to end the relationship with Omega. Because the 
CEO held the decision making authority at Beta, the company remained with Omega 
although all other executives favored backsourcing. The Vice President for Development 
was frustrated with the CEO’s actions: 
“Our president decided that we would want to do this and then we had to 
make it work.  So that immediately puts you in kind of a precarious 
position in the first place…And we stayed in until the very end because 
our president was really the one who spearheaded the whole project and 
wasn’t willing to give up on it…I think part of what got us into problems 
was our president guilt because he was not willing to admit because he 
spearheaded it that this isn’t working.”  
 
Integration of Perspectives 
Three main reasons for backsourcing Omega’s contract were common among all 
informants (Table 6.13). First, Beta’s personnel were dissatisfied with the poor service 
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that Omega was delivering to them.  Secondly, Beta’s staff felt they did not have control 
over the membership database. Thirdly, the contract was very expensive and Beta 
estimated that it could reduce its costs by taking the membership activities back in-house.  
The VP for Development also named the decreased fundraising revenues as the main 
reason for backsourcing. It can be considered a cost factor, yet it does not directly address 
the costs incurred by Beta for outsourcing the database. Decreased revenues are more of a 
function of inadequate service offered by Omega, that resulted in unsuccessful 
membership campaigns by the station.  
Table 6.13 Company Beta: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant 
Informant Primary Reason  Secondary Reason 
Network Administrator Cost Regain control 
Data Entry & Batch Processing Poor service quality Cost 
VP Development Decreased fundraising 
revenues 
Poor service quality 
VP Annual Giving & Outreach Regain control Poor service quality 
Database Administrator Poor service quality Regain control 
Customer Service 
Representative 
Regain control Poor service quality 
CFO Regain control Cost 
 
Poor service quality and lack of control over the membership database, 
experienced by Beta’s staff during the outsourcing contract, are interrelated. Because 
Beta perceived the delivered services as inadequate, it constantly tried to improve 
Omega’s performance to ensure that its membership recruitment activities were 
successful. Whenever Omega failed to contact members on time, or somehow 
mishandled the data in the database, Beta’s employees felt that they could do a better job 
themselves if they had a chance. Yet they had no direct access to the database and 
consequently, they felt helpless that they could not do more effective fundraising.  Poor 
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service quality only intensified the feeling of helplessness and loss of control on the part 
of Beta’s employees. Realizing the importance of the membership database to the 
economic stability of the station, Beta felt it needed to regain control over the database 
and bring it back in-house.  
While service quality and lack of control undermined the success of the 
outsourcing arrangement, excessive costs associated with the contract left Beta even more 
dissatisfied and resentful. The station was paying a large sum of money for inferior 
services, which on several occasions put Beta in financial distress. The economic 
efficiency of the arrangement is always essential for the success of any sourcing decision. 
Inevitably, the cost factor played a role in the decision to end the outsourcing contract 
with Omega and backsource the management of the membership database.  
Table 6.14 reconciles the opinions of the informants on various antecedents of 
backsourcing; mostly the informants agree on the issues (Table 6.15). Overall, a 
combination of economic, strategic and relationship reasons led Beta to the backsourcing 
decision. Beta suffered through multiple conflicts and service mishaps during its 
relationship with Omega. Many times during the three year period the station voiced its 
concerns and dissatisfaction in an attempt to rectify the situation.  Strategically, facing 
the declining service quality and losing control over the membership contributions, Beta 
realized the importance of the membership database to its bottom line. The expected 
outsourcing benefit of cost savings never materialized and the CEO, who insisted on 
outsourcing in the first place, was forced to leave the station. Taking into consideration 
the escalating outsourcing costs, poor service quality and loss of control over the 
membership database, Beta decided to pursue backsourcing.   
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Table 6.15  Beta – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number of 
Coded Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 14 4 100% (4/4) 
Switching Cost 6 4 100% (4/4) 
Asset Specificity 6 5 60% (3/5) 
Change in the Role of IS 2 2 100% (2/2) 
Loss of Control 16 6 100% (6/6) 
Structural Changes 12 6 100% (6/6) 
Service Quality 36 7 100% (7/7) 
Trust 6 3 67% (2/3) 
Goal Conflict 16 5 100% (5/5) 
Satisfaction 10 7 100% (7/7) 
Voice Behavior 30 6 100% (6/6) 
Power 7 4 100% (4/4) 
 
Company Three – Gamma 
Gamma’s decision to outsource its membership activities was driven by the 
factors very similar to the ones described in the case of Beta above. The non-profit 
corporation, Omicron, licensed both Beta and Gamma. Like Beta, Gamma’s outsourcing 
provider, Omega, was established with financial and leadership support from Omicron. 
Gamma was one of the stations that joined in the project from the very beginning and its 
CEO served on Omega’s Board. Outsourcing was expected to generate cost savings and 
increase membership revenues, by concentrating the efforts of the membership personnel 
on fundraising activities. 
When Gamma finally ended the relationship with Omega, it brought the 
previously outsourced membership activities back in-house. However, within a year 
Gamma negotiated with Lambda, the membership database software developer, to take 
over the hosting and technical support of the database software. Gamma maintained all 
other membership activities internally and had full access to the data in the membership 
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database. The station worked closely with Lambda for database support when it was 
necessary. 
Economic Considerations 
The Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
The outsourcing contract fees were based on the number of the station’s 
subscribers. The station had to prepay the monthly fees in advance based on the projected 
subscriber numbers for each period. Several months later, once the actual membership 
figures were posted, the amount was adjusted and future payments were recalculated. If a 
credit was due, Omega did not issue the actual credit to its clients, as it heavily relied on 
the clients’ prepayments for working capital. Instead, the future payments were modified 
based on the credit. The Vice President for Membership at Gamma believed the station 
was overpaying Omega for the services:  
“I think the biggest driver was [Omega] were not meeting revenue goals 
and they were exceeding expense.  So that was the bottom line is they 
created goals that they felt were reasonably attainable at the beginning of 
each fiscal year.   Finally they were not meeting those over several periods 
of time, several quarters just were not getting it and they were exceeding 
their expense budget.” 
 
Unfortunately, during the contract Omega was unsuccessful in recruiting 
members and Gamma even saw its membership decline. Gamma’s expenses for 
membership continued to grow, yet the revenues fell.  From the economic perspective, 
the outsourcing relationship became inefficient. Gamma decided to backsource the 
membership database and activities, to decrease the expenses and increase the revenues 
generated by membership. Gamma’s Senior Vice President for Administration and 
Technology complained about Omega’s negative impact on the station: 
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“Instead of making several hundred thousand dollars in new annual 
revenue, it was costing us several hundred thousand dollars in lost revenue 
and increased expenses. Prior to going to Omega, we were growing 
membership. During Omega, we lost members and dollars. After taking 
the function back in-house our membership revenue began to rise again.” 
 
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
When the decision to backsource was made, Gamma had to first purchase a server 
to host the membership database in-house. Omega refused to lend any help during the 
transition, and Gamma ended up working closely with the software manufacture of the 
membership database software, Lambda. The database server was installed and the data 
was transferred with the help from Lambda.  The IS Manager housed the database server 
at the station, after it was configured:  
“Of course there were some [costs].  We had to buy a server.  I'm sure 
there were costs in having them set up the server and getting it all 
configured, so yup, there was some additional cost that we had to entail 
but I think the company thought it was worth for what we needed.” 
 
Several new staff members were hired for the membership department, and an 
internal person was transferred and assigned the role of database administrator. All new 
personnel were trained to use the membership database, and the database itself was 
cleaned up after the transfer. As part of the contract with Omega, printing and lockbox 
services for receiving payments were subcontracted to third parties. After backsourcing, 
Gamma found new providers to handle the printing, maintain a lockbox facility and 
process bank deposits. New relationships took some time to negotiate and streamline. The 
Vice President for Membership was in charge of the transition back in-house:  
“Sure we had to purchase a new server which was about $10,000.  We had 
to hire new staff.  We had to enter into agreements with different vendors 
which were more expensive than what we had been paying through 
Omega because there certainly was some cost savings with economy of 
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scale, having several stations do it.  The learning curve, you know, was 
difficult, and it took us awhile to rev back up.” 
 
There were large switching costs associated with the backsourcing at Gamma. In 
addition to the above mentioned expenses, for several months, Gamma incurred double 
costs for managing the database. To ensure a successful transition, Gamma hired Lambda 
to assist them with the transfer of the database. During the testing period, Gamma ended 
up paying both Omega and Lambda for their services. The Executive Vice President and 
General Manager estimated the station spent almost a quarter of a million US dollars 
during the transition:  
“I think we spent in conversion and capital combined, the whole 
transition, about what we would normally pay, I would say about 200,000, 
a quarter of a million. Well in the whole concept, the conversion, the 
capital, the new equipment, the printing costs, the day to day expenses of 
the membership, because at one point we were paying twice, because we 
were paying Omega for the data and we were paying Lambda for the 
overlap, because we had overlap for about 2 months to make sure 
everything was working, so we had that expense, it was about 200,000 
total.” 
 
Despite hefty switching costs, Gamma went through with the backsourcing. 
Because of the large capital outlay during the transition, Gamma ended up losing money 
in the first year of backsourcing. The revenues from membership were also slow to pick 
up, after a significant slump during the relationship with Omega. However, once the 
normal fundraising practices resumed, Gamma saw its membership increase by 16% the 
next year. The Vice President for Membership believes the cost of membership 
recruitment went down after backsourcing:   
“I think we lost revenue that first year too. We saw that first year there 
was increase in one time expenses.  That second year though it was less 
expensive for us to do it ourselves then it is to have Omega.” 
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Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
During the outsourcing contract, Gamma modified its business practices to adjust 
to the requirements imposed by Omega. To reduce differences and specifics of each 
station and achieve economies of scale, Omega developed fundraising and membership 
procedures that all of its client stations had to follow as part of the contract agreement. 
Because Omega, as an outsourcing provider, was relying on economies of scale, 
customization was not possible for each individual client. The Vice President for 
Membership lamented the situation:  
“They were forced to be similar.  That was one thing that was agreed to 
before everyone entered into their contract, that you would have to agree, 
you had input into the business practices, but ultimately we would have to 
agree to share business practices with the other stations.” 
 
Before the backsourcing decision was made, Gamma evaluated its options. From 
the economic standpoint the station felt it was paying Omega a large amount of money 
for very ineffective fundraising and membership management. Sometimes, excessive 
costs can be justified by the customized service that the client receives. Yet Omega was 
not providing any unique services to its clients. Instead, all stations had to adjust their 
procedures to fit into the new requirements, even though there were a lot of similarities in 
the fundraising and membership support between the various stations. There were 
significant switching costs associated with backsourcing. However, Gamma chose to end 
the relationship with Omega, despite a large capital outlay during the transition. In the 
long run, the switching costs were justified by the reduced expenses for membership 
activities and increased revenues received from contributions.  
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Strategic Considerations 
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
Gamma relied on IS for office support and communication, financial systems, TV 
and radio programming storage, membership and various other activities. At Gamma, IS 
played mostly a supportive role, yet as the use of computer driven applications increased, 
Gamma recognized the importance of IS within the organization. The Executive Vice 
President and General Manager referred to the increasing role of IS in the station’s 
business: 
“We are in a world of computers.  Everything that we do today is going 
through a network connection at some point. When you set up this 
meeting, it was done by e-mail.  When I call up members of the Courtship 
Society, which is those members of $1000 or more, Don and Catherine 
input that information on their computers, I bring that up on my screen 
here so I know who to call.  So many changes around done by computers.  
That's the way it is now.” 
 
As one of the IS components employed at the station, Gamma’s membership 
database played an important role in its business. The membership database contained 
records of all prior, current and potential members of the station. The membership 
department staff relied on the database to devise new pledge campaigns and to track and 
maintain the relationships with current members. Donations from members contributed a 
major part of Gamma’s revenues, which are then used for TV and radio production and 
broadcasting, as well as administration and development.  The IS Manager emphasized 
the critical importance of the database to the station: 
“Well it is rather important because all the member information is on 
there.  All the information regarding the mailings for program guides 
when they get their membership, when their membership is needed to be 
renewed.  All that information.  So it is one of our major portions of 
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income to the station is through the membership base.  So if that becomes 
lost or not good we can not support our members, we can not track 
revenue, or utilize it.  So, yes, it is very important.” 
 
When the membership database was outsourced to Omega, together with most 
membership activities, Gamma outsourced the core of its business. Membership was 
critical to the station as it generated the majority of revenues and supported the station’s 
operations. During the time of Omega’s outsourcing contract, Gamma realized that it lost 
the key component of its success and decided to end the relationship with Omega. The 
Senior Vice President for Administration and Technology referred to membership as the 
core of Gamma’s business:  
“But outsourcing a part of your core business is very risky - and Omega is 
a good example of that risk.” 
 
He was not alone in this realization. The Vice President for Membership 
expressed similar opinion during her interview: 
“Absolutely we were outsourcing our core with Omega.” 
 
Loss of Control over IS 
Having the membership database outsourced to Omega presented Gamma with 
another problem. The membership personnel no longer had control over membership 
activities. While they were still responsible for raising the funds, they were limited in the 
execution of their fundraising campaigns by Omega’s policies and procedures. 
Accessibility to the database was limited and Gamma’s staff had read-only access to the 
system. All requests for changes or special actions with the data had to be submitted to 
Omega. The Member Services Supervisor at Gamma did not have control over the 
membership:  
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“Because we were very restricted in terms of what we can do with the 
system. We were only allowed to do certain things. We had no control 
over what they were doing or when they were doing it.”  
 
Omega had full control over the renewal notices and any kind of communication 
with the existing members on behalf of Gamma. The outsourcing provider followed its 
own procedures for renewal membership, which proved to be unsuccessful. The 
membership department at Gamma could not contact the members on its own because it 
did not have access to the membership data. Gamma was left to hope that next month’s 
contribution numbers would improve. The Vice President for Membership felt helpless, 
as if her hands were tied: 
“But eventually we weren't getting anything.  We didn't know what was 
being mailed out, we really didn't know what was going on with our own 
company and paying them an inordinate amount of money every month to 
do that. Our hands were really tied.  I really feel our hands were 
handcuffed our entire time with them.” 
 
The database software had the capability to generate reports, but the report 
function was not available to Gamma. Omega blocked most database capabilities from its 
clients, and required that clients submit all their requests with a 10 day turnaround. Often, 
the waiting period was too long and did not allow Gamma to quickly react to changes in 
the fundraising strategy.  The Vice President for Membership used many different queries 
to devise the station’s direct marketing campaigns: 
“Some we could run on our own.  We had very limited access to the 
software.  I would say a good three fourths of it we couldn't use.  So there 
a few things that they allowed us to do, but the rest they did for us.  So we 
would have to request it, go through a cue and wait.” 
 
The main role of the database was to assist the membership department in raising 
funds for the station’s broadcasting operations. Because membership contributions 
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represent the largest source of revenues, the station depended heavily on successful 
membership campaigns. Gamma needed to react quickly to drops in revenues and devise 
new strategies for raising money. Yet Omega was in control of the membership database, 
and as a result it was in control of the fundraising at Gamma. The Executive Vice 
President and General Manager had no control over the station’s revenues during the 
outsourcing contract: 
“Well we lost control to creativity.  There was never a real concern that 
we would lose the integrity of the data, which we didn't, but we did lose 
control of the creativeness of the direct mail and telemarketing campaigns. 
And we lost control where we couldn't do anything to fix the revenue.  If 
they screwed up, we had to live with it.  I couldn't go out and do another 
mailing, because I don't have the database and we are on the contract that 
they are doing all the mailings, so if they were late getting the renewal 
pieces out, we were out of luck.” 
 
After the database was brought back in-house, Gamma was able to control its own 
fortune. Initially an internal person was performing the functions of a database 
administrator. Gamma had to work hard to improve the revenues resulting from member 
contributions. Eventually, the internal DBA did not prove to be knowledgeable, and 
Gamma decided to seek services of the membership database developer, Lambda, that 
earlier helped with the transition. After several months of negotiations with Lambda, 
Gamma hired it to host the database and provide technical support. Yet Gamma retained 
full control of the database and could use complete functionality of the database, and full 
accessibility to the membership data. Lambda provided 24 hour support and assisted 
Gamma as needed. The Executive Vice President and General Manager could quickly 
adapt to the environment with the new arrangement: 
“In the current environment that we have now, absolutely because we 
control the message so we are quick to make changes, adapt to the 
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environment, deal more quickly and effectively with direct mail pieces 
that aren't working.  We can pull them off faster and think of something 
else.  But in Omega world, no, slow as molasses.” 
 
Internal Structural Changes 
The original decision to outsource was avidly supported by the president of 
Gamma who also served on Omega’s Board of Directors. The decision to bring the 
membership database back in-house was spearheaded by the Chief Operations Officer of 
Gamma. There were no major changes in the management of Gamma while outsourcing 
to Omega. During the time of the contract, Gamma’s VP for Membership passed away, 
and a new VP was hired. The new VP was tasked with transitioning out of Omega and 
setting up the membership operations in-house, once the decision was made. However, 
this change in management did not have an impact on the backsourcing decision. The 
station was concerned about its revenues, and would have ended the relationship 
regardless of the change of VP. The Executive Vice President and General Manager 
evaluated Gamma’s outsourcing options and developed a plan to transition out of Omega: 
“I was tasked to clean it up, so I took over membership and I developed 
the plan to get out of Omega and then manage the transition out of Omega.  
And then I set up the new transition into Lambda and then I hired [Vice 
President for Membership] to take it from there.  But I think now the 
player's impact, had the old VP still been alive we still would have gotten 
out of Omega.” 
 
Strategic considerations were crucial in Gamma’s decision to backsource. 
Gamma’s revenues from membership fell, yet the station could not control the 
fundraising campaign as the membership data was not available to Gamma’s staff. The 
station had no recourse and had to continue to rely on Omega for fundraising. The 
membership personnel felt as if their hands were tied and they could not react to the 
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decrease in the membership and revenue decline.  Secondly, membership function proved 
to be value adding to Gamma’s business. Membership is the single largest source of 
revenues, and having it outsourced to Omega put Gamma at a disadvantage. The station 
reassessed the role of the membership database in its business, and ended the relationship 
with Omega to take control over the membership activities. No external or internal 
structural changes at Gamma affected the decision to backsource. 
Relationship Considerations 
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
One of the original reasons for outsourcing was the idea of centralizing 
membership activities for multiple stations under one roof at Omega. Gamma hoped that 
it would free its time for strategizing fundraising while Omega would handle all the 
communication and mailings.  In reality, the quality of fundraising that Omega delivered 
was very poor and the revenues of Gamma went down. One reason for the inadequate 
service quality was inexperienced personnel. The Executive Vice President and General 
Manager was disappointed with Omega’s staffing of the contract: 
“And they weren't able to hire the best people in the system.  So they were 
hiring people who had little experience with public broadcasting, so we 
had to educate them.  That just created one bad mistake after bad 
mistake.” 
 
Omega experienced frequent turnover of personnel and failed to train them 
properly. The staff did not have experience with fundraising and did not understand the 
business of public broadcasting. To make the matters worse, there were frequent mishaps 
in handling membership accounts and data entry. Gamma’s membership department had 
to contact Omega frequently to resolve the membership discrepancies and update the 
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member accounts in case of errors. The Senior Vice President for Administration and 
Technology recalled several occasions when Omega delivered poor service:  
“In reality, Omega was not able to hire the caliber of staff they promised. 
In fact, their staff expertise was what we would consider entry level. They 
made many mistakes, causing major fundraising blunders such as mail 
merge errors and improperly timed direct mail drops. They also provided 
very poor customer service to your members.”  
 
While there were many problems with Omega’s service, some individuals 
employed by the provider were quite knowledgeable.  Omega had some experienced 
technical personnel, but there were not enough of them to handle all the clients. As the 
outsourcing company grew and recruited more clients, the database administrator’s work 
load increased. The stations experienced delays with receiving reports and queries even 
with a ten day waiting policy.  Because the core of the membership activities was 
fundraising, even good database administrators could not improve the revenues.  The VP 
for Membership praised the quality of equipment and technical staff at Omega but 
complained about the fundraising personnel:  
“Equipment: perfect, they had the best equipment.  I really think their 
database administrators were the best of the best.  It was their fundraisers 
were not the best.  So from a database perspective, behind the scenes of 
the server, it was great.” 
 
One problem that came up during the contract was the mishandling of the 
membership mailings. Each month, Gamma contacted members whose membership was 
about to expire. One time, the letters went out, signed by a cartoon character name, 
instead of the station’s president. On another occasion, the letters addressed the members 
of Gamma, yet was signed by the president of another TV station.  On yet another 
occasion, the address merge was done incorrectly and the letters were shipped to the 
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wrong location. The Executive Vice President and General Manager felt Omega was 
never willing to step up and resolve the issues: 
“They weren't being responsive to us as quickly as they should.  They 
weren't getting it, they were not understanding it.  They were making 
mistakes.  For example they would send out our mail pieces to the wrong 
city.  They would send out letters to you as a member of Gamma, but the 
letter would say Nu or some other station.  Sometimes the letters wouldn't 
go out at all.  They could never give you resolution.  I mean part of the 
resolution is taking ownership of the problem and making it, fixing it, and 
it was always, well it's not really our fault, it's someone else's fault.  And 
that wasn't a very fast resolution.”  
 
Another mistake by the provider caused significant financial problems for 
Gamma. The station relies on monetary contributions coming as monthly renewals from 
members to fuel its operating budget. When Omega failed to send out the renewal mail, it 
cost Gamma several thousand dollars in lost revenues. To make the matters even worse, 
Gamma never informed Omega that the mail was not sent. In the end, they did not want 
to take the responsibility for the missed mailing. The VP for Membership believes the 
problems were due to poor senior management at the provider:  
“They did not drop mailing, did not mail a whole month of renewal mail 
which is about 9000 pieces.  Never told us, so when we were trying to 
figure out why we didn't have a certain amount of money coming in, we 
never knew.  I mean we asked if anything odd had happened, no, no 
everything's fine. It was just difficulty in getting what we needed, them 
looking at us as more of a group of stations than individual stations with 
individual needs, a lack of management in my opinion at their station.  
They had undergone station changes in their senior station, which I believe 
had a negative effect as well. They weren't real competent.  They wouldn't 
mail things, they would sign it Teletubbies that kind of thing.” 
 
Every time the membership mailings were mishandled, Gamma suffered financial 
consequences.  It tried to approach Omega to receive compensation for mismanaged 
membership campaigns. Typically Omega was not very responsive and it was difficult to 
 252
receive credit for un-mailed letters. When it was decided to end the relationship, the 
Executive Vice President and General Manager negotiated with Omega to receive some 
reimbursement for the overpayments and damages: 
“Actually towards the end there was a significant overcharge on their part.  
I don't remember the specifics but I remember I negotiated with them and 
they had to pay us back something like 90 thousand dollars.  A lot of it 
was just bad bookkeeping on their part and not doing things that they said 
they were going to do with that money.  For example they would charge 
us X number of dollars because they were going to do a mail out, but then 
they wouldn't do the mail out, well I want my money back.  Or they would 
charge you X number of dollars to do the mail out, but the mail out would 
go so late that it wasn't effective.  And in the end we negotiated some of 
those things to come back to us and in the end we got our money back.” 
 
Goal Conflict 
There was a lot of conflict in the relationship of Gamma with Omega. Many of 
those issues developed because Gamma and Omega pursued different goals.  Omega was 
working on standardizing the fundraising and membership activities of all its client 
stations. Consolidation, unified procedures and economies of scale were Omega’s 
definition of success. However, Gamma wanted to follow its own steps when it came to 
membership renewal and recruitment. Omega did not offer individualized attention to 
Gamma even at the expense of decreased membership and revenues at the station, which 
for Gamma, was a sign of Omega’s failure. The Vice President for Membership felt there 
was a goal conflict between Gamma and Omega: 
“I think their goal of outsourcing was to make sure that it all worked as a 
whole, but they didn't look at the individual, so they may have thought 
something was a success when we would have not thought it was a 
success.  We certainly have individual disagreements with people there 
because we needed to accomplish certain things that they did not feel were 
a priority when looking at the other stations, but it was still a priority for 
us and we needed to get it done.  So there would be some conflict there.” 
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship 
Gamma grew increasingly frustrated with Omega’s recurrent mistakes and the 
need for constant monitoring of the outsourced services. As problems exacerbated, 
Gamma’s top management had to get involved more often, in an attempt to improve 
services. But even the lower level membership personnel felt the strain of the 
relationship. The Member Services Supervisor described the relationship with Omega as 
fair in the beginning but as frustrating in the end:  
“Fair. Again it depends on different people. On my level it was different 
from my supervisors probably because they had to deal with different 
issues. And in the beginning it was different too. In the end there was a lot 
of frustration on my part.” 
 
Inadequate service quality and various conflicts left Gamma dissatisfied with the 
contract with Omega. The provider proved to be very inflexible and did not want to 
modify their practices even when they were unsuccessful. There was an obvious 
incongruity in goals of the two partners which only alienated them even more. The 
Executive Vice President and General Manager described the relationship of Gamma and 
Omega as adversarial: 
“It was an adversarial relationship from the beginning and throughout the 
relationship.  It was adversarial because we didn't feel we were getting the 
customer treatment that we thought we deserved. Most of our 
disagreements with them was on the way they handled those mistakes and 
how they handled providing us proper feedback and information. We 
would, it would take a lot for us to convince them the way we think they 
should be doing direct mail.  Because we think we know our market better 
and at times it was adversarial they thought that they knew how to do it 
better than we did it, but they couldn't prove that they knew how to do it 
better because the facts were they couldn't do it better.” 
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Voice Behavior  
To deal with the day-to-day operational issues, several individuals from Gamma 
worked closely with Omega. The CEO of Gamma served on the board of Omega and was 
involved in the operations of the outsourcing provider. When the issues did not get 
addressed on the lower level, the CEO had to contact the executives at Omega to seek 
resolution. Several executives at the station communicated with Omega staff almost 
daily, including the VP for Membership:  
“Our entire management team was very involved in it.  In fact, our CEO 
served on the board of Omega and at one point was chair of their board.  
So it really was from the top down of our day to day contact with them.  
And with anything they had certain people they would call for this and 
certain people they would call for that.” 
 
The station’s employees tried to address the problems with Omega directly with 
the provider’s staff. However, when the issues were not resolved, it was passed up to the 
more senior level. The Vice President of Membership oversaw the membership 
department and was the main point of contact if the problem was escalated to the next 
level. Sometimes she had to get the Executive Vice President and General Manager 
involved in the dealings with Omega or even the CEO.  The Vice President for 
Membership described the hierarchy for escalation of outsourcing problems:  
“Well our CEO would have directly been serving on their board.  Our 
COO because I reported to him, so he had that level when a director can 
only get so far and you just run into a wall so you just have to bring your 
boss in to say look I've done everything I can.  He would come in at that 
point but didn't have a lot of contact with them.  And then my staff, the 
member services team to talk about hey Natasha called and said that she 
gave $100 two months ago and it's not showing up anywhere, where in the 
world could it be?  So then our member services team which is my 
people.” 
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On the Omega side of business, several individuals were responsible for the 
outsourcing contract with Gamma and kept contact with Gamma’s employees. One of 
them was the data entry person who was in charge of entering and modifying 
membership data when there was a mistake. The second person was the database 
administrator who was responsible for querying the membership database and generating 
reports for the station. When there were problems, the Member Services Supervisor had 
two points of contact within Omega:  
“I usually communicated with two people. I am not sure what the correct 
titles for those people are. But one was the person that would do 
adjustments for us. So I would communicate with him. And then if we had 
requests for reports, there was another person.” 
 
Most communication between the client and provider happened over the phone. 
From time to time, Gamma and Omega had face-to-face meetings to discuss fundraising 
projects. As the problems escalated, Omega resorted to written communication with 
Gamma. Major financial or mailings disagreements were addressed by the station’s 
executives in writing. The VP for Membership tried to document all the communication 
with Omega, especially in the end of the contract:  
“We would either meet mostly by phone or they would come here and we 
would talk about it.  Do a scope of work, what was required how many 
hours was it going to take to complete it because it was doing changes not 
necessarily to the software but to the business rules of the software and 
gift type rules and that type of thing.  So it was in writing and verbally 
large changes were requested.  And really towards the end most changes 
all had to be requested in writing so that there was a paper trail.” 
 
When the executives at the station decided to end the contract with Omega, they 
first got approval from Gamma’s Board of Directors. The decision to terminate was 
unanimous as the relationship was plagued with so many problems. To notify the 
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provider of the decision not to renew, Gamma sent a written letter of termination to 
Omega. At the same time the CEO of Gamma resigned from the Omega’s Board where 
he served together with other stations’ CEOs. The VP for Memberships was part of the 
transition team:  
“Yes and we as soon as the board approved it we sent them written legal 
notice that we were terminating our contract with them and our CEO 
resigned from their board; so it was all done.” 
 
Gamma informed Omega about the intent to discontinue service six months 
before the end of the contract. Omega was not thrilled about the loss of one of its largest 
customers and was not very cooperative during the transition. Gamma proceeded with a 
backsourcing transition plan that was developed by the Executive Vice President and 
General Manager: 
“We gave notice that we would not renew.  The renewal date was coming 
up the same time that we were going to terminate anyway.  So we sent a 
letter saying our intention is not to renew.  We gave I think 6 months 
notice.  Come December 31st, we are not going to renew.  We want to be 
out, and here's the transition plan for us to get out.  The time came and we 
got out.” 
 
Once it was clear that Gamma wanted to end the relationship, Omega attempted to 
negotiate with the station to prevent the termination of the contract. However, Gamma 
had thoroughly evaluated the situation beforehand and was not interested in continuing 
the contract. The VP for Membership felt the relationship with Omega aggravated to a 
point when there was no possibility for reconciliation:  
“I think that our concerns had been addressed so much that by the end we 
said that there was nothing that they would be able to come back and say 
to us that would make us want to stay.” 
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Poor service quality plagued this outsourcing contract from the very beginning.  
Gamma felt the majority of the Omega staff was unqualified to perform the membership 
activities, and the few individuals who were knowledgeable, had their hands full with 
requests from multiple stations. Frequent mistakes and a lack of resolution of those 
problems by Omega, only created more aggravation. Goal incongruity led to 
disagreements about fundraising and membership procedures and strategies. By the time 
Gamma notified Omega of ending the contract, there was no recourse for Omega to 
maintain the relationship. The damage was done during the course of three years and 
multiple attempts by Gamma to improve the service quality were not addressed.  
Emerging Themes 
Power 
Omicron exercised coercive power to pressure several stations to join the new 
outsourcing project. Gamma, as a non-profit broadcasting station, depended on the 
funding and leadership from Omicron and had to submit to the demands and outsource to 
Omega. During the time of the contract, Omicron continued to support Omega despite 
clients’ multiple complaints and dissatisfaction. The Senior Vice President for 
Administration and Technology indicated that Gamma would have exited the Gamma-
Omega contract earlier if it was not for pressure from the other stations and Omicron:  
“We would have dropped out much sooner, but there was political 
pressure from the group and Omicron (major venture funder) to stay the 
course until Omega got their act together.” 
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Integration of Perspectives 
Most informants believed that dwindling service quality was the main reason for 
getting out of the outsourcing relationship with Omega (Table 6.16). Complaints about 
poor service quality included issues with incompetent employees, accounts of multiple 
mistakes in performing services, lack of accountability on the part of provider, delays in 
services and responses to requests, and poor senior management.  Decreased fundraising 
revenues were also mentioned by almost all of the informants during the interviews, and 
the VP for Membership identified it as the main reason for backsourcing. Membership 
contributions were the main output of membership campaigns, and low revenues signaled 
a poor quality of fundraising. Lack of control was a concern of the Membership 
Supervisor as she felt she could not deliver a good service to the members anymore, 
because all the membership data was in hands of Omega and unavailable to Gamma. 
While inadequate service quality was the main driver for backsourcing, the decision was 
also economically sound. The station expected to achieve a cost advantage by returning 
the membership services back in-house as the costs of managing it by Omega continued 
to be exorbitant.  
Table 6.16 Company Gamma: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant 
Informant Primary Reason  Secondary Reason
IS Manager Poor service quality Cost 
Member Services Supervisor Regain Control   
VP for Membership Decreased fundraising revenues Cost 
Executive VP and General 
Manager 
Poor service quality  
Senior VP for Administration 
and Technology 
Poor service quality  
 
 259
Analysis of the comments made during the interviews revealed several other 
factors that played a role in the decision to backsource. Table 6.17 reconciles the 
comments of all the interviewees, which proved to be quite consistent (Table 6.18). From 
the economic perspective, cost advantage was the leading factor in bringing back the 
membership database. Gamma was able to achieve a lower production cost internally and 
eliminate transaction and agency costs associated with the contract. Gamma considered 
switching costs and realized that there was significant expense associated with the 
transition, yet in the long run, this one time expense was justified by decreased overall 
expenses for membership activities. So switching costs did not have an effect on the 
decision. Omega was providing standardized services for all stations, but frequently 
Gamma found itself seeking modifications to the membership practices. Omega was not 
able to deliver customized or asset specific services to Gamma. Asset specificity may not 
have much impact on the backsourcing directly, yet it influenced the perceptions of poor 
service quality and a loss of control.  
Gamma expected some customization to its membership campaigns from Omega, 
particularly when the membership recruitment by the provider was unsuccessful.   As the 
service got worse and the revenues declined, Gamma increasingly felt that it had the 
expertise in fundraising and wanted Omega to implement some innovative procedures. 
Yet Omega wanted to keep the customization to a minimum, which in turn, delivered low 
revenues and inadequate service to Gamma.  
Poor service and decreasing revenues left Gamma feeling a lack of control over 
the membership activities. Gamma could no longer react to the changes in its 
membership environment as the data in the membership database was not available. Loss 
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of control over membership recruitment, and in turn, the station’s revenues was amplified 
by the importance of the membership function to the business of Gamma. Because the 
membership contributions represented the largest portion of Gamma’s revenues, 
membership activities were the core of Gamma’s business. Having the core outsourced 
resulted in the feeling of helplessness and a loss of control.  
Poor service quality exacerbated the feeling of loss of control even more. Gamma 
realized that the goals of the provider were different from its own, particularly when it 
tried to request station specific services from Omega.  To improve the state of affairs, 
Gamma’s staff and management frequently voiced their concerns to Omega. As the 
issues escalated, most appeals were made to the provider’s executives as the highest 
authority. Voice was not able to modify the situation, and Gamma proceeded to exit from 
the relationship.   
Considering all the aspects, Gamma’s outsourcing arrangement with Omega 
suffered from several problems. The main factor, low service quality, resulted in the loss 
of control over the station’s revenues and emphasized the importance of membership for 
Gamma. At the same time low service quality necessitated requests for customized 
services which accentuated the Gamma and Omega goal incongruence. Decreased 
revenues from membership contributions led to financial difficulties at Gamma and 
decreased economic benefits of the outsourcing arrangement.  
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Table 6.17 Gamma – Omega Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant 
     Informant 
 
Construct 
IS Manager Member 
Services 
Supervisor 
VP for 
Membership 
Senior VP for 
Administration 
& Technology 
Executive VP 
& General 
Manager 
Cost 
Advantage 
  Exceeding 
expense of 
outsourcing 
Outsourcing 
increased 
expenses and 
lost revenue 
Outsourcing 
was terribly 
expensive 
Switching 
Cost 
Server 
purchase 
 Purchase server, 
hire staff, new 
vendors 
 Very 
expensive 
transition 
Asset 
Specificity 
All stations 
are similar 
All stations 
are similar 
Stations forced 
to be similar, 
was bad 
 Cookie cutter 
did not work
Change in 
the Role of 
IS 
Membership 
DB is critical 
 Membership 
DB is core 
 IT is critical 
now 
Loss of 
Control 
 No control: 
limited access
No control: 
limited access 
Outsourcing 
part of core 
proved risky 
No control: 
could not fix 
revenues 
Structural 
Changes 
  VP died but no 
impact  
 VP died but 
no impact  
Service 
Quality 
 Fair service 
quality 
Good 
equipment, bad 
service, many 
problems 
Staff expertise 
low, many 
mistakes, poor 
service 
Unresponsive
low 
experience, 
mistakes 
Trust Felt 
comfortable 
that data was 
safe 
    
Goal 
Conflict 
Could not 
name any 
Was not 
involved in 
resolution 
Differences in 
business 
practices 
 Poor 
feedback and 
information 
Satisfaction Did not have 
many issues 
personally 
 Started off 
positive, by the 
end more than 
terrible 
Fair 
relationship, 
deteriorated to 
frustration in 
the end 
Adversarial 
relationship 
from the start
Voice 
Behavior 
Communicated 
network 
problems 
Communicated 
escalated 
through 
supervisor 
CEO chaired 
Omega’s Board. 
Top down 
communication
 Informed of 
termination 
and transition
Power    Pressure from 
Omicron  
Executive 
decision 
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Table 6.18 Gamma – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement 
Construct Total Number 
of Coded 
Quotes 
Number of Informants 
who had Quotes 
Agreement on 
Construct 
Cost Advantage 7 3 100% (3/3) 
Switching Cost 4 3 100% (3/3) 
Asset Specificity 5 4 50% (2/4) 
Change in the Role of IS 4 3 100% (3/3) 
Loss of Control 12 4 100% (4/4) 
Structural Changes 4 2 100% (2/2) 
Service Quality 18 4 75% (3/4) 
Trust 1 1 1 opinion 
Goal Conflict 7 4 50% (2/4) 
Satisfaction 6 4 75% (3/4) 
Voice Behavior 14 4 100% (4/4) 
Power 2 2 100% (2/2) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. ANALYSIS OF BACKSOURCING 
ANTECEDENTS 
The previous chapter presented the results of individual case studies and 
described the influence of each proposed backsourcing antecedent on the backsourcing 
decision in every case. This chapter goes on to further analyze the backsourcing 
antecedents by synthesizing the results of six case studies and identifying the factors most 
salient in backsourcing.  It starts out by triangulating the primary backsourcing factors 
across the cases and identifies several factors that were critical in every case. Then it 
examines each antecedent, in light of all cases, and discusses its impact on the 
backsourcing decision. Finally, a qualitative comparative analysis is employed to identify 
the necessary and sufficient factors for backsourcing. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of additional factors that emerged in the analysis and their role in the 
backsourcing decision. 
Triangulation of Backsourcing Antecedents Across Cases 
The previous chapter focused on the interview results for individual cases and 
presented interesting depictions of backsourcing considerations in every case. By itself, it 
provided a unique perspective into the development of the outsourcing relationships, 
backsourcing decision making process and transition back in-house. However, the main 
research question of this dissertation is why outsourcing clients decide to backsource. To 
answer this research question, results of all analyzed cases need to be synthesized and 
certain main reasons for backsourcing isolated.  
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During the collection of evidence, the researcher interviewed informants about 
their backsourcing experience, and every informant had an opportunity to name the main 
reason(s) that influenced their company’s decision to backsource. Table 7.1 summarizes 
the results of individual cases presented in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9, 6.15 and 6.18. The table 
only includes cases that were backsourced. The most popular primary and secondary 
reason for each case are presented in the respective columns. All other reasons that were 
named by the informants, but did not make it in the primary or secondary category, are 
grouped in the ‘Other reasons’ column. Interestingly enough, across all cases, only four 
factors were identified as primary reasons for backsourcing decisions, and overall there 
were only five reasons for backsourcing mentioned by all informants.  
Table 7.1 Reasons for Backsourcing Across Cases 
Contract Primary Reason Secondary Reason Other reasons 
Alpha-Kappa Change in the Role of IS  Cost  
Alpha-Iota Change in the Role of IS  
Poor service quality 
Cost Loss of Control 
Structural 
Changes/Power 
Alpha-Sigma Cost Poor service quality Loss of Control 
Structural 
Changes/Power 
Beta-Omega Loss of control  
Poor service quality 
Poor service quality 
Loss of control 
Cost 
Gamma-Omega Poor service quality Cost Loss of control 
 
Poor service quality was the most popular primary reason for backsourcing across 
cases, followed by a change in the role of IS.  In fact, service quality was named as either 
the primary or secondary reason for backsourcing in every case except Alpha-Kappa. 
Loss of control over the outsourced activities and cost benefit of backsourcing were also 
identified as primary reasons for taking the activities back in-house. Besides, cost 
surfaced as the most dominant secondary reason for backsourcing.  
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The only additional factor that did not make it as a popular primary or secondary 
reason, and emerged in the ‘Other’ category, was structural changes in the organization. 
This made all three theoretically derived strategic factors (structural changes, loss of 
control, and redefinition of the role of IS) to be identified as crucial by the informants in 
analyzed backsourcing decisions.  
Based on the informants opinions, five main factors had a direct impact on the 
decision to backsource and can be considered as one answer to the research question 
posed for this dissertation. To further investigate the role of other factors across cases, the 
next section reviews all theoretically proposed constructs and discusses their influence on 
backsourcing as well as other constructs.  
Economic Considerations 
According to the informants, cost reasons were critical in backsourcing decisions. 
Yet other economic factors also played a role in backsourcing decisions of Alpha, Beta 
and Gamma. Table 7.2 lists the status of asset specificity, production, transaction, agency 
and switching costs for each case. Cost benefit of backsourcing is broken into internal 
production cost and existing outsourcing contract transaction and agency cost, to evaluate 
the role of those cost components in more detail.  
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Table 7.2 Economic Considerations Across Cases 
Contract Asset Specificity Cost Benefit Switching Costs 
Alpha-Kappa No asset specificity Small internal 
production cost 
advantage 
Almost non-existent 
switching costs 
Alpha-Iota Some asset specificity: 
Need for specific 
procedures 
Internal production cost 
advantage 
Some transaction costs  
High switching costs 
U.S.$80,000-transfer 
U.S. $50,000 – 
termination fee 
Alpha-Sigma Some asset specificity: 
business in many 
countries 
Internal production cost 
advantage 
Some transaction costs 
High agency costs 
High switching costs
Alpha-Tau Some asset specificity: 
Need a global 
provider, direct link 
between continents 
Internal production cost 
advantage 
Some transaction costs  
Not backsourced: no 
switching costs 
Beta-Omega Some asset specificity: 
Need for customized 
membership 
procedures 
Internal production cost 
advantage 
Some transaction costs  
High agency costs 
Some switching 
costs 
Gamma-Omega Some asset specificity: 
Need for customized 
membership 
procedures 
Internal production cost 
advantage 
Some transaction costs  
High agency costs 
High switching costs 
U.S. $200,000 
 
Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement 
Transaction cost theory suggests that only when asset specificity of the 
outsourced service is low, the provider can aggregate the demand of multiple clients and 
achieve reduced  production costs (Walker and Weber 1984). On the other hand, asset 
specificity can raise transaction costs by increasing the need to coordinate the customized 
activities and can raise agency costs by necessitating monitoring of the asset-specific 
arrangement. Additionally, asset specificity by itself can motivate backsourcing when the 
client company can no longer obtain the required customized services from the provider 
or the provider does not have the ability to offer a particular service.  
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Omega, an outsourcing provider for Beta and Gamma, built its business on 
consolidating and standardizing the membership activities of non-profit TV stations. 
Indeed, the stations had a lot of similarities in fundraising and membership recruitment 
procedures. However, both Beta and Gamma used some unique approaches to 
communication with its members and required some customization of the membership 
activities carried out by Omega. In addition to general reports delivered to all stations, 
both stations had to request, and pay extra, for customized reports to fit their situation and 
needs. Such requests inflated the overall costs of the outsourcing contract by increasing 
the monthly payments, or production costs, and incurring an expense to coordinate the 
requests, or transaction costs. Similarly, some specific procedures had to be followed by 
Alpha’s provider, Iota, for application upgrades and maintenance. It increased Alpha’s 
outsourcing costs, as Iota always billed Alpha for requests above SLA (production costs), 
and Alpha had to train Iota’s staff on special procedures (transaction costs).  
In the Alpha-Tau contract, asset specificity coupled with provider’s inability to 
deliver, required unique services and necessitated renegotiation of the contract to 
terminate the existing telecommunication line between Australia and North America. 
Instead, Alpha purchased the line from another telecommunications provider who offered 
its services worldwide and was able to satisfy Alpha’s need for a global direct 
connection.  
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing 
Cost benefit of backsourcing was named by the informants as one of the main 
factors to backsource in every analyzed backsourcing case. As in any make-or-buy 
decision, estimated internal production costs were compared with the cost of the existing 
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outsourcing arrangement.  When original expectations of economic efficiency did not 
materialize in the outsourcing contracts, Alpha, Beta and Gamma turned to backsourcing 
for cost savings.   
Cost benefit was the primary reason for backsourcing of the Alpha-Sigma 
contract. This arrangement was significantly overpriced, and Alpha was motivated to 
backsource because of exorbitant costs associated with this contract. Sigma, on multiple 
occasions, billed Alpha for discontinued network nodes and Alpha’s employees had to 
continuously monitor the provider to curb its opportunism, which increased Alpha’s 
agency costs.  
Costs were the secondary most critical reason for backsourcing for the Alpha-Iota, 
Alpha-Kappa and Gamma-Omega contracts, and one of the other reasons for the Beta-
Omega contract. Alpha considered the cost of Kappa’s contract reasonable, but was not 
satisfied with the costs of the contract with Iota. Alpha was able to backsource both data 
processing contracts and incur lower costs in-house by consolidating its IS operations and 
utilizing economies of scale. In addition to the direct financial expense of outsourcing, 
Alpha also incurred transaction costs when Alpha’s employees had to spend time 
coordinating the activities of Iota. Likewise, Gamma and Beta estimated that they could 
reduce their membership costs by backsourcing the Omega contracts. They were able to 
achieve lower internal production costs, as well as cut the agency costs of monitoring the 
poorly performing provider and the transaction costs associated with coordinating 
customized membership activities. 
Cost considerations are important for any business entity. Not surprisingly, as 
predicted by the transaction cost theory, costs played a role in all analyzed backsourcing 
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decisions. However, only in one case, costs were named as the primary reason for 
backsourcing. In all other cases, cost played a secondary or even supporting role by 
justifying the transfer of the outsourced services back in-house when backsourcing was 
motivated by other factors. In the case of the Alpha-Tau contract, Alpha could have 
reduced its IS cost by backsourcing, yet was precluded from doing so by other factors 
that had a stronger influence on the final decision.  
Switching Costs of Backsourcing 
While expected cost savings can be a motive to backsource an existing 
outsourcing contract, transitioning back in-house can often be an expensive undertaking. 
Backsourcing of IS activities can involve large capital outlays for purchase of IS 
hardware and software and the network’s set up, as well as difficulties in recruitment of 
qualified IS personnel to take over formerly outsourced activities. If early termination of 
an existing contract is involved, switching costs can also include termination fees. Even if 
a company can achieve low in-house production costs, significant switching costs can 
negate the cost benefit of backsourcing.  
All examined cases had some switching costs associated with backsourcing, yet 
the switching costs did not preclude the companies from pursuing backsourcing. Beta and 
Gamma had to rebuild in-house expertise to be able to handle backsourced activities 
internally. Additionally, Gamma had to hire another company to help with backsourcing 
and had to pay both Omega and another provider for the same services during the 
transition. Backsourcing Iota’s contract Alpha had to purchase equipment, and physically 
transfer some equipment from the provider’s site to the internal data center. Sigma’s 
contract backsourcing required extensive travel to set up the new network and significant 
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equipment costs. In addition to all the transition costs, Alpha had to pay an early 
termination fee to Iota for breaching the contract.  
While switching costs can serve as a barrier to transitioning back in-house, in 
most cases those costs are justified by expected long-term cost savings as a result of 
backsourcing. Even the difficulties in reestablishing a non-existent IS department and the 
learning curve associated with gaining expertise and IS skills, could not prevent the 
company from backsourcing. It can especially be true in situations where cost savings are 
not the primary factor motivating backsourcing.  
Strategic Considerations 
Redefinition of the role of IS, need to regain control and internal structural 
changes were each identified as leading reasons for backsourcing by the informants. 
Table 7.3 summarizes the role of strategic components across cases. The following 
sections discuss the influence of these factors on backsourcing, as well as on other factors 
involved in the evaluation of the backsourcing decision. 
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Table 7.3 Strategic Considerations Across Cases 
Contract Change in the Role of IS Loss of Control Structural Changes 
Alpha-Kappa Redefined the role of IS: 
IS became global function 
and was centralized 
No loss of control Internal structural 
changes: 
centralization of 
global operations, 
new CEO and CIO 
Alpha-Iota Redefined the role of IS: 
IS became global function 
and was centralized 
Some loss of control: 
slow responsiveness 
Internal structural 
changes: 
centralization of 
global operations, 
new CEO and CIO 
Alpha-Sigma Redefined the role of IS: 
IS became global function 
and was centralized 
Loss of control: no 
knowledge of the 
network, poor 
flexibility 
Internal structural 
changes: 
centralization of 
global operations, 
new CEO and CIO 
Alpha-Tau Redefined the role of IS: 
IS became global function 
and was centralized 
Loss of control: no 
knowledge of the 
network, poor 
flexibility 
Internal structural 
changes: 
centralization of 
global operations, 
new CEO and CIO 
Beta-Omega Realized the importance 
of IS: Membership 
database is critical to 
generating revenues 
Loss of control: 
could not react to 
changes in 
membership 
Internal structural 
changes: CEO had to 
resign 
Gamma-Omega Realized the importance 
of IS: Membership 
database is critical to 
generating revenues 
Loss of control: 
could not react to 
changes in 
membership 
No internal structural 
changes: 
 
Internal Structural Changes 
Structural changes in the organization can involve external changes such as 
mergers or acquisitions, and internal changes, such as changes in the management. 
Internal structural changes can lead to shifts in corporate power. Power and politics play 
a role in decision making and can have an impact on decisions about sourcing 
arrangements (Markus 1983; Lacity 1993). When new executives join the company, they 
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arrive with their own ideas, which affect overall company strategy and IS strategy in 
particular. Changes in management can lead to a redefinition of the role of IS or even 
impact specific decisions on backsourcing. 
While none of the examined cases had any external structural changes, like 
mergers or acquisitions, Alpha and Beta did experience some changes in management. 
Alpha’s parent company Delta, decided to establish the corporate headquarters of Alpha 
to streamline its business. As a result, all regional executives were replaced with a team 
of executives at the corporate headquarters. The new team embarked on globalization and 
centralization of the company. Alpha’s new CEO and CIO did not support the idea of 
outsourcing, and wanted to create an internal IS center that could handle Alpha’s global 
IS needs. New executives spearheaded backsourcing of all existing outsourcing contracts. 
However, one of the contracts with Tau was not backsourced but only renegotiated. This 
particular contract supported Asia-Pacific operations of Alpha and was part of an 
agreement arranged by Alpha’s parent company, Delta. Even though Alpha’s CIO 
wanted to have full control over IS operations, he was not able to end the relationship 
with Tau, as it would have left Delta with overhead capacity in the contract.  
Beta’s contract with Omega was promoted by Beta’s CEO who also served on 
Omega’s board. Even though the contract deteriorated over time, and there was an 
increasing sense of resentment among Beta’s employee, the CEO continued to support 
the arrangement. Because the outsourcing contract negatively affected the fundraising 
revenues, Beta’s Board of Directors had to step in and advise to discontinue the 
relationship. The station proceeded with backsourcing, while the CEO had to resign over 
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the failed contract with Omega. As long as the CEO was in charge of the decision 
making, he did not allow Beta to pursue backsourcing.  
Loss of Control over IS 
Some IS functions happen to be critical contributors to business operations and 
empower companies to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. However, if an 
outsourcing provider is in charge of critical functions, the client company may experience 
a loss of control over those functions. When a company loses control over an outsourced 
activity, it reduces its ability to take action when things are going wrong (Huxham and 
Macdonald 1992). Poor service quality exacerbates loss of control by bringing an 
emphasis to the company’s inability to act upon derailing activities. To prevent 
significant loss of control, the companies should maintain critical activities in-house.  
Omega standardized membership and fundraising procedures for all its clients and 
limited the client’s access to the membership database. Beta and Gamma had no control 
over the actions taken by Omega to recruit members and raise contributions. Faced with 
falling revenues, both stations wished they could have access to the membership database 
and rely on internal activities to increase fundraising contributions.  Yet, they could not 
modify Omega’s procedures, could not reach out to members on their own, and had to 
wait 10 days to get any report from Omega. To gain control over the membership 
database, Beta and Gamma needed to return the membership database back in-house. 
Alpha’s contract with Iota suffered from the slow responsiveness of the provider. 
Alpha’s requests for updates to its software took time to implement and slowed Alpha’s 
ability to respond to its business needs. During system failures, Alpha’s staff had to travel 
to Iota to address the issues and ensure the fastest response. Because Iota’s data center 
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was several hundred miles away from the Alpha-U.K. office, it took long time to return 
the systems to full functionality. While failures were not frequent, Alpha did experience 
some loss of control and could not react quickly in cases of emergency.   
Alpha experienced significant loss of control in both of its telecommunications 
contract with Sigma and Tau.  Alpha had poor visibility of the networks, and was not able 
to assess the actual capacity of the network, or view its utilization at any given time.  
Requests for any network modifications had to be submitted to the provider and Alpha 
could not promptly react to the telecommunication needs of its business and environment. 
When Alpha experienced network failures, it could not repair the network and had to rely 
on Sigma or Tau to address the issues. To regain control over the network, and better 
utilize the network, Alpha decided to pursue backsourcing. It was successful at 
terminating the contract with Sigma and centralizing the global network administration at 
the corporate headquarters. While Alpha was not able to completely terminate the 
contract with Tau, it renegotiated the contract to have access to the tools that assess the 
utilization of the network and give Alpha more control over its telecommunications 
environment.  
Redefinition of the Role of IS 
Based on core competency perspective, to achieve operational efficiency, 
companies should focus on activities that underpin their business success and deliver 
unique value (Allen 2002; Quinn 1999). Activities that play a supporting role are 
considered commodity type activities, and are good candidates for outsourcing. A 
Business strategy undergoes modifications as businesses develop, which can lead to the 
repositioning and restructuring of certain activities. If those activities are outsourced, the 
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company may have to backsource them to address the changes in strategy. Redefinition 
of the role of IS happens on the executive level of the organization and is driven by the 
company’s decision makers. If there are changes in the company’s management, it can 
inflict subsequent changes in the strategy and role of IS.  
Beta and Gamma outsourced membership data processing and support to an 
outside provider, Omega. Several years into the contract both stations were struggling to 
maintain their membership and their fundraising revenues were falling. Membership 
proved to be a critical component of Beta and Gamma’s operations as it was the largest 
source of revenues and financially supported the stations. Because the stations could not 
control their fundraising, it forced them to reassess the role of membership in their 
business and backsource their membership data processing. There was no company wide 
policy change, yet the poor outsourcing experience led to a loss of control over 
membership, which in turn underscored the value of this activity. 
On the other hand, Alpha experienced a huge strategic shift in positioning of its 
business. The company decided to transition from disparate operations in different 
countries to one global standardized operation, centrally managed by one group of top 
managers. As part of the overall strategy redefinition, the role of IS underwent changes as 
well. To match the new global business structure, IS activities had to become global too. 
Part of the globalization was consolidation of those activities in one location, at the 
corporate headquarters. The new IS operation involved a new corporate wide IS and 
centralized network, which made the existing outsourcing contracts with Iota, Kappa, 
Sigma and Tau obsolete. Redefinition of the role of IS at Alpha was driven by the new 
executives at the company. 
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Relationship Considerations 
A major characteristic of the outsourcing contract and service quality, was 
identified as the primary reason for backsourcing by the informants.  Actually, poor 
service quality was a concern in four out of five analyzed backsourcing scenarios. Table 
7.4 summarized relationship constructs across cases and the following sections discuss 
the role these constructs played in examined backsourcing decisions.   
Table 7.4 Relationship Considerations Across Cases 
Contract Service 
Quality 
Goal Conflict Trust Satisfaction 
with 
Outsourcing 
Voice 
Behavior 
Alpha-
Kappa 
Good service 
quality: very 
responsive 
None Trusted the 
provider 
Satisfied: 
positive 
relationship 
Good rapport: 
provider 
responsive to 
requests 
Alpha-Iota Low service 
quality:  
deteriorated 
over time 
Goal conflict: 
provider 
unwilling to 
do extra work
Some trusted 
the provider, 
some did not 
Somewhat 
satisfied: 
relationship 
deteriorated 
over time 
Documented 
problem 
reports helped 
end contract 
Alpha-
Sigma 
Low service 
quality: 
network 
failures and 
delays 
Goal conflict: 
billing issues 
Did not trust 
the provider: 
constant 
monitoring 
Not satisfied: 
bad contract, 
bad 
relationship 
Poor rapport: 
lack of 
response from 
the provider 
Alpha-Tau Low service 
quality:  poor 
responsiveness 
and delays 
  Not satisfied: 
strained 
relationship 
Negotiated 
more control 
over the 
network 
Beta-
Omega 
Low service 
quality:  poor 
responsiveness 
Goal conflict: 
provider 
unwilling to 
customize 
Did not trust 
the provider: 
constant 
monitoring 
Not satisfied: 
relationship 
deteriorated 
over time 
Poor rapport: 
communicated 
concerns 
daily, lack of 
response from 
the provider 
Gamma-
Omega 
Low service 
quality:  poor 
responsiveness 
Goal conflict: 
provider 
unwilling to 
customize 
Some trusted 
the provider 
Not satisfied: 
relationship 
deteriorated 
over time 
Poor rapport: 
escalated 
concerns 
 277
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement 
Clients evaluate service quality of the outsourcing arrangement by benchmarking 
the received service level against the expected service level. The quality and promptness 
of the provided outsourcing services affects the client’s business and effectiveness of the 
outsourcing arrangement. Not surprisingly, service quality is a big component of client’s 
overall satisfaction with outsourcing. Continuous service performance below the 
expectations puts a negative strain on the relationship between the client and the provider 
and undermines the client’s trust. As the service quality declines, one of the options for 
the client is to exit the relationship (Hirschman 1970) and backsource. 
Five examined outsourcing contracts suffered from inadequate service quality and 
four of them were backsourced. Alpha was unhappy with poor responsiveness, lack of 
professionalism, and service delays in its contracts with Iota, Sigma and Tau. Similarly, 
Beta and Gamma complained about unknowledgeable staff at Omega, delays with 
membership mailings and mishandling of billing. All poor service quality contracts were 
backsourced except Alpha’s contract with Tau. Alpha renegotiated that contract, but had 
to continue with the provider despite low levels of service quality.  
In contrast, Alpha was very happy with the level of service provided by Kappa. 
The staff of Kappa was described as very responsive and Alpha’s requests were always 
addressed promptly. Yet, the contract between Kappa and Alpha was terminated and 
Alpha brought data processing from Kappa back in-house. High service quality by itself 
was not able to justify continuation of outsourcing relationship with Kappa.  
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Trust in the Provider 
Trust between partners in a relationship develops over time. In an outsourcing 
arrangement troubled by inadequate service quality and poor rapport between the 
partners, the trust is likely to deteriorate. Client’s lack of trust in the provider necessitates 
frequent monitoring of provider’s activities to curb opportunistic behavior and ensure 
adequate performance. Such monitoring increases agency cost associated with the 
outsourcing contract, and makes the arrangement less attractive economically. When the 
client can not trust the provider, it affects the overall satisfaction with the relationship and 
backsourcing becomes a viable alternative.  
The Alpha-Sigma and Beta-Omega arrangements were troubled by low service 
quality. As a result, the trust in the provider did not develop in those relationships. Alpha 
and Beta had to scrutinize the provider’s activities to maintain acceptable levels of 
service. Lack of trust undermined the relationship and led to a more frequent voicing of 
concerns by the clients. Beta suspected Omega was opportunistic in inflating membership 
database numbers and overbilling Beta for services. Alpha was also concerned about 
Sigma’s billing for services that were deemed by Sigma above SLA. As the relationships 
deteriorated, both companies pursued backsourcing.  
Goal Conflict 
In an agency relationship, conflicts are inevitable as partners pursue different 
goals. Providers rely on economies of scale to reduce its costs and deliver standardized 
services to multiple clients. On the other hand, clients not only seek to lower their costs, 
but also to streamline their operations. Goal conflict can sometimes be a result of high 
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asset specificity of the outsourcing arrangement when a client requests asset specific 
services from the provider. Goal conflict often causes the relationship between two 
partner companies to disintegrate and backsourcing comes into consideration.  
Beta and Gamma had to alter its membership procedures to comply with the new 
requirements imposed by the provider, Omega. Throughout the contract, however, Beta 
and Gamma saw their fundraising revenues decline and wanted to implement some 
station specific procedures to improve membership activities. Omega insisted on 
restricting stations’ access to the database and continued to follow its own procedures. 
Tensions ran high in the relationship and companies were not able to find common 
ground. Eventually, Beta and Gamma sought to backsource membership activities.  
There was some goal conflict in the relationship of Alpha and Iota. Alpha had 
many legacy applications running at Iota’s facilities. When updates and service were 
required, Iota had to contact individual software developers. Iota wanted to charge extra 
because there were so many different developers to contact, and Alpha was not willing to 
pay more as it felt updates were part of the contract.  Similarly, Alpha ran into billing 
issues with Sigma over the number of the nodes on the network and payments for those 
nodes. Goal conflict in these relationships contributed to overall dissatisfaction as well as 
increased transaction costs of the outsourcing arrangement and resulted in subsequent 
backsourcing.  
Satisfaction with Outsourcing Relationship 
Timeliness and quality of the delivered services, provider behavior and 
performance on the contract, rapport between the client and the provider, costs of 
services, and overall competitive advantage gained by contracting the provider contribute 
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to the overall satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement. A dissatisfied client is likely 
to seek other alternatives to an existing outsourcing contract and can backsource.  
Beta and Gamma were not satisfied with their contracts with Omega. The 
relationship deteriorated over time due to a low quality of the provided services, frequent 
mishaps by the provider, goal conflict in the relationship and monetary disagreements. 
Likewise, Alpha was not satisfied with its contracts with Sigma, Tau and Iota. Sigma and 
Iota contracts were perceived as expensive and delivered unsatisfactory service quality. 
All three contracts also limited Alpha’s ability to control their IS activities and promptly 
respond to business changes. Alpha, Beta and Gamma decided to backsource the 
unsatisfactory relationships with Iota, Sigma and Omega to improve the situation. On the 
other hand, Alpha was very happy with its relationship with Kappa, it was a “perfect 
contract”, yet it was backsourced like all other ones. Even though Alpha was satisfied 
with the relationship, other factors necessitated backsourcing.  
Voice Behavior 
In a relationship, partners can resort to voice behavior in an attempt to change an 
objectionable state of affairs.  Clients and providers in outsourcing contracts have to 
communicate about service levels, billing, service requests, monthly reports, and resolve 
issues when those arise. When there is unhappiness with any part of the contract, a client 
can bring it up with the provider in an attempt to improve the situation.  If those requests 
do not result in improved service, the client can grow increasingly unhappy. On the other 
hand, in healthy relationships parties keep lines of communication open, try to listen to 
the concerns of other party and find common ground. In a successful relationship the 
provider would try to respond to the client’s concerns if such concerns are justifiable.  
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In the Alpha-Sigma, Alpha-Tau, Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega relationships, 
clients used voice to communicate their concerns to the providers. Escalation procedures 
were established for situations when the problems were not addressed to the client’s 
satisfaction. As problems progressed, the companies found themselves contacting the 
provider more frequently. Alpha-Sigma, Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega contracts were 
backsourced when the clients continuously voiced their concerns but did not experience 
any improvement in the situation.  
The Alpha-Iota contract was an interesting example of using voice behavior to 
negotiate early termination of the agreement. Alpha resorted to voicing its concerns every 
time there was a problem with Iota’s service. Iota was not very responsive to Alpha’s 
requests, and Alpha sometimes had to repeat the requests several times. When it was 
decided to backsource, Alpha used the records of communication to demonstrate Iota’s 
poor service quality and multiple requests to modify the service.  Alpha was able to end 
the contract early without termination fees.  
An example of successful voicing behavior and cooperation between client and 
provider is the Alpha-Kappa contract. One of Alpha’s providers, Kappa, was very 
responsive to the clients concerns. Alpha’s use of voice behavior was mostly to maintain 
a healthy relationship with Kappa and modify the situation when necessary. Voice 
behavior increases only when there are problems with the relationship. In a satisfactory 
arrangement, voice behavior is used to maintain rapport between the partners.  
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Emerging Themes 
To make sure that selected theoretical perspectives did not bias and limit the 
findings, the interview transcripts were also reviewed for emerging themes. Those themes 
were added to coding categories and applied to transcripts, together with predefined 
coding categories. One significant theme that emerged across the cases was the role of 
power and its impact on backsourcing decision making. 
Power 
Power can be achieved through control of power bases and power sources. Power 
bases refer to what power holders control that permits them to manipulate the behavior of 
others, while power sources refer to the manner in which parties come to control power 
bases (Hall 1999). Two different notions of power were revealed during the analysis of 
backsourcing decisions. First, power of the organizational decision makers had influence 
on the backsourcing decisions. According to the rationalist perspective on power, top 
management in an organization holds power based on its legitimate and formal 
organization authority and its expertise (Bradshaw-Camball 1991). 
Second, interorganizational power of other entities that were affiliated with the 
client organization also impacted the backsourcing decisions.   The power of those other 
entities was based on the control over resources and information (Bradshaw-Camball 
1991). The organizations faced conflicting goals and had to resort to negotiation and 
politics to favor their interests. Power in interorganizational relations can be explained by 
a pluralist perspective which suggests that other companies can have power based on 
their access to resources, expertise, or their position can legitimize their authority. During 
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a power struggle, parties engage in political games and stakeholders utilize various 
political strategies (Bradshaw-Camball 1991).   
Power of Decision Makers 
Power of decision makers played a significant role in backsourcing decisions at 
Alpha. First of all, the new executives hired to head the corporate headquarters did not 
approve of outsourcing.  The CIO had prior experience working for an outsourcing 
provider and was confident he could create the same successful IS operation in-house, 
especially that Alpha was large enough to enjoy economies of scale. He had full support 
of the CEO who was working on the centralization of Alpha’s worldwide business in the 
corporate headquarters. The CEO was centralizing control over the business, and control 
over IS activities and was part of the overall consolidation. Since the CEO and the CIO 
held the decision making rights they were able to spearhead the backsourcing of various 
IS outsourcing contracts at Alpha. 
Corporate decision to backsource created some resentment on behalf of the local 
employees who felt they were losing control over their own jobs. While the executives 
justified backsourcing by cost savings, poor service quality or need to regain control, 
some employees on location had different opinions. In fact, one of Alpha’s employees in 
France during his interview suggested that the service quality of the Alpha-Iota contract 
was not necessarily bad (contrary to all other accounts), but it was “the Americans” (i.e. 
executives from corporate headquarters) who decided to backsource. As a result of 
business centralization the local offices lost their power and control over the business 
strategy, including IS strategy. New executives at Alpha wanted to backsource all 
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regional IS outsourcing contracts upon their expiration to enjoy full control over the 
operations.  
Similarly, the CEO of Beta was an avid supporter of the idea to outsource to 
Omega. He used his position and decision making authority to continue to support Beta-
Omega contract throughout the term of the arrangement, even when it became apparent 
that Omega was not successful in managing the membership database and the fundraising 
revenues started to slide. There was some resentment on the part of Beta’s membership 
personnel as they grew dissatisfied with the relationship, yet could not modify the 
situation. The CEO, being the decision maker, continued to support the project and 
defend it in front of Beta’s Board. Finally, the Board exercised its power and made the 
decision to end the relationship with Omega and backsource the membership database. At 
the same time the CEO had to resign under the pressure from the Board. Some of the 
interviewees suggested that he could have stayed with Beta had he accepted the 
responsibility for the falling revenues and admitted that outsourcing had been a mistake.  
Power in Interorganizational Relationships 
Power of other entities was evident in backsourcing situations of all three 
examined companies. An interesting situation occurred in the Alpha-Tau contract. This 
particular contract was not negotiated by Alpha, but by Alpha’s parent, Delta. Delta was 
the sole owner of Alpha and was based in Asia-Pacific, where the Alpha-Tau contract 
originated. It was Delta’s decision to establish global headquarters for Alpha and have 
one team of executives managing the worldwide business. Yet when the new strategy 
meant backsourcing part of the contract with Tau, it was not accepted well in Asia-
Pacific.  
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Alpha was able to terminate and backsource all of its worldwide IS outsourcing 
contracts except the contract with Tau in Asia-Pacific. Because Delta was the sole owner 
of Alpha, Delta was able to exercise its power and keep Alpha in the contract with Tau. 
The problem stemmed from conflicting goals of Alpha and Delta. While Alpha estimated 
that it could save money, improve service quality and gain control over those outsourced 
activities by backsourcing, it had to stay with the provider to support its parent company. 
Alpha is the largest company of the Delta consortium and thus was responsible for the 
largest part of the outsourcing contract with Tau. Alpha’s backsourcing would have left 
Delta with significant overhead capacity in the contract that had to be paid for regardless 
of Alpha’s participation.  
Interestingly enough, Alpha – Asia-Pacific was also the last one on schedule to 
transition to the global corporate financial systems and logistics application. The 
transitioning kept being postponed while all other regions have already been using the 
new system hosted and managed at the corporate headquarters. The Asia-Pacific office is 
closely connected with Delta and was able to resist the transitioning the longest, thus 
keeping the control over its local business in its hands. Clearly, there is some political 
maneuvering involved in the relationship between Alpha and Delta. Alpha – Asia-Pacific 
enjoys the support of Delta which derives its power from its ownership of Alpha.  
Role of power was also evident in the Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega contracts. 
First of all, the initial decision to outsource the membership database to Omega was 
strongly supported by a non-profit broadcasting corporation Omicron. Beta and Gamma 
were dependent on Omicron for some of its funding and Omicron served as an umbrella 
corporation for non-profit broadcasting stations. Omega was started under the auspices of 
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Omicron and CEOs of several TV stations were invited to serve on its board. To show 
support for the idea of centralizing membership those stations were also recruited to 
participate in the outsourcing project and had to comply. CEOs of both stations served on 
the Omega’s Board and Gamma’s CEO even presided over the Board.  
When the things at Omega started to deteriorate, Omicron exercised it power over 
the stations once again by insisting the stations continue with outsourcing. Beta’s 
attempts to backsource the Beta-Omega contract were met with threats by Omicron that 
persisted in its support of the project. The CEO of Gamma had to resign from Omega’s 
Board to support his stations’ backsourcing. Both stations received no help from either 
Omega or Omicron during backsourcing transition. 
Role of Power in Backsourcing Decisions 
The role of decision makers or powerful other entities is evident in all examined 
backsourcing cases. Power plays a significant role in organizations that had to conform to 
pressures from the environment as well as pressures exercised within the company. The 
role of power in implementation and use of information systems is widely acknowledged 
(Markus 1983; Jasperson 2002). Within organizations power provides authority and 
decision making rights. In the case of Alpha, structural changes in the organization 
altered the balance of power by shifting it from the local offices to the central 
headquarters. High position in the formal structure of the organization provided access to 
specific power resources (Markus 1983) and allowed executives to make backsourcing 
decisions. Similarly, Beta’s CEO was able to use his authority and continue with the 
outsourcing arrangement with Omega.  
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Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by low service quality of the outsourcing 
arrangement, cost benefit of backsourcing, structural changes, loss of control or 
redefinition of the role of IS. However, it is also evident that the backsourcing decision 
can be imposed by the opinions of corporate executives who have decision making 
authority. To justify their decision, executives are likely to rely on the traditional 
economic factors, yet the evaluation of the existing outsourcing and backsourcing options 
could be first and foremost driven by their personal opinions and beliefs.  
On the other hand, the companies under investigation also experienced pressures 
from other organizations. Delta was able to pressure Alpha into continuation of its 
contract with Tau, and Alpha – Asia-Pacific was successful in resisting corporate IS 
changes with the support from Delta. Omicron was successful at recruiting Beta, Gamma 
and other TV stations to participate in outsourcing to Omega by exercising its power over 
the stations.  Therefore, in interorganizational relationships, other organizations could 
have influence over the client organization and exercise its power to impose its opinions 
on backsourcing decision. 
Integration of Factors 
In all examined backsourcing cases, cost benefit was named as one of the reasons 
for backsourcing. Interestingly enough, in the Alpha-Tau case, the informants suggested 
that it would have been cost beneficial to backsource that contract. Nevertheless, the 
contract was not backsourced even though cost analysis called for it. Other factors, 
namely pressure from the parent company to continue the relationship, had a stronger 
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impact on the decision to continue with the relationship. In this case, cost benefit by itself 
was not able to justify the backsourcing.  
It should be noted that cost factors were closely interrelated with other factors. 
Various economic, strategic and relationship considerations impacted cost components of 
the outsourcing arrangement, thus increasing the overall benefit of backsourcing. For 
example, loss of control over the outsourced IS services increased the agency cost of the 
outsourcing relationship. Any deterioration of the outsourcing contract contributed to the 
decreased cost benefit of the outsourcing arrangement. While cost is important, a 
company could not sacrifice its crucial competencies and capabilities to save money and 
that’s why strategic components are all included in the primary factors that affect the 
backsourcing decision.   While service quality and cost benefit are strong precursors to 
backsourcing, they can be overpowered by strategic factors such as a change in the role 
of IS (Alpha-Kappa) or power pressure (Alpha-Tau). 
Surprisingly, power of the decision makers or other entities involved in the 
interorganizational relationship with the client had a significant impact on the 
backsourcing decision. The role of power was so important that it even overpowered 
other rational economic, strategic or relationship considerations. Politics played an 
important role in backsourcing decisions, and in some cases was able to postpone (Beta-
Omega) or prevent backsourcing (Alpha-Tau).  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
To augment the above analysis of backsourcing antecedents, another technique, 
namely qualitative comparative analysis, was used to identify factors necessary and 
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sufficient to result in the backsourcing outcome. To perform qualitative comparative 
analysis, first, the outcome of interest and its theoretical scope were defined. In this 
dissertation the outcome of interest was backsourcing of information systems and a 
number of theoretical antecedents have been defined as possible factors that affect 
backsourcing. All six examined cases were used during the analysis. While the number of 
cases is not exhaustive, backsourcing is a large scale and infrequent phenomenon, which 
makes it easier to employ an enumeration rather than sampling strategy for case selection 
(Fichman 2004). The case evidence was analyzed for presence of absence of the 
theoretically derived backsourcing antecedents and emerging antecedent, power, in each 
case. Table 7.5 summarizes the factors across cases. Dichotomized values were assigned 
to the factors for each case (0 for absence of a condition, and 1 for presence of a 
condition). 
 290
Table 7.5 Presence of Backsourcing Conditions Across Cases 
    Contract 
Construct 
Alpha-
Kappa 
Alpha-Iota Alpha-
Sigma 
Alpha-Tau Beta-
Omega 
Gamma-
Omega 
Cost 
Advantage 
Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Switching 
Cost 
Not Present Present Present  Present Present 
Asset 
Specificity 
Not Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Change in the 
Role of IS 
Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Loss of 
Control 
Not Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Structural 
Changes 
Present Present Present Present Present Not Present
Poor Service 
Quality 
Not Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Low Trust Not Present Present Present  Present Not Present
Goal Conflict Not Present Present Present  Present Present 
Dissatisfaction Not Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Power Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Backsourcing  Present Present Present Not Present Present Present 
 
QCA 3.0 software was used to construct a truth table that enumerated all possible 
combinations of the independent variables and what outcome was observed. In total, 
there were 11 independent variables considered, which brought the total number of 
possible factor combinations to 2048. The algorithm compared all configurations to one 
another, looking for opportunities to eliminate irrelevant variables and combine 
configurations into simpler forms (Drass 1992). The most parsimonious set of conditions, 
that explained backsourcing in the analyzed cases, was a combination of backsourcing 
cost advantage, redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes in the organization and 
power influence.  
The QCA method may not be a perfect solution to the research question, yet it 
provides an additional insight into the factors that lead to backsourcing. The sample of 
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cases did not include a full enumeration of all backsourcing cases, and there is a 
possibility that different results could be observed with a different sample. However, 
combined with the analysis presented in the earlier section, this method allowed the 
researcher to single out the backsourcing antecedents that are necessary and sufficient to 
lead to backsourcing. These primary factors interact with other factors and together lead 
to backsourcing, yet the other factors only serve as compounding reasons, but are not 
sufficient to produce the outcome. The factors that were not included in the three factor 
solution are considered irrelevant to the outcome, because they do not change the 
outcome whether they are present or not.   
It is essential to point out that all four components that were identified by the 
QCA, as necessary and sufficient reasons to lead to backsourcing, were also included in 
the primary reasons for backsourcing named by the interviewees. Power was named in 
two cases, where it referred to the power of executives and the structural changes that 
caused power shifts. This provides some credibility to the analysis performed by QCA 
and confirms that these four factors are indeed critical in decision to backsource. 
However, loss of control over the outsourced activities and service quality of the 
outsourcing arrangement were not deemed necessary by the QCA to imply backsourcing.  
Why was service quality not included in the final solution? It is surprising that 
service quality was identified as the primary reason for backsourcing by informants 
across cases. The result may be due to the fact that in one of the cases, service quality 
was high (Alpha-Kappa), yet the contract was backsourced. In another case (Alpha-Tau) 
service quality was inadequate, yet the relationship still continued. Other reasons, 
specifically, like the change in the role of IS and cost, were critical in the decision to 
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backsource. Qualitative comparative analysis eliminated variables that are irrelevant to 
the outcome because those variable were either present or absent, yet the outcome was 
unchanged.  It demonstrates that while service quality is an important deliverable in the 
outsourcing contract, it can be superseded by other factors. For the informants it is easy 
to point out to the problems with the service and blame the service quality for the 
outsourcing failure. Yet in decision making, there are more powerful factors in play that 
lead to backsourcing.  
Loss of control was probably also deemed irrelevant by the QCA algorithm. Loss 
of control increases agency costs and also can underscore the importance of the 
outsourced services, thus necessitating the redefinition of the role of IS. While it’s been 
argued that loss of control directly impacts backsourcing, it may be that loss of control 
affects backsourcing indirectly by increasing the cost of existing arrangement and 
demonstrating the importance of outsourced services. 
One of the notions of power, authority of decision makers, and internal structural 
changes in the organization are very similar. Both components were included into the 
QCA solution, but it should be acknowledged that structural power is related to the 
theoretically derived antecedent of internal structural changes. These changes in the 
organizations lead to redistribution of corporate power and thus, imply structural power. 
Construct of power can replace the construct of structural changes as the one that 
addresses both existing and incoming power structures.  
 
 293
CHAPTER EIGHT. LESSONS LEARNED AND REFLECTIONS ON 
RESEARCH 
This is a final chapter of this dissertation. It starts out by evaluating the 
methodology of this research and discussing the steps taken to ensure the validity and the 
reliability of results. It then presents the findings of this dissertation, followed by the 
acknowledgement of limitations. The chapter concludes with a list of future research 
directions stemming from this study. 
Evaluation of Conducted Research 
The value of any research project is its contribution to knowledge. The goal of 
this dissertation was to identify factors that serve as antecedents of information systems 
backsourcing. The knowledge contribution of this dissertation is the framework of factors 
that contribute to the backsourcing decision. Specifically, through case study research, 
several main reasons for backsourcing were identified that include cost benefit of 
backsourcing, poor service quality and loss of control over existing outsourcing 
arrangement, redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes in the organization, and the 
power of decision makers and other entities involved in interorganizational relationships 
with the client company.  
Guidelines for conducting case study research can help to evaluate the quality of 
this research project (Benbasat 1987). Table 8.1 summarized the guidelines and specifics 
for this dissertation. This research pursued exploratory strategy by examining the context 
of backsourcing and determining the factors that impact the outsourcing client’s decision 
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to backsource. The unit of analysis for the case studies was an outsourcing contract 
between client and provider, and six different contracts were examined. Literal 
replication was the goal of case site selection, with research focusing on the phenomenon 
of backsourcing.  
To increase the validity of this study, multiple sources of evidence were utilized. 
While most of the data was collected through semi-structured interviews, archival 
documents and corporate documents were also perused. Interviews were conducted on 
different levels of the organization, and provided detailed accounts of informants’ 
experience with outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing. Using multiple informants 
and different sources of evidence, allowed validating the findings and reducing 
subjectivity. Through triangulation, the researcher was able to depict a multifaceted 
picture of backsourcing considerations and transition in each of the case studies. Across 
the case comparisons it helped isolate the factors salient in backsourcing decisions.  
Specifically, two different methods were used to triangulate and arrive at the list of 
primary backsourcing antecedents. The case study approach also allowed the researcher 
to remain open to emerging themes, and in the analysis an important backsourcing 
antecedent, namely power, was discovered.  
 295
Table 8.1 Evaluation of Dissertation 
Guidelines Specifics of This Dissertation 
Research Theme Information Systems Backsourcing 
Research Objective Exploration: Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to 
backsource? 
Unit of Analysis Outsourcing contract between client and provider 
Site Selection Multiple cases, literal replication, criterion based 
sampling strategy 
Data Collection Semi-structured interviews, archival records, company 
documents 
Methods to ensure reliability 
and validity 
Case study protocol and case study database. Multiple 
informants for each case. Two coders. Triangulation by 
using different sources, informants, and methods. 
 
Methodologically, the use of triangulation presented an advantage to this 
dissertation by providing an opportunity to validate the findings through different 
methods. Through triangulation, we learned the value of various methods and the strength 
of combining those methods to arrive at more compelling conclusions. Triangulation was 
involved in both data collection and data analysis, and it helped increase the rigor of 
research and create a comprehensive account of backsourcing.  
Specific findings of this dissertation, study limitation and future research 
directions are discussed in the following sections.  
Implications for Practice and Research 
The cost benefit of backsourcing, service quality of the existing outsourcing 
arrangement, redefinition of the role of IS in the organization, loss of control over 
the outsourced services, structural changes and internal and external power in the 
organization are the main factors impacting the backsourcing decision. These factors 
were isolated as the salient antecedents of backsourcing in the analyzed cases. Cost 
considerations were expected to play a role in the backsourcing decision, as costs have 
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already been demonstrated to impact other types of sourcing decisions. Service quality 
proved to be the most popular factor claimed by the informants. Service quality is easy to 
measure and is a major expectation in the outsourcing arrangement, so not surprisingly, 
many informants were able to point to low service quality as the problem in the 
relationship.  
It turned out that loss of control over IS is closely connected with service quality. 
Specifically, loss of control is only present in the relationship when service quality of the 
arrangement is low. Inadequate performance of the provider impacts the business of the 
client, thus necessitating better service and need to regain control of underperforming 
activities.  Redefinition of the role of IS was interestingly enough a result of either 
structural changes in the organization or loss of control over outsourced IS activities, so 
again the primary reasons for backsourcing were interrelated. Corporate executives 
joining the organization were able to embark on strategic changes in the organization, 
thus modifying the role IS played in the organization. Alternatively, loss of control stirred 
up reevaluations of the role of outsourced services, thus bringing attention to true 
importance of the IS activities.  
All of the discussed motives were salient in the examined cases, and loss of 
control and redefinition of the role of IS were also influenced by other primary factors. 
As a result, some of these factors, had a stronger impact on the decision to backsource, 
and the next finding is dedicated to that.  
When strategic considerations are involved in the backsourcing decision, 
they supersede economic and relationship concerns. While all of the primary motives 
seem to be important, strategic reasons can dominate the backsourcing decision, 
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especially when service quality and economic considerations dictate otherwise. For 
example, the backsourcing of all Alpha’s contracts was first and foremost driven by a 
change in the role of IS and the desire to consolidate IS operations by the top executives. 
Regardless of the quality of the relationship or economic efficiency of the contract, Alpha 
was terminating all outsourcing contracts in reaction to the redefinition of the role of IS. 
Even though Alpha enjoyed years of a successful relationship with Kappa, it pursued 
backsourcing of this relationship. Despite satisfactory service and acceptable costs Alpha 
pursued backsourcing for strategic reasons.  There could be several explanations to the 
dominant role of strategic factors. 
One reason could be that strategic reasons are part of strategy making in the 
organization and represent decision making at the top level of the organization. As such, 
strategic decisions are far reaching and impact resource allocation, personnel, financials 
and overall company performance. Therefore, backsourcing of IS services can have a 
significant effect on the business of the organization and should be justified, not only by 
immediate concerns about service quality and cost, but also by long term considerations 
of the importance of the outsourced activities to the organization.  
Another reason could be that the redefinition of the role of IS and loss of control 
over the outsourced IS activities do not happen in a vacuum but are caused by other 
factors. As a result, redefinition of the role of IS and the loss of control, exert stronger 
influence on the final decision by combining the underlying reasons. These two motives 
are a result of significant concerns about the existing outsourcing arrangement and 
changes in the organization. Therefore, redefinition of the role of IS and the need to 
regain control over the outsourced activities are more powerful than other factors.  
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Yet another explanation of the dominant role of strategic reasons can focus on the 
role of structural changes in the organization. Structural changes result in the reshaping of 
the business and influx of new ideas brought by the new executives. Interestingly enough, 
in those situations where the cost or service quality were neglected, the power of 
individuals making the decision played a significant role. The next finding addresses this 
point.  
Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by the experience, beliefs, and 
attitudes of the decision maker, because it is the decision maker in the organization 
who has ultimate power over backsourcing decisions and sourcing decisions in 
general. The backsourcing decision is a strategic decision in an organization and 
involves significant changes in the facilities, personnel and resources of the company. 
This kind of decision is made at the highest level of organization as formal structure in 
organizations typically assigns decision making authority to the top executives. Those 
individuals, by their position, are legitimized into power in the organization and power in 
important in decision making (Hall 1999).  
While rational economic considerations are important in decision making, it has 
also been acknowledged that decisions are constricted by “bounded rationality” (Simon 
1957). As such, there are multiple factors that contribute to the decision making. Decision 
makers are expected to thoroughly analyze the situation and information that is available 
in making the decision. In reality, the decision makers may be faced with imperfect 
information, uncertainty, and time and resource constraints.  Some decision makers also 
can rely on their ideologies, values, morals, feelings and even habits to arrive at the 
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solution (Hall 1999). Consequently, the final decision may have little to do with 
economic or strategic motives.  
Because decision makers have the final authority when it comes to the 
backsourcing decision, their view and experience with sourcing in general has a major 
impact on backsourcing considerations. When new executives join the organization, they 
arrive with preexisting expertise and experience. As a result, they base the decisions in 
the new organization not only on the rationale, but also on their prior experience and 
beliefs. The former CIO at Alpha was eager to centralize all of the IS operations in the 
headquarters, even before any economic assessment of the existing outsourcing contracts. 
As one of the informants pointed out the backsourcing “process began the day he walked 
through the door.” In another case, Beta’s CEO stuck to his conviction in the benefits of 
outsourcing and refused to acknowledge the failure of the outsourcing contract with 
Omega despite falling revenues and escalating complains. The backsourcing of the Beta-
Omega contract was only able to begin upon the intervention of Beta’s Board.  
Pressure from others entities involved in the interorganizational relationship 
with the client organization, and that have some sort of power or authority over the 
client organization, can impact the decision to backsource. It is inevitable that in 
interorganizational relationships, some entities have more power because of better 
resources, expertise, structural position or opportunity. As organizations participate in 
various types of interorganizational relationships, they may face some power dependency 
and may have to alter their decision making and act in accordance with powerful others. 
Organizations can pursue conflicting goals which can lead to political maneuvering to 
pursue specific interests.  
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As with any other kind of decision, backsourcing can be motivated by the 
opinions, advice or pressures from other organizations. Delta exercised its power over its 
subsidiary, Alpha, by opposing the backsourcing of the Alpha-Tau contract. While the 
backsourcing was justified by the economic benefits and need to regain control over the 
network in Asia-Pacific, Alpha had to comply with Delta’s request.  Delta had power 
over Alpha as it was the sole owner of Alpha and Alpha had to ensure that it did not 
cause financial problems for its parent.  Beta and Gamma were pressured into initial 
outsourcing by a non-profit broadcasting corporation Omicron. Omicron’s power bases 
included its ability to reward the stations, in the form of grants, and it also served as a 
referent for the stations by guiding their programming and issuing their licenses. 
Omicron’s position and expertise in the non-profit broadcasting community allowed it to 
sponsor the outsourcing provider, Omega, and recruit stations for participation.  
When service quality is sliding, detailed records of communication with the 
provider and contract problems, can assist in negotiation of the contract 
termination by demonstrating problems with service quality. Early termination of the 
outsourcing to bring the services back in-house is often accompanied by termination fees, 
which sometimes can negate the cost benefit of backsourcing. Early termination may be 
motivated by various reasons such as economic efficiency, loss of control over IS, 
redefinition of the role of IS, and low service quality. Some of these reasons, especially 
loss of control over IS, are likely to be a result of unsatisfactory performance by the 
provider. As such, inadequate service quality is a popular reason for backsourcing and it 
also can cause other problems in the contract. If properly documented, poor service 
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quality can help client avoid costly termination fees by bringing claims against provider 
for failure to perform according to SLA.  
It is a good practice to keep thorough documentation of all problems encountered 
in the relationship and attempts taken to resolve them. Detailed records can demonstrate 
unsatisfactory performance below levels specified in the service level agreement if 
necessary. Documented inadequate performance can help justify early termination and 
help the client company to reduce termination fees by requesting reimbursement for poor 
service or damage to the company. Alpha used this strategy to negotiate an early exit 
from the relationship with Iota. Alpha was centralizing its operations in its corporate data 
center and wanted to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract before its expiration. It so 
happened that Alpha also experienced some problems with the levels of service delivered 
by Iota. So when it became apparent that early termination fees are unavoidable, Alpha 
was able to resort to the documented conflicts, demonstrate unsatisfactory performance, 
and demand reimbursement for low service quality, thus, offsetting the termination fees.  
Detailed planning of transition activities and testing of equipment and 
services is important for successful backsourcing. Backsourcing is not an easy 
proposition. Companies lose valuable expertise during outsourcing and recovering lost 
skills and resources can be costly and time consuming experience. It is beneficial for an 
outsourcing client to complete a comprehensive analysis of backsourcing and establish 
procedures for bringing the previously outsourced activities back in-house.  Alpha, for 
example, spent almost nine months planning the backsourcing of the Alpha-Iota contract 
and then was able to transfer all the equipment and services into the new facilities within 
two weeks. Extended planning, testing and negotiations with the provider ensured 
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successful transition and minimal interruptions to business. The equipment and software 
involved in the transition should be significantly tested before actual deployment from 
the internal location. Failure to thoroughly test the equipment can result in failed 
transition and lengthy system outages that can hurt the business. Beta followed a detailed 
plan for the backsourcing transition out of the Beta-Omega contract. To deliver 
satisfactory performance upon backsourcing, Beta worked closely with the software 
manufacturer and ran multiple tests with sample and partial data. It allowed resolving 
problems with the conversion prior to transition.   
Backsourcing offshore outsourcing arrangements can prove to be especially 
complicated and costly. Backsourcing requires significant expense and expertise on the 
part of the client. Backsourcing an offshore contract can be even more costly and time 
consuming as it involves a transfer of equipment and software to a location overseas. The 
software licenses are typically country specific and may not be possible to transfer. 
Similarly, equipment may be difficult to disassemble and relocate or it may not be 
compatible with the local electronics. During the transition, the client company may have 
disruptions to its business. Alpha faced some of these challenges when transitioning out 
of the Alpha-Iota and Alpha-Sigma contracts. Software licenses purchased in Europe had 
to be replaced with software licenses for the United States. The engineers had to spend 
several months in Europe installing networking equipment, to replace discontinued 
Sigma circuits. Alpha had to physically unplug the servers and bring them down for a 
weekend in order to relocate them from the U.K to the United States.  
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In summary, the following were knowledge contributions of this research: 
1. Service quality, cost, loss of control over outsourced services, 
redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes and internal and 
external power in an organization were identified as key antecedents of 
backsourcing.  
2. When strategic considerations are involved in the backsourcing 
decision, they supersede economic and relationship concerns. 
3. Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by the experience, beliefs and 
attitudes of the decision maker. 
4. Pressure from others entities that have some sort of power or authority 
over the client organization can impact the decision to backsource. 
5. Good records of communication and escalation procedures can help in 
negotiation of the contract termination. 
6. Detailed planning of transition activities and testing of equipment and 
services can help ensure successful backsourcing. 
7. Backsourcing offshore outsourcing arrangements can be especially 
complicated and costly.  
Limitations 
While every attempt was made to ensure validity and reliability of this research, 
some limitations, which may have impacted the findings, have to be acknowledged.  
Some findings of this dissertation may be attributed to particular cases that 
were selected for analysis. Selection bias can be a problem if research only samples 
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from within a larger set of potential cases. For that reason, conclusions of the research 
can be partially due to the type of cases that happened to be selected for analysis. To 
overcome selection bias, this research followed a purposeful sampling strategy and 
selected outsourcing contracts that experienced backsourcing. Building on one of the 
theoretically derived factors, the selected companies were also different in terms of the 
role of IS in the organization. Yet, recruiting companies for participation in the case 
studies presented some difficulty. One of the possible explanations can be the fact that 
backsourcing follows prior outsourcing arrangement, and companies may view their 
withdrawal from outsourcing as a failure, and thus, are unwilling to share information 
about their unsuccessful outsourcing. Consequently, the value of backsourcing 
antecedents revealed in this dissertation may be limited because it is based on the small 
number of cases. Future research can include more cases and evaluate the proposed 
framework and its limitations.  
A semi-structured interview used to collect data was developed based on the 
theoretically derived constructs and may have limited dissertation findings to the 
predetermined themes. To help conduct data collection and ensure consistency of data 
collection across cases, a semi-structured interview guide was used. The guide consisted 
of questions based on theoretically derived constructs as well as overall questions about 
the outsourcing relationship and subsequent backsourcing. Using the guide could have 
skewed the results towards the preset constructs and limited the finding of the 
dissertation. However, the informants had a chance to provide their own accounts of the 
situation and name their own reasons backsourcing. The interview guide simply helped to 
ensure that all informants addressed the main points of interest. Subsequently, during the 
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coding of interviews, the researcher considered emergent themes and coded not only 
predetermined themes but also the new themes across the cases. Specifically, an 
important additional backsourcing antecedent, power of decision makers and other 
entities, surfaced during the analysis. 
Some subjectivity may have been introduced into analysis during the 
interpretation of data. It is possible that the researcher may have introduced personal 
biases into the interpretation of the results. To circumvent subjectivity, two independent 
coders coded the interview transcripts and together refined the coding schema. They then 
recoded the transcripts of one case and the coefficient of interrater agreement for that 
case was .527, which indicated moderate agreement. All other cases were coded by the 
primary researcher. To provide complete account of backsourcing events Chapter 6 
presented detailed results of all cases together with coding summaries. The subjectivity 
bias was overcome by triangulating the results of multiple informants and using several 
methods of analysis to arrive at the list of antecedents that impact backsourcing. 
The findings of the qualitative comparative analysis are limited by the small 
number of cases under consideration. Qualitative comparative analysis isolated four 
factors necessary and sufficient to result in backsourcing. QCA is best performed on an 
exhaustive number of cases, and this dissertation only examined 6 contracts, 5 of which 
were backsourced. While the same four factors were also among the factors identified as 
the primary reasons for backsourcing by the informants, the results of the QCA can not 
be fully reliable. Future studies using QCA should attempt to include more backsourcing 
cases in order to improve predictive capability of the identified factors.    
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Future Research Directions 
IS backsourcing is an acknowledged phenomenon in practitioner literature, yet it 
is still unexplored academically. There are a lot of opportunities for future research 
directions. This study of backsourcing followed an exploratory approach trying to 
determine factors that impact backsourcing decisions in organizations. Now, that several 
primary reasons for backsourcing are established, further research is necessary to explore 
the backsourcing success factors, role of executives in backsourcing, provider’s role in 
backsourcing, and evaluate the backsourcing scenarios.   
As backsourcing is gaining popularity, it is important to focus on 
transitioning success factors, and strategies to rebuild expertise in-house.  
Backsourcing is not an easy proposition. Organizations face difficulties in rebuilding in-
house expertise to handle the previously outsourced services internally. This research 
suggested that a detailed plan for transition is necessary for successful backsourcing. 
Transitioning back in-house involves negotiations with the provider to either exit the 
relationship upon expiration or premature termination. Providers are typically unhappy to 
lose clients, and backsourcing organization should be well prepared to handle the 
negotiations and proceed with the transition regardless of the support from the provider. 
Studying successful backsourcing transitions can identify critical steps in preparing for 
backsourcing and help organizations that are getting ready to embark on backsourcing to 
formulate a successful transitioning plan.  
For more powerful conclusions, it can be useful to perform a more 
exhaustive study that can identify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
backsourcing, using qualitative comparative analysis. Qualitative comparative 
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analysis is most powerful when performed on an exhaustive sample of cases. This kind of 
study can collect data about multiple backsourcing cases using publicly available sources 
and other studies that reported on backsourcing. It should attempt to identify as many 
backsourcing cases as possible to fully represent the universe under consideration. It will 
be beneficial then to apply qualitative comparative analysis to the sample and compare 
the finding with the results of this dissertation. The factors identified through analysis 
would represent the primary conditions that result in backsourcing outcome, and can be 
useful for practitioners evaluating backsourcing opportunities.  
From the provider’s perspective, it is helpful to examine the role of the 
provider, in termination of outsourcing agreements. While it is the client’s decision to 
end the relationship with the provider and backsource, the provider is significantly 
involved in the relationship with the client and the providers behavior affects the client’s 
overall perspective on outsourcing. Future research can explore ways for the provider to 
maintain outsourcing relationships and prevent termination. This research suggested that 
several primary reasons for backsourcing (service quality of the outsourcing arrangement 
and loss of control) were closely related to the provider’s performance in the outsourcing 
contract. An interesting research question would be to investigate if improvements in 
service quality can prevent backsourcing. Another appealing topic can be the role of the 
provider in the backsourcing transition. While the provider may be unwilling to help the 
departing client with the transition, the provider may be able to learn from the experience 
and prevent other clients from leaving the relationship.  
Further studies are needed that consider the power of executives and their 
role in backsourcing, and sourcing decisions in general. One of the findings in this 
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dissertation was the fact that beliefs and the disposition of executives play a significant 
role in the backsourcing decisions and sometimes can overrule the rational factors that 
typically are used in the assessment of backsourcing. While earlier research has 
demonstrated that executives’ values, beliefs and morals affect overall decision making, 
outsourcing research has not examined the role of executives in great detail. It is a 
revealing discovery that executives base backsourcing decisions on their prior experience 
and beliefs instead of the needs of the organization. Review of other outsourcing and 
backsourcing cases can provide an informative analysis of true reasons behind sourcing 
decisions. It would be interesting to further examine the role of executive power in 
sourcing decision making. Another attractive research question could be the role of 
external structural changes, such as mergers and acquisitions in backsourcing.  
In summary, IS backsourcing is a new phenomenon, and there are several future 
research directions to be explored: 
1. Transitioning success factors and strategies to rebuild expertise in-house. 
2. Qualitative comparative analysis of a more exhaustive sample of cases. 
3. Exploration of the provider’s perspective in backsourcing.  
4. Role of executive power in backsourcing and sourcing decisions. 
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Semi-Structured Interview with a Company that has Undergone Backsourcing 
I am working on a dissertation research project examining reversal of the 
outsourcing relationship and return of previously outsourced functions back in-house. In 
the last decade many companies turned to information systems (IS) outsourcing suppliers 
for assistance with the growing technology needs. However, recent years also witnessed 
the reversal of IS outsourcing arrangement. This research aims to examine the change in 
the sourcing of corporate IS functions and the grounds for this decision.  
Your identity will remain anonymous, and any and all information obtained in the 
course of the interview will not be associated with you or your company. I would like to 
ask your permission to tape-record this interview. This would allow me to focus more on 
what you are saying rather than note-taking. It will also enable me to be more efficient 
and accurate in reviewing the information that you provide. You can choose to 
discontinue the tape-recording at any time during this interview. At the end of this 
research study, all the tapes will be destroyed.  
 
1. What is your position within this organization? 
2. How long have you been in the present position?  
3. How were you involved in day to day operations of the outsourcing arrangement? 
4. How long did you work with the Outsourcing Provider?  
5. If you think about your company’s IS processes, how do they differ, compared to 
other companies in the same industry? 
6. Can you think of any unique technical skills, extensive business knowledge or 
substantial investments in equipment on the part of the outsourcing provider that your 
company requires?  
7. Who from the Outsourcing Provider did you personally directly interact with?  
8. How often did you communicate with Outsourcing Provider’s representatives?  
9. What were the reasons for those communications?  
10. How would you characterize the relationship between your company and the 
Outsourcing Provider? 
11. What did you think of the quality of service provided by the Outsourcing Provider?  
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(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not 
mentioned in the response) 
a. Physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of personnel 
b. Willingness to help customers and provide prompt service 
c. Ability to perform the promised service dependably and accurately 
d. Knowledge and courtesy of employees 
e. Caring, individualized attention 
12. Can you tell me of any significant disagreements (if any) between your company and 
the Outsourcing Provider during the time of the contract? 
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not 
mentioned in the response) 
a. About specific way work is done or services are provided 
b. About goals and priorities of outsourcing 
c. About specific terms of the relationship between your organization and 
Outsourcing Provider 
 
13. What kind of concerns did you company have about the service that it was receiving? 
a. How did you communicate those concerns to Outsourcing Provider’s 
representatives? 
b. How did the provider react to those communications? 
 
14. What kind of changes if any did your company suggest to Outsourcing Provider if 
there was a problem? 
a. How did your company work with Outsourcing Provider to help improve the 
situation? 
 
15. What did you think about the  
a. IS services performed by Outsourcing Provider?  
b. Customer support by Outsourcing Provider?  
c. Relationship with Outsourcing Provider?  
d. Honesty and accuracy of deadlines set by Outsourcing Provider? 
e. Reliability of the computer systems of Outsourcing Provider?  
f. Willingness of Outsourcing Provider to share information? 
g. Outsourcing Provider’s adherence to agreements?  
 
16. Can you think of any changes in the way IS was utilized in your company during the 
outsourcing contract?  
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not 
mentioned in the response) 
a. Change in the role of information systems in the success of your company? 
b. Change in your company’s expertise in information technology and 
understanding how it can be used in your organization?  
c. Change in the competitive advantage that information systems offer your 
company? 
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17. Can you tell me if your company had control over the IS processes that were handled by 
the Outsourcing Provider and why? 
18. Can you tell me if you felt your company was able to respond to competitive and 
environmental challenges in a timely manner during the outsourcing contract? 
19. Can you tell me of any significant changes in the management that your company has 
undergone during the outsourcing arrangement and during backsourcing? 
20. Were there any specific reasons why your company terminated the relationship with 
Outsourcing Provider?  
21. Which one of those reasons was the biggest driver for backsourcing? 
22. Who now manages the services that were previously performed by Outsourcing 
Provider? 
23. How long did the transition from outsourcing to backsourcing take? 
24. What were the difficulties during the transition from outsourcing to backsourcing? 
25. Were there any extra costs involved in the transition?  
26. What do you think were the benefits of backsourcing? 
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not 
mentioned in the response) 
a. What kind of cost savings did your company achieve by returning the previously 
outsourced services back in-house? 
a. Direct cost savings 
b. Indirect cost savings 
b. Do you think your company gained advantage through the improved management 
of IS? 
c. Can you tell me of any changes in the service quality of IS services after 
backsourcing? 
27. What do you think about the way that IS services are managed in your company now? 
28. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about your 
experience with backsourcing?  
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29. What was the length of the contract with Outsourcing Provider and what was the 
amount of the contract with Outsourcing Provider? 
30. What is your company’s total IT budget?  
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Case Study Protocol 
Purpose of the Protocol 
To ensure the reliability of research case study the researcher should follow the 
same procedures for data collection across multiple cases. To assist the researcher in this 
task this case study protocol should be used. It helps guide the researcher in the collection 
of the data for all case studies on backsourcing. Follow these procedures to establish 
contact, collect and analyze data, and write the case study report for each case.  
Description of Case Study  
This research aims to investigate the reasons for backsourcing after the initial 
outsourcing arrangement, considerations involved in the formation of backsourcing 
intentions on the part of the IS outsourcing client, as well as the transition to 
backsourcing and issues associated with it.  It targets to answer the following research 
question: Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to backsource? The framework of 
backsourcing antecedent guides the collection of data this research. The factors that can 
have an impact on backsourcing decision include various economic, strategic and 
relationship considerations.  
Data Collection Procedures 
 To initiate entry into the organization contact the individual identified as the main 
contact person and discuss the research interest and the possibility of data collection. 
Once the agreement to participate in research is obtained, set up the initial interview in 
person at the company’s location. Use this interview as an opportunity to learn more 
about the organization, its information systems, and the IS outsourcing contract that was 
backsourced. Compile a list of individuals that were involved in the outsourcing 
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arrangement, in the decision to backsource, and in the transition process back in-house.  
Request assistance in contacting the potential interviewees. Set up a subsequent interview 
with the main contact to include them as one of the informants.  
 Set up the interviews with the identified informants. To each informant explain 
the purpose of research, your specific interest in their experience with IS outsourcing and 
backsourcing and promise confidentiality. At the time of the interview ask the informant 
to complete a written consent form which is to be kept by the researcher. Once again 
promise confidentiality of the responses. During the meeting use the semi-structured 
interview guide to conduct the interview. Use a recorder to tape the interviews for later 
transcription. Request to review documents (e-mails, letters, SLAs etc.) pertaining to the 
outsourcing agreement. Ask about additional candidates for interviews, seek introduction 
if possible. Explore the interviewee’s connections with the provider, seek contacts within 
the provider’s organization.  
 Transcribe the recorded interviews as soon as possible after the interview. Make 
every effort to reflect the interview as fully as possible by being verbatim. Forward the 
transcribed interview to the informant for review. If additional questions arise during the 
transcription address them by e-mail. Seek clarification of dates and terms of the contract 
that seem to contradict the information from other sources. 
 If follow-up interviews are necessary with some of the informants, use this 
opportunity to once again request corporate documents and communication pertaining to 
the outsourcing contract, backsourcing decision and transition back in-house. Read all the 
interviews before this follow-up interview and seek to explore issues that surfaced during 
the original interviews.  
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Case Study Questions 
 Use the structured interview guide to direct the discussion. Keep in mind that the 
questions of specific interest include:  
• Details, dates, amounts of the contractual agreement with the outsourcing 
provider 
• Details about the IS operations in the company 
• Role of the IS in the company 
• Changes in the management of the company 
• Uniqueness of the way IS used in the company 
• Costs of outsourcing and backsourcing 
• Service quality delivered by the outsourcing provider 
• Satisfaction with the IS outsourcing provider 
• Trust in the IS outsourcing provider 
• Loss of control over the IS activities when they were outsourced to the 
outsourcing provider 
• Conflict with the outsourcing provider 
• Communication with the outsourcing provider 
• Details of the transition back in-house 
Prompt to get additional information on these items when necessary. 
Initial Data Analysis  
Compile all of the collected data by case. No analysis of the interview data should 
be done until all of the interviews are completed for each case. Read the transcripts of all 
the interviews, if something is not clear in the transcript use the tapes to go back to the 
source and check for accuracy. Combine all of the interviews for each case together in a 
document.  
As a first step in reducing the text of the interviews read the interview and mark 
the passages that related to the overall information about the company and descriptions of 
the information system operations. Set aside for further analysis all contract details of the 
initial IS outsourcing agreement (dates, costs, outsourced activities) and discussion of the 
outsourcing contract experience and subsequent backsourcing. Group the individual 
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passages into two categories: overall information about the company and outsourcing 
contract. Use the company, IS operations and contract details information for case 
descriptions.  
Combine on a single transcript all of the passages from all the interviews that 
relate to the outsourcing contract and backsourcing experience for each case. Seek 
another person to code all of the interviews together to increase coding reliability. 
Review the developed coding schema with the second coder to ensure full understanding 
of the categories. Start out by practice coding several pages of one of the interviews and 
review the results. Discuss and modify the descriptions of the coding categories to 
address experienced misunderstandings and difficulties.  
Both individuals should use the revised coding schema to assign naturally 
occurring chunks of text to one of the coding categories. Naturally occurring chunks of 
text can be represented by complete paragraphs, blocks of sentences or paragraphs, 
individual sentences, or even part of sentences if it can be logically related to one of the 
categories. If some passage does not fit into any category assign it to “Other” category. 
All of the text must be assigned to an existing category or to “Other” category. Once 
coding of the whole transcript is done, read all of the “Other” quotes to see if any 
additional categories may surface. 
Use the interview text from one of the cases to refine the coding schema. Meet 
with the second coder to reconcile the coding. If new categories surfaced for any of the 
coders, develop a new coding category when necessary and add it to the schema. Refine 
the existing coding schema definitions and recode the interview text based on the refined 
schema. Calculate the inter-rater agreement after the final coding. Apply the refined 
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coding schema to all other cases and calculate inter-rater reliability for each of them. If 
new categories surface in other cases, discuss with the second coder and add new 
categories as necessary.  
Once the interview coding is complete, construct a matrix for each case by 
combining the chunks of text assigned to each coding category and arrange it by each 
interviewee (list coding categories in rows, and informants in columns). Use the quotes in 
each cell to create another review matrix that summarizes each interviewee’s perspective 
on each of the coding categories.  
Case Study Description 
 Research information about each company using publicly available sources 
(corporate website, news media, Hoover’s on-line database). Compile a description of the 
company based on the collected archival data and interviews. Detail IS operations of the 
company using the data gathered through interviews and other sources. Describe the 
provider and the IS outsourcing contract that was subsequently backsourced. Describe the 
backsourcing decision and facts of transition without discussing the reasons for 
backsourcing. Use quotes from the interviews when necessary to highlight the 
descriptions.  
Identifying Backsourcing Antecedents 
Use the details of the passages coded ‘Service Level Agreement’ for each case to 
determine the reasons for initial outsourcing if possible. Briefly describe those reasons. 
Structure the analysis of backsourcing antecedents around three perspectives: economic, 
strategic and relationship. Start out with economic perspective and review the quotes in 
the matrix for economic categories: asset specificity, cost benefit/disadvantage and 
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switching costs. Select quotes from every informant that relate to the construct and 
represent their opinion of the situation. More than one quote or none can be selected 
depending on the availability. Describe the situation with respect to every construct, use 
quotes to support the story. In the end of the economic category briefly review the 
constructs and their impact on backsourcing. Perform the same procedure for strategic 
and relationship categories.  
To integrate the perspectives compile the primary and secondary reasons as 
identified by the informants in a table for every case. If possible determine the most 
dominant motive. Compare it to the discussion of backsourcing antecedents in the case. 
Analyze the interrelations between the constructs in the case and the impact on 
backsourcing.  
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Coding Schema for Data Analysis 
Coding is applied to naturally occurring chunks of sentences. All of the transcript text 
should be assigned to one of the categories based on the description provided for each 
category in the table below.  If no category applies, then “Other” (O) should be assigned. 
All of the text coded “Other” then should be analyzed for possible themes.  
Coding Categories Description 
Outsourcing Relationship 
Service Quality 
 
Code: SQ 
Conformance of the service delivered by the provider to the 
requirements of the client. It can refer to the appearance of 
physical facilities, equipment, personnel , and 
communication materials; the ability to perform a promised 
service dependably and accurately; the willingness to help 
customers and to provide prompt service; the knowledge 
and courtesy of employees and their ability to convey trust 
and confidence; and the caring attitude which provides 
individualized attention to customers. 
Satisfaction with 
Outsourcing 
 
Code: SAT 
Satisfaction with overall outsourcing relationship with the 
provider and satisfaction with outsourcing contract and 
service level agreement. Overall satisfaction, not 
satisfaction with the details of day to day operations.  
Trust in the Provider 
 
Code: TRU 
Willingness of the client to be vulnerable to the actions of 
the provider. Expectation that the provider will perform a 
particular action important to the client, irrespective of the 
client’s ability to monitor or control the provider. 
Information sharing and openness between the partners.  
Conflict  
Code: CON 
Can refer to the conflict with the outsourcing provider over 
the services to be performed or the way services are done. 
Voice Behavior 
 
Code: VB 
 Any attempts to communicate with the provider in order to 
change the way the services are performed or resolve issues 
arising in the outsourcing contract and relationship. The way 
issues are escalated and how they are handled by the 
provider. 
Strategic 
Changes in the 
Management 
Code: MAN 
Any changes in the personnel in the client organization or 
any other mention of new people being appointed for 
positions or people leaving the organization. Influential 
individuals in decision making. 
Loss of Control over IS 
 
Code: LOSS 
Inability of the provider to meet the individual requests of 
clients in flexible and timely manner, especially if they 
involve major changes.  Loss of ability to respond to 
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competitive and environmental challenges in a timely 
manner. Lack of control over activities. Damage to business.
Change in the Role of IS 
 
Code: ROLE 
Change in the mission of the IS function and its actual 
contribution to the company’s business operations. Refers to 
strategic importance and value of IS to the organization or 
how IS is utilized. Mention of globalization, centralization, 
implementation of new IS (SAP), retiring legacy systems. 
Economic 
Cost Benefit or 
Disadvantage 
 
 
Code: COST 
Cost benefit of backsourcing. Cost can include production 
costs, i.e. cost of operations; transaction costs, i.e. effort, 
time, and costs incurred in coordination of external market 
activities; agency costs, i.e.  the costs of structuring, 
monitoring, and bonding a contract with the provider. Cost 
savings or losses as a result of backsourcing. 
Asset Specificity  
 
Code: AST 
Refers to the uniqueness of the service or product being 
outsourced. Any need for customization of their services on 
the part of the provider or extra effort to accommodate the 
client. 
Switching Costs 
Code: SWI 
Effort, time, and investments incurred in undergoing 
transition to backsourcing.  Termination fees. 
Other Categories 
Transitioning from 
Outsourcing 
Code: TRA 
Description of steps undertaken to transition back in-house, 
negotiation of contract termination, set up of the in-house 
operations, issues arising during transition, etc. Not why 
transition happened. 
Details of Outsourcing 
contract 
Code: SLA 
Description of SLA, contract terms, dates of contract, 
history of the contract, past contract details and costs. Why 
outsourcing originated. The role of informant in the 
company and in the scontract. 
Benefits of Backsourcing 
Code: BEN 
Description of the current in-house arrangement after 
backsourcing. Mention of any benefits other than cost.  
Multivendor Situation 
Code: MV 
Working with multiple providers. Description of the 
situations where two or more providers are present. 
Provider Perspective 
Code: PRO 
Description of the experiences on the provider side (what 
they did and details of the contract): applicable only to 
WEDU- DC interviewee who worked for the provider 
Power 
Code: Power 
Pressures internally or externally on decision making. Role 
of powerful individuals/companies/society in backsourcing. 
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE CASE MATRIX  
Co
ns
tru
ct
 
Fo
rm
er
 C
IO
 
G
lo
ba
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
M
an
ag
er
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
R
ol
e 
of
 IS
 
 
A
ny
w
ay
, a
nd
 I 
w
ill
 te
ll 
yo
u 
ab
ou
t t
he
 o
th
er
 
pl
ac
es
, b
ut
 I 
w
ill
 g
o 
w
ith
 th
is
 o
ne
 a
ll 
th
e 
w
ay
 
th
ro
ug
h,
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ta
ki
ng
 a
ll 
of
 o
ur
 
le
ga
cy
 sy
st
em
s a
nd
 c
on
ve
rti
ng
 th
em
 to
 
si
ng
ul
ar
 g
lo
ba
l s
ys
te
m
s, 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 in
 
O
rla
nd
o,
 F
lo
rid
a,
 a
t t
he
 lo
ca
tio
n 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 
vi
si
te
d,
 w
ha
t w
e 
di
d 
w
as
 a
s c
ou
nt
rie
s w
er
e 
be
in
g 
co
nv
er
te
d 
w
e 
th
en
 to
ok
 w
or
k 
aw
ay
 
fr
om
 w
ho
ev
er
 th
ei
r p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
ce
nt
er
 w
as
.  
NF
: W
he
n 
th
e 
ba
ck
so
ur
ci
ng
 h
ap
pe
ne
d 
of
 th
is 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 c
on
tr
ac
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
er
e 
we
re
 
an
y 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
wa
y 
IT
 w
as
 u
til
ize
d 
at
 
Al
ph
a 
th
at
 m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
le
d 
to
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 o
ve
r?
JS
: I
 th
in
k 
in
 te
rm
s o
f s
er
vi
ce
 it
 w
as
 
tra
ns
pa
re
nt
 to
 th
e 
us
er
s. 
Th
ey
 d
id
n’
t k
no
w
 w
e 
m
ad
e 
th
e 
m
ov
e.
 B
ut
 th
e 
th
in
g 
th
at
 w
as
 th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 is
 th
at
 w
e 
w
en
t o
ff
 a
n 
ol
d 
le
ga
cy
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
to
 a
 b
ra
nd
 n
ew
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
in
 
O
rla
nd
o.
 T
ha
t w
as
 w
ha
t w
as
 d
iff
er
en
t. 
It 
w
as
n’
t t
he
 se
rv
ic
e 
or
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y,
 o
r t
he
 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e,
 o
r t
he
 k
in
ds
 o
f t
hi
ng
s t
ha
t 
cu
st
om
er
s o
r u
se
rs
 te
nd
 to
 se
e.
 It
 w
as
 re
al
ly
 
th
ey
 h
ad
 a
 b
ra
nd
 n
ew
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 S
o 
th
at
 w
as
 
a 
bi
g 
bu
si
ne
ss
 re
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s c
ha
ng
e 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
. N
ot
hi
ng
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 a
 fa
ct
 
th
at
 it
 w
as
 g
oi
ng
 fr
om
 a
n 
ou
ts
ou
rc
e 
to
 a
n 
in
so
ur
ce
 ty
pe
 o
f a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t. 
N
F:
 W
he
n 
al
l o
f t
hi
s c
en
tra
liz
at
io
n 
oc
cu
rr
ed
, 
do
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
th
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 IT
 st
ra
te
gy
 
wi
th
in
 A
lp
ha
 h
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
? 
JS
: I
t w
as
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e.
 M
y 
op
in
io
n 
is
 th
at
 it
 is
 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s, 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 d
ep
en
de
d 
up
on
 
IT
 fo
r s
er
vi
ce
s a
nd
 su
pp
or
t o
n 
da
ily
 b
as
is
, 
N
F:
 A
lso
 w
as
 th
is 
ag
re
em
en
t t
er
m
in
at
ed
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
try
in
g 
to
 c
en
tra
liz
e 
or
 
w
as
 it
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 w
as
 
ol
d?
 
H
L:
 N
o,
 it
 w
as
 p
ar
t o
f 
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n,
 th
e 
SA
P 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
 
 
NF
: W
he
n 
wa
s t
he
 K
ap
pa
 
th
en
 c
on
tr
ac
t t
er
m
in
at
ed
? 
M
K
: A
fte
r a
bo
ut
 o
ne
 o
r t
w
o 
ye
ar
s a
nd
 th
e 
re
as
on
 fo
r 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
at
 w
e 
ha
d 
ce
nt
ra
l I
T 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
in
 
O
rla
nd
o.
 A
nd
 th
e 
ol
d 
m
ai
nf
ra
m
e 
sy
st
em
s w
hi
ch
 
w
er
e 
ru
nn
in
g 
at
 K
ap
pa
 w
er
e 
re
pl
ac
ed
 b
y 
SA
P.
 S
A
P 
sy
st
em
 
ru
nn
in
g 
on
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
si
te
 a
nd
 th
is
 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
si
te
 is
 in
 O
rla
nd
o.
  
N
F:
 D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
an
y 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
wa
y 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 w
as
 u
til
ize
d 
…
 
M
K
: B
ec
au
se
 w
e 
us
ed
 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ys
te
m
s, 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
pl
at
fo
rm
s, 
an
d 
di
ff
er
en
t a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. S
o 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ru
nn
in
g 
at
 K
ap
pa
 
w
as
 d
ea
d 
af
te
rw
ar
ds
, i
t w
as
 
no
 lo
ng
er
 u
se
d.
 S
o 
it 
w
as
 a
 
co
m
pl
et
e 
ch
an
ge
 fo
r u
s. 
NF
: W
ha
t w
er
e 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r t
er
m
in
at
in
g 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
? 
M
K
: B
ec
au
se
 I 
sa
id
 w
e 
ha
d,
 it
 
w
as
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
 d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 
ce
nt
ra
liz
e 
IT
, i
t w
as
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 
a 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 fu
nc
tio
n,
 b
ut
 a
 
w
or
ld
w
id
e 
fu
nc
tio
n 
an
d 
w
e 
ha
d 
a 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r i
n 
O
rla
nd
o.
 
W
e 
di
d 
no
 lo
ng
er
 h
ad
 th
is
 
Th
e 
re
as
on
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 
K
ap
pa
 w
as
 te
rm
in
at
ed
 w
as
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 h
ad
 b
as
ic
al
ly
 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 sy
st
em
 fo
r 
G
er
m
an
y.
 It
 w
as
 h
ou
se
d 
on
 
IB
M
 m
ai
nf
ra
m
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
th
ey
 ra
n 
an
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
th
at
 w
as
 a
bo
ut
 
25
 y
ea
r o
ld
. W
he
n 
w
e 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 th
e 
G
er
m
an
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 in
to
 o
ur
 g
lo
ba
l 
ar
ch
ite
ct
ur
e 
be
in
g 
SA
P 
an
d 
C
M
S 
et
c.
 a
t t
ha
t p
oi
nt
 o
n 
w
e 
no
 lo
ng
er
 n
ee
de
d 
th
ei
r 
se
rv
ic
es
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
en
’t 
on
 le
ga
cy
 sy
st
em
s a
ny
 
m
or
e.
 A
nd
 th
at
’s
 w
hy
 w
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
.  
N
F:
 T
he
 m
ai
n 
dr
iv
er
 fo
r t
he
 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
is 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
an
d 
ba
ck
so
ur
ci
ng
 w
as
…
 
th
at
 is
 w
as
 o
ld
 le
ga
cy
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fir
st 
of
 a
ll,
 a
nd
 
di
d 
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 
im
pa
ct
? 
R
C
: Y
es
. B
ec
au
se
 w
e 
br
ou
gh
t e
ve
ry
th
in
g,
 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 a
ll 
th
e 
ne
w
 
pr
oc
es
se
s h
er
e 
in
 O
rla
nd
o.
 
So
 th
er
e 
w
as
n’
t a
ny
 n
ee
d 
to
 
ha
ve
 a
ny
th
in
g 
ru
nn
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
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9
Co
ns
tru
ct
 
Fo
rm
er
 C
IO
 
G
lo
ba
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
M
an
ag
er
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 p
ic
k 
up
 th
e 
ph
on
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 w
an
t 
he
lp
, a
nd
 se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 in
 g
en
er
al
. T
w
o 
th
in
gs
 
ha
pp
en
ed
. I
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
ey
 sa
w
 
N
F:
 S
pe
ak
in
g 
ab
ou
t t
ha
t s
pe
ci
fic
 c
on
tra
ct
 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
, s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
 w
hy
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
wa
s t
er
m
in
at
ed
? 
JS
: T
he
 re
as
on
 to
 te
rm
in
at
e?
  
N
F:
 Y
es
. 
JS
: B
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ce
nt
ra
liz
in
g.
 W
e 
w
er
e 
st
ra
te
gi
ca
lly
 c
en
tra
liz
in
g 
al
l o
f o
ur
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 in
to
 o
ne
 g
lo
ba
l l
oc
at
io
n.
 It
 ju
st
 
ha
pp
en
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
 O
rla
nd
o.
 It
 c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
Lo
nd
on
, i
t c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 M
ad
rid
, i
t c
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
an
yw
he
re
. B
ut
 it
 w
as
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ce
nt
ra
liz
in
g 
ou
r a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. A
nd
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 it
 w
as
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
e 
co
nv
er
tin
g 
to
 S
A
P.
 S
o 
w
e 
bu
ilt
, w
e 
di
dn
’t 
m
ov
e 
le
ga
cy
, 
w
el
l…
 I 
w
ill
 sa
y 
th
is
, h
er
e 
is
 m
ay
 b
e 
an
ot
he
r 
ex
am
pl
e.
 K
ap
pa
 h
ad
 sa
y 
4 
or
 5
 se
pa
ra
te
 
sy
st
em
s t
he
y 
w
er
e 
ru
nn
in
g 
fo
r u
s. 
A
bo
ut
 th
re
e 
of
 th
em
 w
er
e 
re
pl
ac
ed
 w
ith
 S
A
P,
 b
ut
 a
 c
ou
pl
e 
of
 th
em
 li
ke
 th
e 
w
ar
eh
ou
se
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
 w
as
n’
t r
ep
la
ce
d 
w
ith
 S
A
P.
 T
ha
t 
sy
st
em
 p
hy
si
ca
lly
 w
as
 m
ov
ed
 to
 O
rla
nd
o 
fr
om
 G
er
m
an
y.
 U
np
lu
gg
ed
, p
ut
 in
 a
 c
ra
te
, 
sh
ip
pe
d 
on
 a
n 
ai
rp
la
ne
 a
nd
 in
st
al
le
d 
he
re
 in
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
’s
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
. S
o,
 it
 
w
as
 m
or
e 
of
 th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
de
al
, a
s 
op
po
se
d 
to
 ju
st
 a
 S
A
P 
th
in
g.
  
NF
: S
o 
wh
at
 I 
am
 h
ea
rin
g 
is 
th
at
 th
e 
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n 
wa
s t
he
 b
ig
ge
st 
dr
iv
er
. 
JS
: Y
es
, t
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
dr
iv
er
, c
en
tra
liz
at
io
n.
  
N
F:
 W
ha
t w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
w
er
e 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
s o
f 
sp
lit
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 
A
m
er
ic
a.
  
N
F:
 H
ow
 lo
ng
 d
id
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 ta
ke
 fr
om
 
ou
tso
ur
ci
ng
 to
 b
ac
ks
ou
rc
in
g?
 
M
K
: T
he
 q
ue
sti
on
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
re
al
ly
 fi
t i
n 
th
is
 c
as
e.
 B
ec
au
se
 
I s
ai
d 
sy
st
em
s w
er
e 
no
 lo
ng
er
 
us
ed
 in
 O
rla
nd
o.
 T
he
 sy
st
em
s 
w
er
e 
le
ga
cy
 sy
st
em
s. 
Th
ey
 
st
ay
ed
 a
t K
ap
pa
 u
nt
il 
th
ey
 
w
er
e 
cl
os
ed
 a
nd
 w
e 
st
ar
te
d 
w
ith
 n
ew
 sy
st
em
s t
ha
t w
er
e 
ne
ve
r a
t K
ap
pa
 in
 O
rla
nd
o.
 
K
ap
pa
 w
ou
ld
 li
ke
, w
ou
ld
 
w
an
t t
o 
ta
ke
 o
ve
r t
he
 n
ew
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 b
ut
 a
s w
e 
ha
d 
no
 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r i
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 
an
ym
or
e 
it 
w
as
 n
ot
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
em
 th
e 
ne
w
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
ou
r o
w
n 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r a
lre
ad
y 
in
 
O
rla
nd
o.
  
NF
: O
k.
 B
ut
 d
o 
yo
u 
se
e 
an
y 
be
ne
fit
s o
f c
en
tra
liz
in
g 
it 
in
 
on
e 
lo
ca
tio
n 
fo
r A
lp
ha
? 
M
K
: O
f c
ou
rs
e.
 B
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ar
e 
us
in
g 
on
e 
sy
st
em
 a
nd
 n
ot
 
a 
sy
st
em
 p
er
 c
ou
nt
ry
 o
r p
er
 
co
nt
in
en
t. 
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0
Co
ns
tru
ct
 
Fo
rm
er
 C
IO
 
G
lo
ba
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
M
an
ag
er
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
ba
ck
so
ur
ci
ng
? 
JS
: A
n 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 h
av
e 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 in
 o
ne
 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 lo
ca
tio
n 
th
at
 h
ad
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 o
ur
 IT
. 
In
 o
th
er
 w
or
ds
, a
ll 
of
 o
ur
 IT
 th
in
gs
 w
er
en
’t 
at
 
di
ff
er
en
t p
la
ce
s. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 o
ne
 p
hy
si
ca
l 
lo
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
on
e 
si
ng
le
 m
an
ag
er
, l
ik
e 
V
P 
or
 in
 
th
is
 c
as
e 
fo
rm
er
 C
IO
, a
nd
 D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
s. 
O
ne
 p
er
so
n,
 o
ne
 
hi
er
ar
ch
y 
to
 d
ea
l w
ith
 is
su
es
 c
on
ce
rn
s o
r e
ve
n 
w
ith
 fo
re
ca
st
s, 
pl
an
ni
ng
, c
ap
ac
ity
, f
ut
ur
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 n
ee
ds
, l
in
k 
up
 w
ith
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
st
ra
te
gy
. I
t w
as
 a
ll 
in
 o
ne
 sp
ot
 a
nd
 o
ne
 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 T
ha
t w
as
 re
al
 p
os
iti
ve
 a
nd
 it
 w
ou
ld
 
be
 in
 a
ny
 c
as
e.
  
Lo
ss
 o
f C
on
tro
l 
ov
er
 IS
 
 
If
 I 
w
as
 tr
yi
ng
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
th
em
 fr
om
 O
rla
nd
o 
an
d 
ne
ve
r p
hy
si
ca
lly
 w
en
t t
he
re
, w
hi
ch
 so
m
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 tr
y 
to
 d
o,
 if
 it
 w
as
 in
 In
di
a 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
, t
he
re
 c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 so
m
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s. 
NF
: D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
Al
ph
a 
ha
d 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r t
he
 
IT
 se
rv
ic
es
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
ou
ts
ou
rc
ed
 to
 
Ka
pp
a?
 
JS
: Y
es
. W
e 
fe
lt 
co
m
fo
rta
bl
e 
th
at
 w
e 
co
ul
d 
m
ak
e 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 to
 se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
, o
r w
e 
co
ul
d 
ge
t t
he
m
 to
 d
o 
th
in
gs
 o
r 
no
t d
o 
th
in
gs
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ou
r r
eq
ue
st
, i
f t
ha
t’s
 
w
ha
t y
ou
 m
ea
n.
 In
 o
th
er
 w
or
ds
, t
he
y 
be
ha
ve
d 
as
 if
 th
ey
 w
or
ke
d 
fo
r u
s, 
no
t a
s i
f t
he
y 
w
er
e 
an
d 
w
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
w
ou
ld
n’
t I
t w
as
n’
t t
ha
t w
ay
 a
t 
al
l. 
 
So
 th
er
e 
w
as
 c
on
tro
l a
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t b
ut
 w
e 
di
dn
’t 
fil
te
r t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 w
er
e 
re
al
ly
 tr
yi
ng
 
to
 so
lv
e 
is
su
es
.  
 
NF
: D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
yo
u 
ha
d 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
s p
ro
ce
ss
es
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 
w
er
e 
ha
nd
le
d 
by
 K
ap
pa
? 
M
K
: C
on
tro
l a
nd
 so
 fa
r t
ha
t I
 
go
t r
ep
or
ts
, r
eg
ul
ar
 re
po
rts
 to
 
fo
llo
w
 u
p 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
l 
ag
re
em
en
ts
. A
nd
 if
 w
e 
ha
d 
ou
r D
B
A
 w
ho
 c
he
ck
ed
 in
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 so
 it
 w
as
 a
 k
in
d 
of
 
co
nt
ro
l o
f w
ha
t w
as
 d
on
e.
 
A
nd
 w
e 
co
ul
d 
ch
ec
k 
ba
tc
h 
sc
he
du
le
 a
nd
 so
 o
n,
 so
 it
 w
as
 
ki
nd
 o
f c
on
tro
l o
f t
he
 w
or
k 
th
at
 w
as
 d
on
e.
 W
e 
ch
ec
ke
d 
w
he
th
er
 a
ll 
ba
ck
-u
ps
 w
er
e 
do
ne
 a
s r
eq
ue
st
ed
 a
nd
 so
 o
n.
 
 
NF
: D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
yo
u 
ha
d 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r I
S 
se
rv
ic
es
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
ou
ts
ou
rc
ed
 
to
 K
ap
pa
? 
R
C
: W
e 
ha
d 
co
nt
ro
l o
f t
he
 
pr
oc
es
s a
sp
ec
ts
, f
ro
m
 
ac
tu
al
ly
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
da
y 
to
 
da
y 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 in
 th
ro
ug
h 
A
lp
ha
. W
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
. I
t w
as
 
ki
nd
 o
f u
ni
qu
e 
in
 fa
ct
 th
at
 
th
e 
se
rv
er
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
sy
st
em
s l
ic
en
se
s t
ha
t r
an
 o
n 
th
at
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t K
ap
pa
 h
ad
 
co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
IB
M
 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
nd
 w
e 
ju
st
 p
ai
d 
a 
su
bs
et
 o
f t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 e
ve
ry
 
m
on
th
 fo
r u
si
ng
 it
. S
o,
 w
e 
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at
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M
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er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
di
dn
’t 
ow
n 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
th
er
ef
or
e,
 th
er
e 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 
w
as
 so
m
e 
lia
bi
lit
y 
of
 so
m
e 
sh
ap
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
fa
ct
 if
 w
e 
go
t 
on
to
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
th
in
gs
 v
er
su
s 
th
em
 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 it
. I
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ye
s, 
w
e 
ha
d 
so
m
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r i
t, 
fr
om
 
th
e 
ot
he
r s
id
e 
of
 th
e 
ho
us
e 
no
. 
C
os
t B
en
ef
it 
or
 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
al
so
 v
er
y 
st
rin
ge
nt
 se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
, 
an
d 
it 
w
as
 a
ls
o 
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 
ba
se
 c
os
t, 
or
 re
ve
nu
e 
fo
r t
he
m
, t
ha
t a
lw
ay
s 
ha
d 
to
 b
e 
hi
t a
t t
he
 m
in
im
um
, b
ut
 th
en
 it
 w
as
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l b
as
ed
 o
n 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
gi
ga
by
te
s o
f 
D
A
SD
 o
r h
ow
 m
uc
h 
m
em
or
y 
or
 o
th
er
 th
in
gs
 
th
at
 p
as
se
d 
th
ro
ug
h.
  
A
nd
 w
e 
w
er
e 
pa
yi
ng
 th
em
 a
nd
 I 
am
 g
ue
ss
in
g 
on
 th
is
, w
ha
te
ve
r I
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
to
ld
 y
ou
 in
 m
y 
ol
d 
no
te
s, 
I b
el
ie
ve
 w
e 
w
er
e 
pa
yi
ng
 th
em
 
so
m
ew
he
re
 a
ro
un
d,
 I 
w
an
t t
o 
sa
y,
 2
0-
30
 
th
ou
sa
nd
 d
ol
la
rs
 a
 m
on
th
, s
om
et
hi
ng
 li
ke
 th
at
, 
A
m
er
ic
an
 d
ol
la
rs
. I
 a
m
 p
re
tty
 su
re
 it
 w
as
 
ac
co
un
te
d 
in
 E
ur
os
 so
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
lit
tle
 b
it 
m
or
e.
  
I n
eg
ot
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 K
ap
pa
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t t
ha
t 
w
as
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
to
 u
s b
ot
h,
 to
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 
w
ou
ld
n’
t l
os
e 
an
y 
m
on
ey
 b
ut
 w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 
to
 p
ay
 a
ny
 p
en
al
tie
s, 
th
at
’s
 th
e 
bo
tto
m
 li
ne
.  
an
d 
w
e 
ba
si
ca
lly
 p
ai
d 
th
em
 a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t l
es
s 
m
on
ey
 p
er
 m
on
th
 th
an
 if
 w
e 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 in
 sa
y 
an
ot
he
r 3
-4
-5
 y
ea
rs
. S
o 
it 
w
as
 
fin
an
ci
al
ly
 g
oo
d 
fo
r u
s. 
Th
at
’s
 th
e 
be
st
 w
ay
 I 
 
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
de
te
rio
ra
tin
g 
fa
ct
or
s t
o 
pu
ll 
it 
ou
t, 
co
st
 
w
as
n’
t e
ve
n 
ne
ce
ss
ar
ily
 
ba
d.
  
th
e 
pr
ic
in
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
w
as
 
re
as
on
ab
le
. I
t w
as
 m
or
e 
th
an
 it
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
co
st
 u
s 
to
 in
so
ur
ce
 b
ut
 it
 w
as
n’
t s
o 
ou
tra
ge
ou
s t
ha
t w
e 
w
an
te
d 
to
 g
et
 ri
d 
of
 it
 
NF
: W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
on
e,
 th
e 
Ka
pp
a?
 
R
C
: T
he
 K
ap
pa
. I
 d
on
’t 
kn
ow
 w
ha
t t
he
 c
os
ts
 w
er
e,
 I 
di
dn
’t 
se
e 
th
e 
bi
lls
. 
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at
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ns
 
ca
n 
pu
t i
t. 
  
1)
 th
ey
 sa
w
 th
ei
r c
os
ts
 g
o 
do
w
n 
gr
ad
ua
lly
, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
as
 a
 b
ig
 e
vo
lu
tio
n,
 b
ut
 th
ey
 sa
w
 
th
ei
r c
os
ts
 g
o 
do
w
n.
  
B
ec
au
se
 it
 w
as
n’
t c
os
t e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fo
r u
s t
o 
ju
st
 
ha
ve
 tw
o 
lit
tle
 se
rv
er
s s
itt
in
g 
on
 a
 c
or
ne
r a
t 
th
is
 h
ug
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r a
t K
ap
pa
 in
 C
ol
og
ne
 
A
nd
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ce
nt
ra
liz
in
g 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
as
 
sa
vi
ng
 u
s m
on
ey
. I
 w
as
 a
bl
e 
to
 in
ve
st
 se
ve
ra
l 
m
ill
io
n 
do
lla
rs
 in
to
 th
is
 c
en
tra
l s
ite
, w
he
re
 I 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 re
pl
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e,
 y
ou
 k
no
w
, t
he
 g
en
er
at
or
s, 
al
l o
f 
th
e 
st
uf
f y
ou
 d
o 
to
 p
ut
 a
 h
ug
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r w
ith
 
a 
he
lp
 d
es
k.
 T
he
y 
ar
e 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 if
 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 h
ig
h 
vo
lu
m
e 
as
 o
pp
os
ed
 to
 ju
st
 a
 
lit
tle
 b
it 
of
 v
ol
um
e 
by
 ti
m
e 
zo
ne
. S
o 
th
at
’s
 
ho
w
 th
at
 w
or
ke
d.
  
N
ow
, t
he
 o
th
er
 th
in
g 
w
as
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 in
 th
at
 lo
ca
tio
n 
fo
r a
 lo
ng
 e
no
ug
h 
pe
rio
d 
of
 ti
m
e,
 th
e 
as
se
ts
 th
at
 w
er
e 
ou
rs
 w
er
e 
fu
lly
 d
ep
re
ci
at
ed
. B
ut
 lo
ts
 o
f t
im
es
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ou
ld
 c
ap
ita
liz
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t f
or
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s o
r 
m
ay
 b
e 
ev
en
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
. A
nd
 if
 y
ou
 d
o 
al
l t
hi
s 
m
ov
in
g 
ar
ou
nd
 q
ui
ck
er
 th
an
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s o
r 
qu
ic
ke
r t
ha
n 
fiv
e 
ye
ar
s y
ou
 q
ui
te
 o
fte
n 
ha
ve
 to
 
ha
ve
 a
 w
rit
e-
of
f t
o 
co
ve
r t
he
 w
as
te
d 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s, 
ex
pe
ns
e 
or
 in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e.
 W
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 to
 
ha
ve
 th
at
 w
ith
 th
is
 K
ap
pa
 si
tu
at
io
n.
  
In
 o
ur
 c
as
e 
fin
an
ci
al
ly
 it
 w
as
 le
ss
 e
xp
en
si
ve
. 
N
ow
 it
 w
ou
ld
n’
t h
av
e 
be
en
 le
ss
 e
xp
en
si
ve
 if
 it
 
w
as
n’
t a
 g
ro
w
th
 si
tu
at
io
n.
 Ju
st
 b
ec
au
se
 y
ou
 
pu
t t
w
o 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 in
 o
ne
 ro
om
, y
ou
 a
re
 st
ill
 
pa
yi
ng
 fo
r t
w
o 
co
m
pu
te
rs
. B
ut
 if
 y
ou
 c
an
 ta
ke
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tw
o 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 a
nd
 p
ut
 th
em
 o
n 
on
e 
co
m
pu
te
r 
th
en
 y
ou
 a
re
 sa
vi
ng
 m
on
ey
. A
nd
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ab
le
 
to
 c
on
so
lid
at
e 
th
e 
ph
ys
ic
al
 th
e 
an
d 
th
e 
so
ftw
ar
e 
hi
er
ar
ch
ie
s t
ha
t j
us
t s
av
ed
 m
on
ey
, 
bo
tto
m
 li
ne
 d
ol
la
rs
.  
B
ut
 n
et
 w
e 
sa
ve
d 
m
on
ey
. 
Sw
itc
hi
ng
 C
os
ts
 
 
A
ls
o 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
pe
na
lti
es
 if
 w
e 
go
t o
ut
 so
on
er
,
N
F:
 W
er
e 
th
er
e 
an
y 
ex
tra
 c
os
ts 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
ba
ck
so
ur
ci
ng
? 
JS
: W
el
l, 
as
 I 
m
en
tio
ne
d,
 in
 te
rm
s o
f t
he
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s, 
w
e 
w
er
e 
ab
le
 to
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
 in
to
 
w
he
re
 w
e 
ne
ve
r l
os
t a
ny
 m
on
ey
. B
ut
 I 
kn
ow
 
of
 a
 lo
t o
f s
itu
at
io
ns
 w
he
re
 th
at
’s
 n
ot
 th
e 
ca
se
. 
B
ec
au
se
 if
 y
ou
 w
an
t o
ut
 e
ar
ly
, t
he
re
 is
 a
lm
os
t 
al
w
ay
s a
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r s
om
eo
ne
.  
I d
id
n’
t h
av
e 
to
 in
 a
ny
 c
as
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 st
af
f. 
So
m
e 
pl
ac
es
 a
s y
ou
 c
an
 im
ag
in
e 
if 
so
m
e 
on
e 
el
se
 is
 d
oi
ng
 a
ll 
th
e 
w
or
k 
an
d 
if 
yo
u 
m
ov
e 
it 
ba
ck
 in
 h
ou
se
, y
ou
 m
ay
 h
av
e 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
hi
er
ar
ch
y.
 B
ut
 I 
w
as
 a
bl
e 
to
, a
ga
in
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
w
er
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
in
g,
 I 
di
dn
’t 
ne
ed
 to
 h
ire
 
pe
op
le
 in
 O
rla
nd
o 
be
ca
us
e 
K
ap
pa
 w
as
n’
t 
w
or
ki
ng
. I
 d
id
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
re
 th
at
 I 
ha
d 
pe
op
le
 o
n 
fo
r s
ec
on
d,
 th
ird
, f
ou
rth
 sh
ift
 h
er
e 
in
 O
rla
nd
o 
w
ho
 sp
ok
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
s, 
bu
t b
ef
or
e 
I 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 to
 w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 it
.  
 
N
F:
 D
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
an
y 
ex
tr
a 
co
st
s i
nv
ol
ve
d 
in
 
ce
nt
ra
liz
in
g 
th
is 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
fu
nc
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ov
in
g 
it 
do
wn
 
to
 O
rla
nd
o 
fo
r E
ur
op
ea
n 
lo
ca
tio
ns
 in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
? 
M
K
: I
f y
ou
 sw
itc
h 
fr
om
 o
ne
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
in
 o
ne
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 
to
 a
no
th
er
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
in
 
an
ot
he
r d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 o
f c
ou
rs
e 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
co
st
s 
be
hi
nd
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
ve
 
an
ot
he
r n
et
w
or
k 
be
hi
nd
. I
t i
s 
in
 th
e 
St
at
es
 it
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 in
 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 th
in
gs
 li
ke
 th
at
. I
 
ca
n’
t g
iv
e 
yo
u 
es
tim
at
io
n 
on
 
co
st
s a
nd
 v
al
ue
s. 
 
 
N
F:
 W
er
e 
th
er
e 
an
y 
di
ffi
cu
lti
es
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
? 
R
C
: N
o.
  
NF
: D
id
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
an
y 
ex
tr
a 
co
sts
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 fr
om
 th
at
 
co
nt
ra
ct
. 
R
C
: W
el
l, 
th
e 
ex
tra
 c
os
ts
 
w
as
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 K
ap
pa
 h
ad
 
do
ne
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
w
e 
di
d.
 
Th
ey
 w
er
e 
le
as
in
g 
th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
 fr
om
 IB
M
, s
o 
th
ey
 
ha
d 
an
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
n 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
go
in
g 
to
 tu
rn
 it
 
of
f a
s w
el
l. 
A
nd
 th
ey
 h
ad
 to
 
re
ne
go
tia
te
 th
ei
r s
up
po
rt 
fr
om
 IB
M
 so
 th
ey
 c
an
 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 o
ff
er
 u
s t
ha
t 
su
pp
or
t s
o 
th
ey
 h
ad
 to
 p
ay
 a
 
lit
tle
 h
ig
he
r d
eg
re
e 
of
 c
os
t 
w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 p
as
se
d 
on
 u
s. 
A
nd
 w
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 h
ad
 to
 p
ay
. 
It 
w
as
n’
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
t t
ho
ug
h.
 
I m
ea
n 
le
ss
 th
an
 1
0,
00
0 
do
lla
rs
. A
t t
he
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
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co
nt
ra
ct
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
re
lo
ca
tio
n 
to
 b
e 
do
ne
 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
as
n’
t o
ur
 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
so
 th
er
e 
w
as
n’
t 
re
lo
ca
tio
n 
co
st
, h
iri
ng
 
pe
rs
on
ne
l, 
m
ov
e 
or
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 li
ke
 th
at
.  
 
A
ss
et
 S
pe
ci
fic
ity
 
A
ll 
of
 th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t e
xc
ep
t f
or
 th
e 
fe
w
 p
ie
ce
s 
of
 th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t w
er
e 
ow
ne
d 
by
 K
ap
pa
. S
o 
K
ap
pa
 a
ls
o 
ow
ne
d 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l a
ss
et
s w
he
n 
w
e 
di
d 
th
at
. 
 
 
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
Fr
om
 a
 b
us
in
es
s s
ta
nd
 p
oi
nt
 a
nd
 fr
om
 a
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l s
ta
nd
 p
oi
nt
, g
oo
d 
ra
pp
or
t, 
 
w
e 
w
er
e 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ba
se
d 
on
 w
rit
te
n 
do
cu
m
en
te
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
. A
nd
 th
ey
 a
lw
ay
s 
di
d 
w
ha
te
ve
r w
e 
as
ke
d 
th
em
 to
 d
o,
 m
ay
 b
e 
th
at
 is
 th
e 
be
st
 w
ay
 to
 p
ut
 it
.  
Th
e 
on
ly
 th
in
gs
 th
at
 c
am
e 
up
 th
at
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
w
er
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
if 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
an
y,
 is
 e
ve
ry
 o
ne
s 
in
 a
 w
hi
le
 a
ga
in
 a
t t
he
 te
ch
ni
ca
l l
ev
el
, y
ou
 
kn
ow
 a
 sy
st
em
s p
ro
gr
am
m
er
, a
 te
ch
ni
ci
an
, 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
“H
e 
di
d 
th
is
”,
 th
e 
ot
he
r g
uy
 w
ou
ld
 
sa
y 
“N
o,
 h
e 
di
d 
th
at
”,
  o
r “
H
ey
, t
he
y 
ca
n’
t f
ix
 
th
at
”,
 o
r “
W
e 
ca
n’
t f
ix
 th
at
”.
 B
ut
 th
at
 w
as
 
re
al
ly
-r
ea
lly
 m
in
im
al
, i
t w
as
 n
ot
 a
 b
ig
 is
su
e 
at
 
al
l. 
 
NF
: W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f t
he
 se
rv
ic
e?
 
W
er
e 
yo
u 
sa
tis
fie
d 
w
ith
 th
em
? 
JS
: V
er
y.
 T
he
y 
w
er
e 
al
w
ay
s o
n 
tim
e 
an
d 
I 
th
in
k 
w
e 
go
t g
oo
d 
va
lu
e.
 In
 o
th
er
 w
or
ds
 w
e 
go
t w
ha
t w
e 
pa
id
 fo
r k
in
d 
of
 th
in
g.
  
N
F:
 If
 y
ou
 e
ve
r s
ug
ge
st
ed
 a
ny
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 
Ka
pp
a 
ho
w 
wo
ul
d 
th
ey
 re
ac
t?
 
 
N
F:
 I 
se
e.
 If
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
ph
ys
ic
al
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s, 
th
ei
r 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
 th
ei
r 
pe
rs
on
ne
l, 
we
re
 y
ou
 sa
tis
fie
d 
wi
th
 th
at
? 
M
K
: Y
es
. 
N
F:
 H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r a
bi
lit
y 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
 th
e 
pr
om
ise
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
de
pe
nd
ab
ly
 a
nd
 a
cc
ur
at
el
y?
 
M
K
: M
os
t o
f t
he
 ti
m
e 
th
e 
ag
re
ed
 se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
l w
as
 
fu
lfi
lle
d.
 If
 n
ot
 w
e 
ha
d 
re
gu
la
r 
m
ee
tin
gs
 to
 d
is
cu
ss
 w
ha
t 
ca
us
ed
 it
 a
nd
 to
 so
lv
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s. 
B
ut
 it
 is
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 to
 
an
no
un
ce
 in
 a
dv
an
ce
 if
 y
ou
 
ha
ve
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 o
n 
a 
Fr
id
ay
 
ev
en
in
g.
 A
nd
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
nu
m
be
r o
r a
 
nu
m
be
r y
ou
 c
ou
ld
 c
al
l b
ut
 it
 
di
d 
no
t a
lw
ay
s w
or
k 
as
 w
e 
A
nd
 a
ll 
in
di
ca
tio
ns
 th
at
 I 
ha
d 
w
as
 th
at
 K
ap
pa
 w
as
 
ve
ry
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l a
nd
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
w
as
 v
er
y 
go
od
. I
 m
ea
n 
th
ey
 
ha
d 
st
ric
t g
ui
de
lin
es
 th
at
 
ha
d 
to
 b
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
 if
 
ch
an
ge
s w
er
e 
to
 b
e 
m
ad
e.
 
Th
e 
G
er
m
an
 c
om
m
un
ity
 
fo
llo
w
ed
 th
is
.  
Th
ey
 w
er
en
’t 
op
po
se
d 
to
 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
in
gs
 q
ui
ck
ly
 a
s 
an
 u
nu
su
al
 o
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
an
d 
w
e 
re
sp
ec
te
d 
th
at
. 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f s
er
vi
ce
 w
as
 
ve
ry
 g
oo
d 
So
, t
he
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
an
d 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
at
 K
ap
pa
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
w
as
 v
er
y 
go
od
, 
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JS
: N
o.
 A
ga
in
, t
he
 b
es
t w
ay
 to
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
is
, I
 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 if
 it
 tr
an
sl
at
es
 w
el
l f
or
 y
ou
 
th
ou
gh
, b
ut
 it
 w
as
 ju
st
 li
ke
 G
er
m
an
s. 
Th
ey
 a
re
 
so
 b
us
in
es
s l
ik
e 
an
d 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
, a
nd
 th
er
e 
is
 
no
th
in
g 
gr
ay
, e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
is
 b
la
ck
 a
nd
 w
hi
te
. 
Ev
er
yb
od
y 
kn
ew
 w
ha
t e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 w
as
 d
oi
ng
. 
It 
w
as
 a
 v
er
y 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 b
us
in
es
s-
lik
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
  
be
ca
us
e 
w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 to
 g
o 
up
 th
e 
la
dd
er
 
ac
ro
ss
 a
nd
 d
ow
n 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 g
et
 tw
o 
pe
op
le
 to
 
do
 so
m
et
hi
ng
.  
ex
pe
ct
ed
.  
NF
: S
o 
wo
ul
d 
yo
u 
sa
y 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
ha
s c
ha
ng
ed
 w
he
n 
K
ap
pa
 to
ok
 o
ve
r E
ps
ilo
n?
 
M
K
: Y
es
, a
 b
it.
 In
 se
ns
e 
th
at
 it
 
w
as
 a
 b
it 
m
or
e 
bu
re
au
cr
ac
y,
 it
 
w
as
 n
ot
 th
at
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 w
er
e 
no
t w
ill
in
g 
to
 d
el
iv
er
 th
e 
jo
b,
 
it 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
pe
op
le
. B
ut
 
w
e 
ha
d 
no
 d
ire
ct
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 if
 I 
m
ig
ht
 sa
y 
so
. N
ot
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
w
ee
k 
bu
t o
n 
w
ee
ke
nd
s f
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 w
or
k.
N
F:
 D
id
 y
ou
 e
ve
r h
av
e 
an
y 
co
nc
er
ns
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
qu
al
ity
 
th
at
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 d
el
iv
er
 to
 
yo
u?
 
M
K
: O
f c
ou
rs
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 
qu
al
ity
 so
m
et
im
es
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
pe
op
le
. A
nd
 if
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
a 
pe
rs
on
 in
 th
e 
te
am
 th
at
 
do
es
n’
t p
er
fo
rm
 a
s t
he
 p
er
so
n 
sh
ou
ld
, y
es
. B
ut
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
pe
op
le
.  
So
 th
ey
 fu
lfi
lle
d 
th
ei
r t
as
k.
 
It’
s n
ot
 th
at
 th
ey
 su
dd
en
ly
 
st
op
pe
d 
w
or
ki
ng
 fo
r A
lp
ha
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 k
ne
w
 th
at
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
as
 c
an
ce
le
d.
 
Tr
us
t i
n 
th
e 
Pr
ov
id
er
 
 
W
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 to
 fo
llo
w
 u
p 
an
d 
m
an
ag
e 
th
em
. T
he
y 
di
d 
w
ha
t t
he
y 
sa
id
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 d
o.
 
So
 if
 w
e 
sa
id
 w
e 
w
an
t s
om
e 
ne
w
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
in
st
al
le
d 
in
 th
re
e 
w
ee
ks
, t
he
y 
w
ou
ld
 m
ak
e 
 
If
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t t
he
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
K
ap
pa
 
an
d 
A
lp
ha
 h
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 
de
sc
rib
e 
it?
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ra
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su
re
 th
at
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t g
ot
 in
st
al
le
d 
in
 th
re
e 
w
ee
ks
, k
in
d 
of
 th
in
g.
  
In
 fa
ct
, i
t w
as
 ju
st
 a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
w
er
e 
K
ap
pa
 
w
as
 d
oi
ng
 th
ei
r b
es
t t
o 
m
ak
e 
su
re
 w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ge
t c
ha
rg
ed
 fo
r t
hi
ng
s w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ne
ed
 to
 g
et
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
fo
r. 
 
NF
: W
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
yo
u 
tru
ste
d 
Ka
pp
a 
wi
th
 
th
ei
r a
ct
iv
iti
es
? 
JS
: V
er
y 
m
uc
h 
so
. A
nd
 b
ot
h 
in
 te
rm
s o
f t
ru
st
 
in
 a
 se
ns
e 
of
 in
te
gr
ity
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
tru
st
 in
 th
e 
se
ns
e 
w
ou
ld
 th
ey
 d
o 
w
ha
t t
he
y 
sa
id
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
go
in
g 
to
 d
o.
 I 
kn
ew
 th
at
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 d
o 
an
 
ho
ne
st
 a
nd
 a
n 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 jo
b.
  
A
nd
 th
e 
bi
gg
es
t t
hi
ng
 th
at
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y,
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
th
in
g 
th
at
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
m
ar
ria
ge
 w
or
k 
w
as
 a
 
lo
t o
f c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 a
 lo
t o
f o
pe
nn
es
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
, i
t w
as
n’
t a
t a
 d
is
ta
nc
e 
ki
nd
 o
f r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p,
 it
 w
as
 a
 c
lo
se
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
  
M
K
: I
 th
in
k 
it 
w
as
 a
 v
er
y 
op
en
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
NF
: W
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
yo
u 
tru
st
ed
 K
ap
pa
 to
 p
er
fo
rm
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
es
 d
ep
en
da
bl
y?
  
M
K
: Y
es
. 
 
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 
O
ut
so
ur
ci
ng
 
B
ut
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
a 
ve
ry
 g
oo
d 
w
or
ki
ng
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
K
ap
pa
 w
as
 e
xt
re
m
el
y 
co
op
er
at
iv
e,
 w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 tr
an
si
tio
na
l p
ro
bl
em
s w
ha
ts
oe
ve
r, 
w
e 
di
dn
’t 
lo
se
 a
ny
 d
at
a,
 th
er
e 
w
er
en
’t 
an
y 
ou
ta
ge
s, 
or
 a
ny
th
in
g,
 
NF
:  
St
ar
tin
g 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
th
at
 
wa
s m
an
ag
in
g 
da
ta
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
in
 C
on
tin
en
ta
l 
Eu
ro
pe
, w
ha
t d
id
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t t
he
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p?
 
JS
: V
er
y 
po
si
tiv
e,
 v
er
y 
go
od
.  
A
nd
 if
 w
e 
w
er
e 
to
 d
o 
it 
al
l o
ve
r a
ga
in
, I
 
w
ou
ld
n’
t h
av
e 
ch
an
ge
d 
th
at
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 o
r t
ha
t c
on
tra
ct
 o
r a
ny
th
in
g.
 It
 
 
So
, I
 th
in
k 
th
ey
 d
id
 th
ei
r b
es
t 
to
 fu
lfi
ll 
ou
r w
ish
es
. A
nd
 o
ne
 
th
in
g 
I w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 m
en
tio
n 
th
at
 c
ha
ng
e 
w
he
n 
w
e 
sw
itc
he
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
Ep
si
lo
n 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r 
to
 K
ap
pa
 in
 a
 b
it 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
w
ay
 
w
e 
ha
d 
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
 to
 w
or
k 
w
ith
 a
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 fr
om
 
M
on
da
y 
to
 F
rid
ay
, t
he
n 
w
e 
ha
d 
to
 p
ay
 fo
r e
xt
ra
 w
or
k 
on
 
w
ee
ke
nd
s. 
A
nd
 a
s l
on
g 
as
 th
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r w
as
 a
 p
ar
t o
f 
Ep
si
lo
n,
 th
es
e 
w
ee
ke
nd
s 
co
ul
d 
be
 h
an
dl
ed
 v
er
y,
 v
er
y 
So
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ve
nd
or
 a
nd
 c
us
to
m
er
 w
en
t 
ve
ry
 w
el
l. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 lo
t 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
th
er
e,
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 o
ut
si
de
 o
f t
he
 
no
rm
 th
at
 c
am
e 
up
 th
at
 
w
as
n’
t e
xp
ec
te
d 
w
as
 
ha
nd
le
d 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
ly
.  
So
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
as
 v
er
y 
go
od
,  
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at
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M
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er
 
D
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 o
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T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
w
as
 v
er
y 
go
od
. 
it 
m
ad
e 
fo
r a
 p
er
fe
ct
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
Th
at
’s
 a
ga
in
 w
hy
 I 
am
 sa
yi
ng
 th
at
 w
e 
fe
lt 
re
al
 
co
m
fo
rta
bl
e 
th
at
 it
 w
as
 a
lm
os
t a
s i
f t
he
y 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r u
s  
Th
ey
 w
or
ke
d 
pr
et
ty
 w
el
l. 
 
So
 w
e 
w
er
e 
ok
 w
ith
 th
at
. T
ha
t w
as
 o
k.
  
NF
: A
ny
 o
th
er
 c
om
m
en
ts 
ab
ou
t t
hi
s p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
Ka
pp
a 
Al
ph
a 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p?
 
JS
: N
o.
 I 
w
ou
ld
 ju
st
 sa
y 
it 
w
as
 re
al
 p
os
iti
ve
. 
fle
xi
bl
e.
 If
 y
ou
 h
ad
 a
ny
 
pr
ob
le
m
s p
eo
pl
e 
w
er
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
on
 a
 S
at
ur
da
y 
an
d 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r u
s. 
So
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
no
 p
ro
bl
em
. W
he
n 
K
ap
pa
 
to
ok
 o
ve
r t
he
re
 w
er
e 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
fo
rm
al
 th
in
gs
 in
 p
la
ce
 so
 
w
e 
co
ul
dn
’t 
ju
st
 c
al
l a
ny
m
or
e 
an
d 
as
k 
on
 F
rid
ay
 e
ve
ni
ng
 if
 
w
e 
ha
d 
a 
pr
ob
le
m
, c
an
 w
e 
ge
t 
su
pp
or
t o
n 
a 
Sa
tu
rd
ay
. S
o 
th
at
 
w
as
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
bu
re
au
cr
ac
y 
an
d 
it 
w
as
 m
or
e 
di
ff
ic
ul
t. 
 
NF
: B
ut
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
yo
u 
w
er
e 
sti
ll 
sa
tis
fie
d 
w
ith
 w
ha
t 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
do
in
g?
 
M
K
: O
h 
ye
s. 
N
F:
 D
id
 y
ou
 e
ve
r t
ry
 to
 
re
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 w
er
e 
wo
rk
in
g 
fo
r y
ou
r c
on
tr
ac
t?
 
M
K
: I
t w
as
 n
ot
 th
at
 b
ad
.  
C
on
fli
ct
  
 
A
nd
 w
e 
pa
rte
d 
fr
ie
nd
s a
nd
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
is
su
es
. 
N
F:
 C
an
 y
ou
 te
ll 
m
e 
ab
ou
t a
ny
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts 
th
at
 y
ou
 m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
ha
d 
wi
th
 
th
em
? 
JS
: T
he
re
 w
er
e 
no
ne
. T
he
re
 w
er
e 
no
ne
 a
t a
ll.
 
Th
e 
on
ly
 p
ro
bl
em
s w
e 
ha
d,
 a
nd
 it
 h
ad
 n
ot
hi
ng
 
to
 d
o 
w
ith
 e
ith
er
 K
ap
pa
 o
r A
lp
ha
, b
ut
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 h
ad
 to
 u
se
 IB
M
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 a
s a
 
su
bc
on
tra
ct
or
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 IB
M
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
so
ftw
ar
e 
to
 th
em
 so
 th
ey
 c
an
 d
o 
th
ei
r j
ob
. A
nd
 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
is
su
es
 a
t t
im
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
em
 a
nd
 
 
NF
: C
an
 y
ou
 te
ll 
m
e 
of
 a
ny
 
sig
ni
fic
an
t d
isa
gr
ee
m
en
ts 
be
tw
ee
n 
Al
ph
a 
an
d 
K
ap
pa
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
? 
M
K
: N
ot
 re
al
ly
. I
t w
as
 if
 a
t a
ll 
da
y 
to
 d
ay
 is
su
es
. W
he
re
 w
e 
th
in
k 
th
e 
jo
b 
sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
st
ar
te
d 
an
d 
th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
ey
 
st
ar
te
d 
it 
an
d 
w
e 
sa
id
 y
ou
 d
id
 
no
t s
om
et
hi
ng
. O
nl
y 
da
y 
to
 
da
y 
is
su
es
, i
f a
t a
ll.
 N
o 
re
al
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IB
M
, b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
so
m
e 
ol
de
r v
er
si
on
s o
f 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
s, 
M
D
S 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
s. 
A
nd
 IB
M
 sa
id
, h
ey
 w
e 
ar
e 
go
in
g 
to
 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
 su
pp
or
t o
f t
ho
se
 sy
st
em
s, 
th
e 
ne
xt
 
la
ye
r, 
or
 th
e 
ne
w
 v
er
si
on
 o
f t
he
 sy
st
em
 w
ou
ld
 
be
 e
xp
en
si
ve
 a
nd
 K
ap
pa
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
ha
d 
to
 
ch
ar
ge
 u
s m
or
e 
m
on
ey
.  
is
su
es
. 
V
oi
ce
 B
eh
av
io
r 
 
K
ap
pa
 w
as
 v
er
y 
re
sp
on
si
ve
. A
nd
 so
m
e 
of
 th
e 
ke
y 
re
as
on
s w
er
e,
 I 
m
et
 w
ith
 th
em
 a
t l
ea
st
 
qu
ar
te
rly
 fa
ce
 to
 fa
ce
,  
W
e 
sa
id
 w
e 
do
n’
t w
an
t t
o 
pa
y 
m
or
e 
m
on
ey
. 
So
 K
ap
pa
 h
ad
 to
 g
o 
ba
ck
 to
 IB
M
 a
nd
 sa
id
 w
e 
ar
e 
no
t g
oi
ng
 to
 u
pg
ra
de
 e
ve
n 
th
ou
gh
 y
ou
 a
re
 
re
fu
si
ng
 to
 su
pp
or
t u
s. 
So
, b
ut
 a
ga
in
, i
t d
id
 n
ot
 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
  
N
F:
 S
o 
w
he
ne
ve
r y
ou
 m
ad
e 
an
y 
ki
nd
 o
f 
re
qu
es
ts 
to
 th
em
 w
ou
ld
 th
ey
 u
su
al
ly
 fo
llo
w
 
th
ro
ug
h 
an
d 
he
lp
 y
ou
 o
ut
? 
JS
: Y
es
. N
ow
, o
ne
 o
f t
he
 th
in
gs
 I 
w
as
 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 d
o,
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
in
 G
er
m
an
y,
 th
es
e 
ar
e 
al
l G
er
m
an
s, 
an
d 
I d
on
’t 
sp
ea
k 
go
od
 
G
er
m
an
. N
ow
 th
ey
 sp
ok
e 
fa
irl
y 
go
od
 E
ng
lis
h,
 
bu
t I
 h
ad
 a
 m
an
ag
er
, a
 se
ni
or
 le
ve
l I
T 
m
an
ag
er
 in
 C
ol
og
ne
, G
er
m
an
y,
 w
ho
 c
ou
ld
 
dr
iv
e 
th
er
e 
in
 2
0 
m
in
ut
es
. A
nd
 so
 sh
e,
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 M
an
ag
er
 w
as
 h
er
 
na
m
e,
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 M
an
ag
er
 
w
ou
ld
 g
o 
an
d 
m
ee
t a
nd
 ta
lk
 to
 th
em
 in
 th
ei
r 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
nc
e 
a 
m
on
th
. S
o 
th
at
 a
ls
o 
ke
pt
 a
 lo
t o
f g
oo
d 
ra
pp
or
t. 
 
A
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t m
or
e 
of
 m
is
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
la
ck
 
of
 ra
pp
or
t. 
B
ut
 I 
di
d 
go
 o
ut
 o
f m
y 
w
ay
 to
 g
o 
ou
t t
he
re
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
nc
e 
a 
qu
ar
te
r, 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
 
Th
e 
pe
op
le
 h
ad
 a
n 
op
en
 st
yl
e 
to
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
an
d 
th
in
gs
 
w
er
e 
di
sc
us
se
d 
in
 a
 fr
ie
nd
ly
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
 
N
F:
 If
 y
ou
 e
ve
r h
ad
 a
ny
 
co
nc
er
ns
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
at
 y
ou
 w
er
e 
re
ce
iv
in
g,
 h
ow
 
di
d 
yo
u 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
th
os
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 to
 K
ap
pa
. 
M
K
: V
er
y 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
nd
 
op
en
ly
. I
 c
al
le
d 
to
 m
an
ag
er
 o
f 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r a
nd
 to
ld
 h
im
 a
bo
ut
 
th
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 o
r p
ro
bl
em
s a
nd
 
he
 tr
ie
d 
to
 h
el
p.
  
NF
: S
o 
ho
w 
wo
ul
d 
yo
u 
sa
y 
th
ey
 re
ac
te
d 
to
 y
ou
r 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 to
 y
ou
r 
co
nc
er
ns
? 
M
K
: T
he
y 
re
al
ly
 tr
ie
d 
to
 h
el
p.
 
N
F:
 H
ow
 m
an
y 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
pe
op
le
 d
id
 y
ou
 u
su
al
ly
 
in
te
ra
ct
 w
ith
? 
Yo
u 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 d
id
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
an
y 
ot
he
r c
on
ta
ct
s?
 
M
K
: Y
es
. A
s w
e 
w
or
ke
d 
w
ith
 
th
is
 c
om
pa
ny
 fo
r a
 lo
ng
 ti
m
e 
I 
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 C
IO
 
G
lo
ba
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
M
an
ag
er
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 M
an
ag
er
 p
hy
si
ca
lly
 w
en
t t
he
re
 
an
d 
sp
ok
e 
th
ei
r l
an
gu
ag
e 
ev
er
y 
m
on
th
. S
he
 
w
as
 a
 A
lp
ha
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 a
nd
 sh
e 
re
po
rte
d 
di
re
ct
ly
 to
 m
e.
 S
he
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
an
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t o
f 
a 
di
re
ct
or
 le
ve
l k
in
d 
of
 p
er
so
n.
 S
he
 m
an
ag
ed
 
ab
ou
t 3
0 
IT
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
 C
ol
og
ne
, G
er
m
an
y,
 a
nd
 
sh
e 
w
as
 so
rt 
of
 D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
f 
K
ap
pa
.  
Th
er
e 
w
er
e 
hi
er
ar
ch
ie
s o
f w
ho
 ta
lk
ed
 to
 w
ho
, 
an
d 
w
ho
 d
id
 w
ha
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
 u
p 
an
d 
es
ca
la
tio
n 
st
uf
f. 
 
It 
go
t e
sc
al
at
ed
 a
nd
 sh
e 
w
ou
ld
 ta
lk
 to
 th
ei
r 
m
an
ag
er
, b
ut
 if
 it
 w
as
, t
he
 re
as
on
 it
 w
as
 5
 o
r 
6,
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
gu
ys
 w
ou
ld
 ta
lk
 to
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
gu
ys
, c
om
pu
te
r o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 w
ou
ld
 ta
lk
 to
 
co
m
pu
te
r o
pe
ra
tio
ns
, a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 w
ou
ld
 ta
lk
 
to
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. T
ha
t’s
 w
hy
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
se
ve
ra
l 
pe
op
le
 b
ut
 it
 re
al
ly
 h
ad
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 th
ei
r 
te
ch
ni
ca
l d
is
ci
pl
in
e,
 n
ot
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 w
as
 o
ut
 o
f 
co
nt
ro
l. 
In
 fa
ct
, a
nd
 e
ve
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 w
e 
ha
d 
it 
se
t u
p,
 a
ny
tim
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 o
r a
n 
is
su
e 
or
 a
ny
th
in
g 
it 
ha
d 
to
 b
e 
lo
gg
ed
, h
ad
 to
 
be
 e
sc
al
at
ed
 a
nd
 h
ad
 to
 b
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
. S
o 
if 
a 
ne
tw
or
k 
te
ch
ni
ci
an
 in
 A
lp
ha
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 
ta
lk
 to
 a
 te
ch
ni
ci
an
 a
t K
ap
pa
, h
e 
ca
n 
do
 it
, b
ut
 
he
 a
ls
o 
ha
d 
to
 w
rit
e 
a 
pr
ob
le
m
 ti
ck
et
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
sy
st
em
 w
e 
ca
lle
d 
R
em
ed
y.
 A
nd
 th
at
 re
po
rt 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 w
as
 o
nl
in
e 
an
d 
w
en
t t
o 
so
m
eo
ne
 
lik
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 M
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 sh
e 
sa
w
 th
at
 th
is
 h
ap
pe
ne
d 
an
d 
he
re
 is
 w
ha
t w
en
t 
on
.  
kn
ew
 a
ll 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 th
at
 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r A
lp
ha
. S
o 
th
e 
op
er
at
or
s, 
I k
ne
w
 th
em
 
pe
rs
on
al
ly
, a
nd
 I 
kn
ew
 
an
ot
he
r, 
th
e 
te
am
 le
ad
er
 th
at
 
ca
re
d 
ab
ou
t t
he
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
. S
o 
I 
co
ul
d 
co
nt
ra
ct
 e
ve
ry
 p
er
so
n.
 I 
ev
en
 k
ne
w
 th
ei
r p
riv
at
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 fo
r w
ee
ke
nd
s. 
So
 it
 
w
as
…
 a
nd
 th
at
 w
as
 th
e 
po
in
t 
th
at
 c
ha
ng
ed
 w
he
n 
K
ap
pa
 
to
ok
 o
ve
r. 
So
 w
e 
w
er
e 
no
t 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
ny
m
or
e 
to
 c
al
l a
n 
op
er
at
or
 o
r p
eo
pl
e 
to
 g
et
 th
is
 
di
re
ct
 h
el
p 
if 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
  
NF
: S
o 
ho
w 
di
d 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 to
 
go
 a
bo
ut
 it
 a
fte
r t
ha
t?
 
M
K
: A
nn
ou
nc
e 
in
 a
dv
an
ce
.  
N
F:
 B
ut
 if
 y
ou
 e
ve
r h
ad
 th
os
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 h
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 
ad
dr
es
s t
he
m
? 
M
K
: I
 w
ou
ld
 ta
lk
 to
 th
e 
m
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 te
ll 
hi
m
.  
B
ut
 in
 a
ny
 c
as
e 
pe
op
le
 w
er
e 
to
ld
 h
ow
 to
 re
ac
t o
r h
ow
 to
 
be
ha
ve
 b
y 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
. 
N
F:
 O
h,
 o
k.
 S
o 
th
in
gs
 w
er
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
. W
er
e 
th
er
e 
an
y 
sig
ni
fic
an
t c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f A
lp
ha
 th
at
 
ha
pp
en
ed
 w
he
n 
th
e 
Ka
pp
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
as
 te
rm
in
at
ed
 o
r 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
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pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
co
nt
ra
ct
 th
at
 m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
le
d 
to
 te
rm
in
at
io
n.
 
M
K
: I
 th
in
k 
w
e 
w
er
e 
al
w
ay
s 
ve
ry
 o
pe
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
ve
ry
 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
an
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
as
 to
 b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 
an
d 
th
ey
 d
id
 th
ei
r j
ob
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
la
st
 d
ay
 o
f t
he
 c
on
tra
ct
.  
NF
: W
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
th
er
e 
we
re
 
an
y 
di
ffi
cu
lti
es
 in
 te
rm
in
at
in
g 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
? 
M
K
: N
o.
 L
ik
e 
I s
ai
d 
it 
w
as
 
al
w
ay
s a
 v
er
y 
fa
ir 
an
d 
op
en
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 fr
om
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g.
 T
he
y 
kn
ew
 o
ur
 
po
si
tio
n.
  
Se
rv
ic
e 
Le
ve
l 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t D
et
ai
ls
 
O
k,
 d
ur
in
g 
th
at
 ti
m
e 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t o
f 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
s w
as
 w
ith
 K
ap
pa
, a
nd
 th
at
 w
as
 in
 
C
ol
og
ne
, G
er
m
an
y.
 A
nd
 n
ow
, s
o 
th
er
e 
is
n’
t 
to
o 
m
uc
h 
co
nf
us
io
n,
 K
ap
pa
 p
ur
ch
as
ed
 a
 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
al
le
d 
C
SC
 w
hi
ch
 w
as
 a
n 
in
te
rn
al
 to
 
Ep
si
lo
n 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n.
 E
ps
ilo
n 
ow
ne
d 
pa
rt 
of
 
A
lp
ha
, E
ps
ilo
n 
ha
d 
an
 in
te
rn
al
 se
rv
ic
e 
bu
re
au
 
th
at
 d
id
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
fo
r s
ev
er
al
 E
ps
ilo
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
, o
f w
hi
ch
 A
lp
ha
 w
as
 o
ne
. B
ut
 th
en
 
th
ey
 so
rt 
of
 d
is
so
lv
ed
 a
nd
 K
ap
pa
 c
am
e 
an
d 
ju
st
 b
ou
gh
t t
he
m
 o
ut
. S
o,
 A
lp
ha
 w
he
n 
I w
as
 
th
er
e 
I h
ad
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
 in
iti
al
ly
 w
ith
 E
ps
ilo
n 
an
d 
th
en
 w
e 
re
ne
go
tia
te
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 
K
ap
pa
. B
ut
 it
 w
as
 re
al
ly
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 to
 
do
 b
as
ic
al
ly
 a
 1
00
%
 o
f a
ll 
of
 th
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
co
m
pu
te
r p
ro
ce
ss
in
g,
 d
at
a 
st
or
ag
e,
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
bu
t p
rin
tin
g 
th
e 
ou
tp
ut
. I
t 
N
F:
 I’
ve
 h
ea
rd
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
 a
s w
el
l?
 
H
L:
 T
ha
t w
as
 in
 
G
er
m
an
y.
 
N
F:
 O
k.
  
H
L:
 W
e 
ha
d,
 I 
fo
rg
ot
 
to
 m
en
tio
n,
 th
at
 it
 w
as
 
an
ot
he
r s
m
al
l 
ou
ts
ou
rc
ed
 d
at
a 
fa
ci
lit
y 
in
 G
er
m
an
y,
 
bu
t i
t w
as
 h
os
te
d 
on
 
th
e 
m
ai
nf
ra
m
e.
 I 
do
n’
t 
ha
ve
 m
an
y 
de
ta
ils
. 
Th
e 
on
ly
 …
 w
e 
ju
st
 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 th
at
 
ag
re
em
en
t b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
NF
: C
an
 y
ou
 te
ll 
m
e 
ho
w
 y
ou
 
w
er
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 K
ap
pa
? 
M
K
: Y
es
. I
n 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
in
 
Eu
ro
pe
 e
ac
h 
co
un
try
 u
se
d 
a 
lo
ca
l I
T 
fu
nc
tio
n 
an
d 
in
 
G
er
m
an
y 
w
e 
us
ed
 a
 lo
ca
l d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
. T
he
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 o
f t
he
 
Ep
si
lo
n 
gr
ou
p 
an
d 
A
lp
ha
 w
as
 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
Ep
si
lo
n 
gr
ou
p.
 A
nd
 
th
is
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 w
as
 
ou
ts
ou
rc
ed
 a
t a
 la
te
r s
ta
ge
 a
nd
 
K
ap
pa
 to
ok
 o
ve
r t
hi
s d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
. 
NF
: H
ow
 lo
ng
 d
id
 y
ou
 w
or
k 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
? 
M
K
: F
or
 a
bo
ut
 a
 y
ea
r I
 th
in
k.
 
R
C
:  
Th
e 
K
ap
pa
 c
on
tra
ct
 
ev
ol
ve
d.
 L
ik
e 
I s
ai
d 
it 
st
ar
te
d 
ou
t a
s a
 si
st
er
 
co
m
pa
ny
 o
f A
lp
ha
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
w
hi
ch
 in
iti
at
ed
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 it
. T
he
 w
as
 
re
al
ly
 n
o 
co
st
 fa
ct
or
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
, b
ec
au
se
 it
 w
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
co
st
 b
et
w
ee
n 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 in
du
st
rie
s w
ith
in
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. I
t 
ev
ol
ve
d 
to
 a
 p
oi
nt
 th
at
 I 
am
 
no
t s
ur
e 
ho
w
 lo
ng
 it
 w
as
 
th
er
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 
oc
cu
rr
ed
, b
ut
 a
t o
ne
 p
oi
nt
 
Ep
si
lo
n 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 th
ey
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an
 R
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at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
w
as
 a
ll 
IB
M
 la
rg
e 
m
ai
nf
ra
m
e 
sy
st
em
s, 
a 
lo
t o
f 
D
A
SD
. F
or
 a
ll 
of
 A
lp
ha
 E
ur
op
e 
ex
ce
pt
 A
lp
ha
 
U
K
. S
o 
it 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
Sp
ai
n,
 F
ra
nc
e,
 G
er
m
an
y,
 
al
l B
en
el
ux
 c
ou
nt
rie
s, 
w
ha
t w
e 
ca
ll 
Ib
er
ia
, s
o 
it 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
G
re
ec
e,
 It
al
y,
 P
or
tu
ga
l, 
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
. A
ll 
of
 th
at
 w
as
 d
on
e 
of
 th
is
 p
la
ce
 a
nd
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 st
ill
 th
er
e,
 I 
am
 p
re
tty
 su
re
 it
 is
 
in
 R
ud
is
ch
ei
m
, b
ut
 it
’s
 ju
st
 li
ke
 5
 m
ile
s s
ou
th
 
of
 C
ol
og
ne
. S
o 
an
yw
ay
, t
ha
t w
as
 K
ap
pa
. T
he
 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
as
 o
ne
 in
 w
hi
ch
 it
 w
as
 b
as
ic
al
ly
 c
an
 
go
 in
 th
eo
ry
 fo
re
ve
r, 
bu
t i
t w
as
 o
ne
 w
he
re
 w
e 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 g
iv
e 
th
em
 a
t l
ea
st
 a
 y
ea
r’
s n
ot
ic
e 
by
 
co
nt
ra
ct
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 g
et
 o
ut
 o
f i
t. 
A
ny
w
ay
, t
ha
t w
as
 K
ap
pa
. N
ow
, w
ha
t w
e 
w
er
e 
do
in
g,
 a
nd
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
ru
nn
in
g 
on
 th
e 
le
ga
cy
 
sy
st
em
s. 
Y
es
, a
ll 
th
e 
da
ta
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g.
 A
nd
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
in
 th
ei
r p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 c
as
e 
th
ey
 h
ad
 w
ha
t w
e 
w
ou
ld
 c
al
l a
 h
el
p 
de
sk
 o
f m
ay
 b
e 
on
e 
or
 tw
o 
pe
op
le
, b
ut
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 re
al
ly
 b
e 
ta
ki
ng
 n
ot
es
, 
or
 th
ey
 d
id
n’
t r
ea
lly
 so
lv
e 
a 
lo
t o
f p
ro
bl
em
s, 
or
 if
 it
 h
ad
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 li
ke
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 is
 d
ow
n 
an
d 
it 
ne
ed
s t
o 
be
 re
st
or
ed
, 
th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 g
et
 in
vo
lv
ed
. T
he
y 
w
er
e 
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 a
t t
he
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 a
nd
 th
ei
r f
ac
ili
ty
 
rig
ht
 th
er
e 
by
 th
e 
??
. H
ow
ev
er
, w
e 
ha
d 
ou
r 
ow
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
de
sk
, w
e 
ha
d 
ou
r o
w
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
er
s, 
w
e 
ha
d 
ow
n 
te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 p
eo
pl
e,
 o
r t
he
re
 w
as
 li
ke
 
a 
gr
ou
p 
of
 te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 th
er
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 
in
 G
er
m
an
y 
fo
r u
s t
ha
t w
en
t t
o 
A
T&
T 
cl
ou
d,
 
th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 tr
an
sm
it 
da
ta
. B
ut
 th
ey
 
w
er
e 
ba
si
ca
lly
 th
e 
ra
is
ed
 fl
oo
r d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 a
nd
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ru
nn
in
g 
th
er
e,
 it
 ju
st
 su
pp
or
te
d 
on
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ou
r a
ut
om
ot
iv
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 
se
pa
ra
te
 a
rm
 in
 A
lp
ha
, 
th
at
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
w
as
 
no
t n
ee
de
d 
an
ym
or
e.
 
So
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
ag
re
em
en
t w
as
 ju
st
 a
 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r t
he
 m
ai
n 
fr
am
e 
w
as
 te
rm
in
at
ed
, 
an
d 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 th
at
 
su
pp
or
te
d 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ar
e 
al
so
 
no
t w
ith
 A
lp
ha
 
an
ym
or
e.
 It
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
ov
er
 b
y 
SA
P.
 
 
A
 y
ea
r o
r t
w
o 
ye
ar
s, 
I d
on
’t 
re
m
em
be
r e
xa
ct
ly
.  
NF
: O
k.
 A
nd
 w
ha
t w
er
e 
yo
ur
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s w
ith
 th
at
 
co
nt
ra
ct
? 
M
K
: I
 w
as
 a
…
 I 
re
pr
es
en
te
d 
A
lp
ha
 a
s o
ne
 o
f t
he
 m
ai
n 
us
er
s i
n 
th
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r. 
A
t 
th
at
 ti
m
e 
w
he
n 
w
e 
st
ar
te
d 
w
ith
 K
ap
pa
 a
ll 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
co
un
tri
es
 h
ad
 th
ei
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 th
ei
r m
ai
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ai
nf
ra
m
e 
co
m
pu
te
r a
t 
K
ap
pa
. I
 w
as
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
ru
nn
in
g 
th
es
e 
pr
og
ra
m
s, 
th
es
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
ns
 p
ro
gr
am
s. 
So
 I 
w
as
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
co
nt
ac
t f
or
 
th
em
.  
NF
: W
ha
t w
er
e 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
th
e 
da
te
s o
f t
ha
t p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
co
nt
ra
ct
, c
an
 y
ou
 re
m
em
be
r?
 
M
K
: I
t’s
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
sa
y 
be
ca
us
e 
w
e 
ha
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
w
ith
 E
ps
ilo
n,
 th
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r 
of
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
an
d 
w
e 
di
dn
’t 
m
ak
e,
 w
e 
ju
st
 c
ha
ng
ed
 th
e 
na
m
e 
in
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
he
n 
K
ap
pa
 to
ok
 o
ve
r i
n 
pr
in
ci
pl
e.
 
So
 it
 w
as
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
an
 e
xi
st
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
, w
hi
ch
 w
e 
ha
d 
us
ed
 
fo
r s
ev
er
al
 y
ea
rs
. 
N
F:
 O
k.
 W
ha
t d
id
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
w
er
e 
go
in
g 
to
 se
ll 
th
at
 
po
rti
on
 o
f t
he
ir 
co
m
pa
ny
 o
ff
 
to
 K
ap
pa
. F
ro
m
 th
at
 p
oi
nt
 
on
 it
 b
eg
an
 a
n 
ou
ts
ou
rc
ed
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
ex
te
rn
al
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
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Co
ns
tru
ct
 
Fo
rm
er
 C
IO
 
G
lo
ba
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
M
an
ag
er
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
al
l t
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 st
uf
f, 
I g
ue
ss
 w
ha
t y
ou
 c
al
l 
co
m
pu
te
r o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. S
o 
th
ey
 d
id
 1
00
%
, w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s t
he
re
 o
r a
ny
th
in
g.
 
Th
ey
 ju
st
 ra
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 th
e 
so
ftw
ar
e 
th
at
 w
e 
w
ro
te
. B
ut
 th
ey
 d
id
n’
t d
o 
an
y 
pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g 
or
 e
ve
n 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
, t
he
y 
ju
st
 ra
n 
th
e 
st
uf
f. 
A
nd
 it
 
w
as
 7
x2
4,
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
th
er
e 
al
l t
he
 ti
m
e.
  
th
ey
 si
gn
ed
 sh
or
t t
er
m
 c
on
tra
ct
s w
ith
 IB
M
, s
o 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
ne
ve
r i
n 
a 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
he
re
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 IB
M
 o
r t
he
 m
ai
n 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
Si
em
en
s a
nd
 o
th
er
s w
er
e 
lo
ng
er
 th
an
 w
he
n 
w
e 
w
er
e 
go
in
g 
to
 te
rm
in
at
e.
  
Sh
e 
is
 st
ill
 w
ith
 A
lp
ha
, b
ut
 sh
e 
is
 n
ot
 in
 IT
. 
Sh
e 
is
 w
or
ki
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s s
id
e 
no
w
 in
 
C
ol
og
ne
. I
 b
el
ie
ve
 it
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
M
K
@
A
lp
ha
.c
om
. I
f i
t d
oe
s n
ot
 w
or
k,
 ju
st
 g
et
 
a 
ho
ld
 o
f D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 a
nd
 h
e 
w
ill
 te
ll 
yo
u 
if 
it 
ha
s c
ha
ng
ed
. A
nd
 sh
e 
is
 in
 
C
ol
og
ne
, a
nd
 ju
st
 m
en
tio
n 
m
y 
na
m
e 
an
d 
sh
e 
w
ill
 k
no
w
. A
 v
er
y 
ni
ce
 p
er
so
n.
 B
ut
 sh
e 
ca
n 
ta
lk
 in
 a
 lo
t o
f d
et
ai
l b
ec
au
se
 sh
e 
al
so
 
m
an
ag
ed
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
, r
em
em
be
r I
 sa
id
 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 o
w
ne
d 
by
 th
is
 E
ps
ilo
n 
co
m
pa
ny
. S
he
 m
an
ag
ed
 th
at
 fo
r f
iv
e 
ye
ar
s 
be
fo
re
 I 
ev
en
 st
ar
te
d 
w
or
ki
ng
 a
t A
lp
ha
. S
o 
sh
e 
ca
n 
gi
ve
 y
ou
 w
ha
t h
ap
pe
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
ve
ry
-v
er
y 
be
gi
nn
in
g.
  
So
 it
 w
as
 a
 ty
pi
ca
l G
er
m
an
 k
in
d 
of
 th
in
g.
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
th
at
 K
ap
pa
 in
 g
en
er
al
 is
 so
rt 
of
 a
 
m
ili
ta
ry
 k
in
d 
of
 ru
n 
th
in
g.
 O
f y
ou
 k
no
w
, 
hi
er
ar
ch
ie
s, 
or
de
rs
, d
o 
w
ha
t y
ou
 a
re
 to
ld
 to
 d
o,
 
ve
ry
-v
er
y 
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
. B
ut
 h
av
in
g 
th
is
 k
in
d 
of
 
ab
ou
t t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
at
 K
ap
pa
 w
as
 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
to
 A
lp
ha
 a
t t
he
 
tim
e?
 
M
K
: W
e 
sh
ou
ld
 c
on
si
de
r t
ha
t 
K
ap
pa
 to
ok
 o
ve
r t
he
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
th
e 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
bu
t a
ls
o 
th
e 
pe
op
le
. T
he
re
 w
as
 
no
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 c
on
ta
ct
s. 
It 
w
as
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pe
op
le
 I 
w
or
ke
d 
w
ith
 fo
r y
ea
rs
. O
nl
y 
in
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t l
ev
el
 I 
ha
d 
a 
ne
w
 
co
nt
ac
t. 
B
ut
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 th
at
 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r A
lp
ha
 o
n 
th
e 
da
y 
to
 d
ay
 b
as
is
 th
at
 w
as
 n
o 
ch
an
ge
.  
NF
: C
an
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
to
 m
e 
ex
ac
tly
 w
ha
t K
ap
pa
 w
as
 
ha
nd
lin
g 
fo
r y
ou
 in
 te
rm
s o
f 
th
e 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r?
 
M
K
: T
he
y 
w
er
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r h
av
in
g 
m
ai
nf
ra
m
e 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fo
r u
s. 
Th
er
e 
w
er
e 
m
ai
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
s t
ha
t t
he
y 
w
er
e 
ru
nn
in
g.
 T
he
y 
w
er
e 
m
ak
in
g 
su
re
 th
at
 th
e 
jo
bs
 w
er
e 
st
ar
te
d,
 
jo
b 
sc
he
du
lin
g,
 a
nd
 b
ac
k 
up
. 
Th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 c
ar
e 
ab
ou
t, 
th
ey
 
di
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
ov
er
 th
e 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 d
at
a 
ba
se
 a
dm
in
is
tra
to
rs
. 
Th
at
 w
as
 d
on
e 
w
ith
in
 A
lp
ha
. 
It 
w
as
 m
or
e 
th
e 
op
er
at
io
na
l 
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ra
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Eu
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pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
co
m
pa
ny
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
w
he
re
 a
 g
en
er
al
 
be
ha
vi
or
 a
nd
 a
tti
tu
de
 o
f t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
is
 v
er
y 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
,  
N
F:
 W
he
n 
yo
u 
w
er
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 w
ith
 K
ap
pa
, h
ow
 
m
an
y 
pe
op
le
 fr
om
 A
lp
ha
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
we
re
 
de
al
in
g 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
? 
JS
: I
 w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
m
ay
 b
e 
5 
or
 6
 p
eo
pl
e 
at
 th
e 
m
os
t. 
W
ha
t i
t w
as
, i
f i
t w
as
 a
 b
ig
 p
ro
bl
em
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 M
an
ag
er
 w
ou
ld
 
ha
nd
le
 it
.  
 
w
or
k,
 th
e 
m
ac
hi
ne
s r
un
ni
ng
 
th
e 
jo
bs
, d
oi
ng
 th
e 
ba
ck
-u
ps
. 
NF
: W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
we
re
 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
s o
f b
ac
ks
ou
rc
in
g 
in
 th
is 
ca
se
? 
M
K
: I
t’s
 n
ot
 re
al
ly
 
ba
ck
so
ur
ci
ng
 b
ec
au
se
 in
 
G
er
m
an
y 
w
e 
al
w
ay
s u
se
d 
an
 
ex
te
rn
al
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
. W
e 
ne
ve
r 
ha
d 
ou
r o
w
n 
m
ac
hi
ne
s. 
So
 fo
r 
us
 it
 w
as
 ju
st
 a
no
th
er
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 g
oi
ng
, i
ns
te
ad
 o
f t
he
 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r o
f K
ap
pa
 in
 
G
er
m
an
y 
w
e 
us
e 
th
e 
da
ta
 
ce
nt
er
 in
 O
rla
nd
o.
 
N
F:
 D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 
ad
di
tio
na
l c
om
m
en
ts 
or
 
sto
ri
es
 a
bo
ut
 th
is 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
wi
th
 K
ap
pa
? 
M
K
: N
o,
 o
nl
y 
w
ha
t I
 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g,
 it
 
w
as
 a
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
 o
f E
ps
ilo
n 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
an
d 
it 
w
as
 
ju
st
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
in
 p
rin
ci
pl
e,
 
ch
an
gi
ng
 in
 n
am
es
 fr
om
 a
 
da
ta
 c
en
te
r t
o 
K
ap
pa
 d
at
a 
ce
nt
er
. A
nd
 I 
on
ly
 h
ad
 
di
ff
er
en
t c
on
ta
ct
s o
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t l
ev
el
.  
N
F:
 D
o 
yo
u 
re
m
em
be
r t
he
 
da
te
s o
f t
he
 w
ho
le
 c
on
tra
ct
 
wi
th
 E
ps
ilo
n?
 W
he
n 
di
d 
it 
sta
rt 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
an
d 
wh
en
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l T
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Pr
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ra
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an
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Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
di
d 
it 
en
d?
 
M
K
: S
ta
rte
d 
at
 le
as
t b
ef
or
e 
11
 
ye
ar
s, 
so
 b
ef
or
e 
19
93
. 
B
ec
au
se
 w
he
n 
I j
oi
ne
d 
A
lp
ha
 
th
ey
 h
ad
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 a
lre
ad
y.
  
NF
: A
nd
 w
he
n 
di
d 
yo
u 
en
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 K
ap
pa
? 
M
K
: I
 sa
id
 I 
do
n’
t r
em
em
be
r 
ex
ac
tly
 it
 w
as
 th
re
e 
or
 fo
ur
 
ye
ar
s a
go
 
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
ba
ck
 in
-
ho
us
e 
A
nd
 so
 I 
go
t t
o 
th
in
k 
no
w
, I
 b
el
ie
ve
 it
 w
as
 
D
ec
em
be
r, 
I t
hi
nk
 w
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 d
id
 o
ur
 la
st
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 in
 N
ov
em
be
r b
ut
 w
e 
st
op
pe
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 th
em
 in
 D
ec
em
be
r o
f 2
00
2,
 th
at
 
w
as
 w
he
n 
w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 w
or
k 
at
 a
ll.
 
W
ha
t I
 d
id
, a
nd
 I 
am
 th
e 
on
e 
w
ho
 d
id
 it
,  
A
nd
 th
ey
 a
gr
ee
d 
to
 a
dd
 e
ve
n 
a 
lit
tle
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
D
A
SD
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
kn
ew
 w
e 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 g
et
 
so
m
e.
  
A
nd
 th
e 
w
ay
 I 
ne
go
tia
te
d 
it 
w
as
 th
at
 it
 w
ou
ld
 
be
 te
rm
in
at
ed
 in
 M
ay
 o
f 2
00
2 
w
ith
 m
on
th
 to
 
m
on
th
 in
cr
em
en
ta
l c
on
tin
ua
nc
es
 a
s l
on
g 
as
 I 
ga
ve
 n
ot
ic
e 
of
 3
0 
da
ys
, w
hi
ch
 w
as
 v
er
y 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
to
 u
s b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
di
dn
’t 
kn
ow
 
ex
ac
tly
 w
he
n 
w
e 
co
ul
d 
co
nv
er
t. 
So
 to
 m
ov
e 
aw
ay
 fr
om
 th
em
 a
nd
 a
ll 
of
 th
ei
r s
er
vi
ce
s i
n 
th
is
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 c
as
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
lo
t o
f 
ho
rr
or
 st
or
ie
s o
f w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
ot
 w
or
ki
ng
 
w
el
l, 
 
B
ut
 th
e 
ot
he
r t
hi
ng
 th
at
 th
ey
 sa
w
 w
as
 o
nc
e 
w
e,
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
th
er
e 
w
as
 a
bo
ut
 si
x 
m
on
th
s 
le
ar
ni
ng
 c
ur
ve
, b
ut
 th
e 
bi
gg
es
t i
ss
ue
 w
as
 th
e 
he
lp
 d
es
k.
 B
ec
au
se
 it
 to
ok
 a
 w
hi
le
 fo
r t
he
 
 
N
F:
 O
k.
 T
he
n 
w
he
n 
di
d 
yo
u 
in
fo
rm
 K
ap
pa
 th
at
 y
ou
 w
er
e 
go
in
g 
to
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 a
nd
 h
ow
 lo
ng
 d
id
 it
 
ta
ke
 fr
om
 th
e 
po
in
t w
he
n 
yo
u 
in
fo
rm
ed
 th
em
 to
 th
e 
po
in
t 
wh
en
 y
ou
 a
ct
ua
lly
 e
nd
ed
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p?
 
M
K
: A
bo
ut
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s. 
B
ec
au
se
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
as
 
fix
ed
 u
p 
to
 a
 sp
ec
ia
l d
at
e 
an
d 
w
e 
en
ha
nc
ed
 fo
r s
om
e 
tim
e 
an
d 
it 
w
as
 a
lw
ay
s v
er
y 
cl
ea
r 
an
d 
op
en
.  
 
W
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 e
nd
ed
 u
p 
ex
te
nd
in
g 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
da
te
 
ab
ou
t f
ou
r m
on
th
s b
ef
or
e 
w
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
  
N
F:
 H
ow
 lo
ng
 d
id
 th
is
 
pr
oc
es
s t
ak
e?
 
R
C
: F
ro
m
 st
ar
t t
o 
fin
is
h 
if 
yo
u 
w
an
t t
o 
th
in
k 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
t w
he
n 
w
e 
fir
st
 
th
ou
gh
t a
bo
ut
 d
oi
ng
 it
 to
 th
e 
po
in
t w
he
n 
w
e 
ac
tu
al
ly
 
ex
ec
ut
ed
 it
 w
as
 a
 lo
t o
f 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t e
ff
or
t t
o 
be
 
do
ne
 to
 b
ui
ld
 th
e 
SA
P 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t t
o 
ge
t i
t 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
to
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 
ca
n 
su
pp
or
t i
t. 
A
nd
 th
en
 
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
th
ro
ug
h 
al
l t
he
 
te
st
s a
nd
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
in
 
co
m
pa
ris
on
s, 
I w
an
t t
o 
sa
y 
it 
w
as
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
18
 to
 2
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el
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hi
p 
M
an
ag
er
 
D
ire
ct
or
 o
f I
T 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
O
rla
nd
o 
he
lp
 d
es
k 
to
 fi
gu
re
 o
ut
 h
ow
 to
 a
ns
w
er
 
a 
ph
on
e 
in
 G
er
m
an
. B
ut
 th
at
’s
 a
ll 
be
hi
nd
 th
em
 
no
w
.  
N
F:
 W
er
e 
th
er
e 
an
y 
di
ff
ic
ul
tie
s i
n 
th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 fr
om
 o
ut
so
ur
ci
ng
 to
 b
ac
ks
ou
rc
in
g?
 
JS
: P
ro
ba
bl
y,
 th
e 
on
ly
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
th
at
 w
e 
ha
d 
to
 m
an
ag
e 
w
ith
, i
t w
as
n’
t a
 p
ro
bl
em
, b
ut
 w
e 
ha
d 
to
 b
e 
re
al
ly
-r
ea
lly
 g
oo
d 
at
 it
 w
as
 th
e 
tim
e 
zo
ne
s. 
B
ec
au
se
 A
lp
ha
 E
ur
op
e 
is
 si
x 
ho
ur
s 
ah
ea
d 
of
 O
rla
nd
o.
 A
nd
 so
 a
ny
 ti
m
e 
yo
u 
ha
d 
an
 is
su
e 
w
e 
ei
th
er
 h
ad
 to
 w
ai
t a
no
th
er
 si
x 
ho
ur
s o
r t
he
y 
ha
d 
to
 w
ai
t a
no
th
er
 si
x 
ho
ur
s. 
If
 
yo
u 
ha
d 
bi
g 
is
su
e 
th
at
 m
an
ag
er
s h
ad
 to
 d
ea
l 
w
ith
. T
ha
t w
as
 a
 c
ha
lle
ng
e.
 B
ut
 it
 w
as
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
th
at
 n
ee
ds
 to
 b
e 
de
al
t 
w
ith
 a
nd
 c
er
ta
in
ly
 p
la
nn
ed
 fo
r i
n 
so
ur
ci
ng
 o
r 
re
so
ur
ci
ng
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 if
 y
ou
 a
re
 p
ul
lin
g 
fr
om
 a
no
th
er
 si
de
 o
f t
he
 w
or
ld
, l
ik
e 
In
di
a 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
. T
he
 ti
m
e 
zo
ne
s c
an
 b
e 
an
 is
su
e 
ju
st
 li
ke
 I 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
la
ng
ua
ge
.  
m
on
th
s p
ro
ce
ss
 th
at
 a
ct
ua
l 
w
en
t b
ey
on
d 
its
 o
rig
in
al
 
de
liv
er
ab
le
 d
at
e 
by
 fo
ur
 
m
on
th
s b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
se
t 
it 
to
 w
rit
e 
w
he
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. A
nd
 w
e 
ha
d 
to
 
ex
te
nd
 it
 fo
r f
ou
r m
on
th
s. 
  
NF
: S
o 
th
is 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
co
nt
ac
t r
an
 o
ut
 it
s c
ou
rs
e 
an
d 
th
en
 fo
ur
 m
or
e 
m
on
th
s 
an
d 
th
en
 it
 w
as
 o
ve
r. 
So
 it
 
w
as
n’
t a
n 
ea
rly
 te
rm
in
at
io
n.
R
C
: Y
es
.  
 
B
en
ef
its
 o
f 
B
ac
ks
ou
rc
in
g 
A
nd
 th
ey
 a
ct
ua
lly
 fe
el
 b
et
te
r a
bo
ut
 it
 b
ec
au
se
 
no
w
, w
he
re
 b
ef
or
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
ag
re
em
en
t w
e 
ha
d 
w
ith
 K
ap
pa
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 is
 th
ei
r h
el
p 
de
sk
 w
ou
ld
 ju
st
 g
o 
to
 a
 v
oi
ce
 m
ai
l u
nl
es
s i
t 
w
as
 re
al
-r
ea
l u
rg
en
t a
t 3
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
. S
o 
if 
a 
w
ar
eh
ou
se
 h
ad
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 in
 F
ra
nc
e 
th
ey
 
w
ou
ld
 ju
st
 le
av
e 
a 
vo
ic
e 
m
ai
l a
nd
 it
 w
ou
ld
n’
t 
be
 to
uc
he
d 
un
til
 8
 o
’c
lo
ck
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
or
ni
ng
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 ti
m
e.
 N
ow
, t
ha
t i
t i
s i
ns
ou
rc
ed
, i
f 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 in
 F
ra
nc
e 
at
 3
 a
m
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
, s
om
eo
ne
 w
ou
ld
 a
ns
w
er
 th
e 
ph
on
e 
on
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 ri
ng
 a
nd
 b
e 
in
 O
rla
nd
o,
 b
ut
 
w
ou
ld
 a
ns
w
er
 th
e 
ph
on
e 
on
 tw
o 
rin
gs
 “
H
ow
 
 
N
F:
 B
ut
 o
th
er
 th
an
 c
os
ts
 a
re
 
th
er
e 
an
y 
ot
he
r i
nd
ir
ec
t 
be
ne
fit
s m
ay
 b
e 
in
 te
rm
s o
f t
he
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
r 
im
pr
ov
ed
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
? 
M
K
: D
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
sa
y,
 b
ec
au
se
 
w
e 
us
e 
ju
st
 th
e 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 a
ll 
th
e 
op
er
at
in
g,
 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
an
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
fu
nc
tio
n,
 I 
do
n’
t s
ee
 a
 re
al
 b
ig
 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
en
d 
us
er
 is
 n
ot
 m
uc
h 
in
vo
lv
ed
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T 
O
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ca
n 
I h
el
p 
yo
u”
. S
o 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 a
ct
ua
lly
 
w
en
t u
p 
in
 th
e 
se
ns
e 
of
 2
4-
7.
 B
ut
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 
an
yw
he
re
 b
et
w
ee
n 
3 
an
d 
6 
m
on
th
 g
ap
 o
f I
 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
di
ss
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
an
d 
th
en
 sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
ag
ai
n 
w
he
n 
it 
ca
m
e 
to
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 to
 p
eo
pl
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 N
ot
 h
ar
dw
ar
e 
an
d 
sy
st
em
’s
 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y,
 b
ut
 w
he
n 
yo
u 
ca
ll 
an
d 
w
an
t t
o 
ta
lk
 to
 so
m
eb
od
y 
in
 y
ou
r n
at
iv
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
. 
Pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 F
re
nc
h,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 th
ey
 
do
n’
t s
pe
ak
 E
ng
lis
h.
 T
he
y 
ju
st
 d
on
’t.
 A
nd
 
th
ey
 d
on
’t 
lik
e 
En
gl
is
h.
 B
ut
 th
ey
 d
on
’t 
sp
ea
k 
En
gl
is
h.
 
A
no
th
er
 b
en
ef
it 
I w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
w
as
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 
tim
e.
 If
 th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 w
an
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
a 
ch
an
ge
 
an
d 
th
ey
 w
an
te
d 
to
 d
o 
it 
rig
ht
 a
w
ay
 d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 a
n 
ou
ts
ou
rc
er
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 w
ith
 a
 m
aj
or
 
pi
ec
e 
of
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
 li
ke
 th
at
 c
an
 
or
 th
e 
ve
nd
or
 h
as
 to
 g
o 
th
ro
ug
h.
 B
ec
au
se
 q
ui
te
 
of
te
n 
ev
en
 th
ey
 a
re
 su
bc
on
tra
ct
in
g.
 W
he
re
 if
 it
 
is
 a
ll 
in
 h
ou
se
 y
ou
 a
dd
 y
ou
 k
no
w
 a
 d
ay
 o
r a
 
w
ee
k 
or
 a
 m
on
th
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 p
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
ex
tra
 la
ye
rs
 o
f c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ei
th
er
 w
e 
ar
e 
on
ly
 d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 a
 sm
al
le
r g
ro
up
 o
f v
en
do
rs
 
an
d 
co
ul
d 
be
 m
or
e 
re
sp
on
si
ve
 if
 y
ou
 a
re
 
m
ov
in
g 
a 
ne
w
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t o
r n
ew
 so
ftw
ar
e.
 S
o 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e,
 re
ac
tio
n 
tim
e 
to
 n
ew
 b
us
in
es
s, 
ne
w
 g
ro
w
th
 o
r c
ha
ng
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
be
ne
fit
. 
Th
e 
sy
st
em
s a
re
 st
ab
le
 a
nd
 
fin
e 
an
d 
th
is
 is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 
be
fo
re
. 
 
M
ul
tiv
en
do
r 
Th
e 
on
ly
 p
ro
bl
em
s w
e 
ha
d,
 a
nd
 it
 h
ad
 n
ot
hi
ng
 
to
 d
o 
w
ith
 e
ith
er
 K
ap
pa
 o
r A
lp
ha
, b
ut
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 h
ad
 to
 u
se
 IB
M
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 a
s a
 
su
bc
on
tra
ct
or
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 IB
M
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
so
ftw
ar
e 
to
 th
em
 so
 th
ey
 c
an
 d
o 
th
ei
r j
ob
. A
nd
 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
is
su
es
 a
t t
im
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
em
 a
nd
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IB
M
, b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
ha
d 
so
m
e 
ol
de
r v
er
si
on
s o
f 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
s, 
M
D
S 
op
er
at
in
g 
sy
st
em
s. 
A
nd
 IB
M
 sa
id
, h
ey
 w
e 
ar
e 
go
in
g 
to
 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
 su
pp
or
t o
f t
ho
se
 sy
st
em
s, 
th
e 
ne
xt
 
la
ye
r, 
or
 th
e 
ne
w
 v
er
si
on
 o
f t
he
 sy
st
em
 w
ou
ld
 
be
 e
xp
en
si
ve
 a
nd
 K
ap
pa
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
ha
d 
to
 
ch
ar
ge
 u
s m
or
e 
m
on
ey
. W
e 
sa
id
 w
e 
do
n’
t 
w
an
t t
o 
pa
y 
m
or
e 
m
on
ey
. S
o 
K
ap
pa
 h
ad
 to
 g
o 
ba
ck
 to
 IB
M
 a
nd
 sa
id
 w
e 
ar
e 
no
t g
oi
ng
 to
 
up
gr
ad
e 
ev
en
 th
ou
gh
 y
ou
 a
re
 re
fu
si
ng
 to
 
su
pp
or
t u
s. 
So
, b
ut
 a
ga
in
, i
t d
id
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t t
he
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 In
 fa
ct
, i
t w
as
 ju
st
 a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
w
er
e 
K
ap
pa
 w
as
 d
oi
ng
 th
ei
r b
es
t t
o 
m
ak
e 
su
re
 
w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ge
t c
ha
rg
ed
 fo
r t
hi
ng
s w
e 
di
dn
’t 
ne
ed
 to
 g
et
 c
ha
rg
ed
 fo
r. 
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